Opinion

Court: District Court, C.D. California
Filed: Feb 28, 2018
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA-EASTERN DIVISION

12 JOEL ALLEN RUTIGLIANO, ) Case No. EDCV 17-01072-AS

)

13 Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

)

14 ) ORDER OF REMAND

v. )

15 )

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting )

16 Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

17 )

Defendant. )

18 )

PROCEEDINGS

22 On May 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review of the

denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income. (Docket

Entry No. 1). The parties have consented to proceed before the

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. (Docket Entry Nos. 11-12).

On October 17, 2017, Defendant filed an Answer along with the

Administrative Record (“AR”). (Docket Entry Nos. 16-17). The parties

filed a Joint Submission (“Joint Stip.”) on February 20, 2018, setting

1 forth their respective positions regarding Plaintiff’s claims. (Docket

Entry No. 20).

The Court has taken this matter under submission without oral

argument. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

On August 3, 2010, Plaintiff, formerly employed as a tester for a

manufacturing company and a deliverer for a phone book company (see AR

57-58, 172, 179-81), filed an application for Supplemental Security

14 Income, alleging a disability since October 31, 2005. (AR 148-54).

16 On October 26, 2011 and May 7, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge,

17 Lawrence I. Duran (“ALJ Duran”), heard testimony from Plaintiff (who was

not represented by counsel), Plaintiff’s mother, and vocational experts

Roxanne Minkus and Corinne Porter. (See AR 31-44, 47-83). On May 17,

2012, ALJ Duran issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (See

AR 13-24). After determining that Plaintiff had severe impairments –-

23 “left ilionguinal nerve block; status post inguinal hernia repair;

24 nystagmus; visual acuity 20/200 in left eye; astigmatism; emmetropia;

25 asthma; left groin pain; depressive disorder; and anxiety” (AR 15-16)1

1 ALJ Duran found that Plaintiff’s other impairments –- benign

right choroidal nevus, seizures, and hypertension -- were nonsevere.

(AR 15-16).

1 –- but did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments (AR

16-18), ALJ Duran found that Plaintiff had the residual functional

capacity (“RFC”)2 to perform heavy work3 with the following limitations:

7 can lift and/or carry 50 pounds frequently and 100 pounds

8 occasionally; can stand and/or walk for 6 hours out of an 8-

9 hour workday with regular breaks; can sit for 6 hours out of

10 an 8-hour workday with regular breaks; unlimited pushing

and/or pulling; can climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,

crawl, reach, handle and finger frequently; must avoid

concentrated exposure to extreme heat, cold, dust, odors,

fumes and pulmonary irritants; can perform simple work; can

16 interact with co-workers, supervisors and the general public

17 occasionally; cannot perform work that requires good visual

18 acuity; and needs letter to be 1 inch in size, close up.

(AR 18-23).

ALJ Duran then determined that Plaintiff was not able to perform

24 any past relevant work (AR 23), but that jobs existed in significant

2 A Residual Functional Capacity is what a claimant can still do

27 despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).

3 “Heavy work involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time

with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds.”

20 C.F.R. § 416.967(d).

1 numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, and

therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of

the Social Security Act. (AR 23-24).

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of ALJ

7 Duran’s decision on August 22, 2013. (See AR 1-3, 5).

9 Plaintiff filed an action in this Court seeking review of ALJ

10 Duran’s decision. On May 29, 2015, the Court issued an Order and

Judgment remanding the matter to the Commissioner based on ALJ Duran’s

failure to fully develop the record with respect to medical records from

treating sources. (See AR 416-25; see also AR 431-35 [July 23, 2015

Appeals Council Order vacating ALJ Duran’s decision and remanding case

16 to administrative law judge]).

18 On July 25, 2016 and December 5, 2016 (on remand), another

Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”), Mason Harrell, Jr., heard

testimony from Plaintiff (who was represented by counsel), medical

experts Wayne Kidder and Dr. Glassmeyer, and vocational experts Gregory

Jones and Troy Scott. (See AR 333-57, 360-96). On February 6, 2017, the

24 ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (See AR 312-23).

