The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MURIEL FISK SAPIEN, Case No. 1:24-cv-01216-HBK
12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING CASE TO
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 1
13 v.
(Doc. 13, 18)
14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
15
Defendant.
16
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19 Muriel Fisk Sapien (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the
20 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for
21 disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). The matter is currently
22 before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted without oral argument. (Doc. 13,
23 18). For the reasons stated, the Court remands the matter to the Commissioner of Social Security
24 for further administrative proceedings.
25 I. JURISDICTION
26 Plaintiff protectively filed for disability insurance benefits on July 29, 2021, alleging an
27 1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§636(c)(1). (Doc. 9).
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1 onset date of September 11, 2020. (AR 288-92). Benefits were denied initially (AR 74-93, 135-
2 39), and upon reconsideration (AR 94-134, 146-51). Plaintiff appeared before an Administrative
3 Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 20, 2023. (AR 37-73). Plaintiff was represented by counsel and
4 testified at the hearing. (Id.). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision (AR 18-36), and the
5 Appeals Council denied review (AR 5-10). The matter is now before this Court pursuant to 42
6 U.S.C. § 405(g).
7 II. BACKGROUND
8 The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing and transcripts, the ALJ’s
9 decision, and the briefs of Plaintiff and Commissioner. Only the most pertinent facts are
10 summarized here.
11 Plaintiff was 64 years old at the time of the hearing. (See AR 39). She has a bachelor’s
12 degree. (AR 44). She lives with her boyfriend. (AR 43). Plaintiff has work history as a project
13 engineer and engineer. (AR 44-51, 66). Plaintiff testified she can no longer do her previous work
14 because of her back and neck pain, scoliosis, limitations in walking, and anxiety. (AR 47-50, 56-
15 57, 72). She reported she can be on her feet for ten minutes before she must sit down and rest for
16 ten minutes, she walks 15 minutes outside 3 times a week, she has trouble focusing and gets
17 confused, and she cannot lift more than 10 pounds. (AR 53-55, 60-62). Plaintiff testified that she
18 worked as long as she could “until [she] just couldn’t,” and interviewed for jobs but she is
19 “limited” and never got hired. (AR 59-60).
20 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
21 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is
22 governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the
23 Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or
24 is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial
25 evidence” means “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
26 conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence
27 equates to “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and
28 citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must
1 consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation.
2 Id.
3 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of
4 the Commissioner. “The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible
5 to more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.
6 2008). Further, a district court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is
7 harmless. Id. An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate
8 nondisability determination.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s
9 decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556
10 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
11 IV. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
12 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within the meaning of
13 the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in any substantial gainful
14 activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
15 expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
16 of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment
17 must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot,
18 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
19 gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
20 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a
21 claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the
22 Commissioner considers the claimant’s work activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the
23 claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the
24 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
25 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step
26 two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s impairment. 20
27 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of
28 impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work
1 activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant’s
2 impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the
3 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
4 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to severe
5 impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from
6 engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as
7 severe or more severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the
8 claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
9 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the
10 enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant’s “residual
11 functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the claimant’s
12 ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her
13 limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the
14 analysis.
15 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the
16 claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past (past relevant
17 work). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant
18 work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If
19 the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
20 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the
21 claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §
22 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider
23 vocational factors such as the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §
24 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must
25 find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable
26 of adjusting to other work, analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is
27 therefore entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).
28 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Tackett v. Apfel,
1 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the
2 Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such
3 work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2);
4 Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
5 V. ALJ’S FINDINGS
6 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
7 (SGA) since September 11, 2020, the alleged onset date. (AR 23). At step two, the ALJ found
8 that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical and
9 lumbar spine with history of laminectomy at L4-5 in 1995; dextroscoliosis; exogenous obesity;
10 status post bariatric surgery, and vertigo. (AR 23). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
11 does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
12 severity of a listed impairment. (AR 25). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC to
13 perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except the
claimant is frequently able to climb ramps and stairs and is never able
14 to climb ladders, ropes, and/or scaffolds. The claimant is frequently
able to balance, crawl, crouch, kneel and stoop.
