Chestnut

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 YEGOR SARIBEKYAN, No. 1:26-cv-01696-DJC-DMC

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Petitioner,

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v. ORDER

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CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT

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Respondents.

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18 Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by a noncitizen

19 who entered the United States in December 2024 and has been detained by

20 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for fifteen months pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

21 § 1225(b)(1). (See Habeas Petition (“Pet.”) (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 1, 4; Juarez Decl. (ECF No.

22 8) ¶ 5.) During this time, Petitioner has never received a bond hearing nor any other

23 individualized assessment of whether he presents a risk of flight or danger to the

24 community. (See Pet. ¶ 14.)

25 Petitioner raises claims similar to those this Court has already addressed. This

26 Court has previously joined other district courts in concluding that the unreasonably

27 prolonged detention of individuals such as Petitioner under section 1225(b) without a

28 bond hearing can violate the Due Process Clause. See Mohammed v. Warden of Cal.

1 City Det. Ctr., No. 1:26-cv-00118-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL 192368 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026);

2 see also Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-cv-

3 00098-SAB, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (explaining that

4 “essentially all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged

5 mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, ‘will — at

6 some point — violate the right to due process[ ]’”) (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No. 2:18-

7 cv-01669-RAJ, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report and

8 recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-cv-01669-RAJ, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash.

9 Nov. 13, 2019)).

10 Petitioner argues that his fifteen-month detention without any individualized

11 assessment violates the Due Process Clause. (Pet. ¶ 39.) To determine if Petitioner’s

12 due process rights have been violated, the Court must answer two questions: “the first

13 asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,

14 and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that

15 protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-

16 cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025).

17 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in securing his freedom from detention.

18 “Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms

19 of physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v.

20 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Petitioner was initially detained in December 2024

21 and has remained in custody for fifteen months. (Pet. ¶¶ 2,4.) On September 30,

22 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s asylum application, granted

23 withholding of removal but ordered Petitioner remained detained. (Pet. ¶ 60.)

24 Petitioner timely appealed. (Id.) Therefore, Petitioner faces indefinitely prolonged

25 detention while the administrative and potential judicial review of his asylum claim

26 takes place. As Petitioner has been deprived of the liberty secured by the Due

27 Process Clause and this deprivation will continue for a protracted and indefinite

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1 period, Petitioner has established his liberty interest. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690,

2 693.

3 Having established that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Court

4 must determine what process Petitioner is due under the Constitution. Courts in this

5 Circuit weigh the following factors to ascertain when prolonged detention violates the

6 Due Process Clause: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of

7 future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal

8 proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by

9 the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a

10 final order of removal.” Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash.

11 2019); see, e.g., Sandesh v. LaRose, No. 3:26-cv-00846-JES-DDL, 2026 WL 622690

12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) (finding “it most appropriate to apply the Banda test to

13 Petitioner’s detention here under [section] 1225(b), as other courts within this district

14 have done in the past” and collecting cases).

15 First, the “length of detention”, which is “the most important factor,” Martinez,

16 2019 WL 5968089, at *9, weighs in Petitioner’s favor as Petitioner has been detained

17 for fifteen months. (Pet. ¶¶ 4,14.) That length of time aligns with what other courts in

18 this Circuit have found to be sufficiently prolonged to warrant relief. See Yagoub v.

19 LaRose, No. 3:26-cv-00914 JLS-JLB, 2026 WL 673799, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026)

20 (finding Petitioner’s detention of “nearly eight months” without a bond hearing

21 weighed in Petitioner’s favor); see also Amado v. United States Dep't of Just., No. 3:25-

22 cv-02687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (explaining that

23 “[c]ourts have found detention over seven months without a bond hearing weighs

24 toward a finding that it is unreasonable” and collecting cases).

25 The second factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. This factor requires

26 consideration of “how long the detention is likely to continue absent judicial

27 intervention; in other words, the anticipated duration of all removal proceedings

28 including administrative and judicial appeals.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9

1 (citation omitted). Petitioner’s appeal of the Immigration Judge’s September 2025

2 decision remains pending. (See Pet. ¶ 60.) Further, either party may seek Ninth

3 Circuit review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision. Therefore,

4 Petitioner faces indefinitely prolonged detention while administrative and potentially

5 judicial appeals of his removal order are decided. Loba L.M. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-

6 00611-JLT-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2939178, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025), report and

7 recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-cv-00611-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 3187577 (E.D. Cal.

