The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – EASTERN DIVISION
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JAMES E. W., II,1 Case No. EDCV 25-00872-AS
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Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
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v.
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FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner
of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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17 For the reasons discussed below, the decision of the
18 Commissioner is affirmed.
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26 1 Plaintiff’s name is partly redacted in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation
27 of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of
the Judicial Conference of the United States.
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1 PROCEEDINGS
2
3 On April 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review
4 of the Commissioner’s determination that Plaintiff was no longer
5 disabled and no longer entitled to a period of disability and
6 disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social
7 Security Act. (Dkt. No. 1). On June 9, 2025, Defendant filed an
8 Answer consisting of the Administrative Record (“AR”). (Dkt. No.
9 13). The parties subsequently filed opposing briefs setting forth
10 their respective positions regarding Plaintiff’s claims (“Pl.
11 Brief” and “Def. Brief”). (Dkt Nos. 17, 20). The parties have
12 consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. (Dkt.
13 Nos. 6-7).
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15 The Court has taken this matter under submission without oral
16 argument. See C.D. Cal. C. R. 7-15.
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18 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
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20 In a Comparison Point Decision (“CPD”) dated January 8, 2018,
21 Plaintiff was found disabled beginning on December 2, 2016, due to
22 mental disorders. (AR 100-13). On September 1, 2021, it was
23 determined that Plaintiff was no longer disabled since that date,
24 and this determination was upheld on reconsideration by a state
25 agency Disability Hearing Officer. (AR 114-76). Plaintiff filed a
26 written request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
27 (“ALJ”). (AR 177). On September 27, 2023, ALJ Stacy Zimmerman held
28 a telephonic hearing and heard testimony from Plaintiff, who was
1 unrepresented, Plaintiff’s mother, and a vocational expert (“VE”).
2 (AR 53-99). On February 28, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding
3 that Plaintiff’s disability ended on September 1, 2021, and
4 Plaintiff had not become disabled since that date. (AR 13-23).
5
6 The following eight-step sequential evaluation process
7 applies for determining whether a previously determined disability
8 continues:
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10 (1) Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity?
11 If so, and the claimant is past any applicable trial work
12 period, the claimant’s disability ends. If not, proceed
13 to step two.
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15 (2) Does the claimant have an impairment or combination of
16 impairments which meets or equals the severity of an
17 impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
18 Appendix 1? If so, the claimant’s disability continues.
19 If not, proceed to step three.
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21 (3) Has there been medical improvement as shown by a decrease
22 in medical severity of those impairments present at the
23 time of the CPD? If so, proceed to step four. If not,
24 proceed to step five.
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26 (4) Is the claimant’s medical improvement related to the
27 claimant’s ability to do work, i.e., has there been an
28 increase in the claimant’s residual functional capacity
1 (“RFC”)2 based on the impairments that was present at the
2 time of the CPD? If not, proceed to step five. If so,
3 proceed to step six.
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5 (5) If there has been no medical improvement or if
6 improvement is not related to claimant’s ability to do
7 work, do any statutory exceptions to medical improvement
8 apply? If none apply, the claimant’s disability
9 continues.
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11 (6) Are all of the claimant’s current impairments in
12 combination severe? If impairments are not severe, the
13 claimant’s disability ends.
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15 (7) Does the claimant possess a RFC to perform the claimant’s
16 past relevant work? If a claimant can do past relevant
17 work, the claimant’s disability ends.
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19 (8) Is there other work that a person with the claimant’s
20 age, education, past work experience, and RFC can
21 perform? If so, the claimant’s disability ends. If not,
22 the claimant’s disability continues.
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2 A RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing
27 exertional and nonexertional limitations. See 20 C.F.R §
404.1545(a)(1).
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1 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(1)-(9); see also AR 14-23 (ALJ applying
2 this process).
3
4 Before proceeding through the steps in this case, the ALJ
5 noted that at the time of the CPD, Plaintiff had the following
6 medically determinable impairments: schizophrenia and anxiety
7 disorder. (AR 15). These impairments resulted in a RFC suggesting
8 Plaintiff would be unable to complete work activity on a day-to-
9 day basis without exhibiting psychiatric symptoms. (AR 15; see also
10 AR 111 (CPD noting same)).
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12 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
13 substantial gainful activity through February 28, 2024, the date
14 of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 15). Plaintiff had some earnings in
15 2018, 2019, and 2023, but his earnings did not rise to the level
16 of substantial gainful activity. (AR 15). At step two, the ALJ
17 found that Plaintiff had the following medically determinable
18 impairments since September 1, 2021, which did not meet or equal a
19 listed impairment: schizophrenia, anxiety disorder, Crohn’s
20 colitis, gluteal cleft cyst, and subcutaneous cyst of the back.
21 (AR 15-17).
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23 At step three, the ALJ found medical improvement occurred on
24 September 1, 2021, and the impairments present at the time of the
25 January 8, 2018 CPD had decreased in medical severity. (AR 17-18).
26 At step four, the ALJ determined that medical improvement was
27 related to Plaintiff’s ability to work because it resulted in an
28 increase to Plaintiff’s RFC. (AR 17-18, 21). At step six, the ALJ
1 found that Plaintiff’s current impairments in combination were
2 severe. (AR 21).