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16 (AR 26). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as
17 a project engineer. (AR 29). In the alternative, at step five, the ALJ found that considering
18 Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant
19 numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including cleaner II, hand packager,
20 and machine packager. (AR 29-30). On that basis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been
21 under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 11, 2020, through the
22 date of the decision. (AR 31).
23 VI. ISSUES
24 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her disability
25 insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff raises the
26 following issue for this Court’s review: whether the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion
27 of Steven Stoltz, M.D. (Doc. 13 at 9-16).
28 ////
1 VII. DISCUSSION
2 A. Medical Opinions
3 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, new regulations apply that change the
4 framework for how an ALJ must evaluate medical opinion evidence. Revisions to Rules
5 Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18,
6 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. The new regulations provide that the ALJ will no
7 longer “give any specific evidentiary weight…to any medical opinion(s)…” Revisions to Rules,
8 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867-68; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a).
9 Instead, an ALJ must consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior
10 administrative medical findings from medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) and (b),
11 416.920c(a) and (b). The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior
12 administrative medical findings include supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant
13 (including length of the treatment, frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment, extent of
14 the treatment, and the existence of an examination), specialization, and “other factors that tend to
15 support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding” (including, but
16 not limited to, “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the
17 claim or an understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements”). 20
18 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
19 Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and therefore the ALJ is
20 required to explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),
21 416.920c(b)(2). Supportability and consistency are explained in the regulations:
22 (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to
23 support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
24 administrative medical finding(s) will be.
25 (2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
26 medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
27 finding(s) will be.
28 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2). The ALJ may, but is not required to,
1 explain how the other factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
2 However, when two or more medical opinions or prior administrative findings “about the same
3 issue are both equally well-supported ... and consistent with the record ... but are not exactly the
4 same,” the ALJ is required to explain how “the other most persuasive factors in paragraphs (c)(3)
5 through (c)(5)” were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).
6 The Ninth Circuit has additionally held that the new regulatory framework displaces the
7 longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide “specific and legitimate” or “clear and
8 convincing” reasons for rejecting a treating or examining doctor’s opinion. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32
9 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). Nonetheless, in rejecting an examining or treating doctor’s
10 opinion as unsupported or inconsistent, an ALJ must still provide an explanation supported by
11 substantial evidence. Id. at 792. This means that the ALJ “must ‘articulate ... how persuasive’
12 [he or she] finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source ... and ‘explain
13 how [he or she] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.”
14 Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), 404.1520(b)(2)).
15 Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly evaluated the January 2022 medical opinion of
16 consultative examining physician Scott Stoltz, M.D., FACP. (Doc. 13 at 9-13). Dr. Stoltz
17 examined Plaintiff and opined that she has the ability to walk and stand a maximum of 4 to 6
18 hours in an 8-hour workday, has no sitting restrictions, can lift and carry a maximum of 10
19 pounds occasionally, can do frequent but not continuous activities, has no manipulative
20 restrictions, can climb stairs and ramps occasionally, and can never climb ladders or scaffolding.
21 (AR 685-86). The ALJ found Dr. Stoltz’s opinion was “less persuasive” than the state agency
22 consulting opinions of M. Amando, M.D. and K. Mohan, M.D. (AR 28).
23 The entirety of the ALJ’s findings arguably explaining his findings as to the
24 persuasiveness of Dr Stoltz’s opinion was that “the prior administrative medical findings of Dr.
25 Amando and Dr. Mohan were supported by explanation with reference to the medical record.
26 Those findings were consistent with the generally normal examination findings and treatment
27 history, but also the findings of Dr. Stoltz.” (AR 28). Presumably in support of this finding the
28 ALJ cited Dr. Stoltz’s findings on examination, as well string citing “normal examination
1 findings” on two 2019 treatment visits for a right forearm lesion (AR 450, 456), a 2019 treatment
2 visit for fatigue (AR 459), a 2019 treatment visit for abdominal pain (AR 489), and a January
3 2020 treatment visit to establish as a patient and complaining of flu-like symptoms (AR 578).
