Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 R.M., A-240-170-123 No. 1:25-cv-1607 TLN AC

12 Petitioner,

13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE

ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et

15 al.,

16 Respondents.

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18 Petitioner, an immigration detainee proceeding through counsel, has filed a petition for a

19 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Currently before the court is petitioner’s

20 petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1), which respondents oppose (ECF No. 14).

21 I. Factual and Procedural Background

22 Petitioner, a nonbinary citizen of India, arrived at the San Francisco International Airport

23 on a valid non-immigrant visa on April 4, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 14-2 at 2; ECF No. 15

24 at 5. Respondents assert that during inspection, petitioner informed Customs and Border Patrol

25 (“CBP”) that they intended to engage in unauthorized employment while in the United States and

26 affirmed the statement under oath. ECF No. 14-2 at 3. CBP then canceled their visa and placed

27 them into expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Id.; ECF No. 14-3. Petitioner later

28 expressed fear of being returned to India and had a credible fear hearing, at which petitioner was

1 found to possess a credible fear of persecution. ECF No. 15 at 5. They were then placed in

2 standard removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. ECF No. 14 at 2-3; ECF No. 15 at 5. On

3 August 14, 2025, petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal. ECF No. 15 at 6.

4 Petitioner is being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and has remained in custody since their

5 arrival. ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 14 at 1; ECF No. 15 at 5-6.

6 While detained, petitioner has requested and been denied bond, being deemed statutorily

7 ineligible, and they have been told that “they are not giving any parole to anybody.” ECF No. 1

8 at 7; ECF No. 14 at 6; ECF No. 15 at 16, 20. While awaiting asylum adjudication, petitioner has

9 had at least five master calendar hearings in front of three different judges,1 and their merits

10 hearing has been rescheduled at least twice,2 only once at petitioner’s request so that pro bono

11 counsel could properly prepare. ECF No. 1 at 9; ECF No. 15 at 7.

12 On November 21, 2025, petitioner filed a pro se petition arguing that their continued,

13 indeterminate detention without a bond hearing violates their Fifth Amendment right to due

14 process. ECF No. 1. Petitioner requests relief in the form of a bond hearing, either by this court

15 or the immigration court. Id. at 18-19. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

16 because petitioner is an immigrant “seeking admission” without valid entry documents who has

17 been placed in expedited removal, they are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) and

18 not entitled to any process. ECF No. 14 at 3-5. Respondents also argue that petitioner’s due

19 process rights have not been violated.3 Id. at 6-10. Petitioner, through appointed counsel, filed a

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1 On at least two occasions, the immigration judge assigned to petitioner’s case was fired by

21 respondent. ECF No. 15 at 7.

2 At the time of briefing, petitioner was set for a merits hearing on February 19, 2026. ECF No.

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14 at 3; ECF No. 15 at 7. However, the EOIR’s website now reflects that petitioner’s hearing is

23 scheduled for April 21, 2026, before yet another judge.

3 As part of their opposition, respondents argue that petitioner has not exhausted administrative

24 remedies in the immigration system because they have not appealed their bond determination to

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). ECF No. 14 at 5-6. Yet respondents also argue that

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petitioner’s detention is “statutorily-compelled” and that petitioner is statutorily “ineligible for a

26 bond.” Id. at 6-7. As petitioner points out, respondents “argue both that Petitioner is not eligible

for release through the immigration process and that Petitioner should seek release through the

27 immigration process.” ECF No. 15 at 20-21. It would be unreasonable for the court to require

petitioner to pursue what respondents’ own arguments indicate is a futile appeal to the BIA, and

28 (continued)

1 traverse in which they acknowledge that they are detained under § 1225(b)(1), but argue that

2 under the Due Process Clause they have “the right to be free from prolonged detention without

3 any opportunity to seek release from a judge.” ECF No. 15 at 12-20.

4 II. Legal Standards

5 A. Standards for Habeas Corpus

6 A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to anyone who is held in custody in violation of

7 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Magana-Pizano

8 v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241 expressly permits the federal

9 courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those aliens are ‘in custody in violation of

10 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” (citations omitted)). In federal habeas

11 proceedings, the petitioner is required to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.

12 Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).