25 After determining that Plaintiff had severe impairments –- “seizure

26 disorder; history of left inguinal hernia repari; congenital nystagmus;

27 history of pulmonary embolism; valvular heart disease; mild degenerative

disc disease of the lumbar spine with lower back pain; alcohol abuse;

1 major depressive disorder; posttraumaic stress disorder (PTSD); and

2 borderline intellectual functioning” (AR 314) –- but did not have an

3 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled

4 the severity of one of the listed impairments (AR 314-16), the ALJ

found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work4 with the

following limitations:

can lift, push or pull 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds

10 occasionally; can sit, stand or walk for 6 hours out of an 8-

11 hour workday; can climb ramps and stairs frequently; cannot

12 climb ropes, scaffolds or ladders; can balance occasionally;

13 can stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl frequently; cannot read fine

print (smaller than 1/8 of an inch); cannot perform jobs where

distant vision is critical; must avoid exposure to fumes or

gases; can be exposed to “no more air pollutants than found in

an air-conditioned environment”; must avoid dangerous

19 machinery or working at heights; limited to non-complex and

20 routine tasks; cannot have interactions with the public; can

21 perform tasks requiring teamwork only occasionally; and might

miss work once per month.

(AR 316-321).

28 4 “Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time

with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.”

20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c).

1 The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff did not have any past

relevant work (AR 321), but that jobs existed in significant numbers in

the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, and therefore found

that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act. (AR 321-23).

8 The ALJ’s decision then became the final decision of the

9 Commissioner, allowing this Court to review the decision.5 See 42 U.S.C.

10 §§ 405(g), 1383(c); 20 U.S.C. § 416.1484(d).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine if

it is free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. See

Brewes v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial

evidence” is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). To determine

whether substantial evidence supports a finding, “a court must consider

the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence

that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Aukland v.

Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation

omitted). As a result, “[i]f the evidence can support either affirming

or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, [a court] may not substitute [its]

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).

5 The record does not reflect Plaintiff’s request for review of

the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council.

1 PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

3 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to properly: (1)

4 consider the relevant medical evidence in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC; (2)

5 consider Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony in assessing

6 Plaintiff’s RFC; and (3) determine whether there are two jobs in the

7 national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (See Joint Stip. at 6-12,

8 18-21, 26-28).

10 DISCUSSION

12 After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds that

13 Plaintiff’s second claim of error warrants a remand for further

14 consideration. Since the Court is remanding the matter based on

15 Plaintiff’s second claim of error, the Court will not address

16 Plaintiff’s first and third claims of error.

18 A. The ALJ Did Not Properly Assess Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom

19 Testimony In Determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity

21 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not provide legally sufficient

22 reasons for finding that Plaintiff’s statements and testimony about his

23 symptoms and limitations was not credible. (See Joint Stip. at 18-21).

24 Defendant asserts that the ALJ provided valid reasons for finding

25 Plaintiff not credible. (See Joint Stip. at 21-26).

26 //

27 //

28 //

1 1. Legal Standard

3 Where, as here, the ALJ finds that a claimant suffers from a

4 medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could

5 reasonably be expected to produce his alleged symptoms, the ALJ must

6 evaluate “the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine

7 the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual’s ability to

8 perform work-related activities for an adult . . . .” Soc. Sec. Ruling

9 (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, *2 (Mar. 16, 2016).6

11 A claimant initially must produce objective medical evidence

12 establishing a medical impairment reasonably likely to be the cause of

13 the subjective symptoms. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.

14 1996); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). Once a

15 claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment

16 that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms

17 alleged, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the

18 claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his or her pain and

19 symptoms only by articulating specific, clear and convincing reasons for

20 doing so. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 798 F.3d 749, 755 (9th Cir.

21 2015)(citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.

