Opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 P2I LTD., Case No. 23-cv-01690-AMO

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’

9 v. ATTORNEY’S FEES

10 FAVORED TECH USA CORPORATION,

et al.,

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Defendants.

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13 On March 27, 2026, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to

14 Title 35 U.S.C. § 285 and the Court’s inherent authority. Dkt. No. 194. The Court assumes

15 familiarity with that order for purposes of the discussion below. In the March 27 Order, the Court

16 left unresolved the specific amount of the attorney’s fees award and ordered Defendants’ counsel

17 to submit more detailed billing records, as well as more evidence supporting the reasonableness of

18 their claimed hourly rates within 21 days. Dkt. No. 194 at 19. The Court permitted Plaintiff the

19 opportunity to submit any objections to Defendants’ supplemental materials within seven days

20 following Defendants’ submissions. Id. Defendants filed the requested materials on April 17,

21 2026. See Dkt. Nos. 196 & 197. Plaintiff filed its objections on April 27, 2026. Dkt. No. 199.1

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1 The day Plaintiff’s objections were due, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting an extension of time

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of three days (one business day), from April 24 to April 27, 2026. Dkt. No. 198. Plaintiff filed its

objections on April 27, 2026. Dkt. No. 199. Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s

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requested extension on April 29, 2026. Dkt. No. 201. The Court, in its discretion, GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion and considers the tardy objections in reaching the conclusions below. Plaintiff’s

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repeated failure to meet case deadlines, even after the Court cited such deficient litigation conduct

1 I. DISCUSSION

2 As noted in the March 27 Order, courts look to the lodestar amount to assess the

3 reasonableness of requested attorney’s fees, which is presumptively reasonable. City of

4 Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992); Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC, 893 F.3d

5 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2018). The lodestar calculation requires examination of “the number of

6 hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Pennsylvania

7 v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986). “This calculation

8 provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s

9 services.” Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). Furthermore, while the

10 lodestar amount provides guidance, “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these

11 determinations.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. A court “necessarily has discretion in making this

12 equitable judgment.” Id. at 437. The Court considers Defendants’ counsel’s supplemental

13 materials to assess in turn (1) the reasonableness of their hourly rates and (2) the reasonableness of

14 the hours expended litigating the case.

15 A. Hourly Rate

16 The reasonable hourly rate is determined by “the rate prevailing in the community for

17 similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers

18 v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on other grounds, 808

19 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). The relevant

20 community is typically the forum in which the district court sits; in this case, the relevant

21 community is the Northern District of California. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973,

22 979 (9th Cir. 2008). The prevailing market rate is guided by attorney affidavits as well as

23 “decisions by other courts awarding similar rates for work in the same geographical area by

24 attorneys with comparable levels of experience.” Trujillo v. Orozco, No. 17-CV-00566-EJD, 2018

25 WL 1142311, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps

26 Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990).

27 Plaintiff does not object to the hourly rates requested by Defendants’ counsel. See Dkt.

1 submitted the declaration of Brian Fanning, Senior Director of Pricing and Profitability at Perkins

2 Coie LLP. See Dkt. No. 197-4. Fanning conducted a thorough review of market benchmarks for

3 the Northern District of California for the years 2023-2025, as well as benchmarks across

4 Northern California for 2026, and he found that the hourly rates charged by the partners, counsel,

5 associates, and senior paralegals staffed to this case almost all fell below the median or only

6 slightly above median. Id. Such favorable comparisons support the reasonableness of the rates

7 charged. In addition to the Fanning Declaration, Defendants’ counsel submitted a copy of the

8 American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) 2023 Report of the Economic Survey

9 demonstrating average hourly billing rates. See Dkt. No. 197-3. The AIPLA Report also shows

10 the hourly rates charged by Defendants’ attorneys and staff to fall within the range of average

11 hourly rates for those in Northern California. Id. Based on these materials, the Court finds that

12 the hourly rates charged by Defendants’ attorneys and staff to be consistent with the prevailing

13 rates over the course of the litigation and thus reasonable.

