The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – WESTERN DIVISION
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11 CESAR TOMAS AVALOS, CASE NO. CV 25-11434-AS
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
14 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, MOTION TO REMAND
15 Defendant.
16
17 INTRODUCTION
18
19 On August 5, 2025, Plaintiff Cesar Tomas Avalos (“Plaintiff”),
20 filed a Complaint against Defendant General Motors LLC
21 (“Defendant”), in Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No.
22 25STCV23049, asserting claims under the California Song-Beverly
23 Consumer Warranty Act for breach of express warranty, breach of
24 the implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of
25 California Civil Code section 1793.2. (Dkt. No. 1-1, at 10-16
26 (“Complaint”)). On August 6, 2025, Plaintiff served the Summons
27 and Complaint on Defendant. (Dkt. No. 7-1, at 5-6). On September
28 4, 2025, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1-
1 2). On December 1, 2025, Defendant filed the Notice of Removal,
2 removing the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction.
3 (Dkt. No. 1).
4
5 On December 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand
6 (“Motion”) along with a supporting Memorandum of Points and
7 Authorities (“Motion Mem.”), a declaration of counsel (“Plata
8 Decl.”) and an exhibit. (Dkt. No. 7). Plaintiff contends that
9 remand is warranted because Defendant’s removal of the case to this
10 Court (1) was untimely and (2) fails to establish that the case
11 satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement. (See Motion Mem.
12 at 5-10). On January 6, 2026, Defendant filed an Opposition to the
13 Motion, along with a supporting declaration of counsel (“Fitch
14 Decl.”) and exhibits. (Dkt. No. 12). Plaintiff followed with a
15 Reply on January 22, 2026. (Dkt. No. 13).
16
17 For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.1
18
19 LEGAL STANDARD
20
21 Removal of a case from state court to federal court is governed
22 by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any
23 civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
24 of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
25 removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the
26
27 1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States
Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (See Dkt. Nos. 5-6).
28
1 district and division embracing the place where such action is
2 pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original subject
3 matter jurisdiction where an action presents either a federal
4 question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity of citizenship under
5 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Generally, a court has diversity jurisdiction
6 only when there is complete diversity of citizenship among adverse
7 parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28
8 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Remand to state court may be ordered for lack of
9 subject matter jurisdiction or any defect in the removal procedure.
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
11
12 To protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal
13 jurisdiction is strictly construed in favor of remand. See Harris
14 v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005); see
15 also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.
16 2006) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside the limited
17 jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing
18 the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”
19 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). If there is any
20 doubt as to whether removal is proper, remand must be ordered.
21 Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir.
22 1988). “The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing
23 federal jurisdiction.” Id.
24
25 DISCUSSION
26
27 As indicated above, Plaintiff’s Motion contends that remand
28 is warranted because Defendant’s removal (1) was untimely and (2)
1 fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.
2 (See Motion Memo at 4-10). The Motion is denied.
3
4 A. Defendant’s Removal Was Timely
5
6 1. Applicable Law
7
8 The Ninth Circuit has explained that there are three pathways
9 for removal of an action from state court based on diversity
10 jurisdiction. See Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d
11 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). The first two pathways are contained
12 in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and impose thirty-day deadlines for removal.
13 See Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021).
14 The third pathway is based on reading 28 U.S.C. § 1446 together
15 with 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and permits removal up to one year from the
16 filing of the complaint, but this pathway only applies if the first
17 two do not. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125-26.
18
19 The first pathway is set forth by § 1446(b)(1) and states that
20 “[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be
21 filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through
22 service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting
23 forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is
24 based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the
25 defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court
26 and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period
27 is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Section 1446(b)(1) “only
28 applies if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on
1 its face,” as determined “through examination of the four corners
2 of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a
3 duty to make further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694.
4
5 The second pathway is set forth by § 1446(b)(3) and states in
6 relevant part that “if the case stated by the initial pleading is
7 not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days
8 after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
9 copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
10 which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or
11 has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Section 1446(b)(3)
12 is triggered only where “an amended pleading, motion, order, or
13 other paper . . . [makes] a ground for removal unequivocally clear
14 and certain.” Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095.
15
16 The third pathway is based on the interaction of § 1446 with
17 § 1441. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Section 1441(a) states that
18 “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
19 civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
20 of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
21 the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
22 United States for the district and division embracing the place
23 where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Ninth
24 Circuit has explained “that §§ 1441 and 1446, read together, permit
25 a defendant to remove outside the two thirty-day periods on the
26 basis of its own information, provided that it has not run afoul
27 of either of the thirty-day deadlines.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125.