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4 At step seven, the ALJ determined that, since September 1,
5 2021, Plaintiff had a RFC to perform work at all exertion levels
6 with the following nonexertional limitations:
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8 [Plaintiff] can follow simple instructions and complete
9 simple tasks in a routine work environment; cannot have
10 customer-service interaction with the public; can attend
11 and concentrate for two-hour periods with normal breaks;
12 can frequently interact with coworkers and supervisors
13 but cannot perform tandem tasks or work as part of a
14 team; can perform low stress work, which is defined as
15 involving only occasional, simple decision making and
16 occasional changes in the work setting.
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18 (AR 18-21 (finding “persuasive” the available medical opinions
19 about Plaintiff’s RFC, and discounting Plaintiff’s and his mother’s
20 testimony and statements suggesting greater limitations)). The ALJ
21 also found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (AR 21).
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23 At step eight, the ALJ found that, based on the impairments
24 present since September 1, 2021, Plaintiff’s age, education, work
25 experience, and RFC, there were jobs existing in significant
26 numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform,
27 including packager, laboratory equipment cleaner, and warehouse
28 worker. (AR 21-23 (adopting VE testimony at AR 86-88)).
1 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s disability ended
2 on September 1, 2021, and Plaintiff had not become disabled since
3 that date. (AR 23).
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5 On December 4, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's
6 request to review the ALJ’s decision. (AR 4-7). The Appeals Council
7 had received additional evidence from Plaintiff but declined to
8 “exhibit” the evidence, finding no reasonable probability that the
9 additional evidence would change the outcome of the decision. (AR
10 5; see also AR 31-52 (evidence submitted for the first time to the
11 Appeals Council)). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s
12 decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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15 STANDARD OF REVIEW
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17 This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine
18 if it is free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence.
19 See Brewes v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
20 “Substantial evidence” is more than a mere scintilla, but less than
21 a preponderance. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir.
22 2014). “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
23 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill,
24 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation
25 omitted).
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27 To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding,
28 “a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence
1 that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s]
2 conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir.
3 2001) (internal quotation omitted). As a result, “[i]f the evidence
4 can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, [a
5 court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.”
6 Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).
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8 Where, as here, the Appeals Council “considers new evidence
9 in deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence
10 becomes part of the administrative record, which the district court
11 must consider when reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision for
12 substantial evidence.” Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1163. “[A]s a practical
13 matter, the final decision of the Commissioner includes the Appeals
14 Council’s denial of review, and the additional evidence considered
15 by that body is evidence upon which the findings and decision
16 complained of are based.” Id. (citations and quotations
17 omitted). This Court therefore has reviewed the evidence Plaintiff
18 submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council in reviewing
19 the ALJ’s decision.
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21 DISCUSSION
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23 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give legally
24 sufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony and
25 statements suggesting greater limitations since September 1, 2021,
26 than the ALJ found to exist. (Pl. Brief at 4-11). After
27 consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds no reason
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1 to remand this matter. The ALJ’s reasoning in this case is adequate,
2 and the Court discerns no material error.3
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4 A. Summary of the Medical Record
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6 As detailed above, Plaintiff was found disabled beginning on
7 December 2, 2016, due to mental health issues. (AR 111-12). On
8 September 1, 2021, when Plaintiff was deemed no longer disabled,
9 state agency review physicians found Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease
10 and other physical impairments were non-severe, and the current
11 record showed that Plaintiff’s mood and anxiety symptoms had been
12 stable for at least a year: he had no hospitalizations or emergency
13 department visits, he was sleeping well, he was socially engaged
14 with others, he had been taking classes, and his mental status
15 examinations were benign. (AR 115-37 (finding Plaintiff capable of
16 performing “SRTS” (simple repetitive tasks) with “LPC” (limited
17 public contact)). The available medical record the ALJ reviewed in
18 this case is consistent with the state agency physicians’ review.
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20 Mental Health Treatment Record
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22 Plaintiff had an in-patient psychiatric hold in November
23 2019. (AR 761-807). Subsequent mental health treatment notes
24 reflect that his condition improved. In February 2020, Plaintiff
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3 The harmless error rule applies to the review of
26 administrative decisions regarding disability. See McLeod v.
Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011); Burch v. Barnhart,
27 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (An ALJ’s decision will not be
reversed for errors that are harmless).
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1 reportedly was feeling stable and doing “okay” with his medication.
2 (AR 532). He had stopped smoking “weed” at the end of November,
3 yoga was helping to calm him, he was feeling more rested, his
4 relationship was doing well, he was taking a history class, he was
5 hoping to visit his sister in Minnesota, and he was feeling
6 positive. (AR 532; see also AR 533 (January 2020 note also reporting
7 improved symptoms)).
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9 In May 2020, Plaintiff reported some symptoms of depression.
10 (AR 542). His mental status examination was within normal limits
11 apart from an unkempt/poor appearance. (AR 542). In June 2020, he
12 was well groomed but anxious. (AR 543). In July 2020, he was well
13 groomed, stable, anxious, and depressed. (AR 544). In October
14 2020, Plaintiff reported his mood was stable on his medications
15 and he had no signs or symptoms of psychosis, but he had some
16 restlessness at night for which he agreed to change the form of
17 his sleep medication. (AR 594). He was able to enjoy activities
18 with others, was focused on school, and denied any hallucinations
19 or paranoia. (AR 594). In November 2020, Plaintiff reported his
20 mood was stable, denied any depressive symptoms, was able to be
21 social and actively engage in social events and activities, was
22 interacting well with others, his anxiety was controlled, and he
23 was sleeping throughout the night. (AR 596).
