The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 LUIS ENRIQUE ESCOBAR-CONTRERAS, Case No. 1:26-cv-00430-KES-SAB-HC
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF
13 v.
HABEAS CORPUS, DENY
14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS,
ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO
15 PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH A BOND
Respondents. HEARING BEFORE AN IMMIGRATION
16 JUDGE
17
(ECF Nos. 1, 12)
18
19 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas
20 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
21 I.
22 BACKGROUND
23 Petitioner is a noncitizen who is currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs
24 Enforcement (“ICE”). The petition alleges that Petitioner is “only being detained for illegal entry
25 when [he] was two years old” and that his “family and children all reside in Fresno and have
26 been there their whole life with” Petitioner. (ECF No. 1 at 6.1) In the opposition to the motion to
27
1 dismiss, Petitioner further alleges that he has lived in the United States for over thirty-one years,
2 attended elementary through high school in Fresno, has been with his U.S. citizen partner for
3 twelve years with whom he has three U.S. citizen children, has a pending application for U visa
4 and cancellation of removal, and has maintained steady employment for over ten years. (ECF
5 No. 15 at 1–3.) Petitioner alleges that on July 7, 2025, ICE agents arrested him at the Fresno
6 court house upon entering the building for his scheduled hearing.2 (ECF No. 15 at 1–2.)
7 Although agents said they had a warrant for his arrest and Petitioner requested to see it, the
8 agents did not provide the warrant. Petitioner was not allowed to attend his hearing or
9 communicate with the court or his attorney and was transported to Golden State Annex, where he
10 has been detained since.
11 On January 20, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising a
12 prolonged detention due process claim. (ECF No. 1.) The Court also “construed [the petition] as
13 raising a claim challenging the statutory authority of Petitioner’s detention.” (ECF No. 5 at 1.)
14 On February 23, 2026, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 12.) On March 12,
15 2026, Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 15.) To date, no reply in
16 support of the motion to dismiss has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed.
17 II.
18 DISCUSSION
19 A. Applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
20 Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed because Petitioner is “an
21 ‘applicant for admission’ who is subject to mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C.
22 § 1225(b)(2),” “Petitioner’s prior release in the discretion of DHS does not have the effect of
23 having converted petitioner’s presence in the United States into an ‘admission,’”3 and “Petitioner
24
2 Petitioner states that he was arrested in 2013, subsequently convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”),
25 sentenced to 120 days in county jail, and ordered to complete an eighteen-month DUI program, which he completed.
On July 7, 2015, Petitioner was ticketed for driving with a suspended license, ward ordered to pay a fine, and
subsequently was able to receive his driver’s license. In October 2024, Petitioner was arrested for a domestic
26
violence offense involving his partner and subsequently was released from custody and told to appear for a hearing
two weeks later. (ECF No. 15 at 3.)
27 3 There is nothing in the record before this Court that Petitioner was previously released from immigration custody.
In the opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner asserts that he never encountered immigration agents until his
1 does not possess a right to freedom from immigration detention in any form other than the form
2 provided by Congress.” (ECF No. 12 at 1, 2.) Such arguments have been rejected by this Court
3 in numerous previous decisions. See, e.g., Crispin M. C. v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01487-KES-HBK
4 (HC), 2026 WL 70553 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2026), J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-
5 SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013328 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025), and Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d
6 1104 (E.D. Cal. 2025),
7 As Respondents have not made any new legal arguments and have not identified any
8 factual or legal issues in this case that would distinguish it from the Court’s prior decisions set
9 forth above, the Court recommends granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the
10 construed claim challenging the statutory authority of Petitioner’s detention for the reasons
11 addressed in those prior orders and finding that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
12 Alternatively, Respondents argue that the Court should hold the matter in abeyance
13 pending the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842. (ECF No.
14 12 at 2.) The Court recommends declining to hold the petition in abeyance given the uncertain
15 timeline regarding the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of Rodriguez Vazquez. Further, for the reasons
16 set forth in section II(B), infra, Petitioner is also entitled to habeas relief on his prolonged
17 detention claim, which does not implicate Rodriguez Vazquez.
18 B. Prolonged Detention
19 1. Overview of Caselaw Regarding Immigration Detention Statutes
20 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal
21 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory
22 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of
23 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-
24 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).
