The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 GARRETSON RESOLUTION GROUP, Case No. 25-cv-02836-AMO
INC.,
8
Plaintiff, ORDER RE GARRETSON
9 RESOLUTION GROUP, INC.’S
v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
10
PAUL JERRY BOLLA, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 73
11
Defendants.
12
13 This is an interpleader action. Before the Court is Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant
14 Garretson Resolution Group, Inc.’s (“GRG”) motion for attorney’s fees. The matter is fully
15 briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the hearing set for June 4,
16 2026, is VACATED. See Civil L.R. 7-6, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 78(b). Having read the parties’ papers
17 and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause
18 appearing, the Court GRANTS GRG’s motion for the following reasons.
19 I. BACKGROUND
20 For purposes of this Order, the Court briefly summarizes the case to provide context and
21 otherwise assumes familiarity with the factual and procedural history of this matter, including the
22 Court’s Order Granting GRG’s Motion for Discharge in Interpleader and Granting GRG’s Motion
23 to Dismiss the Counterclaims asserted against it by Defendant Paul Jerry Bolla. See Dkt. No. 72.
24 GRG, a third-party administrator of mass-tort settlements, entered into several agreements
25 with Dunken Law Group in 2018 to provide a range of services for settlement funds. Separately,
26 Dunken Law Group contracted with several investors for litigation funding – those investors are
27 referred to as the “Presidium Investors” in the parties’ papers. A dispute arose between one of the
1 reached a settlement with Dunken Law Group and on that basis asserts a claim to receive the funds
2 administered by GRG. The other Presidium Investors also assert interests in the fund.
3 GRG filed this interpleader action to determine the interests of the defendants in the fund
4 as well as to remove itself from this and future litigation. GRG deposited the fund with the Court
5 on April 16, 2025. In response to GRG’s interpleader complaint, Bolla asserted counterclaims and
6 otherwise argued against GRG’s discharge. The Court granted GRG’s motion for discharge in
7 interpleader as well as its motion to dismiss Bolla’s counterclaims by order issued January 26,
8 2026. The instant motion for an award of attorney’s fees followed.1
9 II. DISCUSSION
10 GRG moves for an award of $126,347.50 in attorney’s fees and $4,874.45 in litigation
11 costs. Dkt. No. 73. In an interpleader action, “[t]he award of attorney fees is fundamentally a
12 matter of discretion of the trial court.” Schirmer Stevedoring Co. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp.,
13 306 F.2d 188, 194 (9th Cir. 1962). “Fee awards are properly limited to those fees that are incurred
14 in filing the action and pursuing . . . release from liability.” Trs. of Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer
15 Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g, 255 F.3d
16 661 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Tise”). “Compensable expenses include, for example, preparing the
17 complaint, obtaining service of process on the claimants to the fund, and preparing an order
18 discharging the plaintiff from liability and dismissing it from the action.” Id. at 427. “Because the
19 scope of compensable expenses is limited,” attorney’s fee awards to the “ ‘disinterested’
20 interpleader plaintiff are typically modest.” Id. “Moreover, because the attorney’s fees are paid
21 from the interpleaded fund itself, there is an important policy interest in seeing that the fee award
22 does not deplete the fund at the expense of the party who is ultimately deemed entitled to it.” Id.
23
24
25
1 Bolla filed an opposition brief separately from the other Presidium Investor Defendants. See
Dkt. No. 77 (Bolla’s opposition); Dkt. No. 78 (Investor Defendants’ statement in response to
26
GRG’s motion for attorney’s fees). Thereafter, Bolla filed a “reply” brief responding to the
Investor Defendants’ statement. Dkt. No. 82. Bolla’s submission lacks any citation to law or facts
27
and thus proves unhelpful. More to the point, the submission constitutes a sur-reply unsanctioned
1 Because Bolla argues that GRG should not receive any award of attorney’s fees,2 the Court
2 first takes up his equitable arguments. The Court then turns to consider the reasonableness of the
3 attorney’s fees sum requested by GRG by calculating the lodestar. Finally, the Court briefly
4 considers GRG’s request for reimbursement of costs.
5 A. Bolla’s Equitable Arguments
6 Bolla argues first that the Court should deny GRG’s request to recover attorney’s fees and
7 costs because GRG “unreasonably delayed bringing this interpleader action” and “engaged in
8 forum shopping.” Dkt. No. 77 at 5. Bolla raised these same arguments in his opposition to
9 GRG’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 59 at 6-9. The Court already considered and rejected each.
10 Dkt. No. 72 at 6-7.
11 Regarding laches, the Court held that GRG did not delay in bringing this interpleader
12 action because “Bolla’s efforts to preclude adjudication of the other claimants’ interests indeed
13 suggests that recent events provided an impetus for GRG to bring this interpleader action.” Dkt.
14 No. 72 at 7. Further, the Court held that Bolla failed to show prejudice. Id. Bolla provides no
15 basis for the Court to deviate from its earlier holding nor has Bolla cited any authority that
16 supports applying the equitable doctrine of laches to GRG’s instant request for attorney’s fees.