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25 In February 2021, Plaintiff again reported his mood was
26 stable, his anxiety was controlled, he was able to sleep through
27 the night with good quality sleep, his appetite was regular, and
28 he was staying active socially with friends, family and “work.”
1 (AR 600).4 In May 2021, he reported sleeping well, having a stable
2 mood, no mood swings or depressive symptoms and well-managed
3 anxiety. (AR 602). He was becoming more active in social efforts
4 and had increasing energy and motivation to be around friends. (AR
5 602). In July 2021, he reported his medication had been helpful in
6 maintaining mood stability and anxiety management, he was sleeping
7 throughout the night, had a good appetite, was socially active and
8 enjoyed the company of friends, and exercised daily. (AR 604). In
9 September 2021, around the time he was found to have medically
10 improved, Plaintiff reported his medication continued to be
11 effective in maintaining mood stability and managing anxiety, he
12 was sleeping well, his appetite was good, he was exercising,
13 socializing with friends and family, and attending college classes.
14 (AR 676). In December 2021, he again reported stable mood,
15 controlled anxiety, doing well socially, having pleasant
16 relationships with others, going to the gym, and feeling positive
17 with boosted self-esteem. (AR 677).
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19 In February 2022, Plaintiff reported his mood was stable,
20 stating, “I feel normal with these medication[s].” (AR 678). He
21 had not needed to take some of his medications, and he had been
22 successful in taking classes and interacting with his peers at
23 school. (AR 678).
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4 A February 2021 treatment note for congestion reported that
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Plaintiff had a depression screening score of two, which was
“negative” for depression. (AR 550-51). He only reported trouble
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with his sleep. (AR 550).
1 In April 2022, Plaintiff reported frustration and anxiety –
2 he had decompensated with his depressive symptoms and insomnia when
3 his medication was not dispensed due to insurance issues. (AR 679).
4 He was having mood swings with depressive symptoms, low motivation,
5 and loss of interest. (AR 679). However, he had started back on
6 his medication two weeks earlier, and felt his mood had become more
7 stable and his anxiety was better controlled. (AR 679).5
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9 In October 2022, Plaintiff reported his medication was
10 effective with mood stability and insomnia, he denied anxiety or
11 irritability, his behavior had been controlled, and he had been
12 socially active and pleasant with others. (AR 744). He was planning
13 a vacation to Germany and was excited to start a new job as a
14 massage therapist. (AR 744). He had just completed massage therapy
15 school and was certified. (AR 744). In November 2022, Plaintiff
16 reported doing well on his current medication with “good and
17 stable” mood, controlled anxiety, no sleep issues, good appetite,
18 he was enjoying activities with friends and family, enjoying his
19 new job as a massage therapist, and was excited about his upcoming
20 trip. (AR 742). This was the last mental health treatment note the
21 ALJ reviewed.
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5 Plaintiff’s mental health nurse practitioner provided a
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letter dated July 1, 2022, stating that Plaintiff’s symptoms
25 continued to affect his functioning in his everyday life. (AR 746).
Plaintiff’s medication regimen had been adjusted and Plaintiff
26 continued to be in communication to closely monitor its effects.
(AR 746). The nurse practitioner noted Plaintiff had “made some
27 progress over the past two years; however, his condition is chronic
and will require continued mental health assistance.” (AR 746).
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1 Plaintiff supplied some evidence of mental health treatment
2 for the first time to the Appeals Council. See AR 31-52 (evidence
3 which post-dated the administrative hearing in this case). The new
4 evidence reported some mental health issues from apparent
5 medication noncompliance. An excerpt from the emergency department
6 discharge instructions from San Antonio Regional Hospital dated
7 October 31, 2023, notes that Plaintiff had been evaluated for
8 schizophrenia and medication nonadherence and was treated with
9 Olanzapine and discharged without the need for a psychiatric hold.
10 (AR 41). Plaintiff was advised to begin taking his medications as
11 previously prescribed. (AR 41).6
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13 The new evidence includes an “In-Home Supportive Services
14 [“IHSS”] Medical Evaluation” by a treating nurse practitioner dated
15 December 10, 2023. (AR 32-33). The nurse practitioner was unable
16 to assess Plaintiff’s functional abilities/disabilities or
17 capacity for self-care because Plaintiff had been treated via
18 telehealth. (AR 33). The nurse practitioner reported, “during times
19 of mania [Plaintiff] does not sleep which causes altered mentation.
20 He has paranoia most days.” (AR 32). His prognosis was “poor” in
21 that he reportedly lacked insight into his problems and was not
22 medication compliant. (AR 32). The nurse practitioner opined,
23 without explanation, that Plaintiff was “currently” disabled from
24 October 31, 2023, to November 10, 2023, noting that Plaintiff has
25 a chronic condition that can be expected at any time he is not
26
6 There is also an excerpt from discharge instructions on
27 January 12, 2024, which does not indicate the purpose of the visit
or the emergency department course. (AR 42).
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1 medication compliant. (AR 31). The nurse practitioner also opined
2 that Plaintiff could be a danger to himself or others, should not
3 drive, and needs someone to watch him. (AR 33).7
4
5 The new evidence also includes a “Notice of Certification for
6 Intensive Treatment, etc.” for a 14-day hold for inpatient
7 treatment and medication stabilization beginning on February 6,
8 2024. (AR 38). Plaintiff reportedly was agitated, aggressive,
9 delusional, and paranoid. (AR 38). Plaintiff apparently was
10 discharged early on February 12, 2024, with expected “fair”
11 prognosis and stabilization with medication and outpatient
12 treatment compliance. (AR 39).
