Opinion

Kijakazi

Court
District Court, N.D. California
Filed
Jul 30, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6 EUREKA DIVISION

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8 VANESSA D., 1 Case No. 23-cv-02267-RMI

9 Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR

10 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

11 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 19, 21

12 Defendants.

13

14 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) decision denying her

15 application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. See Admin. Rec. at 1.2

16 The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration declined to review the ALJ’s decision.

17 Id. As such, the ALJ’s decision is a “final decision” of the Commissioner of Social Security,

18 appropriately reviewable by this court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Both parties have

19 consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge (dkts. 7, 10) and both parties have moved for

20 summary judgment (dkts. 15, 18). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

21 Judgment is granted, and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

22 LEGAL STANDARDS

23 The Social Security Act limits judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions to final

24 decisions made after a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner’s findings “as to any fact,

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1 Pursuant to the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the

27 Judicial Conference of the United States, Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted.

1 if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” Id. A district court has limited scope of

2 review and can only set aside a denial of benefits if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if

3 it is based on legal error. Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir.

4 1995). The phrase “substantial evidence” appears throughout administrative law and directs courts

5 in their review of factual findings at the agency level. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,

6 1154 (2019). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

7 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1154 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v.

8 NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir.

9 1997). “In determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial

10 evidence,” a district court must review the administrative record as a whole, considering “both the

11 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.”

12 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The Commissioner’s conclusion is upheld

13 where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400

14 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

15 BACKGROUND

16 For many years, Plaintiff has experienced intermittent back pain. AR at 450. In June of

17 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine. Id.

18 at 326, 331. At the time, Plaintiff was experiencing near-constant pain in her back, neck, and

19 shoulder, which would sometimes radiate down her legs. Id. at x. Plaintiff reduced her hours at

20 work hoping that rest would aid her recovery. Id. at 51. Plaintiff continued to experience pain and

21 eventually, left work altogether. Id.

22 Plaintiff has been diagnosed with human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), which she

23 manages with medication. See e.g., 299, 302, 351, 373, 376, 383, 451. Plaintiff experiences some

24 intermittent numbness in her toes that her treatment notes indicate may be due to HIV. See e.g.,

25 381, 414, 423. Additionally, Plaintiff is obese with a body mass index ranging from 35% to 42%.

26 See e.g. id. at 26, 310, 421, 492, 507, 514, 532, 574, 612, 641, 663. There is evidence throughout

27 the record that Plaintiff’s obesity contributes to her chronic pain and her physicians repeatedly

1 440, 454, 455, 468, 486, 494, 509, 534, 576, 591. At her doctor’s recommendation, Plaintiff has

2 altered her diet and attempts light exercise, including walking. Id. at 58. Because of her pain,

3 however, she has stopped her exercise routine. Id. Plaintiff has also received therapy treatment for

4 anxiety and management of her chronic pain. See e.g., id. at 349, 395, 399.

5 By the court’s review, there are eight treatment records that directly address Plaintiff’s

6 back, neck, and shoulder pain. See id. at 450, 324-26, 435-36, 376-77, 555, 530, 579. Of these,

7 four were conducted over the phone because of the coronavirus pandemic and therefore, do not

8 relay objective medical findings; one summarizes Plaintiff’s MRI findings; and three were

9 conducted in-person and provide an assessment of Plaintiff’s range of motion and other objective

10 metrics. See id. The most significant objective findings in the record are the June 2020 MRIs

11 which indicate severe left neural foraminal stenosis at C3-4 and moderate cervical spondylosis

12 with mild spinal canal stenosis at C5-6 (id. at 331) and disc desiccation at L3-4 and L4-5, loss of

13 height of L5-S1, and mosaic type II endplate changes at L5-S1 (id. at 326). At Plaintiff’s in-person

14 appointments, she exhibited varying degrees of impairment. On June 2, 2020—several weeks prior

15 to Plaintiff’s alleged onset date—Plaintiff was tender to palpation in the left lower back and had

16 full range of motion in all extremities. Id. at 453. Nearly a year later, on June 29, 2021, Plaintiff

17 had full range of motion in all extremities, mild tenderness in the left upper and right lower lateral

18 back areas, and limited range of motion in the neck due to pain. Id. at 532. On August 6, 2021, at

19 Plaintiff’s first physical therapy appointment, she exhibited abnormal or restricted range of

20 motion, along with abnormal muscle tone, activity intolerance, and impaired physical strength. Id.

21 at 579. On examination of Plaintiff’s left cervical area, Plaintiff had positive active compression,

22 cervical distraction, Spurling’s sign, ULTT3 and ULTT4 tests with negative ULTT1 and ULTT2

23 tests. Id. There are no other records of Plaintiff’s physical therapy treatment, though she was

24 assigned a further five sessions. Id. at 580.

25 Dr. Hu, Plaintiff’s treating physician, issued two opinions for the record; both were

26 submitted using checkbox questionnaires. Id. at 337-38, 567-96. Dr. Hu’s second opinion was

27 accompanied by records of the treatment notes from Plaintiff’s June 2021 office visit, her August

1 limitations, Dr. Hu opined that Plaintiff would be unable to use her left arm to handle, finger, or

2 reach, and that, due to pain, Plaintiff would be off-task 25% of the time and absent more than 4

3 days a month. Id. at 568-70. Social Security Administration (“SSA”) examiners also reviewed

4 Plaintiff’s records. See id. at 69-82, 83-97. They opined that Plaintiff was capable of a range of

5 “medium” work. Id.

6 THE ALJ’S DECISION

7 The ALJ engaged in the required five step sequential evaluation process. See id. at 18-31.

8 At step one, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful activity during the

9 relevant period. Id. at 23. At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe

10 impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine and obesity. Id. The ALJ

11 found that, among other minor impairments, Plaintiff’s HIV, migraines, abdominal pain, high

12 blood pressure, and “adjustment disorder with anxious mood” were non-severe. Id. at 23-24. At

13 step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s conditions met or equaled any listed impairment.