22 2007)); see also Smolen, supra; Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722

23 (9th Cir. 1998); Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th

24 Cir. 1997). Because the ALJ does not cite to any evidence in the record

27 6 SSR 16-3p, which superseded SSR 96-7p, is applicable to this

case, because SSR 16-3p, which became effective on March 28, 2016, was

28 in effect at the time of the ALJ’s February 6, 2017 decision. 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.929, the regulation on evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, including

pain, has not changed.

1 of malingering, the “clear and convincing” standard stated above

2 applies.

4 Generalized, conclusory findings do not suffice. See Moisa v.

5 Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004)(the ALJ’s credibility

6 findings “must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to

7 conclude the [ALJ] rejected [the] claimant’s testimony on permissible

8 grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony”)

9 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Holohan v. Massanari,

10 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001)(the ALJ must “specifically identify

11 the testimony [the ALJ] finds not to be credible and must explain what

12 evidence undermines the testimony”); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (“The ALJ

13 must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what

14 facts in the record lead to that conclusion.”).

16 2. The ALJ’s Credibility Finding

Plaintiff gave the following testimony at the July 25, 2016

administrative hearing (see AR 334-55):

He is 40 years old, is not married, and does not have

children. He went to school until the ninth grade, and he

knows how to read, write, and do simple math. He receives

public assistance (CalFresh) to buy food, and is staying at

the residence of a good friend. He last used

methamphetamines in December 2015, and he drinks alcohol but

is trying to quit. He believes he last worked in 2005. He

could no longer work, because of a duodenal hernia surgery

25 (although the right side is fine, he still has severe pain in

his left side), and because he experiences anxiety being

26 around people following a house fire in 2008. (See AR 334-

39, 349).

He has pain in his left groin when he tries to walk any

28 kind of distance or when he lifts anything heavy. The pain

in his left groin has been the same over the last few years.

1 He last experienced such pain when he went shopping seven

days earlier (and he still feels pain). The fire caused

2 damage to his lungs (including a lung embolism); he had to

have a thoracentesis (the removal of fluid). Although his

3 breathing has been stable for a couple of years, his lung

issue causes shortness of breath when he is sitting down and

4 walking. He has had a lifelong problem with both eyeballs

(“certain kind of fog that rolls into [his] eyes”). His

5 eyeball problem is getting worse; it is happening more

frequently (once or twice a month) and last about 25 minutes.

6 He also has nystagmus (his eyes shift back and forth), even

though he had surgery when he was a baby. He gets dizzy when

7 he reads small print. To read he usually uses a magnifying

glass or holds papers close to his face. He has panic

8 attacks (which cause his lips to go numb), lasting from 25

minutes to 3 hours, at least once a week. When he has a

9 panic attack outside his house, he tries to get home as fast

as possible. He has a sharp, burning pain (“like a sharp

10 spoon maybe twisting in [my] spine”) caused by a herniated

disc (L3). His back pain, which does not travel up or down,

11 affects his ability to sit and to lift. He threw out his

back putting on his shoes (bending). He has a tingling

12 sensation in his right leg. He walks with a limp (he does

not use an assistive device). (See AR 341-55).

He has had two nerve blocks in his groin –- the first

14 one in August 2010 gave him relief; the second one did not

give him relief. When his groin hurts, he has to lie down

15 and/or take his medication (Dilantin) (which usually works)

and he sometimes applies heat. He is taking medication for

16 his anxiety. In the past he has gone to a psychologist for

his anxiety, but has not yet gone to a clinic to which he was

17 referred (to obtain his medication). He has gone two or

three times to a spine clinic for his herniatic disc;

18 physical therapy and injections have been recommended, and

then surgery, if necessary. (See AR 337, 345, 353-54).

On a typical day he listens to books on the internet.

20 He tries to do dishes, does his own laundry, buys he own food

(the last time was a week earlier). It is difficult for him

21 to buy his own food because it means going out in public: “I

feel like people are looking at me, staring at me. It’s just

22 like walking on a tightrope.” (His fear of going out in

public started after the house fire.) (See AR 340-41).