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14 Crohn’s Treatment Record
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16 The available treatment notes suggest that Plaintiff’s Crohn’s
17 disease has been in remission since well before Plaintiff was found
18 no longer disabled. A February 2020 treatment note reports that
19 Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease had shown endoscopic and microscopic
20 remission in November 2018. (AR 1094, 1114-15). Since Plaintiff’s
21 last visit for Crohn’s disease in June 2019, he continued to be
22 “doing well” from a gastrointestinal standpoint, and he denied
23 flares or ongoing gastrointestinal symptoms. (AR 1094). At his next
24 visit in August 2020, Plaintiff notedly continued “to be doing
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7 There is a second IHSS Medical Evaluation form with some
26 noted limits, but no physician certification. (AR 36-37). It is
unclear who completed this form, but the handwriting looks like
27 Plaintiff’s mother’s writing. (AR 36-37; compare AR 50 (handwritten
letter from Plaintiff’s mother)).
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1 clinically well” – he had regular bowel movements without
2 cramping/pain and blood in his stool, and denied ongoing perianal
3 pain or drainage. (AR 557). He again had no ongoing
4 gastrointestinal symptoms. (AR 557). At his next visit in May 2021,
5 Plaintiff reported he had been doing well and had good control of
6 his symptoms from his infusions. (AR 577-78).
7
8 Plaintiff followed up in April 2022, after he was found to
9 have medically improved, reporting he was doing well on his
10 treatment regimen, since using Metamucil regularly his bowel
11 movements were more formed, and although he has occasional perianal
12 discomfort he had no drainage. (AR 644-45). He continued to report
13 he was doing well in August 2022. (AR 1379). In September and
14 October 2022, Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease reportedly was “well
15 controlled with inactive disease” on his medication. (AR 712-13).
16
17 B. The ALJ Gave Legally Sufficient Reasons Supported by
18 Substantial Evidence for Discounting Plaintiff’s Testimony
19 and Statements.
20
21 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ provided legally insufficient
22 reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony and statements
23 suggesting greater limitations than the ALJ found to exist for the
24 period beginning on September 1, 2021. In summarizing his alleged
25 limitations, Plaintiff refers mostly to limitations as reported
26 by his mother. (Pl. Brief at 4-6 (discussing Plaintiff’s mother’s
27 Function Report Adult – Third Party form at AR 290-97, and to a
28 lesser extent the testimony by Plaintiff and his mother. Although
1 ALJs apply different standards for evaluating a claimant’s
2 statements versus third-party statements (like Plaintiff’s
3 mother’s), see, e.g., Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 655 (9th
4 Cir. 2017) (discussing different standards), the ALJ found
5 Plaintiff’s mother’s statements were “essentially the same” as
6 Plaintiff’s, and applied the same reasoning for rejecting both.
7 See AR 19-21. For ease of analysis, the Court has considered
8 Plaintiff’s statements and his mother’s statements without
9 distinguishing the two in evaluating the ALJ’s reasoning.
10 Plaintiff’s claim fails even if the Court attributes statements
11 made by Plaintiff’s mother to Plaintiff.
12
13 1. Applicable Law
14
15 When assessing a claimant’s credibility regarding subjective
16 pain or intensity of symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step
17 analysis. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017).
18 First, the ALJ must determine if there is medical evidence of an
19 impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged.
20 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. “In this analysis, the claimant is not
21 required to show that her impairment could reasonably be expected
22 to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only
23 show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the
24 symptom.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). “Nor must
25 a claimant produce objective medical evidence of the pain or
26 fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.” Id. (citation omitted).
27
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1 If the claimant satisfies this first step, and there is no
2 evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and
3 convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony about
4 the symptom severity. Id. at 1014-15; see also Robbins, 466 F.3d
5 at 883 (“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on
6 affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an applicant
7 not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and
8 stating clear and convincing reasons for each.”). “This is not an
9 easy requirement to meet: The clear and convincing standard is the
10 most demanding required in Social Security cases.” Garrison, 759
11 F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted). The ALJ must evaluate “the
12 intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent
13 to which the symptoms limit [the claimant’s] ability to perform
14 work-related activities for an adult.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304,
15 at *3.
16
17 While the ALJ cannot “delve into wide-ranging scrutiny of the
18 claimant’s character and apparent truthfulness,” Trevizo, 871 F.3d
19 at 678 n.5, the ALJ may consider “prior inconsistent statements
20 concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that
21 appears less than candid; unexplained or inadequately explained
22 failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of
23 treatment; and the claimant’s daily activities.” Ghanim v. Colvin,
24 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
25 Inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and conduct, or
26 internal contradictions in the claimant’s testimony, also may be
27 relevant. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014).
28
1 In addition, the ALJ may consider the observations of treating
2 and examining physicians regarding, among other matters, the
3 functional restrictions caused by the claimant’s symptoms. Smolen
4 v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Burrell, 775
5 F.3d at 1137. However, it is improper for an ALJ to reject
6 subjective testimony based “solely on a lack of objective medical
7 evidence to fully corroborate the claimant’s allegations.” Bray v.
8 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009)
9 (citation omitted); see also Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498
10 (9th Cir. 2022) (reaffirming same but observing that inconsistency
11 with the medical evidence is a factor that can be considered; “When
12 objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the
13 claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as
14 undercutting such testimony.”); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5
15 (“Objective medical evidence is a useful indicator to help make
16 reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of
17 symptoms, including the effects those symptoms may have on the
18 ability to perform work-related activities. . .”).