28 Thus, “a defendant who has not lost the right to remove because of
1 a failure to timely file a notice of removal under § 1446(b)(1) or
2 (b)(3) may remove to federal court when it discovers, based on its
3 own investigation, that a case is removable.” Id. at 1123. The only
4 time limit on removal under this third pathway is that a defendant
5 must file the notice of removal within one year of the filing of
6 the complaint. Id. at 1126 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) for the
7 one-year time limit).
8
9 2. Analysis
10
11 It is undisputed that Defendant removed this case to this
12 Court more than thirty days after service of the Complaint; indeed,
13 removal occurred almost four months after service, long after
14 Defendant already had answered the Complaint. (See Plata Decl. ¶¶
15 5-6, 9). Defendant asserts that the thirty-day deadlines of §
16 1446(b)(1) and § 1446(b)(3) do not apply here because Plaintiff’s
17 Complaint is ambiguous as to Plaintiff’s state of citizenship and
18 the amount in controversy. (See Notice of Removal at 6-10;
19 Opposition at 14-18). Particularly as to the latter, as Defendant
20 points out, the Complaint fails to provide any of the values needed
21 to calculate the amount of damages sought.
22
23 Plaintiff contends that a thirty-day deadline applied because
24 the face of the Complaint provided sufficient information for
25 Defendant to plausibly allege that the amount in controversy was
26 met. (See Motion Mem. at 5-8). The Complaint asserts breach-of-
27 warranty claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
28 arising out of Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2024 Chevrolet Equinox RS
1 on October 18, 2023. (See Compl. at 1-4). As relief, the Complaint
2 seeks a rescission of the purchase contract and restitution of all
3 monies expended on the subject vehicle, general, special,
4 incidental, and consequential damages, as well as a civil penalty
5 of up to two times the amount of actual damages, along with
6 attorneys’ fees and costs. (See Compl. at 5).
7
8 The Song-Beverly Act permits the purchaser of a vehicle to
9 obtain restitution equal to “the purchase price paid by the buyer,
10 less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal.
11 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(1). The usage offset is calculated based on
12 “the number of miles traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to
13 the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the
14 manufacturer.” Id. § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). In addition, under newly
15 enacted California law, defendants in actions seeking restitution
16 for motor vehicles are entitled to offset from the purchase price
17 any negative equity, manufacturer’s rebate, third-party sold
18 optional equipment, and unpaid financing. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §
19 871.27(b), (c), (d), (f).
20
21 In Plaintiff’s Complaint, not only is the amount of damages
22 unspecified, but so too are the purchase price, the mileage, and
23 any other facts related to the subject vehicle aside from the make,
24 model, year, and Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”). Plaintiff
25 nonetheless asserts that this information alone sufficed for
26 Defendant to estimate the vehicle’s market value and thereby
27 calculate the total damages sought, given that Defendant has
28 “sophisticated knowledge of the motor vehicle industry” and was
1 the vehicle’s “manufacturer and distributor.” (Motion Mem. at 6-
2 7).
3
4 It is true that defendants are required to “apply a reasonable
5 amount of intelligence in ascertaining removability,” and
6 “[m]ultiplying figures clearly stated in a complaint is an aspect
7 of that duty.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136,
8 1140 (9th Cir. 2013). However, when no such figures are provided,
9 “defendants need not make extrapolations or engage in guesswork,”
10 id., nor are they expected to rely on their “subjective knowledge”
11 or “pre-complaint documents to ascertain whether a case stated by
12 an indeterminate initial pleading is actually removable,” Carvalho
13 v. Equifax Inf. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2010).
14 To the contrary, as indicated above, the thirty-day deadline under
15 § 1441(b)(1) applies only if the basis for removal may be determined
16 by examining “the four corners” of the Complaint itself, “not
17 through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.”
