Marin

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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8 DANILO LOPES SANTANA (A-Number: Case No. 1:26-cv-0915-DJC-JDP

201-678-151),

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Petitioner,

10 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

v.

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DAVID MARIN, et al.,

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Respondents.

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14 Petitioner Danilo Lopes Santana entered the United States in 2019 and was detained by

15 ICE in 2026. Since his detention, petitioner has not received a bond hearing; the government has

16 determined that he is subject to mandatory detention. Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus

17 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his detention is not mandatory. For the following reasons, I

18 recommend that the petition be granted and that petitioner be provided a bond hearing.

19 Background

20 Petitioner “entered the United States without inspection approximately seven years ago

21 and was not apprehend upon arrival.”1 ECF No. 13 at 2; see also ECF No. 8 at 2. Petitioner is

22 pursuing asylum. ECF No. 8 at 4.

23 On January 3, 2026, petitioner was arrested in Massachusetts after allegedly threatening

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1 Respondents reference “[p]etitioner’s prior release in the discretion of DHS,” and

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petitioner states that he “was previously released from immigration detention under order of own

recognizance.” See ECF No. 7 at 2; ECF No. 11 at 2. There is no other evidence in the record,

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however, of petitioner previously interacting with immigration officials. Moreover, the amended

27 petition does not allege a violation of petitioner’s constitutional due process rights. See ECF No.

13. Accordingly, I do not address the due process implications if petitioner has, in fact, been re-

28 detained after being released on his own recognizance.

1 his ex-wife with a knife. ECF No. 13 at 12-13; ECF No. 18-2. He was subsequently charged

2 with two counts of assault and one count of threatening to commit a crime. ECF No. 18-2 at 7.

3 Those charges remain pending.

4 That same day, petitioner was transferred to ICE custody. ECF No. 7 at 2. On two

5 occasions since, petitioner has requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236;

6 each time, the immigration court has determined that it lacks jurisdiction because petitioner is

7 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See ECF No. 8-2 at 2; ECF No. 18-

8 1 at 2. Consequently, petitioner has been denied a bond hearing. See id.

9 Procedural History

10 On February 2, 2026, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 1.

11 Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, which the court

12 denied. See ECF No. 7 & 12. On February 18, 2026, petitioner filed an amended petition. ECF

13 No. 13. On February 28, 2026, respondents filed an answer to the petition. ECF No. 16. On

14 March 2, 2026, petitioner filed a traverse. ECF No. 17. On March 13, 2026, petitioner filed a

15 motion to expedite the adjudication of the amended petition. ECF No. 18.

16 Legal Standard

17 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates

18 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75

19 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of

20 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

21 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a

22 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

23 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

24 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have

25 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction

26 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

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1 Analysis

2 Petitioner argues that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that he is not

3 subject to mandatory detention under either 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 1225(b)(2).2 ECF No. 13 at 3-

4 5. Respondents counter that petitioner’s detention is mandatory under both applicable sections.

5 ECF No. 11 at 1-3. I address each section in turn.

6 I. 1226(c)

7 Under section 1226(c), the attorney general “shall take into custody” any noncitizen who

8 “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing

9 acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault

10 of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to

11 another person.”3 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). The term “serious bodily injury” has the meaning

12 given such term “in the jurisdiction in which the acts occurred.” Id. § 1226(c)(2). In

13 Massachusetts—where petitioner was arrested and charged—a “serious bodily injury” means a

14 “bodily injury that results in a permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily function,

15 limb or organ, or a substantial risk of death.” See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, §§ 13A, 13K,

16 15A, 15D.

17 Here, respondents argue that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under section

18 1226(c) because he “was arrested for Assault on Family/Household Member, Threat to Commit a

19 Crime[,] and Assault with Dangerous Weapon” which are crimes “involving serious bodily injury

20 to another person.” ECF No. 11 at 2. Petitioner counters that those crimes did not involve

21 “serious bodily injury.” ECF No. 13 at 4.

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2 Petitioner argues that he is an eligible member of the class in Bautista v. Santacruz,

23 which includes “[a]ll noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered

or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon

24 arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1),

or § 1231 at the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody

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determination.” See No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec.

18, 2025).

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3 The statute also requires that the noncitizen be “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C.

27 §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i). Because petitioner is “present in

the United States without being admitted or paroled,” he is “inadmissible” under § 1182(a)(6)(A).

28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

1 There is no evidence that petitioner’s alleged crime resulted in bodily injury. The arrest

2 report, as noted, indicates that petitioner threatened to harm his ex-wife with a knife. ECF No.

3 18-2 at 9. Petitioner’s ex-wife also reported that petitioner had been following her around, and

4 she told the arresting officers about a previously unreported incident in which petitioner broke

5 into her house, destroyed her property, and threatened to kill her with a knife. See id. There is no

6 indication in the arrest report, however, that petitioner caused bodily harm to his ex-wife or any

7 other individual. Respondents rely solely on the report and do not introduce any other evidence.

8 See ECF No. 11 at 2. As such, there is no evidence or allegation that petitioner caused a bodily

9 injury, much less a bodily injury resulting “in a permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a

10 bodily function, limb or organ, or a substantial risk of death.”4 See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.

11 265, § 13A.

12 Accordingly, petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c).

13 II. 1225(b)(2)

14 Under section 1225(b)(2)(A), applicants “seeking admission” to the United States are

15 subject to mandatory detention: “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the

16 examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and

17 beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained . . . .” 8 U.S.C.

18 § 1225(b)(2)(A). Critically, no bond hearing is provided for a noncitizen detained under this

19 section. Id. By contrast, “[u]nder § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, a detainee may

20 request a bond hearing before an [immigration judge] at any time before a removal order becomes

21 final.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022).

22 For decades, the government applied section 1226(a)—and not section 1225(b)(2)(A)—to

23 noncitizens apprehended in the interior of the United States. See id. at 1196 (“The provision at

24 issue in this case, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, provides the general process for arresting and detaining aliens

25 who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.”). In July 2025, however, the

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27 4 No other provision of 1226(c) applies to petitioner, particularly because there is no

evidence that he has admitted to or been convicted of committing a crime. See 8 U.S.C.

28 § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D).

1 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) revisited its legal position and now maintains that

2 “all applicants for admission within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1225(a) are subject to mandatory

3 detention under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b).” See ECF No. 11 at 2 n.2. Respondents urge the court to

4 follow suit and find that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 1225(b)(2). Id. at 1-2.

5 Id. Petitioner counters that he is subject to discretionary detention under section 1226(a). ECF

6 No. 13 at 5.

7 This issue is one of statutory interpretation, and so I begin with the plain text of the

8 Immigration and Nationality Act. See United States v. Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 833-34 (9th Cir.

9 2019). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

10 admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not

11 clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C.

12 § 1225(b)(2)(A). There is only one exception to mandatory detention: a noncitizen may be

13 paroled into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”

14 under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018).

15 While the text of section 1225(b)(2)(A) limits its reach to applicants “seeking admission,”

16 section 1226(a) does not include the same qualifying language. Section 1226(a) provides that, for

17 a noncitizen who is arrested and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” the

18 Attorney General (1) “may continue to detain” the arrested noncitizen, (2) “may release” the

19 noncitizen on “bond,” or (3) “may release” the noncitizen on “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C.

20 §§ 1226(a)(1)-(2).

21 The government urges the court to read section 1225(b)(2)(A) as using the terms

22 “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” interchangeably. See ECF No. 11 at 1-2.

23 According to the government, all noncitizens who have not been admitted to the United States—

24 i.e., “applicants for admission”—are necessarily “seeking admission” for purposes of section

25 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. Thus, the government contends, section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens

26 who are “applicants for admission.” Id. at 2.

27 I find that the government’s interpretation violates the rule against surplusage in three

28 ways. First, for section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention to apply, “a noncitizen must (1) be

1 an applicant for admission, (2) be ‘seeking admission’, and (3) be ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt

2 entitled to be admitted.’” J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01309-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 2938808,

3 *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025). If, as the government argues, all “applicants for admissions” were

4 also individuals “seeking admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” would be unnecessary. The

5 government’s reading, therefore, runs contrary to the rule against surplusage. See United States,

6 ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023) (“[E]very clause and word

7 of a statute should have meaning.”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“[N]o clause,

8 sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”).

9 Second, the government’s reading cannot be squared with the text of section 1226. Were

10 it possible to interpret section 1225(b)(2)(A) in the manner favored by the government, section

11 1226(a)’s requirement that noncitizens be afforded bond hearings—arguably the section’s

12 centerpiece—would serve no purpose because the government would be allowed to detain all

13 “applicants for admission” under section 1225(b)(2)(A). Further, as noted, under section 1226(c),

14 Congress mandated the detention of certain categories of noncitizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). If, as

15 the government now contends, section 1225(b)(2)(A) can be applied to all noncitizens who are

16 inadmissible, section 1226(c) would also be superfluous.

17 Third, the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”)—passed in January 2025—would also be rendered

18 superfluous. The LRA amended section 1226(c) to add new categories of mandatory detention.

19 See Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3,

20 2025). Under the government’s theory of section 1225(b)(2)(A), the LRA would be unnecessary;

21 if mandatory detention for all unauthorized noncitizens were already permitted—and, in fact,

22 required—by section 1225(b)(2)(A), the amendment would be surplusage. “When Congress acts

23 to amend a statute, [courts] presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”

24 Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).

25 Respondents’ theory, essentially, is that both sections 1226(a) and 1226(c) have been

26 taken out of commission, not by any new law or act of Congress, but by a shift in executive

27 branch policy. This interpretation collides squarely with the rule against surplusage. See Marx v.

28 Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest

1 when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”).

2 I also find that the government’s interpretation runs contrary to the DHS’s longstanding

3 practice prior to July 2025. As noted, the government previously interpreted these provisions in

4 the manner argued by petitioner. Prior agency practice, though not dispositive, may inform this

5 court’s determination of law. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)

6 (“[T]he longstanding practice of the government—like any other interpretive aid—can inform a

7 court’s determination of what the law is.”). Other courts have emphasized the persuasive value of

8 the DHS’s “longstanding agency practice.” See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239,

9 1259 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Congress enacted the LRA against the backdrop of longstanding

10 agency practice applying Section 1226(a) to inadmissible noncitizens already residing in the

11 country.”).

12 Finally, I note that arguments substantially similar to those made by the government here

13 have been rejected by a large majority of district courts nationwide. See Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F.

14 Supp. 3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases); E.L.D.M. v. Becerra, No. 1:25-cv-

15 01906-DJC-JDP, 2025 WL 3707140, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2025). The government’s

16 argument also runs contrary to Jennings, which held that section 1225(b) “applies primarily to

17 aliens seeking entry into the United States,” whereas sections 1226(a) and (c) “authorize[] the

18 Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal

19 proceedings . . . .” 583 U.S. at 289, 297. While the government’s interpretation was endorsed by

20 the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025),

21 the persuasive power of an agency ruling is limited. See Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400.

22 Moreover, a district court in this Circuit recently vacated Matter of Yajure Hurtado “as contrary

23 to law under the [Administrative Procedure Act].” Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-

24 SSS-BFM, 2026 WL 468284, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026).

25 Accordingly, because petitioner was detained in the interior of the United States, I find

26 that his detention is governed by section 1226(a) and not, as respondents argue, by section

27 1225(b). Given this finding, I must determine whether the appropriate relief is release or a bond

28 hearing. Petitioner requests that he be released. ECF No. 13 at 5. Respondents do not address

1 the issue. See ECF No. 11.

2 Courts in this Circuit have ordered both forms of relief. Some courts have found that a

3 bond hearing is the proper remedy. See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1263 (“The Court finds

4 that the specific harm Rodriguez alleges—that he is unlawfully barred from receiving a bond

5 hearing on the merits—is remedied by granting his request for a bond hearing under Section

6 1226(a) and enjoining Defendants from denying bond on the basis that he is detained under

7 Section 1225(b)(2).”). Other courts have held that release is the proper remedy. See Feng v.

8 Lyons, No. 1:26-cv-0235-DJC-SCR, 2026 WL 472635, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2026)

9 (“Provision of a bond hearing after months of detention without the opportunity to seek release on

10 bond cannot be said to satisfy due process where that bond hearing is a matter of statutory

11 right.”).

12 Under the circumstances presented, I find that a bond hearing is proper. The harm

13 suffered by petitioner—not receiving the bond hearing to which he is statutorily entitled—is

14 remedied by a hearing. See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1263. Moreover, Feng is unlike the

15 instant action. In Feng, the court found “no indication . . . of prima facie evidence that Petitioner

16 could be found to be a risk of flight or a danger to the community.” Feng, 2026 WL 472635, at

17 *1. The same cannot be said here. As noted, petitioner was arrested two months ago for

18 allegedly threatening his ex-wife with a knife, and his ex-wife told police that petitioner

19 previously threatened to kill her. See ECF No. 18-2 at 9. As a result, petitioner faces three

20 charges, including felony assault with a deadly weapon. See id. at 7.

21 While this evidence might prove insufficient for the government to carry its burden at the

22 bond hearing, it is sufficient to support the finding that “due process is satisfied if Petitioner is

23 provided with a post-deprivation bond hearing within five days.” See Archundia v. Wofford, No.

24 1:26-cv-1452-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL 607977, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2026) (finding a bond

25 hearing to be the proper remedy where petitioner was previously arrested for “allegedly engaging

26 in prostitution”) (citing J.S.H.M., 2025 WL 2938808, at *15-16).

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1 Conclusion

2 Based on the foregoing, I recommend that petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus be granted.

3 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

4 1. The first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 13, be GRANTED.

5 2. Petitioner (A-Number: 201-678-151) be provided a bond hearing within five days of

6 | the date of the court’s order. At this hearing, the government shall bear the burden of

7 | establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that petitioner poses a danger to the community or

8 | arisk of flight, and petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present.

9 3. Respondents be ordered to file a status report, within five days of the bond hearing,

10 | confirming that the hearing occurred.

1] 4. Petitioner’s motion to expedite, ECF No. 18, be DENIED as moot.

12 5. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

14 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of

15 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

16 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to

17 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed

18 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

19 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

20 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

21 | 1991).

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73 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24 ( q Sty —

Dated: _ March 16, 2026 QH———

25 JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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