13 B. Constitutional Standards

14 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being “deprived of

15 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due Process

16 Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence

17 here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)

18 (citations omitted). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other

19 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”

20 Id. at 690.

21 “The Due Process Clause ‘protects individuals against two types of government action’:

22 violations of substantive due process and procedural due process.” United States v. Quintero, 995

23 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The substantive component of the Due

24 Process Clause “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all,

25 no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a

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27 the undersigned finds exhaustion in this case is waived. See Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994,

1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (exhaustion can be waived where “pursuit of administrative remedies would

28 be a futile gesture.” (quoting SEC v. G.C. George Sec., Inc., 637 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1981))).

1 compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citations omitted). Courts

2 “examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a

3 liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines

4 whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky.

5 Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal citations omitted); Morrissey v.

6 Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question

7 remains what process is due.”).

8 “An as-applied challenge contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the

9 litigant’s particular [circumstances], even though the law may be capable of valid application to

10 others.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), as

11 amended on denial of reh’g (July 29, 1998).

12 C. Statutory Immigration Framework

13 “[A]pplicants for admission fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1)

14 and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Both

15 categories are subject to mandatory detention until a certain point or until certain proceedings

16 have concluded. Id. “Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible

17 due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” as well as “certain other aliens

18 designated by the Attorney General in his discretion.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),

19 (iii)).

20 If a noncitizen subject to § 1225(b)(1) “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum”

21 or “a fear of persecution,” the immigration officer “shall refer the [noncitizen] for an interview by

22 an asylum officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). If, after conducting a credible fear

23 interview, the asylum officer determines that the noncitizen has a credible fear of persecution, the

24 noncitizen “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C.

25 § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Where there is a positive credible fear determination, the United States

26 Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has discretion to “issue a Form I-862, Notice to

27 Appear, for full consideration of the asylum and withholding of removal claim in proceedings

28 under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].” 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f).

1 Despite the statute’s mandatory detention provision, applicants for admission may be

2 temporarily released on parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”

3 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017)). The

4 “express exception to detention” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) “implies that there are no other

5 circumstances under which [noncitizens] detained under § 1225(b) may be released.” Id. at 300.

6 Accordingly, there is no statutory right to a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under

7 § 1225(b). Id. at 296-97.

8 III. Discussion

9 A. Protected Liberty Interest

10 It has long been established that noncitizens in the United States have constitutional due

11 process protections, Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896), and those

12 protections apply regardless of whether they are “seeking admission” or are “admitted,” Wong v.

13 United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkie v.

14 Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 (2007). While “[i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment

15 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,

16 523 (2003) (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 306), the Supreme Court nonetheless upheld 8 U.S.C.

17 § 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision as constitutionally valid on its face, id. at 531.

18 However, the Supreme Court did so with the understanding that detention under § 1226(c)

19 constitutes a “very limited time” that “lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of

20 cases” and “about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.”

21 Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 529-30 & n.12. Then, in Jennings, the Supreme Court held that

22 § 1225(b) and § 1226(c) did not require periodic bond hearings and remanded the case without

23 addressing the due process claims.4 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312.

24 But neither Demore nor Jennings forecloses an as-applied challenge to mandatory

25 detention under § 1225(b). See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312 (court did not address constitutional

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27 4 The respondents in Jennings had argued that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) “do not

authorize ‘prolonged’ detention in the absence of an individualized bond hearing” and that absent

28 a bond-hearing requirement, the statutes violated due process. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 291.

1 arguments because they were not considered below); Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 420 (2019)

2 (as-applied challenge to § 1226(c) not foreclosed). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has expressed

3 “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is

4 constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the

5 government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so,” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909

6 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018), and the district courts have continued to find that “unreasonably

7 prolonged detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing violates due process,” Banda v.

8 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019); see Leke v. Hott, 521 F. Supp. 3d

9 597, 603 & n.8 (E.D. Va. 2021) (“there is no persuasive argument that Petitioner’s prolonged

10 detention [of over two years] without a bond hearing comports with the Fifth Amendment or the

11 ordinary operation of the INA”) (collecting cases); Abdul-Samed v. Warden of the Golden State

12 Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-cv-0098 SAB, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

13 142973, at *16 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (“[E]ssentially all district courts that have considered the

14 issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond

15 hearing, ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No.