17 Regarding forum shopping, the Court noted that “the circumstances of this case,
18 particularly [Bolla’s] own residence, are at odds with Bolla’s contention that GRG’s filing of the
19 interpleader action in this forum amounts to bad faith.” Dkt. No. 72 at 7. Bolla provides no basis
20 to deviate from that holding. Moreover, Bolla fails to cite any authority in support of his theory
21
22
2 The other Presidium Investor Defendants do not oppose GRG’s recovery of attorney’s fees and
costs. See Dkt. No. 78. They ask the Court to
23
either (1) to charge the total attorney’s fees, costs and/or interest
granted by the Court to GRG first against any portion of the money
24
now deposited with the Court (the ‘Fund’) that is to be awarded to
Defendant and Cross-Claimant Paul Jerry Bolla (‘Bolla’), or (2) at
25
the very least, to charge against the amount of the Fund to be
awarded to Bolla that portion of GRG’s fees that were incurred as a
26
direct result of Bolla’s actions in this matter.
Dkt. No. 78 at 2. The Court cannot resolve this issue of apportioning liability for the Interpleader
27
Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees across the Interpleader Defendants at this stage of the case. The other
1 that GRG’s selection of this forum, a forum that Bolla concedes is “a permissible forum,” could
2 warrant a denial or reduction of attorney’s fees. Dkt. No. 77 at 8.
3 Both of Bolla’s equitable arguments against an award of attorney’s fees for GRG
4 accordingly fail.
5 B. Lodestar Calculation of Attorney’s Fees
6 Federal courts utilize the lodestar method for calculating the amount of reasonable
7 attorney’s fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Allianz Life Ins. v. Agorio, 852
8 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (relying on lodestar calculation for an award of
9 attorney’s fees in interpleader action). “[A] court calculates the lodestar figure by multiplying the
10 number of hours reasonably expended on a case by a reasonable hourly rate.” Kelly v. Wengler,
11 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016). The Court takes up these two elements of reasonable hourly
12 rates and reasonable hours expended in turn before crunching the numbers.
13 1. Reasonable Rates
14 “The first step in the lodestar analysis requires the court to determine a reasonable hourly
15 rate for the fee applicant’s services.” Cotton v. City of Eureka, 889 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1167 (N.D.
16 Cal. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he established standard when
17 determining a reasonable hourly rate is the rate prevailing in the community for similar work
18 performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” United States v.
19 $28,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 802 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
20 omitted); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984) (“prevailing market rate” is
21 “normally deemed to be reasonable”). “[T]he relevant community is the forum in which the
22 district court sits.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008).
23 “Affidavits of the [fee applicant’s] attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the
24 community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the
25 plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers
26 of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
27 Here, GRG is represented by attorneys from the law firm of Squire Patton Boggs (US)
1 for a principal; $695-875 for senior associates; $495 for a junior associate; and $390-535 for
2 paralegals. Id. ¶¶ 22-29. GRG cites to other Northern District of California cases finding such
3 rates reasonable. See Dkt. No. 73 at 8 (citing In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales
4 Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 2017 WL 1047834, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017); In re JUUL
5 Labs, Inc., 2023 WL 11820531, at *4, n. 6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2023). The Court agrees that the
6 rates charged by GRG’s counsel rates fall within the ranges previously approved in this legal
7 community.
8 Bolla argues that the hourly rates sought by GRG’s counsel should be rejected as excessive
9 in light the lack of complexity for this “routine interpleader action.” Dkt. No. 77 at 11. This
10 argument fails. District courts within the Ninth Circuit have squarely rejected the argument that
11 the “relevant market” for purposes of calculating a reasonable hourly rate is “limited” to a
12 particular subject area of a case. Stonebrae, L.P. v. Toll Bros., Inc., No. C-08-0221-EMC, 2011
13 WL 1334444, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2011); see also Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial Inc., 523
14 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008). “In litigation, clients generally pay for litigation and strategic
15 experience and skills, not expertise in a particular subject area.” Stonebrae, 2011 WL 1334444, at
16 *3. Moreover, despite Bolla’s description of this as a “routine” action, it is Bolla’s litigation
17 conduct that has enhanced its complexity, including by opposing GRG’s discharge and advancing
18 counterclaims against the disinterested Interpleader Plaintiff. Bolla thus fails to show that GRG’s
19 counsel charges an unreasonable rate.
20 Therefore, the Court finds GRG’s counsel’s requested rates reasonable.
21 2. Reasonable Hours
22 “Having recommended the billing rates, the court turns to the second component of the
23 lodestar calculation: ascertaining the number of hours reasonably expended litigating this matter.”
24 Cotton v. City of Eureka, Cal., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The party
25 moving for attorney’s fees bears the burden of providing the Court with a detailed account of the
26 hours spent litigating the case. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Courts may exclude any hours not
27 reasonably expended for being “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Van Gerwen v.
1 see also Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the
2 requested hours “may be reduced by the court where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if
3 the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed excessive or
4 otherwise unnecessary.”). At the same time, the Supreme Court has instructed:
5 [T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-
eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either
6 party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So
trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and
7 may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.
