The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 JAMES S.,1 Case No. 25-cv-00539-ASK
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
v.
9
Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 17
10 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
et al.,
11
Defendants.
12
13 Plaintiff James S. moves for summary judgment to reverse the Social Security
14 Administration’s denial of his claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42
15 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Dkt. 14. Defendant Commissioner requests that the Court affirm the denial,
16 or, in the alternative, remand. Dkt. 17. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5, the matter is submitted
17 without oral argument. The Court DENIES James S.’s motion for summary judgment and
18 AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision because substantial evidence supports the
19 Commissioner’s denial of James S.’s application for disability benefits.
20 I. BACKGROUND
21 James S. filed an application for disability benefits on September 20, 2021, alleging that
22 his disability began on August 15, 2019. The Commissioner denied that application initially on
23 February 8, 2022, and upon reconsideration on December 9, 2022. James S. then filed a written
24 request for a hearing on December 27, 2022, which was held telephonically before Administrative
25 Law Judge (“ALJ”) Lisa Lunsford on January 8, 2024.
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27
1 The Court uses only Plaintiff’s first name and last initial to mitigate privacy concerns, as
1 On January 31, 2024, the ALJ concluded that “the claimant has not been under a disability
2 within the meaning of the Social Security Act from August 15, 2019, through the date of this
3 decision.” AR 34. Though the ALJ found that James S. suffers “bipolar disorder; anxiety disorder;
4 major depressive disorder; mild cognitive impairment; narcissistic personality disorder; and
5 cannabis use disorder[,]” she determined that James S.
6 has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of
work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
7 limitations: can perform simple tasks with occasional changes in
work routine; can have no interaction with the public and
8 occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors; and can
do no fast-paced work requiring a specific production rate, such
9 as assembly-line work or work that requires hourly quotas.
10 AR 38 (emphasis in original).
11 On March 20, 2024, James S. requested review of the ALJ’s decision. The Commissioner
12 denied James S.’s request for review on October 21, 2024. AR 6. On January 15, 2025, James S.
13 brought this action for judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of his application for
14 disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. 1.
15 James S. now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the ALJ failed to (1) fully
16 and fairly develop the record, (2) give proper weight to the medical opinions of James S.’s treating
17 physicians, (3) give proper weight to other medical and nonmedical testimony, and (4) support her
18 conclusion that James S. is able to engage in substantial gainful work with substantial evidence.
19 Dkt. 14 at 2. The Commissioner requests that the Court affirm the denial. Dkt. 17.
20 II. DISCUSSION
21 Though 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) empowers the Court to review the Commissioner’s decision to
22 deny disability benefits, “a federal court’s review of Social Security determinations is quite
23 limited.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court will only disturb
24 the Commissioner’s decision if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on the
25 application of improper legal standards. Id. Substantial means “more than a mere scintilla,” but
26 only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
27 conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (cleaned up). Under this standard,
1 contains ‘sufficient evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Id. at 102 (cleaned
2 up).
3 The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that
4 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm
5 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995,
6 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
7 resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Id. at 1010 (citation
8 omitted). If “the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing a decision,” the
9 Court must defer to the ALJ’s decision. Id. (citation omitted).
10 Even if the ALJ commits legal error, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision if the error
11 is harmless, meaning “it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or that,
12 despite the legal error, the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains
13 its decision with less than ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (cleaned up). But “[a]
14 reviewing court may not make independent findings based on the evidence before the ALJ to
15 conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless” and is instead “constrained to review the reasons the
16 ALJ asserts.” Id. (cleaned up).
17 A. Disability Analysis
18 A claimant is “disabled” under the Social Security Act (1) “if he is unable to engage in any
19 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
20 impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
21 for a continuous period of not less than twelve months” and (2) the impairment is “of such severity
22 that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
23 work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
24 economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); see Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.
25 2012). The ALJ uses a five-step analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
26 404.1520(a)(1) (disability insurance benefits); id. § 416.920(a)(4) (same standard for supplemental
27 security income). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Ford v. Saul,
1 At step one, the ALJ determines if the claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial
2 gainful activity,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), defined as “work done for pay or profit that
3 involves significant mental or physical activities.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148 (cleaned up). Here, the
4 ALJ determined that James S. “ha[d] not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August
5 15, 2019, the alleged onset date[.]” AR 34 (emphasis in original).
