The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ROSEMARY HEATHER MILLER, Case No. 1:23-cv-00616-KES-FJS (PC)
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR
13 v. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE
TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE
14 MADRUGA, et al., TO PROSECUTE
15 Defendants. (ECF No. 16)
16 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE
17
18 I. BACKGROUND
19 Plaintiff Rosemary Heather Miller (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this
20 civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
21 On March 3, 2026, the Court screened the complaint and found that it failed to state a
22 cognizable claim for relief. (ECF No. 16.) The Court issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to
23 file a first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (Id.) The
24 Court expressly warned Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in
25 a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order
26 and for failure to state a claim. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise
27 communicate with the Court, and the deadline to do so has expired.
28 ///
1 II. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
2 A. Screening Requirement
3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
4 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
5 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
6 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
7 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).
8 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
9 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
10 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
11 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
12 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
13 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
14 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
15 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
16 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
17 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
18 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
19 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
20 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
21 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
22 Plaintiff is currently housed at the Central California Women’s Facility in Chowchilla,
23 California, where the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names the
24 following defendants: (1) Lieutenant R. Madruga; (2) Lieutenant C. Corda; (3) Associate Warden
25 M. Dotson; and (4) Chief Deputy Warden S. Zawolkow.
26 In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2021, at approximately 1500 hours,
27 Defendant Corda presided over Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing on charges written by Defendant
28 Madruga. Plaintiff was charged with “Willfully Obstructing a Peace Officer in the Performance
1 of Duties.” The California Code of Regulations (“CCR”) cited, 3005(d)(1), does not list this
2 specific offense. The hearing was conducted in the game room of Building 509, Plaintiff’s
3 housing unit, not the Facility Program Office. The unit game room is equipped with the Audio
4 Visual Surveillance System (“AVSS”). Defendant Corda denied Plaintiff’s request for witnesses
5 but stated she was reducing the charge to an administrative violation with the specific act of
6 “Disobeying a Direct Order.” Plaintiff then returned to her room.
7 At approximately 2000 hours, Plaintiff was ordered by a correctional sergeant to report to
8 the Program Office per Defendant Corda. Upon her arrival to the program office, Plaintiff was
9 informed by Defendant Corda that she was reversing her prior decision to find her guilty of the
10 administrative violation and was instead finding her guilty of the original serious violation.
11 Defendant Corda stated numerous inmates were alleging racism towards Defendant Corda for
12 finding Plaintiff not guilty of the serious violation, so she was reversing her decision. There were
13 numerous inmates outside of the Facility Program Office when Plaintiff arrived, many of whom
14 were yelling at Defendant Corda.
15 When Plaintiff asked how Defendant Corda could reverse her decision when the hearing
16 was completed, Defendant Corda stated she could do what she wanted. Compounding Plaintiff’s
17 due process violation was the denial of her witness. Plaintiff had requested a witness during the
18 hearing, which was denied by Defendant Corda. Defendant Corda did not document her denial of
19 the witness, as is mandated by statute and precedent. The witness Plaintiff requested, the housing
20 officer assigned to Building 509 on the date of the incident, could have corroborated Plaintiff’s
21 defense: that the officer had ordered her to return to her room. Plaintiff had not insisted on her
22 witness being present once Defendant Corda indicated she was finding Plaintiff guilty of an
23 administrative violation. However, since the requested witness could have corroborated her
24 defense, the witness should have been allowed to testify as to what order(s) was/were given or not
25 given. Plaintiff was not allowed to present her defense to the serious rules violation and the
26 reasons the witness was not allowed were not documented. Further, Defendant Corda indicated in
27 the record of the hearing that Plaintiff had not requested witnesses, but admits she had requested
28 witnesses when interviewed on the grievance Plaintiff submitted.
