The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 BARRY DANIEL BLAIR No. 2:25-cv-1501 DC AC
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 CITY OF MODESTO, et al,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff is a resident of Arizona who brings claims against defendants related to his
18 previous convictions on federal and state charges which arose out of events that occurred in
19 Stanislaus County, California. ECF No. 1. Currently before the court are defendants’ motions to
20 dismiss (ECF Nos. 7, 8, 13) and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 27). For the
21 following reasons, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motions to dismiss be granted,
22 plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied, and the claims be dismissed with prejudice.
23 I. Procedural Background
24 This case proceeds on plaintiff’s complaint filed on March 13, 2025, in the United States
25 District Court for the District of Arizona. ECF No. 1. Defendant Wells Fargo Bank filed a
26 motion to dismiss on May 1, 2025 (ECF No. 7), which was followed by a motion to dismiss by
27 defendants California Department of Justice, California Franchise Tax Board, and California
28 Treasurer-Tax Collector (collectively, “State Defendants”) (ECF No. 8). The case was then
1 transferred to this district (ECF Nos. 10, 11), after which defendants United States, United States
2 Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Prisons (collectively, “Federal Defendants”) moved
3 to dismiss (ECF No. 13).
4 After plaintiff failed to respond to the motions to dismiss, he was granted an additional
5 twenty-one days to file any opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motions and
6 cautioned that failure to comply would result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed
7 for failure to prosecute. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Federal Defendants’
8 motion to dismiss that included a proposed first amended complaint and later filed a motion for
9 summary judgment. ECF Nos. 23, 27.
10 II. Allegations of the Complaint
11 Plaintiff brings claims against defendants City of Modesto, Stanislaus County, Stanislaus
12 County Probation Office, State Defendants,1 Federal Defendants, and Wells Fargo Bank under
13 8 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging
14 constitutional violations under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 1 at 2,
15 4-5.
16 Plaintiff alleges that in June 1996 he was arrested and detained in Modesto, California
17 while waiting for federal authorities to unseal an indictment. Id. at 3. Stanislaus County and the
18 City of Modesto improperly added state charges against him in order to justify his detention, and
19 plaintiff pled guilty to the charges in October 1996, after which he was taken into federal custody.
20 Id. at 3-4. In December 1996, plaintiff pled guilty to federal charges and was sentenced to fifty-
21 one months in federal prison and thirty-six months of supervised release. Id. at 4.
22 Plaintiff alleges that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated by his
23 conviction in both state and federal court for the same offense and that the Franchise Tax Board
24 and Office of the Treasurer’s conversion of a criminal restitution order into a civil judgment was
25 done without due process. Id. at 4-5. Wells Fargo Bank then unlawfully allowed plaintiff’s funds
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1 Plaintiff also names the California Attorney General’s Office as a defendant. ECF No. 1 at 2.
27 However, the California Department of Justice and California Attorney General’s Office are the
same entity. See State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., About the California Department of Justice,
28 https://oag.ca.gov/careers/aboutus [https://perma.cc/3XEA-P5YV] (last visited March 2, 2026).
1 to be seized and the Bureau of Prisons improperly enforced his federal sentence despite his
2 convictions being unconstitutional. Id. at 4. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that he was deprived
3 of the ability to make an informed legal decision because defense counsel advised him that the
4 state charges would be dismissed in favor of the federal indictment and he was not informed of
5 the federal charges when he entered a guilty plea in state court.2 Id. at 3-4.
6 III. Legal Standards for a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
7 A. Motions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
8 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, until proven otherwise, cases lie
9 outside the jurisdiction of the court. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
10 377 (1994). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged by either party or raised sua
11 sponte by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
12 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their
13 own initiative even at the highest level”). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
14 Procedure 12(b)(1) is a jurisdictional attack and may be either facial or factual. White v. Lee,
15 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “The district court resolves a facial attack as it would a
16 motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing
17 all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines whether the allegations are
18 sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117,
19 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
20 B. Motions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
21 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
22 claim if the facts plaintiff has pled do not result in a cognizable claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
23 To survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff must allege more than “naked
24
2 Plaintiff does not name defense counsel as a defendant. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. However, leave to
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amend to add counsel as a defendant would be futile because neither privately retained attorneys
26 nor public defenders act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 actions. See Briley v.