6 At step two, the ALJ decides whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
7 impairments is “severe,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), “meaning that it significantly limits the
8 claimant’s ‘physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.’” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148
9 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a)). If no severe impairment is found, the claimant is not disabled.
10 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Here, the ALJ determined that James S. had “the following severe
11 impairments: bipolar disorder; anxiety disorder; major depressive disorder; mild cognitive
12 impairment; narcissistic personality disorder; and cannabis use disorder[.]” AR 35 (emphasis
13 in original).
14 At step three, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of
15 impairments that meets or equals an impairment in the “Listing of Impairments” (the “listings”).
16 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1. The listings describe
17 impairments that are considered “to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any
18 gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1525(a). Each impairment is described in terms of “the objective
19 medical and other findings needed to satisfy the criteria of that listing.” Id. § 404.1525(c)(3). “For
20 a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical
21 criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does
22 not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (footnote omitted). If a claimant’s
23 impairment either meets the listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically equivalent to the
24 criteria of the diagnosis, he is conclusively presumed to be disabled, without considering age,
25 education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Here, the ALJ determined that James S.
26 “d[id] not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
27 equals the severity of one of the listed impairments[.]” AR 35 (emphasis in original).
1 the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), defined as the most the claimant can still do
2 despite their limitations (20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)), and determines whether they are able to
3 perform past relevant work, defined as “work that [the claimant has] done within the past five
4 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn
5 to do it.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). If, based on the RFC, the ALJ determines that the claimant
6 can perform past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(f). Here, the ALJ
7 determined James S. has the RFC to “perform simple tasks with occasional changes in work
8 routine” with “occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors[.]” AR 37 (emphasis in
9 original). The ALJ also determined that James S. “ha[d] no past relevant work” and, as such,
10 “[t]ransferability of job skills is not an issue[.]” AR 44 (emphasis in original).
11 At step five, the burden shifts to the Social Security Administration to prove that “the
12 claimant can perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy.” Ford, 950 F.3d
13 at 1149 (cleaned up). Here, the ALJ determined that James S. could sustain work as an Order
14 Selector, Housekeeper, or Marking Clerk. AR 45. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that James S.
15 was not disabled. AR 45 (“A finding of ‘not disabled’ is therefore appropriate under the
16 framework of section 204.00 in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.”).
17 James S. asks the Court to reverse the ALJ’s determination that he is not disabled under the
18 Social Security Act on the grounds that the ALJ failed to (1) fully and fairly develop the record;
19 (2) give proper weight to the medical opinions of Dr. Apostle, Nurse Harris-Muchell, and Social
20 Worker Coe; (3) give proper weight to his and his mother’s lay testimony; and (4) support her
21 conclusion that James S. is able to engage in substantial gainful work with substantial evidence.
22 The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
23 1. Full and Fairly Developed Record
24 James. S. argues that his “own treating physician documents” were not considered by the
25 ALJ, and that he “was not asked to provide [his] own medical records.” Dkt. No. 14 at 6. On the
26 contrary, the ALJ informed James S. in writing on October 3, 2023, that he
27 must inform us about or submit all evidence known to you that relates
or have more evidence, such as recent medical records, reports,
1 or evaluations, you must inform me about it or give it to me no
later than 5 business days before the date of your hearing. If you
2 miss this deadline, I may not consider the evidence when I decide
your case.
3
4 AR 284 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the ALJ’s decision explains that James S. “submitted or
5 informed the Administrative Law Judge about all written evidence at least five business days
6 before the date of the [his] scheduled hearing[.]” AR 32. The transcript of the January 8, 2024,
7 hearing confirms that James S. submitted records “on December 29th, 2023, from Sausal Creek,
8 [In-Home Support Services (“IHSS”)] and Epic Care.” AR 58.
9 James S. further claims that he has “been diagnosed with ADHD since the age of three”
10 and “was unable to provide the medical records for this condition before the administrative
11 hearing.” Dkt. 14 at 4-5. But the ALJ’s decision explains that James S.’s “mental health treatment
12 records do not contain any diagnosis of ADHD during the relevant period in this case. While it
13 appears in Dr. Dhawan’s treatment records, Dr. Dhawan notes it by history only and does not
14 adequately document clinical signs of the diagnosis.” AR 35. Further, because James S. withdrew
15 his claim for child insurance benefits, the ADHD diagnosis that he received at age three is
16 irrelevant to the determination of James S.’s disability claim. AR 32, 35, 58-59 (withdrawing
17 disabled adult child benefit claim).