1 Following the submission of the hearing to the Chief Disciplinary Officer, whose job it is
2 to audit the findings and ensure due process is followed, Defendant M. Dotson did not
3 independently review the AVSS footage to ascertain whether the charge for which Plaintiff was
4 found guilty was appropriate. Defendant Dotson did not take any action to correct the incorrect
5 violation code, CCR 3005(d)(1), which does not list “Willfully Obstructing a Peace Officer in the
6 Performance of Duties” as a specific act that can be charged. Defendant Dotson failed to ensure
7 that Plaintiff’s rights were not violated by only approving lieutenants to act as Senior Hearing
8 Officers (“SHO”) who have received proper training. As the Chief Disciplinary Officer,
9 Defendant Dotson was charged with approving lieutenants to act as SHO.
10 Following receipt of her final copies, Plaintiff filed a grievance on the underlying issues.
11 Chief Deputy Warden S. Zawolkow was tasked with conducting an interview and answering
12 Plaintiff’s grievance. Defendant Zawolkow denied Plaintiff’s grievance and failed to open a staff
13 complaint against Defendant Corda, which is his direct responsibility. Defendant Zawolkow
14 additionally failed to address the due process violations Plaintiff asserted in her grievance.
15 In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges that on September 16, 2021, at approximately 16:24:53 hours,
16 staff in inmate housing unit 509 at CCWF activated their alarm, setting off the audible alarm in
17 the unit. The AVSS recorded the events in “D” hallway of Building 509, the location where all
18 events relative to the disciplinary charges occurred. The AVSS shows inmates in Building 509
19 did not follow the protocol of immediately getting down and obtaining a seated position when the
20 alarm sounded. Plaintiff is, at all times relevant herein, assigned to room 30 in Building 509,
21 which is located in “D” Hallway. The AVSS footage shows Plaintiff in her assigned hallway
22 when an obvious commotion occurs between some people approximately eight yards from her.
23 The AVSS footage shows the hallway was crowded with people and a laundry cart.
24 A physical altercation between two people is alleged in the Rules Violation Report
25 Plaintiff received. A review of the actual AVSS footage, however, does not show any type of
26 altercation. Instead, it shows a crowded hallway and an obstructed view due to the laundry cart.
27 During the commotion and alarm, Plaintiff observed a correctional officer giving verbal orders.
28 The correctional officer ordered Plaintiff to enter her room, which was in the vicinity. Plaintiff
1 complied with the verbal orders she was given despite the fact they did not comply with the
2 standard protocol of obtaining a seated position during an alarm. Obtaining a seated position with
3 the number of people, laundry cart, and commotion would have risked physical harm and caused
4 a hazard to those nearby. A review of the AVSS footage shows that when the commotion began
5 and the alarm sounded, numerous individuals began running out of the hallway. Getting down in
6 such a chaotic and dangerous situation could have resulted in Plaintiff or others getting trampled.
7 Upon completion of the institutional count, at approximately 1700 hours, Defendant
8 Madruga summoned Plaintiff and other inmates to the Lieutenant’s Office at C Program.
9 Defendant Madruga was on duty as the Facility Lieutenant at the time of the incident in Building
10 509. Defendant Madruga questioned Plaintiff about the incident and stated she had viewed the
11 AVSS footage prior to questioning Plaintiff. Defendant Madruga told Plaintiff she would not be
12 receiving a Rules Violation Report for not getting down during an alarm as she had been
13 instructed to enter her room by a correctional officer. Defendant Madruga stated she was just
14 trying to ascertain what had occurred during the commotion in “D” Hallway of Building 509.
15 Several hours later, at approximately 2300 hours, Defendant Madruga summoned Plaintiff
16 and multiple other inmates to the Program Office for more questioning. Defendant Madruga again
17 stated that no one was in trouble, she was simply trying to determine what had occurred. During
18 this secondary questioning, two inmates in the room admitted to being involved in a physical
19 altercation. Neither Plaintiff nor the other inmates present had any further relevant information to
20 provide. Defendant Madruga again stated the individuals not admitting to being in a physical
21 altercation would not be receiving a Rules Violation Report.
22 Despite Defendant Madruga’s statements, Plaintiff received a Rules Violation Report
23 authored by Defendant Madruga where the AVSS footage was the sole source of information and
24 evidence against Plaintiff. The Rules Violation Report does not mention the officer giving direct
25 orders to individuals in “D” hallway of Building 509 to enter their rooms, to which Plaintiff had
26 complied. The Rules Violation Report charges Plaintiff with a violation of CCR 3005(d)(1), a
27 section of the CCR that does not list “Willfully Obstructing a Peace Officer in the Performance of
28 Duties” as a specific act that can be charged. The two inmates who admitted to being in the
1 physical altercation were not written up, despite their own admission. The AVSS footage clearly
2 shows at least forty (40) inmates not getting down during the alarm, yet Defendant Madruga
3 chose to issue Rules Violation Reports to only fifteen (15) inmates, which constitutes a due
4 process violation due to unequal distribution of punishment.