18 Harris, 425 F.3d at 694.
19
20 Thus, absent any specific allegations of the dollar value of
21 the claims, bare allegations of the make and model of the vehicle
22 and claims for broad categories of damages are insufficient to
23 trigger the removal deadline. See, e.g., Alvarez-Munguia v. Ford
24 Motor Co., 2024 WL 69076, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2024) (complaint
25 did not trigger thirty-day removal deadline because it alleged only
26 categories of relief and did not identify any “specific measure of
27 damages, nor [did] it allege the amount of attorneys’ fees and
28 costs incurred”); Pastrana v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2024 WL 2817533,
1 at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2024) (thirty-day deadline was not
2 triggered where the complaint did not “list a dollar amount
3 corresponding to the damages”); Moran v. Ford Motor Co., 2023 WL
4 4532755, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2023) (“[W]hile Defendant could
5 have made a plausible guess that the amount in controversy in this
6 case exceeded $75,000, Defendant was under no obligation to do
7 so.”); see also Valentin v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2026 WL 836347, at
8 *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026) (“A substantial majority of courts
9 have found that without pleading facts about the vehicle’s value,
10 a complaint is indeterminate concerning the amount in controversy
11 and therefore removability is not yet clear.” (collecting cases)).
12
13 As the values needed to calculate damages are not contained
14 within the “four corners” of Plaintiff’s Complaint, § 1441(b)(1)
15 does not apply. See Harris, 425 F.3d at 694.
16
17 As indicated above, § 1446(b)(3) provides another pathway
18 whereby removal may be accomplished within thirty days after
19 receipt of “a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other
20 paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one
21 which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). To
22 qualify, the amended pleading, motion, order, or “other paper” must
23 make the basis for removal “unequivocally clear and certain.”
24 Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095.
25
26 Plaintiff contends that the amount of controversy became
27 “unquestionably ascertainable” at least by October 7, 2025, when
28 Plaintiff produced a copy of the subject vehicle’s sales agreement
1 which identified the vehicle’s total sales price – $58,620.15.
2 (Motion Mem. at 3, 7-8; Plata Decl. ¶ 8; see Fitch Decl. ¶ 2, Ex.
3 A). However, “[w]hile Plaintiff[] disclosed the purchase price of
4 the vehicle” by providing the sales agreement, he “did not provide
5 information about the vehicle’s ‘payoff history’ or the number of
6 miles driven. Defendant therefore lacked information needed to
7 calculate the available damages.” Stewart v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025
8 WL 2848991, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (citing Lopez v. Gen.
9 Motors, LLC, 2025 WL 2629545, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2025);
10 Covarrubias v. Ford Motor Co., 2025 WL 907544, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
11 Mar. 24, 2025))). In other words, as numerous district courts have
12 concluded in similar circumstances, the Complaint and sales
13 agreement, by themselves, did not make the amount in controversy
14 “unequivocally clear and certain” to Defendant, as needed to
15 trigger § 1446(b)(3). See, e.g., Valentin, 2026 WL 836347, at *3
16 n.4 (“The car sales agreement alone did not trigger removal under
17 the ‘unequivocally clear and certain’ standard.”); Bateman v. Gen.
18 Motors LLC, 2026 WL 412521, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2026)
19 (“[W]hile the Sales Agreement may have made it likely that the
20 amount in controversy requirement was met, ‘likely’ is not
21 ‘unequivocally clear and certain.’ . . . [Plaintiff’s] production
22 of the Sales Agreement did not meet the high standard for triggering
23 removability.” (citation omitted)); Lopez, 2025 WL 2629545, at *3
24 (amount in controversy was not “unequivocally clear and certain”
25 absent loan payment history). To calculate damages with sufficient
26 certainty, Defendant needed to resort to information obtained
27 though its own investigation or from documents that Plaintiff
28 disclosed later.
1 Furthermore, without sufficient information to calculate
2 actual damages with certainty, Defendant also had no basis to
3 calculate civil penalties. See, e.g., Stewart, 2025 WL 2848991, at
4 *4 (same); Lopez, 2025 WL 2629545, at *4 (same); Bateman, 2026 WL
5 412521, at *4 (same). There was also no information in the Complaint
6 or other papers to calculate attorneys’ fees.
7
8 Accordingly, since neither § 1446(b)(1) or § 1446(b)(3) are
9 applicable, Defendant timely filed the Notice of Removal within
10 one year of the commencement of this action. Roth, 720 F.3d at
11 1125.
12
13 B. Defendant Has Established by a Preponderance of the Evidence
14 that the Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000
15
16 1. Applicable Law
17
18 As previously noted, § 1332 “gives federal district courts
19 original jurisdiction of all civil actions ‘between . . . citizens
20 of different States’ where the amount in controversy exceeds
21 $75,000.” Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005)
22 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). “Where, as here, it is unclear
23 from the face of the complaint whether the amount in controversy
24 exceeds $75,000, ‘the removing defendant bears the burden of
25 establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount
26 in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.’” Chavez v.