18 James S. fails to demonstrate that the administrative record was ambiguous or inadequate.
19 “[A]n ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence
20 or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Ford, 950 F.3d at
21 1156. This duty was not triggered here, “[g]iven that the ALJ had years of [James S.’s] mental
22 health records and multiple opinions from” various medical professionals to inform her well-
23 reasoned decision. Id.
24 2. Medical Opinions
25 James S. argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the medical opinions of Dr.
26 Apostle, Nurse Harris-Muchell, and Social Worker Coe. Dkt. 14 at 8. In opposition, the
27 Commissioner insists that James S. has forfeited his challenge to the ALJ’s assessment of these
1 A claimant “forfeit[s] the argument that the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for
2 discounting the opinions of the healthcare professionals” where the claimant “fail[s] to
3 acknowledge” the ALJ’s “reasons for discounting the various healthcare professionals’
4 opinions[.]” Nadon v. Bisignano, 145 F.4th 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2025). Here, James S. has failed
5 to acknowledge the ALJ’s explicit reasons for discounting the medical opinions of Dr. Apostle,
6 Nurse Harris-Muchell, and Social Worker Coe, and has “therefore also failed to challenge the
7 ALJ’s reliance on them[.]” Id. However, even if James S. had addressed the ALJ’s reasons for
8 discrediting the medical opinions, his challenge would have failed because substantial evidence
9 supports the ALJ’s reasoning.
10 a. Dr. Apostle
11 On December 8, 2022, Dr. Demetry Apostle conducted a 2.5-hour telephonic
12 psychological evaluation of James S., after which Dr. Apostle diagnosed James S. with “moderate
13 to severe major depressive disorder, mild cannabis use disorder, and narcissistic personality
14 disorder[.]” AR 42; see AR 739. The ALJ observed that “[s]ome of Dr. Apostle’s mental status
15 observations of the claimant dramatically differ from those of other examiners and treatment
16 providers, as he described the claimant as agitated, frantic, and tense, with circumstantial and
17 tangential speech[.]” AR 42; see AR 727; see generally AR 723-43. The ALJ found Dr. Apostle’s
18 opinion to be unpersuasive because
19 [i]t is supported only by a one time telephone appointment, and the
assertions of marked levels of impairment are not supported by the
20 clinical findings: attention/concentration was mildly impaired [AR
728-29]; memory was mildly impaired [AR 729]; Beck Depression
21 Inventory showed only moderate symptoms [AR 730]; Beck Anxiety
Inventory showed mild symptoms [AR 730]; and personality
22 pathology was described as moderate [AR 734]. The assertion of
marked impairments in interacting with the public and coworkers is
23 also not supported by the exam, or by the claimant’s treatment
records, which fail to document such extremely challenged social
24 functioning and in contrast note improved interaction with family
members. A marked impairment in completing a workday is also not
25 supported by his ability to complete the 2.5 hour phone exam without
noted significant difficulty and the claimant’s own admission he
26 spends 4-8 hours per day playing video games. The multitude of
marked impairments is also not consistent with the subsequent
27 treatment records which document he was doing fairly well, seeing
if Dr. Apostle’s conclusions were considered to be supported by the
1 exam, the claimant’s medical records do not establish that this marked
level of impairment lasted for 12 months.
2
3 AR 42. Dr. Apostle’s opinion also conflicted with other medical opinions, including Dr. Aparna
4 Dixit’s “mildly persuasive” opinion that James S. “has no work related limitations[,]” Dr. Natasha
5 Choudri’s “somewhat persuasive” conclusion that James S. “had mild limitations[,]” and Dr.
6 Michael Cremerius’s “persuasive” opinion that James S. “has moderate impairments in mental
7 functioning and is limited to simple routine work with no public interaction, limited interaction
8 with coworkers and supervisors, and no fast packed work with strict production quotas[.]” AR 40-
9 41. Based on this substantial evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded that “Dr. Apostle’s opinion
10 overall is unpersuasive.” AR 42.