4 Plaintiff argues the ALJ harmfully erred by failing to consider the supportability and consistency
5 factors pursuant to the revised regulations. (Doc. 13 at 11). The Court agrees.
6 When considering the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ must do more than state a
7 conclusion; rather, the ALJ must “set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather
8 than the doctors’, are correct.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998); Brown-
9 Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495 (a court “cannot substitute [the court's] conclusions for the ALJ’s, or
10 speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ's conclusions. Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be
11 extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for [the court] to meaningfully
12 determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.”). “This can
13 be done by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical
14 evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. In
15 addition, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit clarified that under the new regulations for considering
16 medical evidence, “an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as
17 unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.
18 The agency must ‘articulate … how persuasive’ it finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each
19 doctor or other source, and ‘explain how [it] considered the supportability and consistency
20 factors’ in reaching these findings.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (internal citations omitted).
21 As to the consistency factor, Defendant argues the ALJ properly reasoned that “in contrast
22 to Dr. Stoltz’ opinion, the findings of Drs. Amado and Mohan ‘were consistent with the generally
23 normal examination findings and treatment history.’” (Doc. 18 at 3). However, a plain reading
24 of the ALJ’s findings indicates that he found the opinions of Dr. Amado and Dr. Mohan were
25 consistent with record, and their findings were consistent with the findings of Dr. Stoltz, which
26 speaks directly to the consistency factor as applied to the persuasiveness of Drs. Amado and
27 Mohan as opposed to any explanation of why Dr. Stoltz’s opinion was less consistent and
28 therefore less persuasive than the state agency opinions. Moreover, even if the Court were to
1 consider the cited “normal” examination findings as purportedly consistent with the state agency
2 opinions and the “findings” of Dr. Stoltz, the treatment records string cited by the ALJ are all
3 dated before the September 11, 2020 alleged onset date of disability, and as detailed above, the
4 records do not document treatment for back pain or scoliosis, the severe impairments at issue
5 here.
6 Finally, the ALJ fails to reference any specific objective or clinical medical source
7 evidence from the overall record that is inconsistent with the precise limitations opined by Dr.
8 Stoltz, nor does the ALJ offer any explanation as to how any of the specific limitations opined by
9 Dr. Stoltz, including limitations on standing, walking, lifting, and carrying, are inconsistent with
10 medical source evidence from the relevant period. (See AR 28). As noted by Plaintiff, the ALJ
11 failed to consider probative objective evidence from 2022,2 including, most notably, the results of
12 a November 7, 2022 MRI of the lumbar spine that noted, inter alia, severe dextroscoliosis,
13 moderate canal stenosis at L3-4, and multiple levels of neural stenosis, severe at bilateral L3-4,
14 right L4-5, right L5-S1, and moderate at left L 1-2 levels. (Doc. 13 at 14 (citing AR 966)); see
15 also AR 989-90 (observing severe scoliosis and tenderness pointing to right SI area and noting in
16 the “treatment plan” that Plaintiff could get a spine injection and use a cane or walker)). For
17 these reasons, to the extent that he considered the consistency factor, the ALJ’s findings are not
18 supported by substantial evidence.
19 As to the supportability factor, “the more relevant the objective medical evidence and
20 supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support” the medical opinion, the
21 more persuasive the medical opinion will be. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1) (emphasis added).
22 Defendant argues the ALJ “properly concluded that Dr. Stoltz’s opinion was less persuasive
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24 2 It is somewhat unclear to the Court whether Plaintiff intended to raise the ALJ’s failure to consider 2022
“objective evidence” in the record as a separate issue for the Court’s consideration apart from the assertion
25 of error in considering Dr. Stoltz’s opinion. (See Doc. 13 at 13-16). When the ALJ improperly ignores
significant and probative evidence in the record favorable to a claimant’s position, the ALJ “thereby
26 provide[s] an incomplete residual functional capacity determination.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1160
(9th Cir. 2012); see also Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
27 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981)). Regardless, in light of the Court’s finding that remand is necessary to reconsider
the medical opinion evidence, and direction that the ALJ should conduct a new sequential analysis, the