5 As to both Claims I and II, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the disciplinary sanctions,
6 Plaintiff lost chairperson and membership positions on several committees, panels, and councils,
7 the opportunity for a clemency hearing, eligibility for many of the facility programs which require
8 substantial periods of disciplinary-free conduct, sixty-one (61) days of credits, and thirty (30)
9 days of quarterly package privileges.
10 Plaintiff requests the dismissal of the Rules Violation Report given the number of due
11 process violations associated therewith, reinstatement to the positions she held prior to the finding
12 of guilt, the restoration of the 61 days of credits Plaintiff was assessed, and any other relief the
13 Court deems just and proper.
14 C. Discussion
15 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
16 1. Supervisory Liability
17 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue any defendant based solely upon his or her
18 supervisory role, she may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for
19 the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556
20 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v.
21 City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
22 Cir. 2002).
23 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or
24 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th
25 Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett,
26 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an
27 official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should
28 know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales, 567 F.3d at 570. Supervisory
1 liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so
2 deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force
3 of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.
4 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v.
5 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link
6 between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See
7 Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th
8 Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory
9 personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,
10 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
11 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dotson, as Chief Disciplinary Officer, failed to ensure
12 Plaintiff’s rights were not violated by failing to only approve lieutenants who had received proper
13 training as Senior Hearing Officers. A “failure to train” or “failure to supervise” theory can be the
14 basis for a supervisor’s liability under § 1983 in only limited circumstances, such as where the
15 failure amounts to deliberate indifference. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387–
16 90 (1989). To establish a failure-to-train/supervise claim, a plaintiff must show that “‘in light of
17 the duties assigned to specific officers or employees, the need for more or different training [or
18 supervision] [was] obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in violations of constitutional
19 rights, that the policy-makers . . . can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to
20 the need.’” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at
21 390).
22 Ordinarily, a single constitutional violation by an untrained employee is insufficient to
23 demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Connick v. Thompson, 563
24 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Instead, a plaintiff must usually demonstrate “[a] pattern of similar
25 constitutional violations by untrained employees,” id., unless the need for training is “so obvious”
26 and “so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,” that “the failure to provide proper
27 training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which
28 the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury,” Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
1 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim based upon a theory of failure
2 to train or supervise. At best, Plaintiff alleges that her due process rights were violated on a single
3 occasion by one Senior Hearing Officer, and there is no indication from Plaintiff’s complaint that
4 the alleged failure to train or supervise was obvious and likely to result in a constitutional
5 violation.
6 2. Grievance Process
7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Zawolkow denied her grievance, failed to open a staff
8 complaint against Defendant Corda, and failed to address the due process violations Plaintiff
9 asserted in her grievance.
10 Plaintiff cannot pursue any claims against prison staff based solely on the processing and
11 review of her inmate appeals. Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected right to have her
12 appeals accepted or processed. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003); Mann v.
13 Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.19 88). The prison grievance procedure does not confer any
14 substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a basis for
15 liability under section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.1993); see also
16 Wright v. Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2,
17 2010) (plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to
18 state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment). Denial or refusal to process a prison
19 grievance is not a constitutional violation. Rushdan v. Gear, No. 1:16-cv-01017-BAM (PC), 2018
20 WL 2229259, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2018).
21 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim arising out of the screening or
22 processing of her grievance.
23 3. Fourteenth Amendment
24 a. Due Process
25 “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full
26 panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
27 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural
28 requirements that must be met are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least twenty-four (24)
1 hours between the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the
2 prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they
3 rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in
4 his defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety
5 or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the
6 issues presented are legally complex. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71. In addition, “[s]ome evidence”
7 must support the decision of the hearing officer. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
8 The standard is not particularly stringent and the relevant inquiry is whether “there is any
9 evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached . . . .” Id. at 455–56 (emphasis
10 added).
11 Plaintiff alleges that she was charged and convicted of a specific act that could not be
12 charged under the cited regulation and was denied her requested witness. In addition, Plaintiff
13 alleges that Defendant Corda failed to record that Plaintiff requested witnesses or to document the
14 reasons the requested witness was not allowed. While Plaintiff may be able to state a cognizable
15 due process claim against Defendant Corda, this claim is barred by the favorable termination rule,
16 as discussed below.