California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (“a privately-retained attorney does not act under
27 color of state law for purposes of actions brought under the Civil Rights Act”); Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“a public defender does not act under color of state law when
28 performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding”).
1 assertion[s]” or “labels and conclusions” but provide facts to support the elements of the cause of
2 action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In addition, the claim must
3 have facial plausibility, which occurs “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
4 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted); Bell Atlantic Corp, 550 U.S. at
6 570 (complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
7 When evaluating the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept
8 the allegations of the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
9 the plaintiff. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986) (“Construing these facts and relevant
10 facts obtained from the public record in the light most favorable to the petitioners, we must
11 ascertain whether they state a claim on which relief could be granted.”). When evaluating
12 complaints from pro se litigants, pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted
13 by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Although the complaint
14 should be construed liberally for the benefit of the pro se plaintiff, the court may not supply
15 essential elements of a claim which were not contained in the pleading. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of
16 Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
17 IV. Judicial Notice
18 The court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the
19 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United
20 States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.
21 1992) (citation omitted); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (court may take judicial notice of facts that are
22 capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned).
23 When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a district court
considers evidence outside the pleadings, it must normally convert
24 the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment,
and it must give the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond. A
25 court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached
to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the
26 complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
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28 United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
1 Wells Fargo and State Defendants have submitted various state court records for this
2 court’s consideration. These documents include the Stanislaus County Superior Court order in
3 Case No. 12783, converting the criminal restitution order into a civil judgment (ECF No. 7-1);
4 plaintiff’s civil complaint in Stanislaus County Superior Court Case No. CV-23-001923 (ECF
5 No. 8 at 11-19); defendant Franchise Tax Board’s demurrer in Case No. CV-23-001923 (id. at 21-
6 27); and the order sustaining the demurrer in Case No. CV-23-001923 (id. at 29-31). Stanislaus
7 County Superior Court Case No. CV-23-001923 involved plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress
8 as a result of the Franchise Tax Board’s efforts to enforce the civil judgment in Case No. 12783.
9 See ECF No. 8 at 11-19. In sustaining the demurrer, the state court ruled on the validity of the
10 civil judgment and found the judgment to be enforceable. Id. at 30. These documents are
11 properly subject to judicial notice because the proceedings have a direct relation to matters at
12 issue and the source’s accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The court will therefore
13 consider these documents in ruling on the motions to dismiss.
14 V. Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss
15 A. Parties’ Positions
16 Defendant Wells Fargo moves for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
17 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that Wells Fargo is a private entity and was not acting
18 under the “color of state law” for the purposes of an 8 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. ECF No. 7 at 3-4.
19 Additionally, Wells Fargo contends that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine3 plaintiff cannot
20 challenge the lawfulness of the state court orders in federal court. Id. at 5.
21 Plaintiff has neither responded to Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss nor addressed their
22 arguments in either his opposition to the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss or in his motion
23 for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 23, 27.
24 B. Discussion
25 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from hearing “cases brought
26 by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
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3 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of
28 Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
1 district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
2 judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To
3 determine if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a case, the court must first determine if the federal
4 action contains “a forbidden de facto appeal” of a state court judicial decision. Noel v. Hall,
5 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). If it does not, “the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends.” Bell v.
6 City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). “A federal district court dealing with a suit that
7 is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to hear
8 the forbidden appeal.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. A complaint is a “de facto appeal” of a state
9 court decision where the plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state
10 court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Id. at 1163.
