The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DAWN MICHELLE GRUMBLES, Case No. 1:23-cv-00316-CDB (SS)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
13 v. AND REMANDING ACTION PURSUANT
TO SENTENCE FOUR OF 42 U.S.C.
14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, §405(g)
15 Defendant. (Docs. 14, 17)
16
17 Plaintiff Dawn Michelle Grumbles (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of
18 the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application
19 for disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“SSA” or “Act”). (Doc. 1). The matter is
20 before the Court on the Administrative Record (Doc. 13, hereinafter “AR”) and the parties’ briefs
21 (Docs. 14, 17), which were submitted without oral argument. Upon review of the record, the Court
22 finds and rules as follows.1
23 I. BACKGROUND
24 A. Administrative Proceedings and ALJ’s Decision
25 On August 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, disability
26 insurance benefits, and supplemental security income with an alleged disability onset date of
27 1 On March 24, 2023, after the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate
Judge for all further proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), this action was reassigned to
1 January 18, 2020. (AR 273). Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied on March 1, 2021, and again
2 upon reconsideration on May 20, 2021. Id. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative
3 Law Judge on June 16, 2021. Id. Hortensia Haaversen, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
4 held a telephone hearing on August 31, 2021, during which Plaintiff and impartial vocational expert
5 Laura Pizzurro (`“ VE”) testified. Id. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on January 27, 2022,
6 finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 270, 276-285). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
7 request for review on January 31, 2023, rendering the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the
8 Commissioner. (AR 6). Plaintiff subsequently filed this action seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s
9 decision. (Doc. 1).
10 In the decision, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s claims using the five-step sequential
11 evaluation required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a). (AR 276-85). At step one, the
12 ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 18, 2020, the
13 alleged onset date. (AR 276).
14 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe medically determinable
15 impairments (“MDIs”) which significantly limit the ability to perform basic work activities as
16 required by Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 85-28: degenerative disc disease (DDD), superior
17 labral tear in her right shoulder, and osteoarthritis in the right knee. Id.
18 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment, or any combination
19 of impairments, that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,
21 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926). (AR 277).
22 Prior to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work as defined
23 in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except for the following non-exertional limitations:
24 [Plaintiff] can lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently;
stand or walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday and sit for six hours in an
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eight-hour workday; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasionally perform
26 all other postural activities including balancing; frequent overhead reaching with
bilateral upper extremities; avoid concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, odors,
27 chemical irritants and poor ventilation; frequent push and pull with the right upper
extremity and with bilateral lower extremities; and avoid concentrated exposure to
1 (AR 277).
2 In considering Plaintiff’s symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably
3 be accepted as consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence, the ALJ noted she
4 followed the two-step process as set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929, SSR 16-3p, and
5 20 C.F.R. §§ 404`. 1520c and 416.920c. Id. The ALJ noted that despite Plaintiff’s allegations, “[a]ll
6 the activities that [Plaintiff] reported performing are inconsistent with her previous statements” as
7 Plaintiff “has described daily activities that are not limited to the extent one would expect, given
8 the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” (AR 278). The ALJ further noted that
9 despite Plaintiff’s complaints of allegedly disabling symptoms, Plaintiff has not taken any
10 medications for those symptoms, which suggest that the symptoms may not have been as serious
11 as has been alleged. Id. The ALJ found “after careful consideration of the evidence” that Plaintiff’s
12 MDIs could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms but that her statements
13 concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are not entirely consistent
14 with the medical evidence and other record evidence. Id. The ALJ, citing Plaintiff’s allegations on
15 a disability report and an exertional activities questionnaire, hearing testimony, medical evidence,
16 treatment notes, activities of daily living (“ADLs”), prior administrative medical findings, and
17 third-party statements from friends and family, determined that the evidence of record did not
18 provide support for the existence of greater limitations above those assessed in the RFC regarding
19 Plaintiff’s impairments. (AR 284). The ALJ noted that treatment notes in the record do not sustain
20 Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling conditions but acknowledged that she does experience some
21 levels of pain and physical limitations but only to the extent described in the assessed RFC. Id.