14 B. Hours Expended

15 The number of hours is based only on the amount of time “reasonably expended on the

16 litigation” and excludes “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley,

17 461 U.S. at 433-34. In assessing the reasonableness of the time and costs expended on the

18 litigation of frivolous and non-frivolous claims, the Supreme Court guides, “the dispositive

19 question is not whether attorney costs at all relate to a non-frivolous claim, but whether the costs

20 would have been incurred in the absence of the frivolous allegation. The answers to those

21 inquiries will usually track each other, but when they diverge, it is the second that matters.” Fox v.

22 Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). The fee applicant must submit appropriate documentation to meet

23 “the burden of establishing entitlement to an award.” Id. at 838 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at

24 437). “But trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The

25 essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing

26 perfection.” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838; see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101,

27 110 (2017) (quoting the same). “So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit,

1 give substantial deference to these determinations, in light of ‘the district court’s superior

2 understanding of the litigation.’ ” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437).

3 Plaintiff objects to 14 categories of billing entries. Dkt. No. 199. Plaintiff provides

4 detailed charts reflecting challenged billing entries, with at least some time entries falling within

5 the charts of multiple objections. Dkt. No. 200; Dkt. No. 200-1 through 200-14.2 The Court

6 declines Plaintiff’s invitation to scour the dozens of pages of billing entries to which it objects – as

7 the Supreme Court acknowledges, “trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-

8 eyeshade accountants.” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838. The Court briefly considers some overarching

9 themes from Plaintiff’s objections and rules on the 14 objections below.

10 First, Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s requests for fees relating to the ’070 patent

11 prior to February 14, 2025, based on the Court’s determination that Plaintiff had an arguably

12 reasonable basis for bringing the infringement claim even if it became unreasonable to maintain

13 that claim following Defendants’ February 14, 2025 letter. See Dkt. No. 200-1. The Court agrees

14 based on the conclusion reached in its earlier order. Dkt. No. 194 at 11-13.

15 Second, Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s requests for fees relating to drafting and

16 preparing the motions to dismiss, Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion, routine litigation conduct,

17 witness interviews, discovery, and preparation of expert witnesses. See Dkt. No. 200-2 through

18 Dkt. No. 200-9 & Dkt. No. 200-13. Several of these objections arise from Plaintiff’s attempt to

19 delineate between work related to the ’087 patent and work related to the ’070 patent. See Dkt.

20 No. 199 at 2-5. Based on the records as well as the Court’s sense of the case, the Court finds that

21 the fees requested would not have accrued but for Plaintiff’s frivolous claims. Cf. Fox, 563 U.S.

22 at 839. Further, the Court found the entire case to be exceptional under Section 285 even if it

23 earlier determined that a category of hours should be excluded. See generally Dkt. No. 194.

24 Defendants are entitled to an award of fees based on their reasonable and successful defense of the

25 case.

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1 Third, Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s request for fees related to drafting and

2 preparing earlier motions for sanctions, including a motion for attorney’s fees arising from the

3 motion to dismiss briefing, a Rule 11 motion, and the Section 285 motion. Dkt. No. 199; see also

4 Dkt. No. 200-11, Dkt. No. 200-12, Dkt. No. 200-14. In the Ninth Circuit, a party may recover

5 attorney’s fees for time reasonably spent on motions for attorney’s fees – often referred to as “fees

6 on fees.” See Brown v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Camacho v.

7 Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 981 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he Court may reduce or deny an

8 award for such fees-on-fees based on hours not reasonably expended, based on the results obtained

9 in the litigation, or some other relevant consideration.” Abittan v. Hansen L. Firm, P.C., No. 25-

10 CV-05427-SVK, 2026 WL 1215531, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2026) (internal quotation marks &

11 citations omitted). The Court finds that Defendants only partially prevailed on their first motion

12 for an award of attorney’s fees, Dkt. No. 90, and a reduction of the fees expended on that motion

13 is appropriate. Defendants largely prevailed on their Rule 11 motion, Dkt. No. 136, based on

14 Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of one of the patent claims as well as the Court’s eventual finding

15 of bad faith litigation conduct and are entitled to the entirety of the fees expended preparing that

16 motion. Defendants prevailed on their motion for attorney’s fees under Section 285, Dkt. No. 168,

17 and are entitled to the entirety of the fees expended preparing that motion.