11 Here, the complaint expressly alleges the unlawfulness of the criminal restitution order
12 against plaintiff and its conversion into a civil judgment, and plaintiff seeks to enjoin collection
13 under the order, a declaration that the order is unlawful, and compensatory damages stemming
14 from enforcement of the order. ECF No. 1 at 4, 5. Plaintiff’s claim plainly constitutes a “de facto
15 appeal” of both the civil judgment and the state court’s later affirmance of that order. This court
16 may not reconsider the judgments of state courts. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore bars
17 plaintiff’s claims for relief related to the validity of the restitution order because consideration of
18 the claims would require the court to re-litigate the merits of the decision issued by the superior
19 court finding the order to be valid.
20 C. Conclusion
21 Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss should be granted and the claim against it should be
22 dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4
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4 Although Wells Fargo moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, a
24 motion for dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1154 (“Under Rooker-Feldman, a
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federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the
26 final judgment of a state court.”). However, regardless of the provision under which Wells Fargo
moves for dismissal, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
27 the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Moore v. Maricopa Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 657 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2011) (“a district court must first determine whether it
28 has jurisdiction before it can decide whether a complaint states a claim”).
1 VI. State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
2 A. Parties’ Positions
3 State Defendants move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for
4 lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and under
5 Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 8. State Defendants argue that, as state
6 agencies, they cannot be sued in § 1983 actions because they are not persons within the meaning
7 of the statute. Id. at 3 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Groten
8 v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001)). Next, they argue that plaintiff’s requested relief
9 is barred by the Tax Injunction Act because the restitution at issue concerns unpaid tax, interest,
10 and penalties and California has a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy within the meaning of the
11 Act. Id. at 3-4. State Defendants also assert that the action is barred by the statute of limitations
12 for § 1983 claims, which in Arizona is two years from “when a plaintiff knows or has reason to
13 know of the injury that is the basis of the action and the cause of that injury.” Id. at 4 (quoting
14 Gregg v. Hawai’i Dep’t of Public Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 2017)). Finally, State
15 Defendants argue claim preclusion bars the claim against the Franchise Tax Board because
16 plaintiff previously sued the Franchise Tax Board in California state court based on the same
17 conduct and the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the California Department of
18 Justice or State Treasurer. Id. at 4-7.
19 Though plaintiff has captioned his opposition as an opposition to Federal Defendants’
20 motion to dismiss, he also addresses the grounds for dismissal argued by State Defendants. ECF
21 No. 23. First, he asserts that his claim is not time barred because under the continuing violation
22 doctrine a constitutional violation resulting in continued harm is not barred by the statute of
23 limitations and the statute of limitations resets with “each new violation.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff
24 additionally claims that sovereign immunity does not apply because he is seeking an injunction.
25 Id. He next contends that the Tax Injunction Act is inapplicable to his restitution order because it
26 is not a tax within the meaning of the Act. Id. Finally, plaintiff contends that his claim against
27 the Franchise Tax Board is not barred by claim preclusion because the prior lawsuit did not raise
28 /////
1 constitutional claims and was not adjudicated on the merits. Id. Plaintiff requests that to the
2 extent the court requires more specificity as to any claim he be given leave to amend. Id. at 3.
3 B. Discussion
4 i. Statute of Limitations
5 The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is determined by the relevant state’s personal
6 injury statute of limitations, Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004), which in
7 California is two years,5 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. Additionally, under California law, an
8 incarcerated person may toll the statute of limitations for up to two years while incarcerated, at
9 which time the statute of limitations begins to run, or the statute of limitations begins to run after
10 incarcerations ends, whichever occurs first. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). The statute of
11 limitations begins to run “when the plaintiff ‘knows or has reason to know of the injury which is
12 the basis of the action.’” Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
13 Bagley v. CMC Real Est. Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991)). Here, plaintiff had reason to
14 know the basis of his claims regarding the restitution order against him, at the latest, when the
15 restitution order was converted into a civil judgment in March 1999. Thus, even assuming
16 plaintiff was entitled to the full two years of statutory tolling based on incarceration, he would
17 have needed to bring his claims by March 2003 and the claim is over twenty years overdue.