22 At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work
23 as an accountant under DOT # 160.162-018 as this work does not require the performance of work-
24 related activities precluded by Plaintiff’s RFC under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565 and 416.965. Id. The
25 ALJ noted that Plaintiff last worked as an accountant for eight years from August 2005 until March
26 2013, meeting the recency requirement and the four-year requirement to learn a job with an SVP
27 of 8. Id. The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff’s earnings exceeded the monthly countable average
1 perform the job as an accountant as generally performed and in accordance with SSR 00-4p. Id.
2 The ALJ concluded Plaintiff has not been under a disability under the Act from January 18,
3 2020, through the date of the ALJ’s decision under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f), and
4 a finding of “not disabled” was appropriate under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act since August
5 18, 2020, the dat`e the application was filed. (AR 285).
6 B. Medical Record and Hearing Testimony
7 The relevant hearing testimony and medical record were reviewed by the Court and will be
8 referenced below as necessary to this Court’s decision.
9 II. LEGAL STANDARD
10 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is
11 governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the
12 Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is
13 based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence”
14 means “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
15 conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence
16 equates to “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and citation
17 omitted). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
18 a conclusion.” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation and citation
19 omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider
20 the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. Id.
21 The court will review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination
22 and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which she did not rely. Social Security Act § 205,
23 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its
24 judgment for that of the Commissioner. “The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the
25 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d
26 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, a district court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account
27 of an error that is harmless. Id. An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the [ALJ’s]
1 the ALJ’s decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v.
2 Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
3 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” and eligible for benefits
4 within the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in any
5 substantial gainf`u l activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
6 which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
7 continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the
8 claimant’s impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
9 work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
10 of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
11 1382c(a)(3)(B).
12 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a
13 claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the
14 Commissioner considers the claimant’s work activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant
15 is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not
16 disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).
17 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step
18 two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R.
19 § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of impairments
20 which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the
21 analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant’s impairment does not
22 satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not
23 disabled. Id.
24 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to impairments
25 recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from engaging in
26 substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more
27 severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled
1 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the
2 enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant’s “residual
3 functional capacity,” defined generally as the claimant’s ability to perform physical and mental
4 work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations (20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)).
5 At step `f our, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the
6 claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past (past relevant
7 work). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work,
8 the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If the
9 claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
10 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the
11 claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §
12 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational
13 factors such as the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. Id. If the claimant is
14 capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20
15 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, the analysis
16 concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits. Id.
17 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Tackett v. Apfel,
18 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the
19 Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such
20 work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Beltran
21 v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
22 III. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS2
23 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her application
24 and asserts the ALJ impermissibly rejected her subjective symptom testimony. (Doc. 14 at 5).
25 A. Parties’ Contentions
26 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons to reject her
27 subjective symptom testimony such that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
1 evidence. (Doc. 14 at 5). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not provide any explanation as to how
2 her reported activities of daily living were inconsistent with her previous statements. Id. at 7.
3 Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not explain the nexus between her ability to engage in the most basic
4 routine activities with the rigors of full-time employment. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff contends that the
5 ALJ improperly `r ejected her subjective complaints in finding that she has not taken any medications
6 for her symptoms because Plaintiff did take narcotic pain medication during the relevant period as
7 prescribed by her doctors at Aria Community Clinic. Id. at 9. Plaintiff explains that she cannot
8 take anti-inflammatory medication because she has IBS but that she takes large amounts of Tylenol,
9 has had injections and is awaiting more injections, goes to physical therapy, ices her knee to help
10 with swelling, and uses an electrical stimulator. Id.
11 Defendant contends that the ALJ reasonably considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints,
12 which the ALJ found inconsistent with Plaintiff’s evidence for multiple reasons. (Doc. 17 at 4).
13 Defendant argues that the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s treatment notes contradicted her
14 allegations of disabling conditions including her treatment notes of improvement despite limited
15 use of medication. Id. Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s use of non-prescription, “over-the-
16 counter” medication to improve her pain symptoms justifies the ALJ’s discounting of her pain
17 complaints. Id. at 5. Defendant argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that
18 Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, such as shopping and driving, were inconsistent with her
19 subjective complaints. Id. at 6.
