The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 LANCE WILLIAMS, Case No.: 1:24-cv-001506-CDB
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS AND THE
13 v. DOE DEFENDANT FOLLOWING
SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST
14 A. ROCHA, et al., AMENDED COMPLAINT
15 Defendants. 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD
16 Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge
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Plaintiff Lance Williams is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
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action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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On February 18, 2026, the Court issued its First Screening Order. (Doc. 18.) The Court
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determined that Plaintiff stated plausible Eighth Amendment excessive force, failure to protect,
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and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants Rocha and Florez in
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Claim I but failed to allege any other plausible claim against any other named defendant in Claim
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II or Claim III. (Id. at 4-15.) Plaintiff was directed to do one of the following within 21 days: (1)
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notify the Court in writing that he did not wish to file a first amended complaint and was willing
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to proceed only on the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Rocha and
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Florez (Claim I); Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendants Rocha and
1 Florez (Claim I); and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims
2 against Defendants Rocha and Florez (Claim I) with the remaining claims against any defendant
3 to be dismissed; or (2) file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the
4 Court; or (3) file a notice of voluntary dismissal. (Id. at 17.)
5 On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Notice of Filing of Amended
6 Complaint and Clarification of Courts Screening and Request for Extension.” (Doc. 19.)
7 On March 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (Doc. 20.) That same date,
8 the Court granted Plaintiff a 30-day extension of time within which to file a first amended
9 complaint and addressed his request for clarification. (See Doc. 21.)
10 Given Plaintiff’s filing of March 11, the Court presumes Plaintiff did not need the
11 requested extension of time and will screen the first amended complaint.
12 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
13 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
14 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
15 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious,
16 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
17 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if
18 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal
19 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
20 III. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
21 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
22 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
23 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain
24 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
25 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
26 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal
27 quotation marks & citation omitted).
1 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
2 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must
3 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”
4 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal
5 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
6 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of
7 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the
8 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal
9 theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation
10 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially
11 pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal
12 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted
13 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
14 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not
15 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
16 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).
17 B. Linkage and Causation
18 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal
19 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under
20 section 1983, a “plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual
21 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
22 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is
23 inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
24 defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Leer v.
25 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized
26 and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions
27 are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
1 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative
2 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required
3 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,
4 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
5 C. Supervisory Liability
6 Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of
7 their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; see e.g.,
8 Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff required to
9 adduce evidence the named supervisory defendants “themselves acted or failed to act
10 unconstitutionally, not merely that subordinate did”), overruled on other grounds by Castro v.
11 Cnty of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934
12 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section
13 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is
14 no respondeat superior liability under section 1983”).
15 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or
16 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th
17 Cir. 1989). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a
18 ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to
19 inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Accord
20 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability may be based on
21 inaction in the training and supervision of subordinates).
22 Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official
23 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional
24 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942
25 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations & quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other
26 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).
27 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must ... demonstrate that his
1 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707,
2 713 (9th Cir. 2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
3 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
4 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the
5 involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v.
6 Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
7 IV. DISCUSSION
8 A. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
9 Plaintiff names A. Rocha, H. Florez, E. Magallanes, and “Sergeant John Doe,” all
10 employed at California State Prison, Corcoran (COR), as defendants in this action. (Doc. 20 at 2-
11 3.) He seeks a jury trial, and compensatory and punitive damages of $100,000 each per defendant.
12 (Id. at 8.)
13 B. Plaintiff’s Claims1
14 Claim One: Factual Allegations
15 Plaintiff contends that on June 27, 2021, he was “attacked again by his then cellmate”
16 inmate Tenner. (Doc. 20 at 4.) Plaintiff ran from the unit to the office and asked Defendant Rocha
17 for help “due to his cellies homosexual attack.” (Id.) Rocha stated, “‘since your bugging me I can
18 move you.’” (Id.) When Plaintiff asked why he had to be moved when Tenner was the problem,
19 Rocha stated, “‘You have nothing coming because of all the complaints he has filed on staff.’”
20 (Id.) Rocha then told Plaintiff to “‘Man up if you don’t go back to your cell I’m going to issue
21 you a 115 (rule violation).’” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he refused to return to his cell out of fear for his
22 safety; instead, he asked “to be taken to the hole (administrative solitary segregation).” (Id.)