18 Although plaintiff argues that under the continuing violation doctrine “the statute of
19 limitations resets with each new violation,” ECF No. 23 at 2 (citing Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d
20 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001), the doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case. In making his
21 argument, plaintiff relies on Knox v. Davis, which held that “[t]he continuing violation theory
22 applies to § 1983 actions, allowing a plaintiff to seek relief for events outside of the limitations
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24 5 State Defendants’ motion to dismiss bases their analysis on the Arizona statute of limitations,
which is also two years. See ECF No. 8 at 4; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of
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limitations for personal injury claims). However, after State Defendants filed their motion to
26 dismiss, the case was transferred from the Arizona District Court to this court because venue was
improper in Arizona. ECF No. 10. California law, including its tolling provisions, therefore
27 controls the statute of limitations. See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir.
1983) (when a case is transferred due to improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, the law of the
28 transferee state applies).
1 period.” 260 F.3d at 1013 (internal citations omitted). However, the court in Knox found that the
2 continuing violation theory did not apply to the plaintiff’s situation. Id. Knox, an attorney,
3 challenged the repeated denial of her attempts to send legal mail to or visit with her incarcerated
4 clients. Id. at 1012-13. The court found the continuing violations doctrine did not apply because
5 the denials were “merely the continuing effect of the original suspension” of her privileges, rather
6 than a continuing violation of her rights. Id. at 1013. In the present case, plaintiff was ordered to
7 pay restitution in 1996, and the criminal restitution order was converted to a civil judgment in
8 1999. ECF No. 7-1. Analogous to Knox, defendants’ “collection efforts, wage garnishments, and
9 levies against Plaintiff’s financial accounts,” ECF No. 23 at 2, are “merely the continuing effect”
10 of the original restitution order and its subsequent conversion into a civil judgment. Thus, the
11 continued enforcement of the restitution order is best understood as a continued effect of a past
12 action rather than a continued violation.
13 More fundamentally, the Ninth Circuit has held that after National Railroad Passenger
14 Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), “little remains of the continuing violations doctrine” and it
15 survives only in circumstances not applicable here. Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d 738,
16 748 (9th Cir. 2019) (Morgan rendered the application of the continuing violations doctrine to
17 serial acts “virtually non-existent,” available only for hostile work environment claims, and the
18 doctrine applies to systematic acts only for “class-wide pattern-or-practice claims”).
19 ii. Failure to State a Claim
20 To the extent plaintiff is attempting to bring a claim for wrongful prosecution against the
21 State Defendants, he fails to state a claim because he only vaguely alleges that the California
22 Department of Justice “was involved in the prosecution.” ECF No. 1 at 2. The statute of
23 limitations would not bar a claim for wrongful prosecution because it is clear on the face of the
24 complaint that the proceedings were not terminated in plaintiff’s favor and such a claim does not
25 arise until favorable termination occurs. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994)
26 (“Just as a cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal
27 proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, so also a § 1983 cause of action for damages
28 attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or
1 sentence has been invalidated.”). However, the claim is not cognizable and is frivolous for the
2 same reason and no leave to amend is warranted. See id. at 484 (element of “malicious
3 prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused”);
4 Enercon GmbH v. Erdman, 13 F. App’x 651, 652 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court properly
5 determined “that . . . the malicious prosecution claim was frivolous because the prior proceedings
6 had not been terminated in [plaintiff’s] favor”).
7 C. Conclusion
8 As set forth above, the fact that plaintiff’s financial injury is now felt nearly thirty years
9 after his conviction does not give new life to his claim, which is barred by the statute of
10 limitations, and plaintiff cannot pursue a claim for wrongful prosecution. Because the claims
11 against State Defendants are clearly barred on these grounds, the court need not consider the
12 additional grounds for dismissal raised in their motion to dismiss and declines to do so.