20 B. Governing Authority
21 “In step two of the disability determination, an ALJ must determine whether the [plaintiff]
22 has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.” Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
23 Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 2011). A [plaintiff] has a severe impairment when the evidence
24 establishes that an impairment has more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to perform
25 basic work activities. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005); Smolen v. Chater, 80
26 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(a), 416.922(a) (“An impairment or
27 combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or mental
1 and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” which include physical functions such as walking,
2 standing, sitting, pushing, and carrying, and mental functions such as understanding and
3 remembering simple instructions; responding appropriately in a work setting; and dealing with
4 changes in a work setting. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(b), 416.922(b).
5 The ALJ` is responsible for determining credibility,3 resolving conflicts in medical
6 testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). A
7 plaintiff’s statements of pain or other symptoms are not conclusive evidence of a physical or mental
8 impairment or disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); see SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2 (“an
9 individual’s statements of symptoms alone are not enough to establish the existence of a physical
10 or mental impairment or disability”); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007)
11 (“An ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain or other non-exertional
12 impairment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
13 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (same), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a).
14 Determining whether a plaintiff’s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible
15 requires the ALJ to engage in a two-step analysis. Id. at 1112. The ALJ must first determine if
16 “the [plaintiff] has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could
17 reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue,
18 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). This does not
19 require the plaintiff to show that his impairment could be expected to cause the severity of the
20 symptoms that are alleged, but only that it reasonably could have caused some degree of symptoms.
21 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282.
22 If the first step is met and there is no evidence of malingering, “the ALJ must provide
23 ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons for’ rejecting the [plaintiff’s] testimony.” Treichler v.
24 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). See
25
26 3 SSR 16-3p applies to disability applications heard by the agency on or after March 28,
2016. Ruling 16-3p eliminated the use of the term “credibility” to emphasize that subjective
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symptom evaluation is not “an examination of an individual’s character but an endeavor to
“determine how symptoms limit [the] ability to perform work-related activities.” SSR 16-3p, 2017
1 Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting an adverse
2 credibility finding must be based on “clear and convincing reasons”). The ALJ must make findings
3 that support this conclusion, and the findings must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing
4 court to conclude the ALJ rejected the plaintiff’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not
5 arbitrarily discre`d it the plaintiff’s testimony. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004).
6 The Ninth Circuit does “not require ALJs to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the
7 [plaintiff’s] testimony, nor do they require ALJs to draft dissertations when denying benefits.”
8 Stewart v. Kijakazi, No. 1:22-cv-00189-ADA-HBK, 2023 WL 4162767, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 22,
9 2023), findings and recommendations adopted, 2023 WL 5109769 (Aug. 8, 2023); see Record v.
10 Kijakazi, No. 1:22-cv-00495-BAM, 2023 WL 2752097, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023) (“Even if
11 the ALJ’s decision is not a model of clarity, where the ALJ’s ‘path may reasonably be discerned,’
12 the Court will still defer to the ALJ’s decision.”) (quoting Wilson v. Berryhill, 757 Fed. Appx. 595,
13 597 (9th Cir. 2019)). “The standard isn’t whether our court is convinced, but instead, whether the
14 ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489,
15 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (the clear and convincing standard requires an ALJ to show his work).
16 The ALJ may consider numerous factors in weighing a plaintiff’s credibility, including “(1)
17 ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the [plaintiff’s] reputation for lying, prior
18 inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the [plaintiff] that
19 appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to
20 follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the [plaintiff’s] daily activities.” Smolen, 80 F.3d
21 at 1284. In evaluating the credibility of symptom testimony, the ALJ must also consider the factors
22 identified in SSR 16-3P. Id. (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991)). Accord
23 Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009). These factors include:
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(1) Daily activities; (2) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or
other symptoms; (3) Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4) The
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type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual takes
or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (5) Treatment, other than
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medication, an individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other
symptoms; (6) Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to
27
relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15
to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and (7) Any other factors
1 concerning an individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or
other symptoms.