18 With the preceding discussion in mind, as well as the Court’s determination that

19 Defendants’ counsel was alternatively entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the

20 Court’s inherent authority based on a finding of bad faith, Dkt. No. 194 at 17, the Court rules on

21 Plaintiff’s objections as follows:

22 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for work relating to the ’070 Patent prior to

23 February 14, 2025, identified in Plaintiff’s Exhibit A. Dkt. No. 200-1. The Court

24 SUSTAINS that objection. See Dkt. No. 194 at 11-13.

25 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for routine litigation activities (pre-2/14/25)

26 identified in Plaintiff’s Exhibit B. Dkt. No. 200-2. The Court OVERRULES that

27 objection because Defendants are entitled to an award of fees based on their reasonable and

1 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for witness interviews identified in Plaintiff’s

2 Exhibit C. Dkt. No. 200-3. The Court OVERRULES that objection because Defendants

3 are entitled to an award of fees based on their reasonable and successful defense of the

4 case.

5 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for work with expert witnesses identified in

6 Plaintiff’s Exhibit D. Dkt. No. 200-4. The Court OVERRULES that objection because

7 Defendants are entitled to an award of fees based on their reasonable and successful

8 defense of the case.

9 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for discovery activities identified in Plaintiff’s

10 Exhibit E. Dkt. No. 200-5. The Court OVERRULES that objection because Defendants

11 are entitled to an award of fees based on their reasonable and successful defense of the

12 case.

13 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for Combined Patent Issues (pre-2/14/25)

14 identified in Plaintiff’s Exhibit F. Dkt. No. 200-6. The Court SUSTAINS that objection in

15 part and, based on a review of the records cited therein, reduces the amount attributable to

16 those billing entries by 50%.

17 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for First motion to dismiss identified in

18 Plaintiff’s Exhibit G. Dkt. No. 200-7. The Court OVERRULES that objection because

19 Defendants are entitled to an award of fees based on their reasonable and successful

20 defense of the case.

21 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for Second motion to dismiss identified in

22 Plaintiff’s Exhibit H. Dkt. No. 200-8. The Court OVERRULES that objection because

23 Defendants are entitled to an award of fees based on their reasonable and successful

24 defense of the case.

25 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for Third motion to dismiss identified in

26 Plaintiff’s Exhibit I. Dkt. No. 200-9. The Court OVERRULES that objection because

27 Defendants are entitled to an award of fees based on their reasonable and successful

1 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for trade-secret-only activities identified in

2 Plaintiff’s Exhibit J. Dkt. No. 200-10. The Court SUSTAINS that objection because the

3 Court did not find Defendants entitled to an award of fees on the trade secret claims.

4 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for Defendants’ Rule 11 motion identified in

5 Plaintiff’s Exhibit K. Dkt. No. 200-11. The Court OVERRULES that objection because

6 Defense counsel is entitled to fees-on-fees.

7 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for Defendants’ prior sanctions motion

8 identified in Plaintiff’s Exhibit L. Dkt. No. 200-12. The Court SUSTAINS that objection

9 in part because Defendants prevailed on only a portion of that motion. Accordingly, the

10 Court reduces the amount attributable to those billing entries by 75%.

11 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for Work Relating to Defendants’ Rule 12(c)

12 Motion (post-2/14/25) identified in Plaintiff’s Exhibit M. Dkt. No. 200-13. The Court

13 OVERRULES that objection Defendants are entitled to an award of fees based on their

14 reasonable and successful defense of the case.

15 • Plaintiff objects to Defense counsel’s claim for Defendants’ Section 285 motion identified

16 in Plaintiff’s Exhibit N. Dkt. No. 200-14. The Court OVERRULES that objection

17 because Defense counsel is entitled to fees-on-fees.

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1 Il. CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, and based on the Court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for

3 attorney’s fees, Dkt. No. 194, the Court AWARDS counsel for Defendants $2,208,115.77 in

4 || attorney’s fees. The Court reached this number by reducing the amounts of the objections

5 sustained above, $478,168.23, from the total amount requested by Defendants’ counsel,

6 $2,686,284. If necessary, Defendants may submit a proposed order to give effect to this award

7 || within 28 days from the date of this order.

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9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 Dated: June 12, 2026

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ae :

ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN

13 United States District Judge

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