16 C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197895, at *17 (W.D.

17 Wash. May 23, 2019))).

18 Petitioner has been continuously detained since their arrival at the San Francisco

19 International Airport on April 4, 2025, and because petitioner expressed credible fear of return to

20 their home country, they are no longer in expedited removal proceedings. ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF

21 No. 14 at 2-3; ECF No. 15 at 5. While respondents argue that “petitioner has made no showing

22 that their detention is indefinite” and assert petitioner is responsible for delays in their

23 proceedings because they have chosen to contest their removal and sought continuances for more

24 time to obtain evidence (ECF No. 14 at 8-9), the facts of this case suggest otherwise.

25 The record indicates that petitioner has requested only one continuance, and that the

26 request was made after pro bono counsel appeared on their behalf and the extension was for the

27 purpose of allowing counsel time to properly prepare. ECF No. 1 at 9; ECF No. 15 at 7. Aside

28 from petitioner’s single request for continuance, the remaining “delays” cited by respondents

1 appear to be due to the administrative process and petitioner’s exercise of their rights within that

2 process. Contrary to respondents’ implication, “Petitioner is entitled to raise legitimate defenses

3 to removal . . . and such challenges to [their] removal cannot undermine [their] claim that

4 detention has become unreasonable.” Liban M.J. v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 367 F.

5 Supp. 3d 959, 965 (D. Minn. 2019) (citation omitted); Masood v. Barr, No. 19-cv-7623 JD, 2020

6 WL 95633, at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4809, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) (“[I]t ill suits the

7 United States to suggest that he could shorten his detention by giving up these rights and

8 abandoning his asylum application.”). Moreover, petitioner asserts, and respondents do not

9 contest, that at least two immigration judges to whom petitioner’s case was assigned were fired,

10 further delaying proceedings. ECF No. 15 at 7. “[T]he delay caused by immigration judge

11 assignments ‘is attributable to the Government, not [petitioners].’” Malyshko v. Warden, Otay

12 Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 3:26-cv-0069 RBM SBC, 2026 WL 252367, at *5, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

13 19115, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026) (quoting Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120). As it currently

14 stands, there is no clear end to petitioner’s immigration proceedings in sight, even assuming their

15 currently scheduled hearing goes forward.5 See Mohammed v. Warden of Cal. City Det. Ctr., No.

16 1:26-cv-0118 DJC CSK, 2026 WL 192368, at *3, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13886, at *6 (E.D. Cal.

17 Jan. 26, 2026) (due to petitioner’s asylum claim “his case will first be heard by an Immigration

18 Judge, then by the Board of Immigration Appeals, followed by the Ninth Circuit provided either

19 party seeks further review”).

20 Taking these factors into consideration, the undersigned finds that petitioner’s detention is

21 prolonged and indefinite and they have therefore demonstrated a protected liberty interest.

22 ////

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5 According to the American Immigration Council’s website, “[i]ndividuals with an immigration

24 court case who were ultimately granted relief such as asylum in FY 2024 waited more than 1,283

days on average for that outcome.” Asylum in the United States, Am. Immigr. Council (May 9,

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2025), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/asylum-united-states/

26 [https://perma.cc/84D3-UWJS]; see also Immigration Court Quick Facts, Transactional Recs.

Access Clearinghouse, https://tracreports.org/immigration/quickfacts/eoir.html

27 [https://perma.cc/QU2N-4TWN] (showing that as of the end of February 2026 there were

3,318,099 active cases before the immigration court, 2,322,671 of which were awaiting asylum

28 hearings).

1 B. Process Due

2 Having determined that a liberty interest exists, the court must now examine what process

3 is due. See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (the court “first asks whether there exists a liberty or

4 property interest which has been interfered with” and then “examines whether the procedures

5 attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient”). Petitioner argues that their

6 detention has become prolonged such that they are entitled to a bond hearing under several

7 alternative tests: (1) the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

8 (1976); (2) the six-factor test set forth in Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D.

9 Wash. 2019); and (3) the six-month benchmark. ECF No. 15 at 13-20. The court applies the

10 framework set forth in Mathews, and concludes for the reasons set forth below, that a prompt

11 bond hearing at which the government will bear the burden demonstrating continued detention is

12 warranted is necessary. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022)

13 (assuming without deciding that the Mathews standard applies to a due process challenge to a

14 non-citizen’s ongoing detention); A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0107 KES SKO, 2025 WL

15 1424382, at *4, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94233, at *10 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (noting most

16 district courts in the Ninth Circuit employed Mathews to evaluate entitlement to a bond hearing),

17 adopted by 2025 WL 1808676, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125244 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025).