19
20 The ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings
21 that are “sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude
22 that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.”
23 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation
24 omitted); see Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir.
25 2015) (“A finding that a claimant’s testimony is not credible must
26 be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude
27 the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible
28 grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony
1 regarding pain.” (citation omitted)). Although an ALJ’s
2 interpretation of a claimant’s testimony may not be the only
3 reasonable one, if it is supported by substantial evidence, “it is
4 not [the court’s] role to second-guess it.” Rollins v. Massanari,
5 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
6
7 2. Testimony and Statements from Plaintiff and his Mother
8
9 The record contains similar Function Report forms dated May
10 2, 2022, from Plaintiff and his mother. (AR 282-97). Plaintiff
11 reported that he lived with his mother/caretaker, and that his
12 mental health conditions make it hard for him to maintain/manage a
13 daily routine – his moods change rapidly, he has difficulty in
14 groups, confined settings and social spaces, he needs to walk
15 sometimes to calm himself, and he cannot sit, stand or walk too
16 long without flexibility to move/adjust his environment to avoid
17 stress and discomfort. (AR 282).
18
19 His daily activities consisted of going to the bathroom,
20 sometimes showering, dressing, going to get tea or coffee, walking
21 or vaping to relax, eating sometimes, preparing for class/zoom,
22 doing homework, going to the store, preparing for doctor
23 appointments or video calls, sometimes exercising, eating dinner,
24 relaxing, and watching a movie or television show. (AR 283). He
25 did not always do his personal care due to being tired, forgetting,
26 and not being motivated. (AR 283). He needed reminders to put away
27 clothes, make is bed, clean up messes, for “bathroom stuff,” and
28 to take his medications. (AR 284). He could prepare some quick
1 meals 2-3 times a week and snacks daily. (AR 284). With reminders,
2 he could do laundry, iron, household chores (though he tends to
3 slack off), and take out the trash. (AR 284). He goes outside daily
4 walking or driving/riding in a car, could go out alone, could shop
5 in stores for up to 30 minutes, and could pay bills (sometimes with
6 support) and count change. (AR 285).
7
8 His hobbies include watching shows or videos, playing video
9 games, online media, working out in a gym, and facetiming to play
10 videos, but he is not motivated to do these activities as often as
11 he did before his illnesses began. (AR 286). He spent time with
12 others in person, on the phone, via text and video chat. (AR 286).
13 He attended his doctors’ appointments by video/phone conference,
14 and then was mainly home or with family/friends due to the Covid-
15 19 pandemic. (AR 286). He sometimes needed someone to accompany
16 him for support, mostly with “medical business,” and did not attend
17 peer activities as often, did not go to big events/parties, and he
18 refrained from drinking/smoking “as much.” (AR 286).
19
20 Plaintiff checked that his anxiety, moods, depression, and
21 Crohn’s disease affect all possible areas of functioning. (AR 287).
22 He could walk for 30 minutes before needing to stop to rest, could
23 pay attention depending on whether he is focused or distracted or
24 tired, sometimes finishes what he starts, follows written
25 instructions pretty well when he is focused/not under stress, and
26 gets along with authority figures well but can get upset and needs
27 support to handle stressful situations. (AR 287). He does not
28 handle stress well though he does better with medications and “good
1 rest.” (AR 288). He avoids high pressure settings/situations and
2 is not as sociable. (AR 288). Plaintiff reported that he had been
3 fired from two jobs due to his conditions causing conflicts at
4 work, disrupting his schedule, or making him unable to manage his
5 job duties. (AR 287).
6
7 Plaintiff’s mother reported in her form that Plaintiff is in
8 her “care/home 24/7,” and that she oversees his medical care,
9 personal care, and some social and family activities. (AR 290).
10 She reported that Plaintiff requires daily medications to manage
11 his mental illnesses/sleep, and requires IV treatments every eight
12 weeks and a special diet for his Crohn’s disease. (AR 290).
13 Plaintiff’s daily activities include resting, making up for lost
14 sleep, doing chores or running errands or exercising if he is able.
15 (AR 291, 297). Plaintiff required “constant” reminders to put
16 grease in his hair, flush the toilet, put trash in the trash can,
17 clean the kitchen after making a mess, change his bed sheets, do
18 chores, stay organized not cluttered, and take his medications.
19 (AR 292). She reported that Plaintiff has more patience with his
20 medications and does not get upset when he does repetitive steps
21 to prepare meals, but he does not prepare meals if he is
22 tired/anxious/upset. (AR 292). He could do “lite” housework with
23 many delays because he is easily distracted, his moods cause him
24 to do chores slowly, he forgets, and is tired or anxious. (AR 292).
25
26 Plaintiff’s mother admitted that Plaintiff has been on “more
27 effective medications and therapy that [] manage[] his conditions
28 and help[] him relax and focus better in life!” (AR 294). She said
1 he does not like to be around unfamiliar people “too long,” tends
2 to get anxiety or pressure to be social, and requires her assistance
3 to handle medical appointments, chores, basic living routines,
4 money and bills, and to reduce his stress. (AR 295).
5
6 Plaintiff appeared for the telephonic hearing with his mother
7 present. At the outset of the hearing, the ALJ advised Plaintiff
8 of his right to representation (which Plaintiff said he understood)
9 and asked if Plaintiff wanted to go forward without a
10 representative. (AR 57-58). Plaintiff said, “I’m asking my mom,”
11 and had an off-the record discussion then said, “It’s okay to go
12 forward.” (AR 58-59). Plaintiff’s mother added, “We’ll go forward.