27 JP Morgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation
28 omitted); Guglielmo v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th
1 Cir. 2007); see also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of
2 Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010)
3 (“[I]n a case that has been removed from state court to federal
4 court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,
5 the proponent of federal jurisdiction – typically the defendant in
6 the substantive dispute – has the burden to prove, by a
7 preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.”). “A
8 defendant may rely on reasonable assumptions to prove that it has
9 met the statutory threshold.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d
10 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2020). The parties also may submit evidence,
11 “including affidavits or declarations, or other summary-judgment-
12 type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of
13 removal.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th
14 Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
15
16 “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total
17 amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s
18 liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th
19 Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “In that sense, the amount in
20 controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could
21 reasonably recover.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d
22 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
23 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018)) (emphasis in original). Thus,
24 the amount in controversy is the amount “at stake” in the litigation
25 at the time of removal, “whatever the likelihood that [the
26 plaintiff] will actually recover them.” Chavez, 888 F.3d at 417.
27
28
1 “[T]he amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory,
2 punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction,
3 and attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or
4 contract.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d
5 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018).
6
7 2. Analysis
8
9 Plaintiff contends that Defendant has failed to meet its
10 burden to establish the amount in controversy necessary to provide
11 this Court with subject matter jurisdiction. (Motion Mem. at 8-10;
12 Reply at 4-7). However, as set forth below, Defendant has provided
13 ample evidence to support its amount-in-controversy allegations
14 based on Plaintiff’s claims for (a) actual damages and (b) civil
15 penalties.2
16
17 a. Actual Damages
18
19 Under the Song-Beverly Act, the purchaser of a vehicle may
20 obtain restitution equal to “the purchase price paid by the buyer,
21 less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal.
22 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(1). The usage offset (or “mileage offset”)
23 is calculated by multiplying the purchase price by a fraction with
24 a denominator of 120,000 and a numerator of “the number of miles
25 traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to the time the buyer first
26
2 Because the threshold is satisfied based on the calculation
27 of actual damages and civil penalties, the Court need not address
Defendant’s estimate of attorneys’ fees.
28
1 delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer.” Id. § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).
2 In addition, under newly enacted California law, defendants in
3 actions seeking restitution for motor vehicles are entitled to
4 offset from the purchase price any negative equity, manufacturer’s
5 rebate, third-party sold optional equipment, and unpaid financing.
6 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.27(b), (c), (d), (f).3 The Ninth Circuit
7 has explained that, because “an estimate of the amount in
8 controversy must be reduced if ‘a specific rule of law or measure
9 of damages limits the amount of damages recoverable,’”
10 consideration of the Song-Beverly Act’s offsets in calculating the
11 amount in controversy is “appropriate.” Schneider v. Ford Motor
12 Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 701 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Morris v.
13 Hotel Riviera, Inc., 704 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983)).
14
15 Here, Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle (a 2024
16 Chevrolet Equinox RS) on October 18, 2023, for $58,620.15, with 18
17 miles on the odometer. (Fitch Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A at 1 (sales
18 agreement)). On July 8, 2024, with 21,887 miles on the odometer,
19 Plaintiff presented the vehicle to a dealership for repair of the
20 defect claim he appears to be pursuing here. (Id. ¶ 3, Ex. B (repair
21 history summary)). Plaintiff’s use of the vehicle before
22 discovering this alleged nonconformity was 21,869 miles (21,887—
23 18). As Defendant points out, dividing this number by 120,000 and
24 multiplying this by the cash price of the vehicle — which is
25
26 3 Section 871.27 was enacted as part of California Assembly
Bill 1755 and went into effect on January 1, 2025. See A.B. 1755,
27 2023-24 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024). Because this action was
initiated after January 1, 2025, these requirements apply here.
28
1 $36,460.00 (see Fitch Decl. Ex. A at 2) — results in an estimated
2 mileage offset of $6,644.53. See Cal. Civil Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).
3 Additionally, Defendant has identified $4,222.00 in other offsets
4 for optional third-party contracts. (Fitch Decl. Ex. A at 2); Cal.
5 Code Civ. Proc. § 871.27. Deducting these offsets of $4,222.00 and
6 the usage/mileage offset of $6,644.53 from the total purchase price
7 of $58,620.15 results in $47,753.62.
8
9 The amount of unpaid financing also must be deducted. As of
10 July 17, 2025, Plaintiff had $32,390.09 remaining in unpaid
11 financing. (Fitch Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C (loan payoff estimate)). As
12 Defendant notes, “[g]iven that this matter is unlikely to resolve
13 early, it would be reasonable to estimate at least 18 additional
14 monthly payments of $715.65 prior to resolution of trial and any
15 appeal, leaving an estimated $19,508.39 in unpaid financing.”