23 Next, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rocha placed him in a holding cell and “said, ‘Let me
24 call the sergeant’ because he needed instruction on what to do showing his inexperience as a
25 correctional officer.” (Doc. 20 at 4.) Defendants Rocha, Florez, and Doe then approached
26 Plaintiff and Rocha advised Plaintiff had “3 options and they are to go to the hole, to go talk to
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1 Because Plaintiff does not clearly state which claims are asserted against which Defendants (see Doc. 20 at 3, 6),
1 inmates in A-section … or go back to initial cell with Tenner the booty bandit and Man Up being
2 funny referencing for plaintiff to put his booty in the air in the cell for Tenner.” (Id.) A-section
3 inmates advised Plaintiff “there was no move available” for him, so he then asked Rocha and
4 Florez “emparitively [sic] to be taken to the hole because he had enemy and safety concerns”
5 because Tenner stabbed Plaintiff “with a pencil and he didn’t want to kill inmate Tenner in the
6 middle of the night.” (Id.) However, Rocha and Florez forced Plaintiff to return to his cell. (Id.)
7 Rocha and Florez threatened to file rule violations “that would have been falsified” and
8 threatened to use force. (Id. at 5.) When Plaintiff stated he would file a grievance and a lawsuit
9 for a failure to protect, “out of nowhere like a tornado storm Rocha and Florez [rushed]” him,
10 yelling “stop attacking an officer and stop resisting.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Rocha and Florez
11 “smash[ed]” him into the holding tank gate, aggressively searched him, instructed him to “put
12 down the weapon,” and then Rocha grabbed Plaintiff by the back of the neck and smashed his
13 forehead into the gate “trying to knock him out,” causing a “swollen knot” on Plaintiff’s forehead
14 the “size of a marble the big marble.” (Id.) Florez then grabbed Plaintiff by the back of the neck
15 and punched him in the back, causing Plaintiff to scream for a nurse. (Id.)
16 Plaintiff asserts Defendants Rocha and Florez “refused to call medical man down for
17 plaintiff upon his request or let him go to the nurse station” and threatened to kill him and issue a
18 115 “and in their words ‘that he better not snitch.’” (Doc. 20 at 5.) Back in the cell, Tenner
19 “attacked plaintiff again” and Plaintiff contends that before the attack “Tenner got the okay from
20 Florez and Rocha asking them if it was ok if he got down with plaintiff because he was getting on
21 there nerves and he was a pervert because he like women and not little boys.” (Id.) Plaintiff
22 contends Rocha and Florez gave Tenner “the thumbs up and said ‘go handle it we hate
23 Williams.’” (Id.) Defendant Rocha issued a retaliatory 115 “that was later dismissed because it
24 was falsified.” (Id.)
25 Plaintiff contends Defendant Doe failed to protect him because Doe “instructed
26 Defendants to place [him] back in the cell with inmate Tenner if that is what they did which could
27 only been done under the Sergeants orders.” (Doc. 20 at 5.) Plaintiff maintains that Rocha, Florez,
1 correctional goal,” and his First Amendment right to file a grievance “was chilled outright”
2 because he “did not file any grievance on any issue in claim one due to threats and actions of
3 retaliation by defendants.” (Id.)
4 Claim One: Applicable Legal Standards
5 Eighth Amendment Excessive Force
6 “[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on prisoners constitutes cruel and
7 unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 328
8 (1986) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). As courts have succinctly observed,
9 “[p]ersons are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment.” Gordon v. Faber, 800 F. Supp.
10 797, 800 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (citation omitted, quoting Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th
11 Cir. 1977), aff’d, 973 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1992)). “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply
12 not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer, 511
13 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).