13 We’re ready.” (AR 59).8
14
15
8 The ALJ gave Plaintiff and his mother two weeks after
16 the hearing to review his file and to advise whether Plaintiff had
any additional treatment not included. (AR 60, 65). By letter dated
17 January 25, 2024, the ALJ notified Plaintiff of additional medical
evidence proposed to be entered into the record, and gave Plaintiff
18 an opportunity to submit written comments about the evidence,
written statements about facts/law which may apply in light of the
19 evidence, any additional records Plaintiff wished to have the ALJ
consider, and written questions for the author(s) of the new
20
evidence. (AR 388-89). Plaintiff’s mother replied by letter dated
21 February 7, 2024, reporting that she had not had an opportunity to
review Plaintiff’s notes, and that Plaintiff had been in emergency
22 care that week due to coming off Zyprexa which made him unable to
manage his moods, anger, and aggressive behavior. (AR 393). He was
23 inconsistently taking his medications, had been back on his
medication since February 6 (the day before), but had not fully
24
recovered enough to resume his daily routines at home and school
25 “as of yet.” (AR 393-94). Plaintiff’s mother provided some records
documenting Plaintiff’s current class schedule (AR 396-400), but
26 no records from his recent emergency care. See AR 14 (ALJ’s decision
noting same and indicating the record was then closed). As detailed
27 above, Plaintiff provided some records from Plaintiff’s emergency
care for the first time to the Appeals Council. (AR 5, 38-39).
28
1 The hearing transcript suggests that Plaintiff may have had
2 some difficulty during the hearing. Plaintiff’s mother noted that
3 Plaintiff had to leave the room while the ALJ was discussing the
4 status of Plaintiff’s file. (AR 60). Plaintiff explained that he
5 was “not comfortable right now” because of his Crohn’s disease.
6 (AR 61-62). When the ALJ advised Plaintiff of the issues to be
7 decided in his case and asked whether Plaintiff or his mother had
8 any questions, the following occurred:
9
10 [Plaintiff’s mother]: I’m sorry. What’s going on?
11 James is in distress. What’s going on? Yeah, he’s tearing
12 and –
13
14 ALJ: Mr. [W], are you okay?
15
16 [Plaintiff’s mother]: I didn’t – yeah. James –
17 Judge, he’s really distressed. And under the
18 circumstances, abruptly canceling his benefits, it’s
19 been a real strain on him. He’s also timid, so he’s been
20 trying to manage, and you know, deal with the hardship
21 of that and just – yeah. [INAUDIBLE] position.
22
23 ALJ: Okay. So are you going to be okay with going
24 forward with the hearing today, or do you need a break?
25
26 [Plaintiff’s mother]: Do you need a break? She’s
27 asking.
28
1 [Plaintiff]: Oh, she –
2
3 [Plaintiff’s mother]: Yeah, it’s been a build-up to
4 the hearing, and it’s – yeah, challenging just to keep
5 his stress, you know, at bay, you know, as much as we
6 can, which he’s never absent, you know, from having
7 elevated anxiety and just stress and – and everything.
8 So this is not – yes, an ideal situation for him. But
9 we’re going through it and trying to get him through it
10 as best we can for his own benefits and livelihood.
11 James, she’s asking if you think you’re going to be able
12 to go forward? What do you think?
13
14 [Plaintiff]: Yes.
15
16 ALJ: Okay.
17
18 [Plaintiff’s mother]: Yeah, it will be an emotional
19 case, but yeah, he’s here.
20
21 (AR 67-68). Plaintiff’s mother then stepped out during Plaintiff’s
22 testimony. (AR 69).
23
24 Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work because “[t]he
25 job tends stress me out to the point where I can no longer work
26 with people, and I need somebody – the people I work with and jobs
27 that I was working took me to the edge, so I can’t control my
28 anxiety anymore and to treat me [INAUDIBLE] because of my race and
1 who I am as a person. And I don’t get to so like be the best worker
2 in the workforce. . . . I’m always discriminated against, but I’m
3 a good worker, but when I do. That’s what people in social
4 [INAUDIBLE].” (AR 69-70). Plaintiff said he had issues with waiting
5 for anything which “messes with [him].” (AR 76). Plaintiff also
6 had issues with his Crohn’s disease in that if he does not spend
7 enough time in the bathroom wiping completely, “things may like
8 leak out,” and he will have to go back to the bathroom. (AR 76).
9 He said it is “uncomfortable” and “not okay,” and that he was
10 uncomfortable sitting during his testimony but he was “just bearing
11 with it.” (AR 76-77).
12
13 Plaintiff had not worked since 2019. (AR 70). He had been in
14 college since 2013, but he had to “cut back” and “not be where [he]
15 should be. . . because of this.” (AR 71, 74-75). He then was
16 attending Cal Poly in person, taking 15 units and studying
17 psychology. (AR 71-72). He anticipated graduating in two years at
18 that course load level. (AR 75).
19
20 Plaintiff was also receiving mental health treatment and was
21 taking Zyprexa which he said helped but “not really.” (AR 72).9
22 Plaintiff was not sure if he was getting help with college through
23 a disabled students’ program, but he did not think so. (AR 72-73).
