The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BERK STREET ENTERPRISES, INC., Case No. 24-cv-08841-RFL
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
v. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
BRAVO PERSONAL CARE LA LLC, et
al., Re: Dkt. No. 76
Defendants.
Berk Street Enterprises, Inc. (operating under the trademark Bravo Personal Care
Services) filed this action against former employee Lonnie Govan-Mendoza and the company he
founded, Bravo Personal Care LA LLC. Berk Street alleges that it initially allowed Govan-
Mendoza to use its mark on the belief he would operate in Los Angeles, but quickly withdrew
permission after learning he planned instead to compete with Berk Street in Northern California.
Accordingly, Berk Street contends Defendants infringed upon its trademark while using its trade
secrets and poaching its clients. Govan-Mendoza was enjoined from using the name Bravo
Personal Care and since changed his company’s name. The Clerk entered default against Bravo
Personal Care LA, and Govan-Mendoza is proceeding without the benefit of counsel. Now,
Berk Street moves for partial summary judgment as to Govan-Mendoza’s liability under the
complaint’s first and third causes of action: trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114, and unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125. For the reasons explained
below, Berk Street’s motion is GRANTED.1
1 Govan-Mendoza objects to the consideration of some evidence. As none of the objected to
material is considered in ruling on this motion, the objections are overruled as moot.
The analysis for both claims is substantively identical as both are based on alleged
infringement of a registered mark. Lodestar Anstalt v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 31 F.4th 1228, 1245
(9th Cir. 2022) (citing Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047
n.8 (9th Cir. 1999)). As a result, Berk Street must show (1) a protectible ownership interest in
the mark and (2) a likelihood of consumer confusion from Govan-Mendoza’s use of the mark.
See id. (citations omitted). Berk Street has a protectable ownership interest in “Bravo Personal
Care Services” as it registered the mark prior to Govan-Mendoza’s first use, and he does not
contest proof of registration. (See Dkt. No. 102 at 19; Dkt. No. 103 at 14; Pom Wonderful LLC
v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).)2
The analysis therefore turns to whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion from
Govan-Mendoza’s use of the mark. This requires considering the non-exhaustive factors set
forth in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979): “(1) strength of the
mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by
the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the
product lines.” Lodestar, 31 F.4th at 1252 (citation omitted). These factors are “fluid,” so a
plaintiff “need not satisfy every factor, provided that strong showings are made with respect to
some of them.” Pom Wonderful, 775 F.3d at 1125 (citation omitted). The fact intensiveness of
trademark cases frequently precludes summary judgment, although courts “have not hesitated” to
grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Lerner & Rowe PC v.
Brown Engstrand & Shely LLC, 119 F.4th 711, 718 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). To be
entitled to summary judgment, Berk Street must show that any reasonable jury would find
confusion “‘probable,’ not merely ‘possible.’” See Lodestar, 31 F.4th at 1261 (citation omitted).
Strength of Mark. “Bravo Personal Care Services” is at least a suggestive mark. As
bravo is a shout of approval, it “requires a mental leap from the mark to the product.” See
2 All citations to page numbers in filings on the docket refer to ECF pagination.
Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Berk Street makes at least a moderate showing on
this factor.
Proximity of Services. Berk Street and Govan-Mendoza are direct competitors, so their
services are strongly related. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th
Cir. 2000). Both provide in-home healthcare services to veterans in Northern California. (See
Dkt. No. 102 at 40, 61–63; Dkt. No. 103 ¶¶ 4, 20–24, 61.) It is immaterial that Berk Street also
provides healthcare services to the elderly, as both still directly compete to serve veterans. (See
id.)
Similarity of Marks. The marks are plainly similar. The first three words are identical in
both marks: Berk Street’s mark is “Bravo Personal Care Services,” while Govan-Mendoza’s
mark is “Bravo Personal Care LA.” Since those three words are the dominant part of the marks,
the distinct final word is a “trivial distinction[]” that does not prevent the marks from being
“overwhelmingly similar.” See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1206.
Evidence of Actual Confusion. Evidence of actual confusion is “persuasive proof that
future confusion is likely.” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 352 (citation omitted). To determine how to
weigh evidence of actual confusion, “the number of instances of actual confusion must be placed
against the background of the number of opportunities for confusion.” Lerner & Rowe, 119
F.4th at 720 (citation omitted). While consumers are the focus of this inquiry, non-consumers
are relevant if their confusion creates an inference of consumer confusion or influences
consumers. Rearden LLC v. Rearden Com., Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012). Berk
Street presents strong evidence of actual confusion.
Starting with consumers, Berk Street presents evidence that three of its clients asked
whether Govan-Mendoza was operating a “branch[]” of Berk Street after he represented the two
were associated. (Dkt. No. 87 ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 103 ¶ 49.) While Govan-Mendoza denies telling
clients he was operating a branch and contemplates that the clients only said this after being “led
by [Berk Street’s] questions,” he provided no evidence that these clients understood the two
services were distinct. (See Dkt. No. 91 at 9, 122; Dkt. No. 102 at 54.) Accordingly, after
resolving factual disputes in favor of Govan-Mendoza, three consumers still believed he operated
a branch of Berk Street. Berk Street also shows that one of Govan-Mendoza’s clients called
Berk Street for a start date. (Dkt. No. 103 ¶ 53; Dkt. No. 103 at 38.) Govan-Mendoza does not
dispute that this incident occurred, but characterizes it as one involving a “severely disabled
veteran” who “mistakenly called” Berk Street after receiving a list of agencies from the VA.
