Robinson

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 ARICA ROBINSON, an No. 2:25-cv-02366-JAM-SCR

individual,

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Plaintiff,

12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

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ANNA HAAS, as an individual,

14 CITY OF ROSEVILLE, as a

municipality, and DOES 1

15 through 10, inclusive,

16 Defendants.

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18 Plaintiff was arrested by City of Roseville Police

19 Department Officers in August 2023 when her car was reported

20 stolen by her estranged husband as a form of domestic abuse.

21 Plaintiff brought suit against her arresting officers and the

22 City of Roseville, alleging her detention and subsequent arrest

23 were unlawful. The City of Roseville now moves to dismiss

24 Plaintiff’s sole claim against them for municipal liability under

25 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing Plaintiff has failed to adequately

26 plead any theory of liability recognized under Monell v.

27 Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

28 658 (1978).

1 As discussed further below, the Court agrees and finds that

2 Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead Monell liability. Thus,

3 the Court grants dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against the City

4 of Roseville with leave to amend.

5 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

6 Plaintiff Arica Robinson claims she was unlawfully detained

7 and arrested by Defendant City of Roseville Police Department

8 Officer Anna Haas and other officers on August 29, 2023. Compl.

9 ¶¶ 1, 15, ECF No. 1. At the time of her arrest, Plaintiff was

10 married to but estranged from her husband, Herschel Robinson

11 (“Herschel”), and had a restraining order against him due to a

12 documented history of abuse. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. The restraining order

13 explicitly protected a vehicle Plaintiff and her husband had

14 purchased approximately one month before the arrest. Id. ¶¶ 10–

15 12. The vehicle was placed in Herschel’s name for ease of

16 financial approval during the purchase but was purchased using

17 Plaintiff’s money. Id. ¶ 12. Further, Plaintiff and Herschel

18 verbally agreed that the vehicle belonged to Plaintiff, as it was

19 going to be used exclusively for her personal and professional

20 purposes, and the vehicle was insured in Plaintiff’s name. Id.

21 ¶¶ 12–13.

22 On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff was driving the vehicle to

23 Grass Valley when she stopped at a gas station in Roseville to

24 refuel. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff was inside the gas station store

25 when Defendant Haas and another police officer entered the

26 premises and asked who Plaintiff’s vehicle belonged to. Id.

27 Plaintiff responded that the vehicle was hers, and the officers

28 escorted her outside. Id. Once outside, the officers informed

1 Plaintiff that the vehicle had been reported stolen. Id.

2 Plaintiff believed that her husband was responsible for reporting

3 the theft, as he had previously made similarly false reports to

4 the police in different counties in an ongoing pattern of abuse

5 and harassment. Id. ¶ 18.

6 The officers handcuffed Plaintiff and placed her in the back

7 of their patrol vehicle. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff remained

8 handcuffed in the backseat of the patrol car for approximately 45

9 minutes to an hour “while the officers stood outside conversing

10 and making no apparent effort to investigate the situation.” Id.

11 ¶ 21. At one point, one of the officers opened the door and

12 asked, “How did you get the keys to the vehicle?” to which

13 Plaintiff explained that the vehicle belonged to her, that it was

14 insured in her name, and that she used it for work. Id.

15 Plaintiff further informed the officer that she and her husband

16 had purchased the car together but that she had since obtained a

17 restraining order against him due to ongoing abuse. Id. ¶ 22.

18 Plaintiff offered to show the officer her marriage license and

19 restraining order, which were both in the vehicle. Id. The

20 officer briefly glanced at the documents before “appear[ing] to

21 dismiss their significance[.]” Id. ¶ 23.

22 Plaintiff was transported first to jail and later to a

23 hospital in Folsom after jail staff observed that her blood

24 pressure was elevated. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. After receiving medical

25 treatment, Plaintiff was taken back to the police station for

26 booking and was detained overnight in jail. Id. ¶¶ 27–29.