24 Plaintiff drove himself to school. (AR 73). Plaintiff said his
25
9 A September 5, 2023 letter from Plaintiff’s mother on
26 his behalf reported that Plaintiff had taken many different
prescriptions but none of them had gotten rid of Plaintiff’s
27 “overwhelming brain, ruminating thoughts, fluctuation mood
changes, severe depression, or physical health problems.” (AR 745).
28
1 mother helped with daily activities by providing a place for
2 Plaintiff to live, cleaning, helping with laundry, and reminding
3 Plaintiff of important things Plaintiff needed to do. (AR 73).
4 Plaintiff’s mother was working through “IHSS” (In Home Support
5 Services) as Plaintiff’s caretaker. (AR 73, 80-81).10
6
7 Plaintiff had an externship with Massage Envy earlier in the
8 year, and was attempting to get a job there but he was not hired.
9 (AR 73-74). Plaintiff had obtained a massage therapy license or
10 credential in September 2022, from the National Holistic Institute
11 in Ontario. (AR 74). Plaintiff said he had done the training but
12 he had never gotten a job “anywhere officially under an
13 institution.” (AR 74).
14
15 Plaintiff said on a typical day he gets on a “streaming
16 service” to play video games – he used to hang out with friends
17 but he did not have any friends anymore. (AR 75). He goes to school
18 on Mondays and Thursdays, and on the other days he tries to do
19 dishes at home. (AR 75).
20
21 Plaintiff’s mother testified that Plaintiff has a “very
22 fragile, delicate mental health disorder” along with his Crohn’s
23 disease. (AR 78). She said Plaintiff is very intelligent,
24 ambitious, has goals, and “it’s been a challenge for him.” (AR 78).
25 She said he has anger, meltdowns, manic episodes, and becomes
26
27 10 As of May 2023, Plaintiff was approved for 121 hours and
48 minutes of In-Home Support Services per month. (AR 748-49).
28
1 distressed very easily. (AR 79). She said that Plaintiff has
2 special accommodations in school allowing for more time to do his
3 work. (AR 80). She said Plaintiff is constantly under stress, in
4 distress, dealing with anxiety, and is just angry and upset in part
5 because his disability benefits had been discontinued. (AR 81).
6
7 Plaintiff’s mother said that she does “everything” for
8 Plaintiff – housekeeping, cleaning, and prepping meals. (AR 81).
9 She said on a typical day Plaintiff rests, maintains his sleep
10 pattern, tries to relax, tries to walk, watches TV, and plays
11 games. (AR 83).
12
13 3. Analysis
14
15 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable
16 impairments could have reasonably been expected to produce the
17 alleged symptoms,” but his “statements concerning the intensity,
18 persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms” were not
19 entirely consistent with the objective medical evidence and other
20 evidence of record. (AR 19). The ALJ reasoned: (1) treatment notes
21 revealed that treatment had been “generally successful” in
22 controlling Plaintiff’s symptoms, i.e., (a) Plaintiff “reported
23 improvement in his mental impairments when he started taking
24 medications as prescribed; he reported stable mood, controlled
25 anxiety, sleeping well through the night, feeling rested during
26 the day, being focused at school, being socially active, and
27 enjoying the company of friends” (AR 19 (citing AR 594, 596, 600,
28 602, 604, 676-79, 742, 744)); (b) Plaintiff’s treatment providers
1 “noted he was stable and improved with medications and other
2 treatment modalities” (AR 19 (citing AR 714, 1268, 1380)); and (c)
3 mental status examinations “have been generally normal” (AR 19
4 (citing AR 1017, 1020, 1022)); and (2) despite Plaintiff’s
5 allegations of disabling mental problems, he described daily
6 activities inconsistent with these limitations in that he
7 reportedly was able to attend college full time, complete his
8 massage therapy certification, extern at Massage Envy, vacation in
9 Germany, go out alone, drive a car, shop in stores and by computer,
10 pay bills, count change, handle a savings account, and play video
11 games online, and his earnings records showed he was able to work
12 earning $1,580 in the first quarter of 2023 (AR 19-20 (citing AR
13 71-74 (Plaintiff’s testimony about his college work, massage
14 therapist certification, and externship with Massage Envy); AR 230-
15 31, 238 (Plaintiff’s 2023 earnings records); AR 248-55 (Plaintiff’s
16 Function Report form); AR 742-44 (most recent mental health
17 treatment notes that were before the ALJ stating that Plaintiff
18 continued to go out and enjoy times with friends and family,
19 socialized, had completed his massage therapist certification and
20 was enjoying his new massage therapist job, and was planning for
21 and excited about a trip to Germany)).
22
23 The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by
24 substantial evidence in the record, for discounting Plaintiff’s
25 testimony and statements. As noted above, a lack of corroborating
26 objective medical evidence is relevant to an ALJ’s evaluation of a
27 claimant’s statements, so long as the ALJ does not reject
28 statements solely on that basis. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d
1 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (where “the claimant produces
2 objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an
3 adjudicator may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based
4 solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate
5 the alleged severity of pain”) (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d
6 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986)); Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
7 554 F.3d at 1227. “When objective medical evidence in the record
8 is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ
9 may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v.