8 Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Consistent with this balanced approach and with an eye
9 towards eliminating inefficiencies, the Court may use its discretion to give the fee award a 10%
10 “haircut” across the board “without a more specific explanation.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento,
11 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).
12 Here, GRG’s counsel devoted 182.4 hours to this interpleader case. The hours spent on the
13 complaint and case initiating documents, the motion for discharge in interpleader, and
14 miscellaneous tasks like perfecting service and attending conferences easily fit within the types of
15 tasks the Ninth Circuit has deemed “compensable.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 426-27. The Court will
16 award fees for the 111.1 hours spent on these tasks. See Soo Decl. ¶¶ 30-36.
17 The hours spent on the motion to dismiss, serving Bolla, and replying to his opposition to
18 the motion for discharge are also compensable. Bolla argues these hours are not compensable
19 because they were spent “litigating the merits of the adverse claimants’ positions” beyond
20 interpleader tasks. Dkt. No. 77 at 9 (citing Tise, 234 F.3d at 426). Not so. These hours were
21 necessary as a result of Bolla’s litigation conduct. For example, Bolla asserted legally deficient
22 counterclaims against GRG, compelling GRG to expend over 50 hours of attorney time litigating a
23 motion to dismiss the counterclaims. Soo Decl. ¶ 39. GRG did not take a position on the
24 respective merits of Defendants’ claims in any of that briefing. Thus, all these hours were spent
25 litigating and supporting GRG’s effort to effectuate the interpleader and extricate itself from the
26 case, not “litigating the merits of the adverse claimants’ positions.” Tise, 234 F.3d at 426.
27 Bolla argues that GRG’s counsel overstaffed the matter and expended excessive hours for
1 of time GRG’s counsel spent on this case was unreasonable, merely espousing without support
2 that GRG spent “extraordinary amounts of time for straightforward pleadings.” Dkt. No. 77 at 12.
3 The challenged hours expended appear directly tied to Bolla’s litigation conduct. For example,
4 GRG devoted over 25 hours drafting a reply in support of the motion for discharge in interpleader
5 because, despite Bolla’s contention that the matter remained straightforward, Bolla filed an
6 opposition to discharge that contained a wide range of equitable arguments largely unsupported by
7 any citation to such doctrines’ application in the interpleader context. See Dkt. No. 72 (rejecting
8 Bolla’s arguments as to laches, bad faith/forum shopping, and unclean hands). Moreover, and
9 contrary to Bolla’s invitation to second-guess GRG’s staffing, the Court “may not attempt to
10 impose its own judgment regarding the best way to operate a law firm, nor to determine if
11 different staffing decisions might have led to different fee requests. The difficulty and skill level
12 of the work performed, and the result achieved – not whether it would have been cheaper to
13 delegate the work to other attorneys – must drive the district court’s decision.” Moreno, 534 F.3d
14 at 1115. Bolla’s arguments attacking the time GRG spent defending Bolla’s motion and
15 counterclaims, and “pursuing [its] release from liability” accordingly fail. Tise, 234 F.3d at 426.
16 Finally, Bolla complains that GRG’s counsel engaged in block billing. Given the
17 descriptions of counsel’s time entries, the Court disagrees – the entries largely describe the tasks
18 performed with sufficient information for the Court to assess the reasonableness of GRG’s fees.
19 See Soo Decl., Ex. A (Dkt. No. 73-2). Therefore, this argument also fails.
20 The Court finds the 182.4 hours expended by GRG’s counsel reasonable.
21 3. Lodestar Calculation
22 Having approved the hourly rates of GRG’s counsel as reasonable and having approved the
23 hours expended in the action as reasonable, the Court turns to multiply the rates by the hours. The
24 Court reaches a sum of $126,347.50 based on the rates and hours identified in paragraphs 23-30 of
25 the Soo Declaration. See Dkt. No. 73-1. The Court, in its discretion, imposes a 10% “haircut”
26 across the board. Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. The Court will accordingly award $113,712.75 in
27 attorney’s fees to GRG, to be paid from the interpleader fund.
1 C. Reasonable Costs
2 Tn addition to an award of attorney’s fees, the district court may award costs to the
3 disinterested stakeholder. Schirmer, 306 F.2d at 194. Bolla suggests that an award of costs should
4 || bedeferred. Dkt. No. 77 at 15. The Court finds that GRG is entitled to retmbursement for its
5 || costs. See Allianz Life Ins., 852 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (awarding costs for “research, filing, and
6 || service expenses”). GRG must timely submit a bill of costs stating separately and specifically
7 || each item of taxable costs with receipts in support. See Civil L.R. 54-1.
8 || I. CONCLUSION
9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS GRG’s motion and awards reasonable
10 || attorneys’ fees in the amount of $113,712.75. The Court further finds that GRG is entitled to an
11 award of its costs, but the Court does not now resolve the amount of costs. Within seven (7) days
12 || following resolution of the bill of costs, GRG shall file a proposed order with instructions to the
€& 13 Clerk of Court for payment of the total sum from the interpleader fund currently deposited with
14 || the Court registry.
Q 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
2 17 || Dated: June 1, 2026
Z 18 □
19
ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN
20 United States District Judge
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28