13 VII. Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
14 A. Parties’ Positions
15 Federal Defendants move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for
16 lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
17 to state a claim. ECF No. 13-1. Federal Defendants argue that the United States did not waive its
18 sovereign immunity, thus it cannot be sued under Bivens; § 1983 does not apply to the United
19 States; and plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act because that statute
20 does not apply to alleged violations of the constitution. Id. at 4-6. Additionally, Federal
21 Defendants assert that plaintiff failed to state a valid claim for relief under the double jeopardy
22 clause, because “the States are separate sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government
23 because each State’s power to prosecute is derived from its own ‘inherent sovereignty.’” Id. at 6
24 (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985)). Finally, Federal Defendants argue that
25 plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success in this
26 action would necessarily invalidate the underlying conviction which has not been reversed,
27 expunged, invalidated by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court. Id. at 7.
28 In response, plaintiff argues that his claims are not Heck barred because he does not seek
1 to overturn his conviction and he characterizes the enforcement of the restitution judgment as a
2 collateral consequence of his conviction. ECF No. 23-1 at 2. He further asserts that the double
3 jeopardy clause was violated because enforcement of the restitution judgment was removed from
4 the original sentencing by decades and its continued enforcement after he served his federal
5 sentence “amounts to an ongoing second punishment for the same underlying conduct.” Id. at 3.
6 Finally, plaintiff argues that his claims are not barred by sovereign immunity because he is
7 seeking only injunctive relief and he requests leave to amend if the court deems the complaint
8 insufficiently pled. Id. at 3-4.
9 B. Discussion
10 To the extent plaintiff argues that his prosecution in federal court constituted a successive
11 prosecution and was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, he fails to state a valid claim for
12 relief. Plaintiff cites North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), for the proposition that
13 the restitution order violated double jeopardy because “the Fifth Amendment prohibits multiple
14 punishments for the same offense” and he has already served his federal sentence. ECF No. 23-1
15 at 3. However, plaintiff misunderstands what constitutes an offense for purposes of double
16 jeopardy. While the Double Jeopardy Clause does “protect[] against multiple punishments for the
17 same offense,” plaintiff’s state court conviction and federal court conviction do not constitute the
18 same offense. “[A] single act that violates the laws of two sovereigns constitutes two separate
19 crimes. As a result, successive prosecutions by multiple sovereigns for that single act do not
20 violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United States v. Enas, 255 UF.3d 662, 665-66 (9th Cir.
21 2001) (Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)). In other words, both California and the
22 United States were entitled to punish plaintiff for the crimes for which he had been convicted in
23 their respective courts. Plaintiff’s state court restitution order was punishment for his state law
24 offense and does not constitute a second punishment for his federal offense.
25 To the extent plaintiff is attempting to claim that he was subject to wrongful prosecution
26 and imprisonment by the federal government, his claims are clearly Heck barred. In this case,
27 plaintiff does not allege that the underlying conviction on which he was sentenced has been
28 declared invalid or reversed on direct appeal. In fact, in an effort to try to escape Heck’s bar he
1 explicitly states that he is not trying to vacate or overturn his conviction, just the enforcement of
2 the restitution order. ECF No. 23-1 at 2. However,
3 in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
4 unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a . . .
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
5 on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
6 question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
7 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Heck’s
8 rationale applies to Bivens actions). Therefore, because plaintiff’s federal conviction has not
9 been overturned, he cannot bring a claim for malicious prosecution or unlawful imprisonment.
10 C. Conclusion
11 Because California and the United States are separate sovereigns, plaintiff’s convictions
12 and separate sentences by the state and federal courts do not violate double jeopardy. To the
13 extent plaintiff is attempting to make a claim for malicious prosecution and unlawful
14 imprisonment against Federal Defendants, his claims are barred by Heck because the conviction
15 has not been overturned or invalidated. The court needs not consider the other grounds for
16 dismissal and therefore declines to do so.