He is not able to work a job packing shoes in boxes

24 because of his groin pain (he would have to call somebody for

a ride home) and his panic attacks (he would have to lock

25 himself in a bathroom or try to make it home). He does not

know whether he could get through one day. (See AR 351-52).

28 After briefly summarizing Plaintiff’s testimony (see AR 317), the

ALJ made the following findings: Plaintiff’s “medically determinable

1 impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the above alleged

2 symptoms; however, the [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the

3 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

4 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the

5 record for the reasons explained in this decision. Accordingly, these

6 statements have been found to affect the claimant’s ability to work only

7 to the extent they can be reasonabley be accepted as consistent with the

8 objective medical and other evidence and other evidence.” (Id.).

10 The ALJ discussed the objective evidence concerning Plaintiff’s

11 groin pain, back pain, respiratory issues, cardiovascular issues, vision

12 issues, neurological issues, and mental issues, and found that (with the

13 exceptions of Plaintiff’s vision issues and inability to be in public)

14 and found that the objective evidence did not support or corroborate

15 Plaintiff’s testimony of disabling symptoms. (AR 318-19). In

16 particular, the ALJ found that “other evidence in the record refutes the

17 severity of the claimant’s subjective complaints,” stating:

19 As pertinent here, the [Plaintiff’s] descriptions of his

activities of daily living are not limited to the extent

20 expected given his complaints of disabling symptoms and

limitations. According to the claimant, he can manage his

21 personal hygiene, perform household chores that include

washing dishes, laundry, and cooking, and shop in stores

22 (Hearing Testimony; Exhibit 3F, p. 4; Exhibit 25F, p. 3).

Although he testified that being in public is difficult for

23 him, the record notes that he is able to use public transport

(Exhibit 38F, p. 26). He can also read, write, perform

24 simple mathematical calculations, and follow audiobooks

(Hearing Testimony). Accordingly, these examples are other

25 factors considered in evaluating the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of the [Plaintiff’s] alleged symptoms,

26 and they illustrate the claimant’s greater ability to

function in contravention to his claims. (AR 319-20).

1 3. The ALJ’s Assessment of Subjective Symptom Testimony

As set forth below, the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony about the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of his pain and symptoms.7

First, the ALJ’s discounting of Plaintiff’s testimony about his

symptoms and functional limitations based on his ability to perform

certain daily activities, such as managing his personal hygiene, washing

dishes, doing laundry, cooking, and shopping, was not a clear and

convincing reason. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th

Cir. 2001)(“[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain

daily activities . . . does not in any way detract from her credibility

as to her overall disability. One does not need to be ‘utterly

incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.”); Reddick, supra (“Only if the

level of activity were inconsistent with the Claimant’s claimed

limitations would these activities have any bearing on Claimant’s

credibility.”). While a plaintiff's ability to spend a “substantial

part” of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of

physical functions that are transferable to a work setting may be

sufficient to discredit him, here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff

was spending a substantial part of his day engaged in these activities

or that the physical demands of such tasks as managing his personal

7 The Court will not consider reasons for discounting

Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony (see Joint Stip. at 22, 25-26)

that were not given by the ALJ in the decision. See Connett v.

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)(“We are constrained to

review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”; citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332

U.S. 194, 196 (1947), Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847-48 (9th Cir.

2001)); and Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014)(“We

review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability

determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did

not rely.”).

1 hygiene, washing dishes, doing laundry, cooking, and shopping were

2 transferable to a work setting. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

3 Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). There is no indication in

4 the record, and the ALJ did not ask Plaintiff at the administrative

5 hearing, about the amount of time it took Plaintiff to perform each of

6 these activities. Although Defendant contends that the ALJ’s decision

7 was supported by Plaintiff’s testimony at the October 26, 2011

8 administrative hearing (see Joint Stip. at 25, citing AR 71-72), it does

9 not appear that the ALJ considered or relied on that testimony in his

10 decision. Thus, Plaintiff’s admitted daily activities do not constitute

11 a legally sufficient reason to reject Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

12 testimony.