14 A correctional officer engages in excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual
15 Punishments Clause if he (1) uses excessive and unnecessary force under all the circumstances,
16 and (2) “harms an inmate for the very purpose of causing harm,” and not “as part of a good-faith
17 effort to maintain security.” Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 788 (9th Cir. 2018). In other
18 words, “whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force …, the core
19 judicial inquiry is … whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
20 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7
21 (1992). In making this determination, courts may consider “the need for application of force, the
22 relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by
23 the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id.
24 at 7. Courts may also consider the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Id. However, the
25 absence of serious injury is not determinative. Id.
26 The Supreme Court has made clear that “not ‘every malevolent touch by a prison guard
27 gives rise to a federal cause of action’” under the Eighth Amendment. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.
1 dispositive of a claim of excessive force. See id. at 36-37. But the extent of an inmate’s injury is
2 one factor indicative of whether the force used was necessary in a particular situation. Moreover,
3 if force is applied maliciously and sadistically, liability is not avoided “merely because [the
4 plaintiff] had the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Id. at 37. Put another way, there
5 is no “de minimis” level of injury that is an acceptable result of excessive force under the Eighth
6 Amendment. Id. at 38-40; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth
7 Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis
8 injuries).
9 Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect
10 Prison officials have a duty “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
11 inmates, which has been interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners.” Labatad v.
12 Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
13 832-33 & Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005)). To establish a violation of
14 this duty, a prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference to threat of
15 serious harm or injury to an inmate.” Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 (citing Gibson v. Cnty. of
16 Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)).
17 A failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment requires a showing that “the
18 official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate ... safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
19 837. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of
20 fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial
21 evidence, ... and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from
22 the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842 (citations omitted). The duty to protect a
23 prisoner from serious harm requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee
24 the safety and well-being of the prisoner. Id. at 832-33; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th
25 Cir. 1998). As “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth
26 Amendment,” plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant acted with a “sufficiently
27 culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal quotations marks,
1 To state a claim, the Eighth Amendment requires allegations sufficient to plausibly show
2 that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm or safety. Farmer,
3 511 U.S. at 847. The objective component of an Eighth Amendment requires that a prisoner show
4 he was deprived of something “sufficiently serious.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th
5 Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The state of mind requirement under the subjective
6 component of the Eighth Amendment standard has been defined as “deliberate indifference” to an
7 inmate's health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the “deliberate indifference” standard, a
8 prison official cannot be found liable for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement
9 unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837.
10 Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
11 Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a
12 prisoner’s] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need
13 is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘“significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton
14 infliction of pain.”’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jett v.
15 Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059
16 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th
17 Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
18 To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must
19 first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition
20 could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second,
21 the plaintiff must show the defendants’ response to the need was deliberately indifferent.”
22 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096
23 (quotation marks omitted)).
24 As to the first prong, indications of a serious medical need “include the existence of an
25 injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or
26 treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily
27 activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060,
1 1122; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Examples of serious medical needs
2 include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and
3 worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
4 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain”).
5 As to the second prong, deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than
6 negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or
7 safety.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). Deliberate indifference is
8 shown where a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and
9 disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. In medical
10 cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or
11 possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122
12 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). “A prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however,
13 such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately
14 indifferent to his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
15 Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060
16 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from
17 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person
18 ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison
19 official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the
20 Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188).
21 To prevail on a deliberate-indifference claim, a plaintiff must also show that harm resulted
22 from a defendant’s wrongful conduct. Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122; see Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096;
23 Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (prisoner alleging deliberate indifference
24 based on delay in treatment must show delay led to further injury).
25 First Amendment Retaliation
26 Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances and lawsuits and
27 retaliation against prisoners for exercising this right is a constitutional violation. Rhodes v.
1 prison context requires: (1) that a state actor took some adverse action against the plaintiff (2)
2 because of (3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the plaintiff’s
3 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) “the action did not reasonably advance a
4 legitimate correctional goal.” Id. at 567-68. To prove the second element, retaliatory motive,
5 plaintiff must show that his protected activities were a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind
6 the defendant’s challenged conduct. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009).