27 Plaintiff alleges she developed post-traumatic stress disorder as

28 a result of the incident and now lives in fear of law

1 enforcement. Id. ¶¶ 29–31.

2 Plaintiff filed suit on August 19, 2025, alleging three

3 causes of action for (1) Unreasonable Seizure of a Person

4 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Haas; (2) Denial

5 of Substantive Due Process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

6 Defendant Haas; and (3) Monell Liability against Defendant City

7 of Roseville (the “City”) and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to 42

8 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 32–56. The City filed a Motion to Dismiss

9 (ECF No. 6) Plaintiff’s third cause of action for Monell

10 liability on October 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a timely

11 Opposition (ECF No. 8), and the City filed a Reply (ECF No. 9).

12 The matter was submitted without oral argument under Local Rule

13 230(g). ECF No. 11.

14 II. LEGAL STANDARD

15 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a

16 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

17 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted

18 only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or

19 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”

20 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th

21 Cir. 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true

22 and construes “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

23 party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154,

24 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

25 Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). That said, if

26 the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an

27 entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v.

28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

1 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement

2 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”

3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations.”

4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However,

5 this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient

6 factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal,

7 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic

8 recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. “A claim has

9 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

10 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

11 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

12 III. OPINION

13 “Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach

14 under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

15 378, 392 (1989). Rather, government entities may be liable under

16 section 1983 “only for ‘their own illegal acts.’” Connick v.

17 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati,

18 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). Otherwise stated, a government entity

19 may be held liable under section 1983 only if a policy, practice,

20 or custom of that entity is a “moving force” behind a violation

21 of constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95.

22 To establish liability for governmental entities under

23 Monell, “a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that [the plaintiff]

24 possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived;

25 (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy

26 amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s

27 constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving

28 force behind the constitutional violation.’” Dougherty v. City

1 of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v.

2 Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.

3 1997)). Consistent with these principles, a local government may

4 be held liable under three distinct theories: (1) when the

5 “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by

6 its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said

7 to represent official policy, inflicted the injury”; (2) when a

8 local government “fail[s] to train employees in a manner that

9 amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to a constitutional right,

10 such that ‘the need for more or different training is so obvious,

11 and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of

12 constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can be

13 reasonably said to have been deliberately indifferent to the

14 need’”; or (3) when “the individual who committed the

15 constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making

16 authority or such an official ratified a subordinate’s

17 unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.”

18 Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir.

19 2018) (some internal quotation marks omitted).

20 Here, the City argues Plaintiff has unsuccessfully pled

21 Monell liability under any theory. Mot. Dismiss at 3–7, ECF No.

22 6-1. In opposition, Plaintiff argues she has sufficiently pled a

23 Monell claim based on the City’s failure to adequately train

24 Defendant Haas and the other officer(s) who arrested Plaintiff

25 “to assess whether probable cause existed when investigating

26 claims of spouses stealing property from one another.” Opp’n

27 Mot. Dismiss at 5–6, ECF No. 8.

28 The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiff has

1 inadequately pled Monell liability based on the City’s failure to

2 train Defendant Haas or other officers. To allege a failure to

3 train, a plaintiff must allege: (1) “a constitutional violation”;

4 (2) “a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate

5 indifference to constitutional rights”; and (3) “that the

6 constitutional injury would not have resulted if the municipality

7 properly trained their employees.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San

8 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff fails

9 to sufficiently allege the second requirement, namely that the

10 City maintained a training policy deliberately indifferent to her

11 constitutional rights. This prong requires Plaintiff to show

12 both that the City chose a training program inadequate to prevent

13 constitutional violations and that the City was deliberately

14 indifferent to such violations. See Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23

15 F.4th 863, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2022).

16 First, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege the City’s

17 training policy was deficient. Plaintiff generally alleges that

18 the City was “on notice of the Constitutional defects in their

19 training of HAAS and other City of Roseville Police Department

20 officers, including but not limited to relying on false reports

21 without substantiating basic facts to establish reasonable

22 suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest members of the

23 public, including Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶ 55. However, Plaintiff