8 Nov. 14, 2025) (finding that “[a]lthough future events are difficult to predict, the Court

9 nevertheless finds that the pending appeal before the BIA and possible remand to the

10 immigration court for further proceedings or possible judicial review by the Ninth

11 Circuit will be sufficiently lengthy such that this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner [ ]”);

12 Bojorge-Sequeira v. Geo Grp. Inc., No. 2:25-cv-01807-KKE-GJL, 2026 WL 288378, at

13 *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-cv-

14 01807-KKE-GJL, 2026 WL 285657 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2026) (finding this factor

15 weighed in favor of petitioner who had appealed the Immigration Judge’s decision to

16 the BIA).

17 Next, the Court considers the conditions of detention. Here, Petitioner

18 contends that he has suffered significant physical and mental health deterioration and

19 that his confinement continues to cause serious harm. (Pet. ¶ 13.) However, he has

20 not submitted evidence about the conditions of his confinement. See Djelassi v. ICE

21 Field Off. Dir., 434 F. Supp. 3d 917, 931 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (finding the “third factor —

22 conditions of the detention facility where Petitioner is detained — is neutral because

23 the parties have not submitted any evidence regarding the conditions at the

24 Northwest Detention Center.”). Thus, this factor is neutral.

25 The fourth Banda factor involves the delay attributed to the Petitioner. Here,

26 the Petitioner is pursuing an appeal in his asylum case. (Pet. ¶ 60.) Additionally, the

27 record indicates that Petitioner requested at least a few of the continuances that were

28 present in this case for case management reasons. (See Juarez Decl. ¶ 7.) There was

1 also one urgent request by Petitioner’s Counsel to continue the individual merits

2 hearing, but he subsequently sought to advance the hearing to an earlier date. (See

3 Juarez Decl. ¶ 9.) As there is no allegation or appearance of bad faith, the Court finds

4 that these actions do not significantly weigh against Petitioner. See Masood v. Barr,

5 No. 3:19-cv-7623-JD, 2020 WL 95633, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2022) (explaining that a

6 BIA appeal is a “perfectly legitimate” proceeding); see also Martinez, 2019 WL

7 5968089, at *10 (distinguishing between “legitimate defenses” to removal, which

8 “cannot undermine [a petitioner’s] claim that detention has become unreasonable”

9 and “dilatory” or “bad faith” tactics to “deliberately slow the proceedings.”).

10 Under the fifth Banda factor, the Court considers the delay in the removal

11 proceedings caused by the Respondents. Here, Petitioner alleges that the day before

12 Petitioner was set to appear at his individual merits hearing, DHS transferred

13 Petitioner to a different detention facility. (Pet. ¶ 36.) At the hearing, which

14 Petitioner’s counsel attended, DHS could not explain why Petitioner was suddenly

15 transferred nor why he was not allowed the opportunity to appear remotely. (Id.)

16 Petitioner’s next individual hearing is set for March 26, 2026. (Id. ¶ 38.) Thus, this

17 factor weighs slightly against Respondents.

18 Finally, the Court lacks sufficient information to assess the likelihood that

19 Petitioner’s removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal and therefore

20 declines to do so. See Sarr v. Scott, 765 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1109 (W.D. Wash. 2025)

21 (declining to speculate as to the merits of Petitioner’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit after

22 the Immigration Judge and the BIA found Petitioner removable).

23 In sum, four of the Banda factors, including the most important one, weigh in

24 favor of Petitioner while one remains neutral. Having established Petitioner has a

25 liberty interest and determined that his prolonged and indefinite detention entitles

26 him to process, the Court grants Petitioner a bond hearing.

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ee IE III IO RI III EOE IIE III IIE IE IGIED IED IIE EEE

1 CONCLUSION

2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

3 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED as to Count

4 |."

5 2. Within seven (7) days of this Order, Petitioner shall be afforded a

6 constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. At

7 this hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear

8 and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community

9 or arisk of flight, and Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present.”

10 In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a danger to the community

11 and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond,” the

12 Immigration Judge should consider Petitioner's financial circumstances and

13 alternative conditions of release. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000

14 (9th Cir. 2017).

15 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case and enter judgment for

16 Petitioner. This Order resolves all pending motions.

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18 IT |S SO ORDERED.

19 | Dated: _March 19, 2026 “Dane I. ratte

Hon. Daniel alabretta

20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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22 | DJC6 - SARIBEKYAN26cv016%6.merits_v1

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24 | In the interests of judicial economy, the Court declines to address the remaining grounds for relief in

25 the Petition.

26 ? This burden of proof has been regularly applied by courts reviewing similar cases, and the Court

adopts the views of those courts here. See, e.g., Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL

27 2935630, at *13-14(N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2025); Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035-JLT-

HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025); Castellon v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-00968-JLT-

28 EPG. 2025 WL 2373425, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2025).