14 Id. at 25 In formulating Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ determined that

15 Plaintiff could perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567, with several exertional

16 limitations. Id. at 25-26. In reaching this determination, the ALJ found Dr. Hu’s opinion to be

17 unpersuasive because it was “grossly unexplained and unsupported” and was “far too extreme in

18 assessed limitations than are objectively supported by the overall medical evidence.” Id. at 28.

19 Although the ALJ mentioned Plaintiff’s obesity, the ALJ did not explain what effect, if any,

20 Plaintiff’s obesity has on her impairments. See id. at 26 (noting that Plaintiff is obese) and id. at 27

21 (noting that Plaintiff had a BMI over 35%). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could

22 complete her past relevant work as a companion, salesclerk, receptionist, and deli clerk. Id. at 29.

23 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 30.

24 DISCCUSION

25 The ALJ erred by failing to develop the record as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations

26 resulting from her degenerative disc disease. Because the ALJ did not properly develop the record,

27 the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Hu’s opinion was unfounded was not supported by substantial

1 “The differences between courts and agencies are nowhere more pronounced than in Social

2 Security proceedings . . . [which] are inquisitorial rather than adversarial[,] [thus] [i]t is the ALJ’s

3 duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.”

4 Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-111 (2000). It is well established that “[i]n Social Security cases

5 the ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s

6 interests are considered.” Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). When the record

7 consists of insufficient or ambiguous evidence, it is incumbent upon the ALJ to take reasonable

8 steps to ensure that questions raised by the medical evidence are carefully addressed so that a

9 determination of disability may be made on a sufficient evidentiary record. See Tidwell v. Apfel,

10 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1999). This duty exists regardless of the claimant’s status as

11 represented or unrepresented. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003).

12 Ultimately, the court finds that the record is insufficiently developed. Plaintiff’s

13 impairments, specifically her degenerative disc disease, are evident by objective metrics. Plaintiff

14 has provided MRI imaging confirming mild to severe degenerative conditions in her cervical and

15 lumbar spine. However, there is very little in the record by way of objective medical findings that

16 assess Plaintiff’s functional limitations resulting from her cervical and lumbar disc disease. The

17 sole medical opinion provided by a non-SSA examiner—that of Dr. Hu—was rejected by the ALJ

18 as “grossly unexplained and unsupported.” If the ALJ thought she needed to know the basis of Dr.

19 Hu’s opinion, it was the ALJ’s duty “to conduct an appropriate inquiry,” by, for example, ordering

20 a consultative examination, “subpoenaing [Plaintiff’]s physician, or submitting further questions

21 to [Plaintiff’s physicians],” or questioning Plaintiff herself. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288. This is

22 particularly the case where, as here, the record is sparse as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations

23 attributable to her degenerative disc disease. Plaintiff’s three in-person assessments do not

24 constitute substantial evidence capable of contradicting Dr. Hu’s opinion. Nor is it evident that the

25 paucity of records indicates mild or moderate symptoms. Much of the relevant period occurred

26 during the coronavirus pandemic affecting Plaintiff’s care—as mentioned above, many of her

27 appointments were conducted over the phone, a medium that does not lend itself to objective

1 acknowledged, while the record contains intake evaluation notes from Plaintiff’s physical therapy,

2 there are no records of subsequent visits. The ALJ’s determination that Dr. Hu’s opinion was

3 unfounded, is based upon an inadequate record and as such, cannot be said to constitute substantial

4 evidence.

5 Accordingly, the court finds that the record requires further development, and that remand

6 is appropriate. Because the court remands for failure to fully and fairly develop the record, the

7 court need not address Plaintiff’s alternative grounds for remand. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d

8 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012; see also Steven M. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-06991-RMI, 2021 WL 1056787,

9 at *5 (N.D. Cal Mar. 19, 2021). However, the court notes that the ALJ also failed to properly

10 address the effect of Plaintiff’s obesity on her RFC. The SSA has emphasized the importance of

11 addressing obesity in developing a claimant’s RFC. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 19-2P,

12 (S.S.A. May 20, 2019), 2019 WL 2374244. The SSR, which requires ALJ’s to consider claimant’s

13 obesity in formulating the RFC, specifically notes that obesity complicates other diagnoses,

14 pointing out that, in addition to exertional limitations, claimants with obesity may experience

15 limitations in their “physical and mental ability to sustain work activity.” Id. Given that Plaintiff’s

16 doctors repeatedly advised her to lose weight to assist with her back, neck, and joint pain, the ALJ

17 erred by failing to incorporate Plaintiff’s obesity into her RFC. Passing mention of Plaintiff’s

18 obesity does not indicate that it was properly addressed as an exacerbating impairment and the

19 court will not supply reasoning on the ALJ’s behalf, nor evaluate reasoning that the ALJ did not

20 articulate. The court may not make inferences—even if reasonable—from the ALJ’s

21 summary of the RFC to supplement inadequate reasoning. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494-95.

22 On remand, the ALJ is ORDERED to inquire as to whether any other records exist from

23 the relevant period upon which Dr. Hu based her opinion. The ALJ is further ORDERED to enlist

24 a consulting physician to assess Plaintiff’s limitations. Finally, the ALJ is ORDERED to consider

25 the other issues raised in Plaintiff’s briefing and to modify any ensuing opinion as necessary.

26 CONCLUSION

27 For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by

1 Defendant’s Cross-Motion is DENIED. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

2 || with this order. A separate judgment shall issue.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 Dated: July 30, 2024

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R@BERT M. ILLMAN

7 United States Magistrate Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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