2
3 SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). If the ALJ’s finding is
4 supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing. Tommasetti, 533
5 F.3d at 1039 (cit ` a tions and internal quotation marks omitted).
6 The clear and convincing standard is “not an easy requirement to meet,” as it is “‘the most
7 demanding requirement in Social Security cases.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th
8 Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). “A
9 finding that a [plaintiff’s] testimony is not credible must be sufficiently specific to allow a
10 reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the [plaintiff’s] testimony on permissible
11 grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a [plaintiff’s] testimony regarding pain.” Brown-Hunter
12 v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
13 “The fact that a [plaintiff’s] testimony is not fully corroborated by the objective medical
14 findings, in and of itself, is not a clear and convincing reason for rejecting it.” Vertigan v. Halter,
15 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your
16 statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect
17 your symptoms have on your ability solely because the objective medical evidence does not
18 substantiate your statements.”). Rather, where a plaintiff’s symptom testimony is not fully
19 substantiated by the objective medical record, the ALJ must provide additional reasons for
20 discounting the testimony. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ must
21 specify what testimony is not credible and identify the evidence that undermines the [plaintiff’s]
22 complaints – ‘[g]eneral findings are insufficient.’” Id. (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,
23 722 (9th Cir. 1998)).
24 However, the medical evidence “is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the
25 [plaintiff’s] pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
26 The Ninth Circuit has distinguished testimony that is “uncorroborated” by the medical evidence
27 from testimony that is “contradicted” by the medical records and concluded that contradictions with
the medical records, by themselves, are enough to meet the clear and convincing standard.
1 Hairston v. Saul, 827 Fed. Appx. 772, 773 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161).
2 C. Analysis
3 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s severe impairments—degenerative disc disease, superior
4 labral tear in her right shoulder, and osteoarthritis in the right knee—significantly limit her from
5 performing basic` work activities. (AR 277-78). The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s allegations from
6 her disability report and exertional activities questionnaire. (AR 278). The ALJ noted that despite
7 Plaintiff’s allegations, “[a]ll the activities that [Plaintiff] reported performing are inconsistent with
8 her previous statements” as Plaintiff “has described daily activities that are not limited to the extent
9 one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” Id. The ALJ
10 further noted that despite her complaints of allegedly disabling symptoms, Plaintiff has not taken
11 any medications for those symptoms, suggesting that the symptoms may not have been as serious
12 as she alleged. Id. After finding that Plaintiff’s impairments could reasonably be expected to cause
13 some of her alleged symptoms, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the
14 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms are not entirely consistent with the
15 record. Id.; see Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (noting that ALJs “routinely include this [boilerplate]
16 statement in their written findings as an introduction ... before [identifying] what parts of the
17 claimant's testimony were not credible and why.”).
18 In discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ relied on the following: (1) Plaintiff’s routine
19 treatment with Tylenol suggests Plaintiff’s alleged disabling symptoms are not as serious as alleged,
20 and (2) Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were consistent with the assessed RFC. (AR 278-84).
21 However, notably absent from the ALJ’s decision is any citation to or consideration of
22 Plaintiff’s hearing testimony. See (AR 277-85). Throughout her hearing testimony, Plaintiff
23 provided several accounts of her pain and symptoms, none of which was addressed by the ALJ in
24 the decision. For example, at the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she stopped working as a bus driver
25 because she “was feeling a lot of pain” and her knee was “really bothering” her to the point she
26 “couldn’t even bend [her] leg.” (AR 27-28). She testified that after she started seeing Dr. Park,
27 she learned that her “knee does need to be replaced, … but what [she] was feeling was actually
1 going to schedule two injections for her neck to “try and help alleviate” Plaintiff’s “really horrible
2 headaches” and that “he’s sending me to PT” to address Plaintiff’s ribs which “go out of place quite
3 often” and cause her pain. (AR 31). Plaintiff testified that she is unable to maintain crocheting
4 because her “hands and arms fall asleep” and that she has not been able to hike in the mountains
5 “because sitting `i n the car for longer” from 45 minutes to an hour causes her back pain. (AR 32).