11 b. Nurse Harris-Muchell
12 In October 2023, Nurse Carolyn Harris-Muchell signed an IHSS form indicating that
13 James S. “has left food cooking and walked away, is unable to do laundry or shop, and needs
14 reminders for daily activities and transportation to appointments[.]” AR 42; see AR 830. However,
15 the ALJ found Nurse Harris-Muchell’s opinion to be “unpersuasive because they are unsupported
16 by her treatment records and rely primarily upon the subjective input from [James S.] and his
17 mother at the time they were applying for IHSS[.]” AR 43. That James S.’s mother “helps him
18 with tasks and does chores for him does not clearly establish he is incapable of such chores and
19 tasks.” AR 43. The ALJ found Nurse Harris-Muchell’s opinion that James S. “requires assistance
20 even with basic activities of daily living” to be inconsistent with James S.’s prior statements. AR
21 43; see AR 695, 701, 712, 727. Substantial evidence thus supported the ALJ’s reasonable
22 conclusion that Nurse Harris-Muchell’s opinion was unpersuasive. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter,
23 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (“When confronted with conflicting medical opinions, an
24 ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s opinion that is conclusory and brief and unsupported by
25 clinical findings.”).
26 c. Social Worker Coe
27 In December 2023, Social Worker Ericka Coe “asserted that all but two of James S.’s
1 absent more than 4 days per month[.]” AR 43; see AR 855-56. But the ALJ observed that Ms. Coe
2 only offered
3 two reasons to support her conclusions, including that he becomes
distracted easily and quickly, and he has difficulty getting out of bed
4 often. The latter reason is not supported by her direct knowledge and
thus based only on subjective statements of the claimant and/or his
5 mother. The former reason related to distractability is not supported
by any treatment notes of her own or by her clinic’s treatment notes,
6 which do not indicate such a severe impairment and in contrast note
normal memory and attention during multiple appointments[.]
7
8 AR 43; see AR 755, 762, 770, 780, 787, 790, 796, 803, 808, 810, 816, 820. Because Ms. Coe’s
9 opinion was inconsistent with the majority of treatment records, the ALJ discounted Ms. Coe’s
10 opinion. AR 43; see AR 38. Substantial evidence, including treatment records “showing
11 improvement in symptoms and functioning and medication effectiveness[,]” supports the ALJ’s
12 reasonable interpretation of Ms. Coe’s assertions. AR 43; see AR 597-99.
13 3. Nonmedical Testimony
14 James S. claims “[t]here is no evidence in the record that my mother’s testimony about my
15 limitations is inac[c]urate or untrustworthy, yet the ALJ discounts any medical reports that rely on
16 my mother’s statements.” Dkt. 14 at 9.
17 Under the Social Security Act, the ALJ is “not required to articulate how [she] considered
18 evidence from nonmedical sources using the requirements” for medical opinions and prior
19 administrative medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(d); see Hudnall v. Dudek, No. 23-3727,
20 2025 WL 1379101, at *5 (9th Cir. May 13, 2025) (Bumatay, J., concurring) (“Read in context,
21 § 404.1520c(d) means that ALJs are not required to articulate how they consider nonmedical
22 sources as they are required to do for medical sources.” (emphasis in original)); see also Kennedy
23 v. O’Malley, No. 22-35866, 2024 WL 242992, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2024) (“[A]n ALJ is not
24 required to articulate how she considered evidence from nonmedical sources under the new
25 regulations.” (cleaned up)).
26 Nevertheless, the ALJ articulated her consideration of James S.’s mother’s reports by
27 explaining that “[t]he third-party functional reports submitted by [James S.’s] mother are largely a
1 S.’s] treatment records . . . Her statements regarding his inability to perform many basic daily
2 activities are also inconsistent with his prior reports to examiners[.]” AR 43; see AR 456-64, 498-
3 505. Accordingly, James S.’s argument that the ALJ failed to accord the proper weight to his
4 mother’s testimony fails.
5 Additionally, James S. argues that the ALJ should not have considered his prior
6 “misrepresentations” about “being a ‘quick learner’ and a ‘good student’, who graduated high
7 school at the age of 15” with Spanish fluency and a background in Mandarin and Japanese because
8 he “sometimes ha[s] delusions which cause these misrepresentations.” Dkt. 14 at 5. But the ALJ
9 adequately balanced these self-reported facts with Dr. Choudri’s observation that James S. “was
10 unable to perform serial sevens” but, according to Dr. Dixit, “could perform serial threes[.]” AR
11 36; see AR 696, 701. And, despite James S.’s insistence to the contrary, the ALJ also
12 acknowledged and incorporated James S.’s changing reports of paranoid thinking in her decision.