25 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been
26 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection
27 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th
1 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’”
2 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under
3 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Id.
4 “Subsection C provides for the detention of ‘criminal aliens’ and states that ‘[t]he Attorney
5 General shall take into custody any alien who’ is deportable or inadmissible based on a
6 qualifying, enumerated offense.” Id. at 530 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)).
7 “[D]etention under Subsection C is mandatory,” and “[r]elease under Subsection C is limited to
8 certain witness protection purposes.” Id. “Section 1231(a) applies to detention after the entry of a
9 final order of removal” and “governs detention during a ninety-day ‘removal period’ after the
10 conclusion of removal proceedings.” Id. at 530–31.
11 “[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the Supreme Court and [the Ninth Circuit] have
12 grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether the various detention statutes may authorize
13 indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond
14 hearing.’” Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
15 Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010)). In Zadvydas v. Davis,
16 533 U.S. 678 (2001), two noncitizens, who had been ordered removed but whose removal could
17 not be effectuated due to lack of a repatriation treaty or because their designated countries
18 refused to accept them, challenged their prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which
19 governs detention beyond the ninety-day removal period. Applying the canon of constitutional
20 avoidance because a “statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
21 constitutional problem,” the Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation into” § 1231(a)(6) and
22 held that the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably
23 necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
24 689. Thus, “after a presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal period detention,
25 the alien was entitled to release if he successfully demonstrated that there was ‘good reason to
26 believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”
27 Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
1 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to
2 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Demore distinguished Zadvydas by emphasizing
3 detention under § 1226(c) has a “definite termination point” and “in the majority of the cases it
4 lasts for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas.” Id. at 529 (noting
5 that “in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained pursuant to § 1226(c), removal
6 proceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days” and “[i]n the
7 remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge to the
8 Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an average of four months, with a median time that
9 is slightly shorter”).4 However, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which created the
10 majority rejecting the facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), specifically noted
11 that “a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized
12 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became
13 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14 In the Rodriguez class action, noncitizens “challenge[d] their prolonged detention
15 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without individualized bond
16 hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.” Rodriguez v. Robbins
17 (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In Rodriguez II, to avoid constitutional
18 concerns, the Ninth Circuit held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) is
19 implicitly time-limited and expires after six months. Thereafter, the government’s authority to
20
21 4 “Thirteen years after the decision in Demore, the government admitted that the figures it provided to the Court, and
which the Court relied on, contained ‘several significant errors.’” Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-04187-TSH,
22 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (citations omitted). Although the “Supreme Court had inferred
from the government’s brief in Demore that in cases in which the alien appeals, the time of detention was ‘about five
23 months,’” the government’s 2016 letter clarified that for years 1999–2001, the “length of detention in cases where
the alien appealed [was] 382 days, or a little more than a year.” Id. (citations omitted).
24
[I]n cases in which an appeal was filed, in most years the average length of detention was more
25 than 300 days, or more than double the five-month estimate the Court relied on in Demore. The
data from the Jennings case show that 460 members of the respondent section 1226(c) subclass
were detained for an average of 427 days (over fourteen months) with some individual detention
26
periods exceeding four years. Indeed, when the GAO conducted a study, it found that as of 2015,
the median length of time it takes the BIA to complete an appeal of a removal order exceeds 450
27 days.
1 detain shifts to § 1226(a), which requires a bond hearing governed by the procedural
2 requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).5 Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d
3 at 1138–44. In Rodriguez III, the Ninth Circuit held that for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C.
4 §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must provide periodic bond hearings every
5 six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued detention as ‘the period of . . .
6 confinement grows.’” Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano (Diouf II),
7 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)).
8 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth
9 Circuit’s interpretation that §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) included “an implicit 6–month time limit on
10 the length of mandatory detention” and reversed Rodriguez III, holding that the Ninth Circuit
11 misapplied the constitutional avoidance canon to find a statutory right under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
12 to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must prove by clear
13 and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at
14 296, 304, 306. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the]
15 constitutional arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the
16 case to the district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance, but noted
17 that it had “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without
18 any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect
19 against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d
20 252, 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2018).