28 Court declines to consider this argument in detail here.
1 because it lacked support from his own examination.” (Doc. 18 at 4). As part of the opinion
2 analysis, the ALJ did summarize Dr. Stoltz’s “normal” examination findings including excellent
3 range of motion of her spine, normal range of motion of other joints, negative straight leg raise
4 test, 5/5 motor strength with good tone, normal sensation and reflexes, normal neurological
5 examination, and a slight limp. (Doc. 28, 684-85). However, as noted by Plaintiff, the ALJ
6 appeared to overlook Dr. Stoltz’s observations that Plaintiff had back pain with knee extensions
7 while seated, and “severe scoliosis of the lumbosacral spine with a very prominent left pelvic tilt
8 and prominence compared to the right.” (AR 684). Similarly, while not acknowledged by the
9 ALJ, Dr. Stoltz reviewed primary care notes from 2021 and radiology reports from 2021 that
10 showed “severe dextroscoliosis, severe degenerative changes and even mild to moderate
11 degenerative changes of the cervical spine with grade I anterolisthiasis of C4-C5 and her COBB
12 angle was 41 degrees at the lumbosacral spine,” and Dr. Stoltz noted in his functional assessment
13 that Plaintiff “certainly has radiological evidence for her issues as well as findings on [Dr.
14 Stoltz’s] physical exam with pelvic tilt and visible dextroscoliosis of the lower spine.” (AR 681,
15 685). Thus, to the extent he explicitly considered the supportability factor, the ALJ failed to offer
16 the requisite explanation, pursuant to the revised regulations, as to how he considered the
17 objective evidence presented by Dr. Stoltz in determining his opinion was less persuasive.
18 Woods, 32 F.4th at 792; see also Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495 (“Although the ALJ’s analysis
19 need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for [the court] to
20 meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by substantial
21 evidence.”).
22 Based on the foregoing, the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Stoltz’s opinion was “less persuasive”
23 is not supported by substantial evidence. On remand, the ALJ should reconsider Dr. Stoltz’s
24 medical opinion, along with all relevant medical opinion evidence.
25 B. Remedy
26 Plaintiff argues the Court should remand to the Social Security Administration for the
27 payment of benefits, or in the alternative, remand for further administrative proceedings. (Doc.
28 13 at 16). The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or reverse and award benefits
1 is within the discretion of the district court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.
2 1989). An immediate award of benefits is appropriate where “no useful purpose would be served
3 by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been thoroughly developed,”
4 Varney v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988), or when the
5 delay caused by remand would be “unduly burdensome[.]” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273,
6 1280 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021 (noting that a district court may abuse
7 its discretion not to remand for benefits when all of these conditions are met). This policy is
8 based on the “need to expedite disability claims.” Varney, 859 F.2d at 1401. But where there are
9 outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, and it is not clear
10 from the record that the ALJ would be required to find a claimant disabled if all the evidence
11 were properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96
12 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000).
13 The Court finds that further administrative proceedings are appropriate. See Treichler v.
14 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand for benefits is not
15 appropriate when further administrative proceedings would serve a useful purpose). Here, the
16 ALJ improperly considered the medical opinion evidence, which calls into question whether the
17 assessed RFC, and resulting hypothetical propounded to the vocational expert, are supported by
18 substantial evidence. “Where,” as here, “there is conflicting evidence, and not all essential
19 factual issues have been resolved, a remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate.” Treichler,
20 775 F.3d at 1101. On remand, the ALJ should reevaluate the medical opinion evidence. If
21 necessary, the ALJ should order additional consultative examinations and, if appropriate, take
22 additional testimony from medical experts. The ALJ should conduct a new sequential analysis,
23 reassess Plaintiff’s RFC and, if necessary, take additional testimony from a vocational expert
24 which includes all of the limitations credited by the ALJ.
25 Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
26 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) is GRANTED.
27 2. Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) is DENIED.
28 3. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g), the Court REVERSES the
] Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS this case back to the Commissioner of
2 Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
3 4. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion within thirty (30)
4 days.
5 5. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, terminate any motions and
6 deadlines, and close this case.
7
Dated: _ March 31, 2026 Wiha Th foare4 Hack
9 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA
10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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