7 Plaintiff must provide direct or circumstantial evidence of defendant’s alleged retaliatory motive;
8 mere speculation is not sufficient. See McCollum v. CDCR, 647 F.3d 870, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2011);
9 accord, Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition to demonstrating
10 defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s protected conduct, circumstantial evidence of motive may
11 include: (1) proximity in time between the protected conduct and the alleged retaliation; (2)
12 defendant’s expressed opposition to the protected conduct; and (3) other evidence showing that
13 defendant’s reasons for the challenged action were false or pretextual. McCollum, 647 F.3d at
14 882.
15 Claim One: Analysis
16 Liberally construing the first amended complaint and accepting all facts as true, Plaintiff
17 states plausible excessive force claims against Defendants Rocha and Florez. He contends that
18 Rocha and Florez rushed him “out of nowhere,” pushing him into the holding tank gate, that
19 Rocha grabbed him and smashed his forehead into the gate “trying to knock him out” causing
20 injury, and that Florez then grabbed him by the neck and punched him in the back causing him to
21 cry out. Plaintiff fails to assert an excessive force claim against Defendants Magallanes or Doe
22 because no facts are alleged to suggest they were involved in any way.
23 Next, Plaintiff states plausible failure to protect claims against Defendants Rocha and
24 Florez because they are alleged to have known inmate Tenner posed an excessive risk to Plaintiff
25 but failed to take reasonable measures to guarantee his safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33, 837.
26 However, Plaintiff fails to state a failure to protect claim against Defendant Doe because he
27 alleges only that Doe was present when Rocha gave him three options: “go to the hole, to go talk
1 and it cannot be said Doe failed to guarantee Plaintiff’s safety. Concerning Plaintiff’s assertion
2 that Doe “instructed Defendants to place [him] back in the cell with inmate Tenner if that is what
3 they did which could only been done under the Sergeants orders,” that assertion is speculation on
4 Plaintiff’s part. Simply put, no facts alleged indicate Doe was present or involved after Plaintiff
5 was given three options and what is alleged is insufficient to permit the drawing of any
6 reasonable inference that Doe was present or otherwise involved. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to
7 allege Doe was deliberately indifferent. And Plaintiff fails to allege a failure to protect claim
8 against Defendant Magallanes because no facts alleged indicate Magallanes was present or
9 involved.
10 Next, Plaintiff states plausible deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims
11 against Defendants Rocha and Florez because he alleges they refused to allow him to see a nurse
12 after he suffered an injury to his forehead causing a “swollen knot.” Plaintiff fails to assert a
13 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendants Magallanes or Doe
14 because no facts are alleged establishing or permitting the drawing of any reasonable inference
15 they were present or involved at the time Plaintiff sought medical care.
16 Finally, Plaintiff states plausible retaliation claims against Defendants Rocha and Florez
17 given the allegations they took adverse actions against him because he filed grievances and
18 complaints by physically assaulting him, and that those actions chilled the exercise of his First
19 Amendment rights because he did not file a grievance thereafter and that their actions did not
20 reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against
21 Defendant Doe because no facts alleged indicate that Doe took adverse action against Plaintiff
22 because he filed grievances or complaints. Thus, Plaintiff did not adequately allege retaliatory
23 motive by Doe and instead offers only speculation. And, again, Plaintiff fails to allege a
24 retaliation claim against Defendant Magallanes because no facts are asserted in this claim involve
25 Magallanes.
26 Claim Two: Factual Allegations
27 Plaintiff contends that on July 18, 2021, he was called to the program office. (Doc. 20 at
1 poking plaintiff in the chest and head.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that after learning Florez “was listed
2 as staff assistant due to plaintiffs’ mental health status,” Florez grabbed Plaintiff by the neck,
3 lifting him off the ground and holding him against a wall. (Id.) Florez then punched Plaintiff in
4 the stomach and when Plaintiff slid down the wall to the ground, Florez kicked him in the ribs.
5 (Id.) While Plaintiff was on the ground, Defendant Magallanes exited the program office and
6 Correctional Officer A. Franco2 exited another office. (Id.) Magallanes loudly stated, “‘that’s how
7 you follow orders get his ass out of here and Williams if you say anything or go to medical your
8 dead.’” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Magallanes is “liable for the excessive force and failure to protect
9 because he clearly ordered defendant Florez to assault” him and Magallanes did nothing to stop or
10 intervene in the assault by Florez. (Id.)