(Dkt. No. 91 at 49.) Since Berk Street and Govan-Mendoza’s consumers are disabled veterans, it
would not make sense to discount that individual’s confusion simply because of their disability.
Berk Street also presents relevant evidence of non-consumer confusion. It shows that the
VA emailed Berk Street about one of Govan-Mendoza’s clients. (Dkt. No. 103 ¶ 56; Dkt. No.
103 at 40; see also Dkt. No. 91 at 4–6.) Since the VA is involved in authorizing or referring
veteran clients for both services, the VA’s confusion could “influence consumer perceptions and
decision-making.” (See Dkt. No. 91 at 8; Dkt. No. 103 ¶ 54; Rearden, 683 F.3d at 1216.) It is
beside the point whether such errors were “solely the responsibility of the VA,” as they are still
indicative of consumer confusion. (See Dkt. No. 91 at 3.) Additionally, the California
Department of Social Services investigated Berk Street over a complaint submitted against
Govan-Mendoza’s service, and an operations software company called Berk Street three times
concerning Govan-Mendoza’s clients. (Dkt. No. 103 ¶¶ 57–58; Dkt. No. 103 at 42.) As these
are both “sophisticated nonconsumer[s],” their confusion serves as a reasonable proxy for
consumer confusion. See Rearden, 683 F.3d at 1216.
In sum, Berk Street shows numerous instances of actual confusion. Though Govan-
Mendoza disputes some other instances of confusion that were not outlined above, as well as
how to characterize the outlined incidents, he does not dispute that these incidents occurred.
They are strong evidence of actual consumer confusion considering Govan-Mendoza had three
clients total. (See Dkt. No. 102 at 20; Lerner & Rowe, 119 F.4th at 720.)
Marketing Channels. “Convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood of
confusion.” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353. Govan-Mendoza did not advertise and solely received
clients from VA authorizations. (See Dkt. No. 91 at 8; Dkt. No. 102 at 20–21, 41.) Berk Street
advertises through its website and social media, though it contends that all its veteran clients are
referred or authorized by the VA. (Dkt. No. 91 at 49, 54–85; Dkt. No. 103 ¶¶ 54, 61–63.)
Accordingly, with respect to veterans’ care (which is Govan-Mendoza’s only service), the VA
essentially operates as a marketing channel since clients must receive authorization from the VA
for a service to provide care. This factor therefore weighs in favor of consumer confusion.
Degree of Consumer Care. According to Berk Street, veterans “tend to simply defer to
the VA’s recommendation” on which service to choose. (Dkt. No. 103 ¶ 63.) By contrast,
Govan-Mendoza contends veterans and their families are “acutely aware of the agencies they are
communicating with and interviewing.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 50.) As there is a genuine dispute of
material fact over this factor, it is assumed to weigh against consumer confusion.
Defendant’s Intent. An intent to deceive is presumed if the defendant “adopted his mark
with knowledge, actual or constructive, that it was another’s trademark.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at
1059. Berk Street initially provided Govan-Mendoza with permission to use its mark. (See, e.g.,
Dkt. No. 102 at 92.) However, Berk Street sent Govan-Mendoza an email on September 21,
2023 stating: “You are not authorized to use the name Bravo Personal Care. The name is
trademarked throughout California. Change your name.” (Dkt. No. 103 at 32.) Govan-
Mendoza testified that he received this email. (Dkt. No. 102 at 46.) Separately, he stated that he
did not start using the mark “Bravo Personal Care LA” in connection with his homecare services
until December 15, 2023. (Id. at 19; see also Dkt. No. 91 at 8.) Accordingly, at the time Govan-
Mendoza started using his mark, he had actual knowledge of Berk Street’s trademark and his
lack of permission to use it. This factor therefore weighs in favor of consumer confusion.
Likelihood of Expansion. This factor is “relatively unimportant” as Berk Street and
Govan-Mendoza “already compete to a significant extent.” See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1060.
Conclusion. Berk Street has shown that the two marks are overwhelmingly similar, there
are numerous instances of actual consumer confusion between the two services, the services are
direct competitors, and Govan-Mendoza had a presumed intent to deceive. Even assuming
consumers exercise great care when choosing veterans’ care services, no reasonable jury could
find that confusion between the two services is less than probable. See Lodestar, 31 F.4th at
1261. Accordingly, this is “one of the rare trademark infringement cases susceptible to summary
judgment.” See Lerner & Rowe, 119 F 4th at 726. Berk Street’s motion for partial summary
judgment is GRANTED. By April 21, 2026, the parties shall jointly submit a proposed
schedule for the determination of damages and attorneys’ fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 31, 2026
RITA F. LIN
United States District Judge