24 fails to plausibly allege any unlawful seizure incidents

25 involving domestic disputes beyond this case. See id. ¶¶ 9–31,

26 50–56. An “inadequate training policy itself cannot be inferred

27 from a single incident.” Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875; see also City of

28 Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 (“adequately trained officers

1 occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little

2 about the training program”). The Complaint offers no other

3 facts about the City’s training program or policies, instead

4 focusing only on the acts of individual officers towards

5 Plaintiff. Compl. ¶¶ 9–31, 50–56. As Plaintiff relies solely on

6 the single incident involved in this case, she has not

7 sufficiently established the City employs an inadequate training

8 policy. Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875 (holding plaintiffs did not state

9 a failure to train claim under Monell because they relied solely

10 on a single incident and pled no other facts to suggest a

11 deficient training policy); City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91

12 (“[T]hat a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained

13 will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the

14 officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than

15 a faulty training program.” (citations omitted)).

16 Second, when premising Monell liability on a failure to

17 train, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by

18 untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate

19 deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”

20 Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v.

21 Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). “Without notice that a course

22 of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers

23 can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program

24 that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. Here,

25 Plaintiff generally alleges that the City had notice of and

26 “approved ratified, condoned, encouraged, sought to cover up,

27 and/or tacitly authorized the continuing pattern and practice of

28 misconduct and/or civil rights violations by HAAS and other City

1 of Roseville Police Department officers[.]” Compl. ¶ 53.

2 However, as discussed above, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege

3 facts supporting “[a] pattern of similar constitutional

4 violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62; see also Oliveira v. Cnty.

5 of Madera, No. 1:16-cv-01626-DAD-SKO, 2017 WL 4151272, at *11

6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017) (dismissing failure to train claim

7 because “Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing a pre-existing

8 pattern of constitutional violations stemming from the alleged

9 failure to train officers regarding concurrent jurisdiction”).

10 “[E]vidence of the failure to train a single officer is

11 [generally] insufficient to establish a municipality’s deliberate

12 policy.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 485 (9th

13 Cir. 2007).

14 Nor is this one of the “rare” instances where a single

15 incident may suffice to establish deliberate indifference where

16 the violation of constitutional rights is a “highly predictable

17 consequence” of a failure to train because that failure to train

18 is “so patently obvious.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 63–64. For

19 example, where a “city has armed its officers with firearms[,]

20 . . . the need to train officers in the constitutional

21 limitations on the use of deadly force can be said to be ‘so

22 obvious,’ that failure to do so could properly be characterized

23 as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional rights.” City of

24 Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. By contrast, where, “as here,

25 [City] employees are not making life-threatening decisions . . .

26 and because micromanaging of municipal policies should be

27 avoided, the single incident exception is inapplicable.”

28 Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1155. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s

NEI IIE IE EINE IIE III OS IIE IEE IRR GUS OI ED Re

1 failure to train claim is inadequately pled.

2 In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide

3 whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be freely

4 given where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory

5 | motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the

6 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]

7 futility of amendment ... .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

8 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052

9 (9th Cir. 2003). This is the Court’s first dismissal of

10 Plaintiff’s Monell claim, and the City has not demonstrated that

11 amendment is clearly futile. Thus, the Court dismisses

12 Plaintiff’s claim for Monell liability against the City with

13 leave to amend.

14 Iv. ORDER

15 Defendant City of Roseville’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6)

16 Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

17 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, she must do so

18 within twenty (20) days of this Order. Defendants shall file

19 their response to the amended complaint within twenty (20) days

20 thereafter.

21 IT IS SO ORDERED.

22 Dated: March 16, 2026

23 Se Z J (Paras

HN A. MENDEZ.

24 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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