14 It is not clear whether the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony

15 about his limited abilities to perform such daily activities (see AR 340

16 [Plaintiff testified that he tries to wash dishes “when [he] can], 340-

17 41 [Plaintiff testified that he last went shopping for food a week

18 earlier], 59-60 [Plaintiff testified at the October 26, 2011

19 administrative hearing that he sometimes cooks meals but that at that

20 time he was not able to cook his own meals]. Therefore, the degree to

21 which Plaintiff could perform such daily activities may not have been

22 inconsistent with his testimony regarding his symptoms and limitations.

23 See Reddick, supra; see also Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec.

24 Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)(“If a claimant is able to

25 spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the

26 performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work

27 setting, a specific finding as to this fact may be sufficient to

28 discredit a claimant’s allegations.”).

1 Second, although the ALJ also found that there was a lack of

2 objective medical evidence supporting Plaintiff’s testimony concerning

3 his symptoms and limitations, this factor cannot, by itself, support an

4 adverse finding about Plaintiff’s testimony. See Trevizo v. Berryhill,

5 862 F.3d 987, 1001 (9th Cir. 2017)(once a claimant demonstrates medical

6 evidence of an underlying impairment, “an ALJ ‘may not disregard [a

7 claimant’s testimony] solely because it is not substantiated

8 affirmatively by objective medical evidence.’”; quoting Robbins v. Soc.

9 Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006)); Rollins v. Massanari,

10 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602

11 (9th Cir. 1998); see also SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, *4-*5 (“We must

12 consider whether an individual’s statements about the intensity,

13 persistence, and limiting effects of his or her symptoms are consistent

14 with the medical signs and laboratory findings of record. . . .

15 However, we will not disregard an individual’s statements about the

16 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because

17 the objective medical evidence does not substantiate the degree of

18 impairment related-symptoms alleged by the individual.”).

20 Because the Court finds that the the ALJ did not discount

21 Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony on legally permissible grounds,

22 the Court is unable to defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination.

23 Cf. Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th

24 Cir. 1995)(the court will defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations

25 when they are appropriately supported in the record by specific findings

26 justifying that decision)(citations omitted).

1 B. Remand Is Warranted

3 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or order an

4 immediate award of benefits is within the district court’s discretion.

5 Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). Where no

6 useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings,

7 or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to

8 exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. Id.

9 at 1179 (“[T]he decision of whether to remand for further proceedings

10 turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings.”). However, where,

11 as here, the circumstances of the case suggest that further

12 administrative review could remedy the Commissioner’s errors, remand is

13 appropriate. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011);

14 Harman v. Apfel, supra, 211 F.3d at 1179-81.

16 Since the ALJ failed to properly assess Plaintiff’s subjective

17 symptom testimony, remand is appropriate. Because outstanding issues

18 must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and

19 “when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the

20 [Plaintiff] is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social

21 Security Act,” further administrative proceedings would serve a useful

22 purpose and remedy defects. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th

23 Cir. 2014)(citations omitted).8

8 The Court has not reached any other issue raised by Plaintiff

25 except to determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate

payment of benefits would not be appropriate at this time.

26 “[E]valuation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that

Plaintiff is in fact disabled.” See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995,

27 1021 (2014). Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on Plaintiff’s

claims regarding the ALJ’s errors in failing to properly (1) consider

28 the relevant medical evidence in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC (see Joint

(continued...)

1 ORDER

3 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is

4 reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant

5 to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

7 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

9 DATED: February 28, 2018

11 /s/

ALKA SAGAR

12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8 (...continued)

Stip. at 6-12), and (2) determine whether there are two jobs in the

national economy that Plaintiff can perform (see Joint Stip. at 26-28).

Because this matter is being remanded for further consideration, these

issues should also be considered on remand.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.