Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MICHAEL BRUCE ANTHONY Case No. 1:26-cv-1020 KES SKO

MCPHERSON,

12 aka Makal B. Makfarsan, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION AS

FRIVOLOUS, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

13 Plaintiff, APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS, TERMINATING FINDINGS AND

14 v. RECOMMENDATIONS AS MOOT, AND

DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO CLOSE

15 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, et al., CASE

16 Defendants. Docs. 2, 8

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18 Michael Bruce Anthony McPherson, also known as Makal B. Makfarsan, seeks to proceed

19 in forma pauperis in this matter. Plaintiff names the “Federal District Courts” and Rob Bonta,

20 Attorney General of California, as the defendants in this action. Doc. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiff’s only

21 claim in the complaint relates to “interference with his creation.” Id. at 10 (cleaned up). For the

22 reasons set forth below, the Court finds the complaint is frivolous and the action is DISMISSED

23 with prejudice.

24 I. SCREENING

25 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by inmates seeking relief against a

26 governmental entity or an officer of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court

27 must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

28 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

1 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

2 Moreover, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the

3 court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that … the action or appeal … fails

4 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

5 II. PLEADING STANDARDS

6 A complaint must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain

7 statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief

8 sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

9 8(a); see also Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The

10 Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent

11 standards” than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

12 The purpose of a complaint is to give the defendant fair notice of the claims, and the

13 grounds upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512

14 (2002). Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of

15 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explained that Rule 8 “demands

16 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and a complaint is

17 insufficient if it offers “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v.

18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court noted:

19 [A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

20 [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

21 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The plausibility standard is not

22 akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

23 [Citation]. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line

24 between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’

25 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).

26 III. ALLEGATIONS

27 Plaintiff names the Federal District Courts and the California Attorney General as the

28 defendants in this action Doc. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiff identifies his “plans” for Hollywood, sports, real

1 property, and the construction of new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 3-5, 8-9. Plaintiff

2 contends that he is God and the Government, and he seeks to hold the defendants liable for

3 interference with his creations. Id. at 10, 13.

4 IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

5 A claim is frivolous “when the facts alleged arise to the level of the irrational or the

6 wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict

7 them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

8 319, 325, 328 (1989) (finding claims may be dismissed as “frivolous” where the allegations are

9 “fanciful” or “describe[e] fantastic or delusional scenarios”). The Court may . . . dismiss a claim

10 as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual

11 contentions are clearly baseless.” Howell v. Johnson, 2021 WL 3602139, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug.

12 13, 2021) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). A review of Plaintiff’s complaint establishes that it

13 contains only “fantastical claims” and “delusional scenarios” asserting Plaintiff’s authority to

14 create “plans” for sports, property, Hollywood, and the federal courts. For these reasons, the

15 Court finds the complaint is frivolous.

16 To the extent Plaintiff’s allegations are based on a sovereign citizen ideology—as he

17 refers to himself as God and the Government—courts have rejected arguments premised on such

18 ideology as frivolous and meritless. See, e.g., United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 n.3

19 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejected arguments premised on the sovereign ideology as “utterly meritless”);

20 United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233, n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (courts “summarily reject[]” as

21 frivolous the legal theory of individuals who consider themselves sovereign and not subject to

22 the jurisdiction of the courts); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 761 (7th Cir. 2011)

23 (“[Sovereign citizen] theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented”); see

24 also Mackey v. Bureau of Prisons, 2016 WL 3254037, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2016).

25 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

26 As the complaint is frivolous, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. Lopez v.

27 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or

28 malicious, there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave

1 | toamend.”). Where, as here, the complaint is frivolous, the “district court may deny leave to

2 || proceed in forma pauperis at the outset.” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (th Cir.

3 | 1998); Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). Thus, the

4 | Court also denies Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis.

5 The Court ORDERS:

6 1. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

7 2. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is DENIED.

8 3. The findings and recommendations dated February 11, 2026 (Doc. 8) are

9 terminated as MOOT.

10 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this action.

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13 | IT ISSO ORDERED. _

14 Dated: _ April 6, 2026 4h | |

15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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