6 Plaintiff testified she cannot cook like she “used to” because “standing and cooking for long
7 periods” causes her feet and legs to hurt or her hip and foot will “go to sleep[.]” (AR 33).
8 When asked how much weight she is able to lift, Plaintiff testified that she drops things now
9 that she did not before such as a “jug of milk or … a case of water” and that she usually has to have
10 someone help with those items “because, even if [she is] able to lift it, it ends up causing [her] pain,
11 either [her] back or … shoulder[]” or she drops it. (AR 36). When asked how long she is able to
12 walk, Plaintiff testified that she can walk 20 or 30 minutes “max” depending on the day. “[T]hat
13 20 or 30 minutes is a really good day” as Plaintiff experiences “shooting pains” down the back of
14 her legs. (AR 36). When asked how long she can sit, Plaintiff testified she can sit anywhere from
15 a few minutes to an hour because her foot will go to sleep or she will experience pain in her legs.
16 (AR 37).
17 In the decision, the ALJ necessarily rejected Plaintiff’s testimony in noting that her
18 “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not
19 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record” (AR 278, emphasis
20 added), despite failing to identify what testimony she rejected and why. Where a plaintiff presents
21 medical evidence of a disabling condition “along with his testimony during the hearing regarding
22 his symptoms, … [this] establishes for the ALJ a duty to discuss Plaintiff's impairments and
23 resulting subjective symptom testimony and, if the ALJ finds such testimony should be rejected,
24 the ALJ must describe his reasons with specificity under the relevant clear and convincing
25 standard.” Carr v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-01021-CDB (SS), 2025 WL 240821, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
26 17, 2025). “While the Court may be able to draw inferences about what testimony may be
27 inconsistent, the ALJ must identify those inconsistencies with specificity.” Id. at *9 (citing Lambert
1 Here, the ALJ erred when she necessarily rejected Plaintiff’s testimony about her pain
2 without identifying specific testimony rejected sufficient to permit the Court to discern the bases
3 for the ALJ’s rejection. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (holding an ALJ “must specify what testimony is
4 not credible and identify the evidence that undermines” it). The ALJ failed to abide by the very
5 regulatory provis` ions she cited in addressing the governing standard for weighing the evidence, 20
6 C.F.R. 404.1529 and SSR 16-3P (see AR 277), which provides: “In determining whether you are
7 disabled, we consider all your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms
8 can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.
9 We will consider all of your statements about your symptoms, such as pain, and any description
10 your medical sources or nonmedical sources may provide about how the symptoms affect your
11 activities of daily living and your ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1529 (emphasis added); see SSR
12 16-3P (“Our adjudicators must base their findings solely on the evidence in the case record,
13 including any testimony from the individual or other witnesses at a hearing”). Because there is no
14 record that the ALJ considered or identified any of Plaintiff’s testimony in discounting Plaintiff’s
15 subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ failed to meet the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.
16 * * * * *
17 In sum, the ALJ failed to identify which subjective symptomology testimony she found not
18 credible, and why, and this Court lacks any bases to conclude that the ALJ adequately considered
19 Plaintiff’s testimony. The resulting error is not harmless. Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1278 (citing Brown-
20 Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494).
21 D. Remedy
22 Plaintiff requests this case be remanded for further proceedings and a new decision. (Doc.
23 14 at 10). “The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or simply to award benefits is
24 within the discretion of court.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 682 (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d
25 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if
26 enhancement of the record would be useful.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (emphasis
27 omitted) (9th Cir. 2004).
1 | symptom testimony in discounting her allegations of pain. Given these errors, the Court concludes
2 | that remand for further proceedings is warranted because additional administrative proceedings
3 | may remedy the deficiencies in the ALJ’s decision noted herein.
4] IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
5 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
6 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.
7 2. The ALJ’s decision (Doc. 13) is REVERSED; and
8 3. This matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) for further
9 proceedings consistent with this decision; and
10 4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Dawn
11 Michelle Grumbles and against Defendant Commissioner of Social Security.
12 | ITIS SO ORDERED.
'S | Dated: _ February 27, 2026 | Word by
14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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