10 Kijakazi, 53 F.4th at 498 (emphasis original).
11
12 Here, the ALJ properly relied on inconsistencies between the
13 extreme symptoms/limitations Plaintiff and his mother alleged, and
14 the available medical record leading up to and after September 1,
15 2021, which reflected that Plaintiff’s impairments admittedly were
16 controlled/stable with treatment. (AR 19). Indeed, the record that
17 was before the ALJ suggested that Plaintiff’s conditions were
18 stable and controlled by his medications when Plaintiff was
19 medication compliant. Even when Plaintiff reported to his provider
20 that his depressive symptoms and insomnia returned because he had
21 stopped taking his medications due to insurance issues, he also
22 said that two weeks after he resumed taking his medications, he
23 felt his mood had become more stable and his anxiety was better
24 controlled. (AR 679). He had no other noncompliance issues or
25 decompensation reported in the post-September 1, 2021 record that
26 the ALJ reviewed. “Impairments that can be effectively controlled
27 with medication are not disabling. . . .” Warre v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d
28 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). A favorable
1 response to treatment can undermine a claimant’s complaints of
2 debilitating limitations. See Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d
3 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“evidence of medical treatment
4 successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of
5 disability”); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d at 1040 (claimant’s
6 response to conservative treatment undermined his reports regarding
7 the disabling nature of his pain, as did his testimony that his
8 diabetes was controlled by medication). The ALJ’s reliance on
9 Plaintiff’s favorable response to treatment was a clear and
10 convincing reason supported by substantial evidence for discounting
11 Plaintiff’s complaints of extreme limitations.
12
13 The new evidence the Appeals Council reviewed does not
14 undermine this conclusion. The evidence suggests that Plaintiff’s
15 mental health symptoms return when he is noncompliant with his
16 medications. (AR 31). Plaintiff had two instances of decompensation
17 due to medication noncompliance after the administrative hearing
18 and before the ALJ’s decision. (AR 38-39, 41). However, like the
19 one instance of decompensation reported in the record the ALJ
20 reviewed (at AR 679), the new records suggest that Plaintiff’s
21 condition stabilized with medication compliance. Plaintiff
22 apparently required outpatient treatment on October 31, 2023,
23 because he stopped taking his medications. (AR 41). Plaintiff’s
24 nurse practitioner suggested that Plaintiff was only “disabled”
25 from October 31, 2023 to November 10, 2023, or eleven days after
26 Plaintiff went to the emergency room and was instructed to resume
27 taking his medications as prescribed. (AR 31, 41). Plaintiff
28 required inpatient treatment in February of 2024, but he stabilized
1 enough to be discharged from the hospital after six days of an
2 anticipated 14-day hold, with expected stabilization with
3 medication and outpatient treatment compliance (AR 38-39). When
4 Plaintiff’s mother raised the fact of this psychiatric emergency
5 with the ALJ by letter the day after Plaintiff was admitted for
6 inpatient treatment in February, she stated that it was due to
7 Plaintiff coming off his medication, which he had since resumed
8 but he had not fully recovered “as of yet,” suggesting she also
9 expected Plaintiff to recover once he was back on his medication.
10 (AR 393).
11
12 Nothing about the new evidence that was before the Appeals
13 Council suggests that Plaintiff was as disabled as he and his
14 mother claimed he was from September 1, 2021, through the date of
15 the ALJ’s decision. And nothing in the record the Appeals Council
16 reviewed suggests that Plaintiff became disabled after the
17 administrative hearing in this case since Plaintiff’s apparent
18 episodes of decompensation were brief and do not suggest expected
19 disability for a continuous period of 12 months or more. See 20
20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (listing duration requirement). If Plaintiff’s
21 condition has since deteriorated, he can apply for benefits for a
22 new disability period.
23
24 The ALJ also properly relied on Plaintiff’s admitted daily
25 activities to find he was not as limited as he alleged since
26 September 1, 2021. An ALJ may rely on a claimant’s daily activities
27 in discounting symptom testimony. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
28 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (daily activities may be used to discount
1 subjective complaints where the daily activities “contradict [a
2 claimant’s] other testimony” or “meet the threshold for
3 transferrable work skills”); see also Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d
4 at 1165 (“Engaging in daily activities that are incompatible with
5 the severity of symptoms alleged can support an adverse credibility
6 determination.”); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir.
7 1998) (daily activities have bearing on a claimant's credibility
8 where the “level of activity [is] inconsistent with the Claimant's
9 claimed limitations”). Here, the fact that Plaintiff was able to
10 drive, go out alone, stop in stores, pay video games online, attend
11 college full time (even with special accommodations), complete a
12 massage therapist certificate program in Ontario, and work some in
13 the first quarter of 2023, suggests that he was not so gravely
14 limited as he and his mother’s allegations suggest. See Valentine
15 v. Comm’r, 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (while daily activities
16 did not suggest Plaintiff could return to his prior work, they did
17 suggest that his “later claims about the severity of his
18 limitations were exaggerated”).
19
20 The ALJ’s reasoning is sufficiently specific for the Court to
21 conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discount Plaintiff’s
22 testimony. The ALJ adequately explained why the record did not
23 support Plaintiff’s claimed limitations. Compare Brown-Hunter, 806
24 F.3d at 491 (finding fault with ALJ’s conclusion that the
25 claimant’s limitations were less than alleged where the ALJ merely
26 summarized the medical record without explaining why it undermined
27 the claimant’s allegations).
28
1 Because the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony on legally
2 permissible grounds and the ALJ’s reasoning is supported by
3 substantial evidence, the Court will defer to the ALJ’s
4 interpretation of the evidence. See Flaten v. Sec’y of Health &
5 Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995) (court will defer
6 to an ALJ’s credibility determinations when they are appropriately
7 supported in the record by specific findings justifying the
8 decision).
9
10 ORDER
11
12 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner
13 is affirmed.
14
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
15
16 Dated: May 12, 2026
______________/s/_____________
17
ALKA SAGAR
18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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