17 b. Equal Protection
18 Plaintiff alleges that the AVSS footage shows at least forty inmates not getting down
19 during the alarm, yet Defendant Madruga chose to issue Rules Violation Reports to only fifteen
20 inmates, constituting a due process violation due to unequal distribution of punishment. Plaintiff
21 may be attempting to allege a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
22 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated
23 alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, (1985); Shakur v.
24 Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be established by
25 showing that defendants intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff based on his membership
26 in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690,
27 702– 03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), or that
28 similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship
1 to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 (2008);
2 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546
3 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008).
4 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against any defendant for violation of the Equal
5 Protection Clause. Plaintiff does not allege that she was discriminated against because of her
6 membership in any protected class.
7 4. Favorable Termination Rule
8 It has long been established that state prisoners cannot challenge the fact or duration of
9 their confinement in a section 1983 action; habeas corpus petitions are the sole path to such
10 remedies. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). Often referred to as the favorable
11 termination rule or the Heck bar, this exception to section 1983’s otherwise broad scope applies
12 whenever state prisoners “seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement-either directly
13 through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination
14 that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81; Heck
15 v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482, 486–87 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997).
16 Thus, “a state prisoner’s [section] 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the
17 relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state
18 conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would
19 necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81–82.
20 In this action, Plaintiff argues that violation of her due process rights warrants the
21 dismissal of the Rules Violation Report and restoration of her lost credits. These claims are barred
22 by Heck v. Humprey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Compare Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646
23 (1987) (holding that § 1983 claim is not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects and
24 a biased hearing officer implied the invalidity of the underlying prison disciplinary sanction of
25 loss of good-time credits), with Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
26 that the favorable termination rule of Heck and Edwards does not apply to challenges to prison
27 disciplinary hearings where the administrative sanction imposed does not affect the overall length
28 of confinement and, thus, does not go to the heart of habeas).
1 Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a Rules Violation Report that charged her with a
2 violation of an act that could not be charged under the cited regulation and the denial of her
3 request for witnesses. She was ultimately found guilty of a serious violation, resulting in the loss
4 of credits and loss of chairperson and membership positions on various committees, panels, and
5 councils, among other consequences. A judgment in favor of Plaintiff on her claim will
6 necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary action, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated that
7 the disciplinary action has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
8 invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
9 federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” See e.g., Cox v. Clark, 321 Fed. Appx. 673,
10 676 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of due process claim pursuant to Balisok to the extent
11 that plaintiff sought restoration of good-time credits and the reversal of a disciplinary decision);
12 McCoy v. Spidle, 2009 WL 1287872, *7–*8 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2009) (“A challenge under section
13 1983, seeking only damages and declaratory relief for procedural due process violations is also
14 barred if the nature of the challenge would necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of
15 good-time credits.”).
16 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims related to the challenged Rules Violation Report and
17 resulting loss of credits are barred by the favorable termination rule.
18 III. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER
19 A. Legal Standard
20 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with
21 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . .
22 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their
23 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where
24 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court
25 may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, failure to
26 obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52,
27 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d
28 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring
1 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987)
2 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order).
3 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors:
4 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its
5 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of
6 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779
7 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).
8 B. Discussion
9 Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and she failed to comply with the
10 Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating her
11 case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.
12 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a
13 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action.
14 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against
15 dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d
16 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). But “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is
17 to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that
18 direction.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228
19 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Such is the case here.
20 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in
21 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262;
22 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s March 3, 2026, screening
23 order expressly warned Plaintiff that her failure to file an amended complaint would result in a
24 recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and
25 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 16.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal
26 could result from her noncompliance.
27 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that
28 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further
1 | unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Although Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma
2 || pauperis in this action, it appears that monetary sanctions will be of little use and the preclusion
3 | of evidence or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating her
4 | case.
5 | IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
6 Accordingly, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY
7 | RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim
8 | pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a court order, and for Plaintiff's failure to
9 | prosecute this action.
10 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge
11 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen
12 | (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file
13 | written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
14 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages or
15 | include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in the
16 | record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be considered.
17 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the
18 | waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v.
19 | Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394
20 | (9th Cir. 1991)).
21
IT IS SO ORDERED. Le □□
23 Dated: _ April 15, 2026 2 Le ZS,
FRANK J. SINGER
24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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