21 Following Jennings, the Ninth Circuit upheld the “construction of § 1231(a)(6) to require
22 a bond hearing before an IJ after six months of detention for an alien whose release or removal is
23 not imminent” with the government “bear[ing] a clear and convincing burden of proof at such a
24 bond hearing to justify an alien’s continued detention.” Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762,
25 766 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, Garland v. Aleman
26
5 In Singh, the Ninth Circuit provided guidance as to the procedural requirements for the bond hearings.
27 Specifically, “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger
to the community to justify denial of bond.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. Due process also requires a contemporaneous
1 Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 546 (2022), and “[i]n a companion case decided that same day arising
2 from the Third Circuit, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, [596] U.S. [573], 142 S. Ct. 1827, 213
3 L.Ed.2d 125 (2022), the Supreme Court separately rejected [the Ninth Circuit’s] statutory
4 interpretation in Aleman Gonzalez,” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir.
5 2022), holding that “there is no plausible construction of the text of § 1231(a)(6) that requires the
6 Government to provide bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention,
7 with the Government bearing the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a
8 detained noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community,” Arteaga-Martinez, 596
9 U.S. at 581. Arteaga-Martinez declined to reach the constitutional claims. Id. at 583.
10 “[A]fter the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jennings and Arteaga-Martinez, it remain[ed]
11 undetermined whether the Due Process Clause requires additional bond procedures under any
12 immigration detention statute” until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Diaz, which
13 concerned a petitioner detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) who sought a second bond
14 hearing before an IJ at which the government would bear the burden of proof by clear and
15 convincing evidence. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1201, 1193. The Ninth Circuit held that “due
16 process does not require the procedures Rodriguez Diaz would have us impose” because
17 “Section 1226(a) offers substantial procedural protections to detained persons, and Rodriguez
18 Diaz has not shown that these procedures violate due process, either facially or as applied.” Id.
19 2. Procedural Due Process
20 The petition challenges Petitioner’s prolonged immigration detention without a bond
21 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
22 Here, Petitioner has been subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
23 The Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for
24 noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that
25 “district courts throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings
26 for noncitizens held for prolonged periods under § 1226(c)” based on due process and noted that
27 “[a]ccording to one such court order, the ‘prolonged mandatory detention pending removal
1 Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), vacated on other
2 grounds, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). Further, the First, Second, and Third Circuits have found that
3 “the Due Process Clause imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon the duration of
4 detention . . . under [section 1226(c)].” Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations
5 in original) (citation omitted). Accord Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2024)
6 (“conclud[ing] that a noncitizen’s constitutional right to due process precludes his unreasonably
7 prolonged detention under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German Santos v. Warden
8 Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that after Demore and
9 Jennings, petitioners detained pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied challenges to their
10 detention and that due process affords them a bond hearing once detention becomes
11 unreasonable). Contra Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024).
12 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that unreasonably prolonged
13 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing violates
14 due process. The Court now turns to whether Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably
15 prolonged such that due process requires a bond hearing.
16 Courts in this circuit have taken various approaches to determining whether procedural
17 due process requires a bond hearing in a particular case. See Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-
18 04187-TSH, 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (six-month bright-line rule in
19 § 1226(c) context); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (six-
20 factor test that considers “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
21 detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
22 detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood
23 that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez
24 v. Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) (eight-
25 factor test that considers “whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in
26 prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the nature of the crimes the
27 petitioner committed” in addition to the six factors set forth above in § 1226(c) context
1 June 7, 2021); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5–6 (N.D.
2 Cal. June 14, 2022) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge test to petitioner’s due process claim
3 requesting initial bond hearing in § 1226(c) context).
4 In the petition, Petitioner applies the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), test, or
5 alternatively “the multi-factor reasonableness test the Third Circuit adopted in German Santos v.
6 Warden Pike Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020).” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) This
7 Court previously found that “[t]o determine whether § 1226(c) detention has become
8 unreasonable, the Court will look to the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of
9 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the
10 government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022).
11 Here, because Respondents’ response failed to address Petitioner’s prolonged detention
12 claim, there is no information before this Court regarding the likely duration of future detention
13 and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by Petitioner and the government.