16 (Opposition at 19; see Fitch Decl. Ex. A at 1). By then subtracting
17 that amount from $47,753.62, Defendant posits that the amount of
18 “actual” damages at issue here is $28,245.23.4
19
20
21
22 4 This estimate of actual damages presented in Defendant’s
Opposition is appropriately revised from the $47,753.62 estimate
23 presented in the Notice of Removal. (See Notice of Removal at 5).
“[A] notice of removal must include only ‘a plausible allegation
24
that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
25 threshold.’” Schneider, 756 F. App’x at 700 (quoting Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)). “The
26 preponderance of the evidence standard applies only after ‘the
plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant's
27 allegation’ and ‘both sides submit proof.’” Id. at 700-01 (quoting
Owens, U.S. at 89).
28
1 Plaintiff contends that this latter calculation of future loan
2 payments is speculative. (See Reply at 4-5). However, because the
3 amount in controversy “is simply an estimate of the total amount
4 in dispute,” Defendant “is permitted to rely on a chain of reasoning
5 that includes assumptions to calculate the amount in controversy.”
6 Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025)
7 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendant’s
8 assumptions are reasonable, and its calculations are supported by
9 sufficient documentation.
10
11 b. Civil Penalty
12
13 In addition to actual damages, the Complaint seeks a civil
14 penalty of up to two times the amount of actual damages (see Compl.
15 at 5), as permitted for willful violations of the Song-Beverly Act,
16 see Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). “Courts treat the Song-Beverly Act’s
17 civil penalties akin to punitive damages,” Carillo v. FCA USA, LLC,
18 546 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Suman v. Superior
19 Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1309, 1317 (1995)), and “[i]t is well
20 established that punitive damages are part of the amount in
21 controversy in a civil action,” Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d
22 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Bell v. Preferred Life Assur.
23 Society, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943)).
24
25 Plaintiff contends that Defendant cannot merely assume the
26 maximum civil penalty award and must instead “offer evidence of
27 willfulness that might support such an award.” (Motion Mem. at 10;
28 Reply at 5-6). Here, however, the Complaint expressly alleges that
1 Defendant’s conduct was willful (see Compl. ¶ 17, 24, 28) and seeks
2 “a civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual
3 damages pursuant to [California] Civil Code section 1794(c)”
4 (Compl. at 5). In such circumstances, several courts have
5 appropriately found that maximum civil penalties may be included
6 in calculating the amount in controversy. See Amavizca v. Nissan
7 N. Am., Inc., 2023 WL 3020489, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023)
8 (“Many courts have included the maximum civil penalty available
9 under the Song-Beverly Act as part of the amount in controversy,
10 at least when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted
11 willfully and requests the full penalty in the complaint.”
12 (collecting cases)); Canesco v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d
13 872, 902 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]his Court sides with the majority
14 of courts and more recent cases, which find civil penalties
15 appropriate for inclusion in the calculation of the amount in
16 controversy without the defendant needing to ‘prove a case against
17 itself’ with respect to liability for civil penalties.”); Perez v.
18 Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 2985229, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025)
19 (“[S]everal courts have found that maximum civil penalties may be
20 included in calculating the amount in controversy. This is
21 especially true where, as here, there are ‘allegations in the
22 [Complaint] that Defendant’s conduct was willful.’ ‘Moreover,
23 Defendant is not required to prove the case against itself.’”
24 (citations omitted)).
25
26 Applying this maximum (two-times) civil penalty here
27 ($28,245.23*2), as Defendant points out, brings the total amount
28 to $84,735.69 ($28,245.23 + ($28,245.23*2)), which well exceeds
1 $75,000. See also Carillo, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (denying a
2 motion to remand after finding the amount in controversy satisfied
3 based on “the amount of actual damages available as restitution”
4 of $25,018.70, which when adding the civil penalty of twice the
5 amount ($50,037.40), amounted to a total of $75,056.10 in
6 controversy); Perez, 2025 WL 2985229, at *4 (same, for $36,071.22
7 in damages plus a two-times civil penalty, for a total of
8 $108,213.66). Accordingly, Defendant has demonstrated that it is
9 more likely than not that the amount in controversy exceeds the
10 threshold for diversity jurisdiction.
11
12 CONCLUSION
13
14 Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
15
16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
17
18 DATED: May 6, 2026
19
/s/ __________
20 ALKA SAGAR
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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