18 Under Mathews, the court considers three factors:

19 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;

second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through

20 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s

21 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

22 requirement would entail.

23 424 U.S. at 335. Additionally, due process rights in the immigration context “must account for

24 the government’s countervailing interests in immigration enforcement.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53

25 F.4th at 1206.

26 With respect to the first factor, “an individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from

27 prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably substantial.’” Id. at 1207 (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638

28 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011)). As addressed above, petitioner has been detained for nearly

1 twelve months with no end currently in sight. This factor therefore weighs in their favor.

2 The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, also weighs in petitioner’s favor.

3 Considering that petitioner has been provided no process, the risk of erroneous deprivation is

4 high, particularly because respondents do not argue or present any evidence that petitioner

5 presents a danger to the community or a flight risk. See A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5, 2025

6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94233, at *12 (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a petitioner’s] interest

7 is high where [h]e has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing[.]” (alterations

8 in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-

9 1141 KES SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *6, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176124, at *11 (E.D. Cal.

10 Sept. 9, 2025) (“Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is

11 justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” (alteration in

12 original) (citations omitted)). In fact, the government’s own records indicate that petitioner has

13 no known criminal record. ECF No. 14-2 at 2. As a result, the risk of erroneous deprivation

14 weighs in petitioner’s favor.

15 Finally, while the government has an interest in enforcing its immigration laws, its

16 “interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing is ‘low’” and custody hearings in immigration

17 court “are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.” R.T.D.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *6, 2025 U.S.

18 Dist. LEXIS 176124, at *11 (citing Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019);

19 Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025)). “Respondents offer no

20 ‘justifiabl[e] concern[]’ that Congress might have sought to address by providing for

21 [petitioner’s] unbailable detention.” Rincon v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-12633 BEM, __ F. Supp. 3d __,

22 2025 WL 3122784, at *8, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220058, at *17 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2025) (first

23 two alterations in original) (discussing petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(1)).

24 C. Conclusion

25 For these reasons, the court finds that the government’s interest in detaining petitioner

26 without a hearing is low and does not outweigh petitioner’s substantial liberty interest or the high

27 risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. The undersigned therefore recommends that the petition

28 for a writ of habeas corpus be granted and respondent be ordered to provide petitioner a bond

1 hearing before an immigration judge within seven days, at which the immigration judge must

2 order petitioner released unless the immigration judge finds that petitioner is a risk of flight or

3 danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence. See Maksim v. Annex, No. 1:25-cv-

4 0955 SKO, 2025 WL 2879328, at *6, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200588, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9,

5 2025) (adopting clear and convincing evidence burden in similar circumstance); Ohanyan v.

6 Warden of Cal. City Det., No. 1:25-cv-1661 TLN SCR, 2026 WL 183743, at *7, 2026 U.S. Dist.

7 LEXIS 12932, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2026) (recommending a bond hearing to an asylum

8 seeker detained for over 14 months), adopted by 2026 WL 295550, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23431

9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2026).

10 CONCLUSION

11 1. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for expedited relief

12 (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED to the extent it is being recommended that their petition be granted.

13 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that:

14 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) be DENIED;

15 3. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED;

16 4. Respondents be ordered to provide petitioner R.M., A-240-170-123, within seven days

17 of the issuance of an order adopting these findings and recommendations, a bond hearing before

18 an immigration judge at which the immigration judge must order petitioner released unless

19 respondents prove by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner is a risk of flight or danger to

20 the community;

21 5. Respondents be further directed to file a notice certifying compliance with the above

22 provision within three days from the date of the bond hearing;

23 6. If petitioner is granted release on bond, respondents shall return all of petitioner’s

24 documents and possessions at the time of release; and

25 7. Judgement be entered in petitioner’s favor and this case closed.

26 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

27 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within three days after

28 being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with

1 | the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period

2 || 1s warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties

3 || have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v.

4 | Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets

5 || the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties

6 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

7 || the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

8 | DATED: March 26, 2026 ~

9 AMttun—Clone_

ALLISON CLAIRE

10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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