Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

1:24-CV-9776 (LTS)

IN RE: DREW SMITH.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Petitioner Drew Smith, of Frederick, Maryland, filed this action pro se, “requesting a

Declaratory Judgment affirming that Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding public office

under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, and . . . a Writ of Prohibition (or other writ) to enforce

this ruling.” (ECF 1, at 1.) Among the associated relief he seeks, Petitioner asks this Court to

“[d]irect state and federal election officials, including the Electoral College electorates, to

enforce this disqualification by excluding Donald J. Trump from any certifications as President

on December 16, 2024[,] [o]r[,] in the event that it cannot be prevented timely, to issue a writ of

prohibition[] to stop the inauguration proceedings.” (Id. at 39.)

By Order dated December 20, 2024, the Court granted Petitioner in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) status. (ECF 6.) In another Order dated December 20, 2024, and entered three days later,

on December 23, 2024, the Court denied Petitioner’s “emergency petition for declaratory

judgment and writ of prohibition” and his “motion for expedited relief” (ECF 1 & 3) inasmuch as

Petitioner sought, in those submissions, immediate preliminary injunctive relief (ECF 7); the

Court also informed Petitioner, in that Order, that it would issue an explanatory Order with

respect to denying that relief at a later date and would also address his other claims in that

explanatory Order (id.). In still another Order dated and entered on September 11, 2025, the

Court denied Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 4) without prejudice to

Petitioner’s filing another such motion should this action proceed following review under the IFP

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and service of a summons and the initial pleading on Petitioner’s

opponent (ECF 8.)

For the reason discussed below, the Court dismisses this action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is

obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009),

and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Standing

The Court must dismiss this action for lack of standing. “Article III, Section 2, of the

Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the resolution of cases and

controversies.” Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-

controversy requirement.” Arizonians for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997).

To demonstrate standing, a litigant must show that: (1) he has personally suffered some

actual or threatened injury as a result of his opponent’s alleged illegal conduct; (2) the injury is

fairly traceable to his opponent’s conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the

requested relief. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church &

State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear

that, as to standing, “the [litigant] must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, to show standing, the litigant must

demonstrate “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Id.

Finally, “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by

a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The burden of

establishing standing to sue rests with the party bringing the action. Id.

Moreover:

a generalized grievance, no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.

A litigant raising only a generally available grievance about government—

claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the

Constitution and the laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly

benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or

controversy.

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In short, standing requires a litigant to have “a personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues.”

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Thus, “a voter fails to present an injury-in-fact [for the

purpose of standing] when the alleged harm is abstract and widely shared or is only derivative of

a harm experienced by a candidate.” Crist v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 262 F.3d 193,

195 (2d Cir. 2001). “[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind . . .

[that] is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature

of the injury all citizens share.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,

220 (1974).

In addition, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that: “Congress shall have

power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 5. Section 3 of that amendment concludes, “Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each

House, remove . . . [the] disability” articulated in that Section by which a person is prohibited

from holding federal office. Id. § 3. As the Supreme Court of the United States held in Trump v.

Anderson, only Congress—pursuant to its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

to pass appropriate legislation to enforce that amendment—may disqualify persons from holding

federal office or from being federal candidates under Section 3 of that amendment. 601 U.S. 100,

110-11 (2024).

Here, Petitioner seeks to disqualify President Trump from holding federal office under

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner states that he has “standing as an American

citizen . . . , as the issue raised involves a real and substantial constitutional question regarding

the enforcement of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment.” (ECF 1, at 22.) In addition, he asserts

standing “as an American citizen, qualified voter, and U.S. resident[] with [a] vested interest in

the constitutional eligibility of candidates for public office, particularly the office of the

President of the United States.” (Id.) Petitioner further states that, because “this issue involves

the scope of constitutional compliance and public trust, standing applies universally to all

citizens of the United States. . . . The scope of presidential authority directly impacts all citizens,

granting . . . Petitioner sufficient interest in this matter.” (Id.) Petitioner’s claims are thus

premised on alleged injuries that Petitioner shares with the general voting population of the

United States—that is, injuries that he “suffers in some indefinite way in common with people

generally.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Courts have not hesitated to dismiss similar actions brought by voters challenging

election results or the certification of elections for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to lack

of standing. See Collins v. Merrill, No. 1:16-CV-9375 (RJS), 2016 WL 7176651, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Dec. 7, 2016) (where the plaintiff “allege[d] that she ha[d] standing based on the fact that her

‘personal rights’ as a New York state voter ‘[were] at imminent risk of violation,’ since the

[Electoral College] Electors [were] scheduled to convene on December 19, 2016 to elect the next

President of the United States,” the court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

because of lack of standing, as such claims were “premised entirely on alleged injuries that

Plaintiff share[d] with the general voting population”) (citations omitted); id. (noting that

“Courts have not hesitated to dismiss similar allegations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

(citing cases)). With respect to claims brought by another voter to disqualify President Trump

from federal office pursuant to Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court has found that

voter’s “alleged injury . . . [to be] precisely the sort of generally available grievance that courts

routinely hold does not confer standing.” Johnson v. Trump, No. 1:25-CV-0607 (LTS), 2025 WL

2614677, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2025) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

Crist, 262 F.3d at 195 (2d Cir. 2001); Collins, 2016 WL 7176651, at *2; Fischer v. Cruz, No. 16-

CV-1224 (JS) (ARL), 2016 WL 1383493, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2016) (voter lacked standing

to sue for alleged injuries resulting from Senator Ted Cruz’s presence on the 2016 presidential

primary ballot, notwithstanding Senator Cruz’s alleged ineligibility to qualify for the presidency,

since “Plaintiff share[d] this alleged injury with every other voter in the State of New York”).

“[O]nce a presidential election concludes, one’s stake in the legitimacy of the

candidate’s presidency is ‘shared by an even greater number of people, i.e., all 300 million-plus

U.S. citizens, whether voters or not.’” Johnson, 2025 WL 2614677, at *4 (quoting Berg v.

Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to satisfy the

standing requirement of alleging a concrete and particularized personal and specific injury-in-

fact to himself. The Court therefore dismisses this action, for lack of standing and, thus, for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Mahon, 683 F.3d at 62 (“If [a]

plaintiff[] lack[s] Article III standing, a [federal] court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear

[his] claim.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

B. Leave to amend is denied

District courts generally grant a pro se litigant an opportunity to amend a pleading to cure

its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657

F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011). Because the defects in Petitioner’s pleading cannot be cured

with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Petitioner leave to amend his pleading.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses this action for lack of standing and, therefore, for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). For this reason, the Court denies all of

Petitioner’s requests for relief, including any requests for immediate preliminary injunctive

relief. (ECF 1 & 3.)

The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would

not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter a civil judgment dismissing this action for

the reason set forth in this Order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 6, 2026

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge