The opinion
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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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12 REBECCA LIMON, Case No.: 23-cv-01491-AJB-BJW
13 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
14 v. DENYING IN PART JOINT
MOTION REGARDING
15 THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,
SCHEDULING ORDER
16 Defendants.
(Doc. No. 47)
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19 Before the Court is the Joint Motion to Continue Expert Discovery, Expert
20 Disclosure, and Pretrial Motion Deadlines; Joint Request for Leave to Complete
21 Deposition of Defendant Stephanie Rose After Fact Discovery Deadline (“Joint Motion”).
22 (Doc. No. 47.) The Court FINDS that a hearing is not necessary to resolve the Joint Motion
23 and VACATES the status hearing set for July 9, 2026. CivLR 7.1.d.1.
24 For the following reasons, the Joint Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
25 IN PART. (Doc. No. 47) Plaintiff Rebecca Limon (“Limon”) may complete the deposition
26 of Defendant Stephanie Rose (“Rose”) by July 15, 2026. The remaining deadlines in the
27 January 27, 2026 Amended Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 37) and Magistrate Judge Brian J.
28 White’s May 19, 2026 Minute Order (Doc. No. 44) remain unchanged.
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 A. Factual Background
3 Defendant City of San Diego (the “City”) employed Limon as a Crime Scene
4 Specialist. (Doc. No. 18 at 2.) After processing a homicide scene in 2010, Limon was
5 diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. (Id.) A year later, Limon went on medical
6 leave. (Id.) Limon claims that when she returned to work in 2012, she was subjected to a
7 hostile work environment and that her supervisors and co-workers refused to accommodate
8 her disability. (Id.) Limon returned to medical leave in 2014. (Id.)
9 Limon subsequently applied for a Latent Print Examiner position with the City. (Id.)
10 In 2017, Limon sued the City for violating its own policies regarding placement of disabled
11 employees. (Id.) In 2020, Limon and the City reached a settlement that required the City
12 to try to place Limon in a vacant, available position. (Id.)
13 In early 2021, Limon and the City discussed placing Limon in a Latent Print
14 Examiner position. (Id. at 2–3.) However, the City required Limon to undergo a
15 background investigation and a polygraph examination. (Id. at 3.) Limon contends that the
16 investigation and examination were not required by the City’s transfer process or the
17 settlement. (Id.) In August 2021, the City informed Limon that she did not pass the
18 background investigation, at least in part due to the results of the polygraph examination.
19 (See id.) The City refused to retest Limon and to exempt her from the polygraph
20 examination. (Id. at 3–4.) In December 2021, the City informed Limon that she was not
21 eligible for any positions because of the failed polygraph examination. (Id. at 4.)
22 B. Procedural Background
23 On August 14, 2023, Limon initiated this action. (Doc. No. 1.) The City, Rose, and
24 the other individual Defendants1 moved to dismiss Limon’s complaint. (Doc. Nos. 3; 5.)
25 The Court collectively refers to all Defendants as “Defendants.”
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1 The other individual Defendants consist of Chief of Police Dave Nisleit, Melissa Jackson, Silvia
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1 On August 8, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motions to
2 dismiss. (Doc. No. 18.) Limon then filed a first amended complaint, which the Defendants
3 answered. (Doc. Nos. 19; 20.)
4 On November 4, 2024, Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major issued a scheduling
5 order that set the following relevant deadlines:
6 Event 11/04/2024
Deadlines
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Fact Discovery 07/25/2025
8 Expert Disclosures 08/29/2025
Expert Discovery 10/24/2025
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Pretrial Motions 11/21/2025
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11 (Doc. No. 27.)
12 On May 23, 2025, the parties moved for a four-month extension of all scheduling
13 order deadliness to accommodate (1) Limon’s father’s terminal cancer; (2) Limon’s
14 counsel’s, Suzy Moore (“Moore”), daughter being hospitalized several times between
15 January 2025 through April 2025; and (3) Moore’s husband experiencing complications
16 from prior injuries. (Doc. No. 29 at 2.) Moore also noted that she had “other State and
17 Federal deadlines and is a sole practitioner.” (Id.)
18 Four days later, Magistrate Judge Major granted the extension request and set the
19 following relevant deadlines:
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21 Event 11/04/2024 05/27/2025
Deadlines Deadlines
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Fact Discovery 07/25/2025 11/25/2025
23 Expert Disclosures 08/29/2025 12/29/2025
24 Expert Discovery 10/24/2025 02/24/2026
Pretrial Motions 11/21/2025 03/21/2026
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26 (Doc. No. 30.)
27 On September 26, 2025, the parties moved for a second four-month extension of all
28 scheduling order deadlines to accommodate Moore’s paralegal’s injuries incurred on May
1 28, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 31; 31-1 ¶ 4.) The paralegal was Moore’s only employee and was out
2 of work for approximately five weeks. (Doc. No. 31-1 ¶ 4.) The paralegal subsequently
3 went on medical leave between August and September 2025, and ultimately notified Moore
4 in September 2025 that the paralegal may have to permanently retire. (Id. ¶ 6.)
5 On September 30, 2025, Magistrate Judge Major granted the extension request and
6 set the following relevant deadlines:
7 Event 11/04/2024 05/27/2025 09/30/2025
Deadlines Deadlines Deadlines
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Fact Discovery 07/25/2025 11/25/2025 03/25/2026
9 Expert Disclosure 08/29/2025 12/29/2025 04/28/2026
Expert Discovery 10/24/2025 02/24/2026 06/01/2026
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Pretrial Motions 11/21/2025 03/21/2026 07/19/2026
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12 (Doc. No. 32.) The case was then transferred to Magistrate Judge White. (Doc. No. 33.)
13 On January 27, 2026, following a status conference, Magistrate Judge White granted
14 an extension of certain pre-pretrial motion deadlines “due to minor scheduling conflicts as
15 well as previous unforeseen personal emergencies of counsel and staff.” (Doc. Nos. 36; 37
16 at 1.) The following relevant deadlines were set:
17 Event 11/04/2024 05/27/2025 09/30/2025 01/27/2026
Deadlines Deadlines Deadlines Deadlines
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Fact Discovery 07/25/2025 11/25/2025 03/25/2026 05/25/2026
19 Expert Disclosure 08/29/2025 12/29/2025 04/28/2026 05/22/2026
Expert Discovery 10/24/2025 02/24/2026 06/01/2026 07/12/2026
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Pretrial Motions 11/21/2025 03/21/2026 07/19/2026 07/19/2026
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22 (Doc. No. 37.)
23 On May 11, 2026, the parties raised a discovery dispute with Magistrate Judge
24 White. (Doc. No. 42.) Following a discovery conference on May 19, 2026, Magistrate
25 Judge White granted a fourth extension of the expert disclosure and fact discovery
26 deadlines:
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1 Event 11/04/2024 05/27/2025 09/30/2025 01/27/2026 05/19/2026
Deadlines Deadlines Deadlines Deadlines Deadlines
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Fact Discovery 07/25/2025 11/25/2025 03/25/2026 05/25/2026 06/12/2026
3 Expert Disclosure 08/29/2025 12/29/2025 04/28/2026 05/22/2026 06/19/2026
Expert Discovery 10/24/2025 02/24/2026 06/01/2026 07/12/2026 07/12/2026
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Pretrial Motions 11/21/2025 03/21/2026 07/19/2026 07/19/2026 07/19/2026
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6 (Doc. No. 44.)
7 On June 18, 2026, the parties notified Magistrate Judge White that they had not
8 complied with the June 12, 2026 fact discovery deadline because a deposition for
9 Defendant Stephanie Rose remained outstanding. (Doc. No. 45.) The following day,
10 Magistrate Judge White informed the parties that they may move for a continuance of the
11 pretrial motion deadline and the pretrial conference but advised the parties that they are
12 “not to assume that any such continuance will be granted and must proceed accordingly.”
13 (Id.)
14 On June 26, 2026, one week after Magistrate Judge White’s admonition, the parties
15 filed the present motion. (Doc. No. 47.)
16 II. LEGAL STANDARD
17 “A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the
19 diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,
20 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). “The district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if
21 it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Id.
22 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment). “If the party
23 seeking the modification ‘was not diligent, the inquiry should end’ and the motion to
24 modify should not be granted.” Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th
25 Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609).
26 //
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1 III. DISCUSSION
2 A. The Court allows limited leave for Limon to depose Rose by July 15, 2026.
3 Limon seeks the Court’s permission to depose Rose after fact discovery closed on
4 June 12, 2026. (Doc. No. 47 at 9–10.) Limon alleges that Rose was the captain in charge
5 of the crime lab and who discriminated against Limon. (Doc. No. 19 ¶¶ 7, 37–39.) Because
6 of Rose’s alleged role, Limon contends that Rose’s deposition is “essential” since Rose
7 “was the final decisionmaker regarding the denial of Plaintiff’s request to transfer into the
8 Latent Print Examiner position.” (Doc. No. 47 at 10.)
9 Defendants take a more neutral position on this request. On one hand, if the Court
10 continues the pretrial motion deadline, Defendants do not oppose producing Rose for a
11 deposition. (Id. at 9.) On the other, if the Court does not continue the pretrial motion
12 deadline, Defendants oppose allowing more time because they “may” then “have
13 insufficient time to evaluate [Rose’s] testimony and prepare any dispositive motions on
14 behalf of Ms. Rose and other Defendants.” (Id.)
15 In light of the facts that Rose is a named defendant in this matter and that Moore was
16 not able to depose Rose on the two previously scheduled deposition dates, the Court finds
17 that good cause exists to grant Limon limited leave to depose Rose now that the fact
18 discovery deadline has lapsed. (See id. at 10.) See also Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Discovery
19 is otherwise closed in this case.
20 The Court notes, however, that Limon’s other reasons for seeking more time are
21 unavailing.
22 First, Limon points out that her counsel has encountered multiple conflicts between
23 January 2024 and May 2025. (Doc. No. 47 at 10.) However, the Court has already granted
24 multiple extensions of the scheduling order deadlines that addressed these conflicts. (See
25 Doc. Nos. 29–32; see also Doc. No. 37.)2
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2 None of the extensions addressed the facts that Moore “experienced a serious fall . . . that rendered
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1 Second, Limon notes that Moore “transitioned to a new law firm, commencing
2 employment on January 20, 2026.” (Doc. No. 47 at 10.) She adds that Moore “was required
3 to obtain internal approval to substitute in as counsel for Plaintiff Rebecca Limon, which
4 was completed on June 5, 2026.” (Id.) It is unclear how and why this transition would have
5 impacted Moore’s ability to depose Rose. In fact, Moore was able to defend Limon at a
6 January 22, 2026 deposition, and was later able to depose a Defendant on March 24, 2026.
7 (Doc. No. 47-1 ¶ 7.)
8 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Limon’s request to depose Rose after the June 12,
9 2026 fact discovery cutoff. (Doc. No. 47.) Limon must complete Rose’s deposition on or
10 before July 15, 2026.
11 B. The parties have not established that good cause exists to continue the
expert disclosure, expert discovery, and pretrial motion deadlines.
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13 At the outset, the parties have not acted diligently in moving to continue the expert
14 disclosure, expert discovery, and pretrial motion deadlines. Both parties appear to agree
15 that the key reason for moving these deadlines is a need for more time to “evaluate
16 testimony and prepare pretrial motions under the existing July 19, 2026 deadline.” (Doc.
17 No. 47 at 7.) In particular, the parties assert that the “delayed completion of fact discovery
18 prevents the Parties’ experts from considering all evidence necessary to develop opinions
19 to be offered at trial, which has in turn impacted the Parties’ ability to consider whether
20 Daubert motions are warranted prior to the existing pretrial motion deadline.” (Id. at 7–8.)
21 The record indicates that the parties were aware of these scheduling concerns by
22 May 11, 2026. On that date, the parties raised a discovery dispute with Magistrate Judge
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25 of a violent crime” in May 2025. (See Doc. No. 47 at 10.) However, it is unclear how Moore’s ability to
work between January 2024 through September 2024 is relevant to deadlines set in and after November
26 2024. And although the Court is sympathetic to the fact that Moore’s daughter was a victim of a violent
crime, this is the first time that Moore has identified this issue as a basis for seeking an extension. (Cf.
27 Doc. No. 31.) Regardless, Limon and Moore do not offer any explanation as to why the four-month
extension granted in September 2025 is insufficient to accommodate any conflicts that have arisen from
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1 White. (Doc. No. 42.) Following a discovery conference on May 19, 2026, Magistrate
2 Judge White continued the fact discovery, expert disclosure, and rebuttal disclosure
3 deadlines. (Doc. No. 44.) One month later, the parties informed Magistrate Judge White
4 that they failed to comply with his May 19, 2026 Order because the Rose deposition was
5 still outstanding. (Doc. No. 45.) Magistrate Judge White thus informed the parties that they
6 could file a motion before the Court, but warned that “they are advised not to assume that
7 any such continuance will be granted and must proceed accordingly.” (Id.) One week later,
8 on June 26, 2026, the parties filed the Joint Motion. (Doc. No. 47.)
9 The foregoing facts illustrate that the parties were aware of their scheduling
10 difficulties by May 11, 2026—before the fact discovery deadline would have closed on
11 May 25, 2026 (see Doc. No. 37), and before the parties pushed the fact discovery deadline
12 to a month before the current July 19, 2026 pretrial motion deadline (see Doc. No. 44).
13 However, the parties fail to acknowledge that this issue was known by May 11, 2026,
14 and they do not offer any explanation for why they did not seek relief from the pretrial
15 motion deadline in the intervening six weeks. (See generally Doc. No. 47.) This failure and
16 decision to wait over a month militates against a finding of good cause to continue the
17 expert disclosure, expert discovery, and pretrial motion deadlines. See Zivkovic, 302 F.3d
18 at 1087.
19 On the merits, neither party presents a persuasive justification for continuing the
20 expert disclosure, expert discovery, and pretrial motion deadlines.
21 Beginning with Limon’s justifications, Limon points to Moore’s conflicts and
22 subsequent transition to the Frantz Law Group. (Doc. No. 47 at 7.) Moore also provides a
23 supporting declaration. (Doc. No. 47-1.) Moore additionally identifies that she is “subject
24 to court-ordered discovery obligations in another federal matter, Ellis Foster v. Board of
25 Trustees for the State of California, involving a substantial volume of documents and
26 multiple depositions through June 26, 2026.” (Id. ¶ 14.)
27 These justifications are unavailing. Moore’s conflicts and subsequent transition to
28 the Frantz Law Group do not establish diligence for the reasons discussed above. (Supra
1 at 6–7 & n.2.) Moore’s competing discovery obligations also appear to be illusory. The
2 Court’s independent research reveals that the competing discovery obligation arises from
3 Magistrate Judge Steve B. Chu’s February scheduling order in Foster v. Board of Trustees
4 of the California State University, No. 24-cv-01917-LL-SBC (S.D. Cal. filed Feb. 24,
5 2026) (Doc. No. 51). Given that the scheduling order was issued in February 2026, Moore
6 was well-aware of the deadline in the four intervening months. Moore does not offer any
7 explanation for why she could not balance the discovery obligations in both matters. (See
8 generally Doc. Nos. 47; 47-1.) Regardless, Moore has requested and received an extension
9 of the relevant Foster deadlines to as late as August 14, 2026. Joint Motion, Foster v. Bd.
10 of Trustees of the Cal. State Univ., No. 24-cv-01917-LL-SCB (S.D. Cal. filed June 25,
11 2026) (Doc. No. 58); Order, Foster v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal. State Univ., No. 24-cv-
12 01917-LL-SBC (S.D. Cal. filed June 29, 2026) (Doc. No. 59). Thus, any conflict caused
13 by the prior June 26, 2026 deadline is moot. Furthermore, extensions of the expert
14 disclosure, expert discovery, and pretrial motion deadlines would likely only invite more
15 scheduling conflicts.
16 Turning to Defendants’ justifications, Defendants focus on Defense counsel’s
17 schedule. (Doc. No. 47 at 7.) In particular, Defendants note that Defense counsel was on
18 vacation between March 30, 2026, and April 3, 2026. (Doc. No. 47-2 ¶ 8.) They add that
19 Defense counsel has two matters set for trial on September 4, 2026; and trials set for
20 January, April, and May of 2027. (Doc. No. 47 at 8; see also Doc. No. 47-2 ¶ 7.) In relying
21 on these circumstances, Defendants quote Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d
22 1253, 1259 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that “attorneys, like everyone else, have
23 critical personal and familial obligations . . . . It is important to the health of the legal
24 profession that attorneys strike a balance between these competing demands on their time.”
25 (Doc. No. 47 at 7.)
26 Like Moore’s identification of a competing discovery obligation, Defendants’
27 reliance their counsel’s schedule does not provide a persuasive basis for continuing the
28 deadlines. Defendants do not offer any evidence that Defense counsel could not plan
1 around the identified scheduling conflicts. (See id. at 7–8.) Nor do Defendants explain why
2 the City could not provide a co-counsel to accommodate Defense counsel’s scheduling
3 conflicts. (See id.) In any event, it appears that continuing the deadlines is likely to cause
4 more conflicts with Defense counsel’s known trial schedule. (See id. at 8.)
5 Defendants’ reliance on Ahanchian does not change this analysis. In Ahanchian, the
6 plaintiff’s counsel
7 moved for a one-week extension of time to file his opposition to defendants’
summary judgment motion, citing as good cause: (1) the extremely short eight
8
day response deadline (with three of those days falling over a federal holiday
9 weekend) created by the combination of an unusual local rule and defendants’
litigation tactics; (2) his preplanned absence, beginning the day defendants
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filed the motions, in fulfillment of an out-of-state commitment; and (3) the
11 large number of supporting exhibits attached to the defendants’ motion.
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13 624 F.3d at 1255. The district court denied the motion and later denied the plaintiff’s
14 counsel’s request to file an opposition three days late. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
15 holding that the plaintiff’s counsel “clearly demonstrate[d]” good cause. Id. at 1259.
16 The circumstances establishing good cause in Ahanchian are not present here. First,
17 the pretrial motion deadline was set almost a full year ago in September 2025. (Doc. No.
18 32.) The parties are not being subjected to an “eight day response deadline” created by the
19 Court’s rules. Cf. Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1255. To the extent that the parties will have a
20 shortened window in which to respond to any new information from discovery, it was the
21 parties’ serial joint requests that have narrowed that window. (See Doc. Nos. 36; 37; 42;
22 44; 45.) Second, there is no clear evidence of gamesmanship by any party to shorten their
23 opponents’ time to respond. See Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1255, 1262–63. Third, to the extent
24 the parties contend that they “will have insufficient time to evaluate testimony and prepare
25 pretrial motions” (Doc. No. 47 at 7), the only new factual testimony that the parties can
26 expect is from Rose. The parties do not offer any explanation as to how or why Rose’s
27 deposition could impact their expert disclosures (for which the parties’ deadline has already
28 lapsed) or the expert discovery to be conducted. (See generally Doc. No. 47.)
Under these circumstances, the parties have failed to move diligently in seeking to
2 |{continue the expert disclosure, expert discovery, and pretrial motion deadlines.
3 || Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Joint Motion as it pertains to continuing the expert
4 || disclosure, expert discovery, and pretrial motion deadlines. Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1087.
5 CONCLUSION
6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
7 Joint Motion. (Doc. No. 47.)
8 On or before July 15, 2026, Limon may depose Defendant Stephanie Rose. No
9 || further continuances will be granted.
10 The expert discovery, expert disclosure, and pretrial motion deadlines remain
11 unchanged. (See Doc. Nos. 37; 44.)
12 IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 Dated: July 2, 2026
15 United States District Judge
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