13 See AR 38 (“The claimant denied any paranoia”); AR 39 (“The claimant did not think he needed
14 treatment and denied many symptoms although admitted some isolation and paranoia.”); AR 40
15 (“He denied paranoia and reported clearer thinking”). The ALJ thus reasonably incorporated and
16 considered James S.’s self-reports.
17 4. Substantial Gainful Work
18 James S. challenges the ALJ’s RFC finding on the grounds that the “RFC did not account
19 for my documented difficulty with sustained concentration, interaction with others, and adaptation
20 to workplace changes. . . . The ALJ also erred by failing to consider the cumulative and interactive
21 effects of my multiple mental impairments.” Dkt. 14 at 10.
22 As to James S.’s first basis, “the ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating
23 clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006
24 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). For instance, an RFC limited to “simple, routine, repetitive,
25 sedentary work, requiring no interaction with the public” sufficiently incorporates pace and
26 concentration deficiencies. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1171, 1173-76 (9th Cir.
27 2008).
1 routine” and “occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors” that do not require
2 “interaction with the public” or “fast-paced work [with] a specific production rate[.]” AR 37
3 (emphasis in original). The ALJ’s RFC formulation carefully considered the entire record and
4 “took into account those limitations for which there was record support[.]” Bayliss v. Barnhart,
5 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); see AR 37-44. The RFC incorporates Dr. Cremerius’s
6 “persuasive” medical opinion that James S. “is limited to simple routine work with no public
7 interaction, limited interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and no fast packed work with
8 strict production quotas[.]” AR 41; see AR 128, 130, 134-37, 141, 155, 157-58, 166-68, 181-82.
9 The RFC also incorporates:
10 • Dr. Dixit’s “mildly persuasive” conclusion that James S. has “no work related
11 limitations.” AR 40.
12 • Dr. Choudri’s “somewhat persuasive” conclusion that James S. has “mild
13 limitations in: maintaining concentration, attention and persistence; adapting to the
14 usual stresses of work; maintaining a schedule and attendance; and completing a
15 normal workday.” AR 40-41.
16 • Dr. Catlin’s “somewhat persuasive” conclusion that James S. has a moderate
17 impairment in understanding, remembering, and applying information; a mild
18 impairment in interacting with others; a mild impairment in concentrating,
19 persisting, or maintaining pace; a moderate impairment in adapting and managing
20 himself; and a marked impairment in responding to demands, adapting to changes,
21 and managing symptoms. AR 41-42.
22 Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC finding was sufficiently supported by substantial evidence and
23 adequately incorporates James S.’s documented difficulties.
24 James S.’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC finding did not “consider the cumulative and
25 interactive effects of [his] multiple mental impairments[,]” Dkt. 14 at 10, ignores the ALJ’s
26 explicit consideration of the combined effect of James S.’s limitations. AR 35-37. The ALJ found
27 that James S.’s mental impairments do not “meet or medically equal any of the mental listings” or
] this conclusion after considering James S.’s limitations “in four broad areas of mental
2 || functioning” including: “a moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying
3 information, a moderate limitation in interacting with others, a moderate limitation in
4 || concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and a moderate limitation in adapting or managing
5 oneself.” AR 36. Moreover, the ALJ considered James S.’s consistent denials of “suicidal
6 ideation, homicidal ideation, and auditory and visual hallucinations.” AR 36. The ALJ’s RFC
7 || formulation thus properly considered “the combined effect of all of [James S.’s] impairments on
8 [his] ability to function, without regard to whether each alone was sufficiently severe.” Smolen v.
9 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
10 ok
11 The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the factual determinations underlying
12 || the Commissioner’s denial of James S.’s disability benefits. Accordingly, James S.’s motion for
13 summary judgment is DENIED.
14 || Il, CONCLUSION
15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES James S.’s motion for summary judgment
16 and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision.
Z 18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19 Dated: March 31, 2026
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AJAY, HNAN
22 United States Magistrate Judge
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