17 VIII. County and City Defendants
18 There is no indication in the record that defendants City of Modesto, Stanislaus County, or
19 Stanislaus County Probation Office have been served in this case, even though it has been a year
20 since the complaint was filed. ECF No. 1. Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
21 provides that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the
22 court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without
23 prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R.
24 Civ. P. 4(m). The deadline for service has long since passed. Moreover, even if plaintiff can
25 show good cause to excuse the failure to execute timely service, the allegations against these
26 defendants are clearly frivolous and should be dismissed. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
27 1221, 1227 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A paid complaint that is ‘obviously frivolous’ does not confer
28
1 federal subject matter jurisdiction and may be dismissed sua sponte before service of process.”
2 (internal citations omitted)).
3 Plaintiff claims the City of Modesto and Stanislaus County unlawfully detained and
4 prosecuted him in June 1996 and that the Stanislaus County Probation Office unlawfully enforced
5 the restitution order. ECF No. 1 at 2-4. However, plaintiff alleges that he pled guilty to the state
6 charges in October 1996 and was immediately transferred to federal custody. Id. at 4. The latest
7 date a claim for false imprisonment against these defendants could have arisen was the date he
8 left their custody, and the statute of limitations has long since expired. See Wallace v. Kato,
9 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007) (claim for unlawful detention is based on detention without legal
10 process and “ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process—when, for example,
11 he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges”); DeNardo v. Municipality of
12 Anchorage, 43 F. App’x 120 (9th Cir. 2002) (district court did not err in finding case “filed well
13 beyond the statute of limitations period” was frivolous).
14 To the extent plaintiff is alleging malicious prosecution, the claim is frivolous because, as
15 set forth above, the proceedings at issue were not terminated in plaintiff’s favor. See Heck,
16 512 U.S. at 484 (element of “malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal
17 proceeding in favor of the accused”); Enercon GmbH v. Erdman, 13 F. App’x 651, 652 (9th Cir.
18 2001) (district court properly determined “that . . . the malicious prosecution claim was frivolous
19 because the prior proceedings had not been terminated in [plaintiff’s] favor”).
20 Finally, for the reasons set forth above in addressing defendant Wells Fargo’s motion to
21 dismiss, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this court from considering plaintiff’s claims
22 regarding his restitution order and its enforcement.
23 Because the claims against defendants City of Modesto, Stanislaus County, and Stanislaus
24 County Probation Office are frivolous, they should be dismissed.
25 IX. No Leave to Amend
26 A plaintiff appearing in pro se should generally be given leave to amend, unless it is clear
27 that amendment would be futile. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987). As
28 addressed above, no additional facts in this case would create a legal basis for plaintiff’s claims,
1 | making amendment futile. Moreover, the proposed first amended complaint that plaintiff
2 || submitted with his opposition to the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss includes only minor
3 || changes to the complaint that have no substantive effect on the factual basis of his claims and
4 || therefore fails to demonstrate that leave to amend would not be futile. See ECF No. 23-1 at 5-11.
5 X. Motion for Summary Judgment
6 Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his claim that the restitution order and continued
7 || collection efforts constitute double jeopardy. ECF No. 27. As set forth above, this claim is not
8 | cognizable and could not be remedied by amendment. Nothing in plaintiff's motion for summary
9 || judgment alters that determination and the motion should therefore be denied.
10 XI. Conclusion
11 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
12 1. Respondents’ motions to dismiss (ECF No. 7, 8, 13) be GRANTED;
13 2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 27) be DENIED; and
14 3. The complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim and for lack
15 | of subject matter jurisdiction.
16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
17 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days
18 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
19 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
20 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the
21 || objections shall be served and filed within seven days after service of the objections. The parties
22 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal
23 || the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
24 | DATED: March 10, 2026. ‘
25 thttien —Chope_
ALLISON CLAIRE
26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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