11 Next, Plaintiff asserts that Florez grabbed him “off the ground.” (Doc. 20 at 7.) When
12 Officer Franco said, “that’s not cool guys,” Florez replied, “’I’m just finishing up what I didn’t
13 finish before.’” (Id.) Then Florez threw Plaintiff “through the door like a rag doll to give example
14 it was like when Eddie Murphy was thrown threw the glass for being black in Beverly Hills just
15 without the glass.” (Id.) Plaintiff states he “stumbled and stumbled up into a full run.” (Id.) At that
16 point, Plaintiff yelled to Officer Franco to “call [him] a nurse.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends he “ran full
17 speed across the yard in pain back to his unit in fear of death observed by multiple inmates and
18 staff.” (Id.)
19 Claim Two: Applicable Legal Standards
20 Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment excessive force, failure to protect, and deliberate
21 indifference to serious medical needs claims. The applicable standards are provided above and
22 will not be repeated here.
23 Claim Two: Analysis
24 Liberally construing the first amended complaint and accepting all facts as true, Plaintiff
25 plausibly alleges Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure to protect claims against
26 Defendants Florez and Magallanes. He contends Florez physically assaulted him without
27
2
1 justification, deliberately indifferent to his health and safety, and that Magallanes condoned
2 Florez’s assault, and was present and failed to intervene. Further, Plaintiff plausibly alleges
3 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims against Florez and Magallanes because it
4 can be reasonably inferred Plaintiff’s request for a nurse, although directed to Officer Franco, was
5 heard by Florez and Magallanes. It also can be reasonably inferred that Florez and Magallanes
6 were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical need where Plaintiff fled back to his unit and
7 no facts alleged indicate Plaintiff was seen by medical staff following the incident, and where
8 Plaintiff alleges Magallanes threatened him if he were to “go to medical.” Because no facts are
9 alleged regarding Defendants Rocha or Doe, no claims upon which relief can be granted are
10 stated against Rocha and Doe in Claim Two.
11 Screening Summary
12 Regarding Claim One, Plaintiff states plausible Eighth Amendment claims against Rocha
13 and Florez for excessive force, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to serious medical
14 needs, and plausible First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Rocha and Florez.
15 However, Plaintiff fails to allege any other cognizable claim against Defendants Doe or
16 Magallanes, or any other named defendant.
17 Regarding Claim Two, Plaintiff states plausible Eighth Amendment claims against
18 Defendants Florez and Magallanes for excessive force, failure to protect, and deliberate
19 indifference to serious medical needs. He fails to allege any other claim against Defendants
20 Rocha or Doe, or any other named defendant.
21 The Court concludes granting further leave to amend would be futile. See Hartman v.
22 CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of first amended complaint
23 and finding leave to amend futile where complaint’s allegations belied plaintiff’s entitlement to
24 relief). Therefore, the Court will recommend this action proceed on Plaintiff’s cognizable claims
25 against Defendants Rocha, Florez, and Magallanes, and that Defendant Doe be dismissed.
26 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
27 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a
] Further, for the reasons given above, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:
2 1. This action PROCEED only on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims for excessive
3 force, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against
4 Defendants Rocha and Florez as asserted in Claim One, First Amendment retaliation
5 claims against Defendants Rocha and Florez as asserted in Claim One, and Eighth
6 Amendment excessive force, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to serious
7 medical needs against Defendants Florez and Magallanes as asserted in Claim Two;
8 2. Defendant Doe be DISMISSED from the action; and
9 3. Any remaining claims against any other named defendant be DISMISSED.
10 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
11 | Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days
12 | after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written
13 | objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to
14 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages
15 | without leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to
16 | the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference
17 | the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise
18 | reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation
19 | may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations
20 | under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time
21 | may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th
22 | Cir. 2014).
23 | ITIS SO ORDERED.
| Dated: March 23, 2026 | Wr bY
25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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