14 Accordingly, the Court will apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. See
15 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, 1206 (“assum[ing] without deciding,” in context of petitioner
16 detained under to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) seeking a second bond hearing, that Mathews test applied,
17 noting the Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal
18 proceedings,” and finding “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the
19 heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context”); id. at 1219 (Wardlaw,
20 J., dissenting) (“agree[ing] that the test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct.
21 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework to determine whether there was a
22 due process violation”).
23 [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors. First, the private interest that will be
24 affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
25 or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
26 additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
27 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
1 a. Private Interest
2 It “is beyond dispute” that Petitioner’s interest here is “fundamental.” Hernandez v.
3 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
4 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
5 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
6 at 690. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an
7 individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably
8 substantial.’” (quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Petitioner “has a legitimate and reasonably
9 strong private liberty interest under Mathews.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207. Accordingly,
10 the Court finds the first Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.
11 b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
12 The risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is high where, as here, Petitioner
13 has not received any bond hearing. See Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-07996-NC, 2020 WL
14 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of Landeros
15 Jimenez’s liberty interest is high. He has not received any bond or custody redetermination
16 hearing during his one-year detention. Thus, the probable value of additional procedural
17 safeguards—a bond hearing—is high, because Respondents have provided virtually no
18 procedural safeguards at all.”). Accordingly, the Court finds the second Mathews factor weighs
19 in favor of Petitioner.
20 c. Government Interest
21 “[T]he government clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in
22 the United States in violation of our law.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore,
23 538 U.S. at 518, 515). “These are interests of the highest order that only increase with the
24 passage of time.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. “The government interest in immigration
25 enforcement in general is surely substantial. But the question here is not the government’s
26 interest in immigration enforcement [in general] but its interest in” detaining Petitioner without
27 providing him with a bond hearing. Zerezghi v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 955
1 WL 1862254, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (The “government interest at stake here is not the
2 continued detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond
3 hearing.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020);
4 Henriquez, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (“Although the Government has a strong interest in
5 enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly
6 executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without providing an individualized
7 bond hearing is low.”). Accordingly, the Court finds the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of
8 Petitioner.
9 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that due process requires
10 Petitioner be provided with a bond hearing.
11 C. Remedy
12 “The Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy
13 is a bond hearing before an immigration judge[.]” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 882. See Doe v.
14 Becerra, 697 F. Supp. 3d 937, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have regularly
15 found that the IJ is the proper authority to conduct bond hearings and determine a detainee’s risk
16 of flight or dangerousness to the community.” (citing Martinez, 36 F.4th at 1223 (“district courts
17 throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens
18 held for prolonged periods”))); Mansoor v. Figueroa, No. 3:17-cv-01695-GPC (NLS), 2018 WL
19 840253, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018) (“The Court finds the IJ is uniquely qualified and
20 situated to make neutral administrative determinations about Petitioner’s eligibility for release on
21 bond and/or placement in a supervised release program[.]”).
22 The Court further finds that “the government must prove by clear and convincing
23 evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond” and
24 that the bond hearing must comport with the other requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d
25 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating
26 that “the BIA properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and
27 convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community” with respect to a bond hearing
1 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without
2 bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances and
3 alternative conditions of release. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 1000. See Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The
4 district court “correctly directed the immigration judge (“IJ”), in setting his bond and
5 establishing appropriate terms for his potential release, to consider his ability to pay and
6 alternative means of assuring appearance.”).
7 III.
8 RECOMMENDATION
9 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:
10 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED on the construed claim challenging
11 the statutory authority for Petitioner’s detention and the prolonged detention claim.
12 2. Respondents be directed to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before
13 an immigration judge that complies with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder,
14 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), and where “the government must prove by clear and
15 convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to
16 justify denial of bond,” id. at 1203. In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a
17 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention
18 without bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial
19 circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
20 1000 (9th Cir. 2017).
21 3. Respondents be enjoined and restrained from continuing to detain Petitioner pursuant to 8
22 U.S.C. § 1225(b) rather than § 1226(a).
23 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District
24 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local
25 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within
26 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file
27 written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any
1 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days
2 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate
3 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file
4 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.
5 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d
6 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
7
, | IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ae
9 | Dated: _ April 8, 2026
STANLEY A. BOONE
10 United States Magistrate Judge
1]
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28