The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GEORMAIN LAMAR WALKER, Case No. 1:25-CV-00409-JLT-EPG (PC)
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Plaintiff,
12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
v. THAT THIS ACTION BE DISMISSED
13 WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO
B. CATES, et al., EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
14 REMEDIES, FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
Defendants. AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A
15 COURT ORDER
16 (ECF Nos. 1, 11)
17 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS
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19 Plaintiff Geormain Lamar Walker is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
20 pauperis in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff filed the
21 complaint commencing this action on April 9, 2025. (Id.).1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
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were negligent in transporting him in a prison van, resulting in physical and emotional injuries.
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(ECF No. 1).
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On January 8, 2026, the Court screened the complaint and concluded Plaintiff’s
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complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 11).
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The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to file a first amended complaint or to notify the Court that
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1 The action was reassigned to the undersigned on October 6, 2025. (ECF No. 9).
1 he wanted to stand on his complaint. (Id., p. 5). The Court warned Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to
2 comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action.” (Id., p. 6).
3 The deadline to respond to the screening order has expired, and Plaintiff has not filed an
4 amended complaint or otherwise responded to the Court’s order. Accordingly, for the reasons
5 given below, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed, without prejudice,
6 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, failure to prosecute, and failure to comply with a
7 court order.
8 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
9 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against
10 a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
11 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are
12 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
13 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
14 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7), the Court may
15 also screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any
16 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
17 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28
18 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
19 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
20 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
21 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
22 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
23 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient
24 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
25 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting
26 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are
27 not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677,
28 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s
1 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
2 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
3 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
4 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).
5 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
6 In Claims I through III of his complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants were
7 negligent in transporting him in the prison van, resulting in physical and emotional injuries.
8 (ECF No. 1).
9 In answer to the questions about exhaustion, Plaintiff checked the box indicating he did
10 not submit a request for administrative relief on Claim I. (Id., p. 3). For Claim II, he checked
11 the box for “yes” and “no” as to whether he requested administrative relief but then did not
12 check any boxes in answer to the question whether he appealed his request for relief to the
13 highest level. (Id., p. 4). For Claim III, Plaintiff answered that he had requested administrative
14 relief but did not appeal his request to the highest level. (Id., p. 5).
15 On April 11, 2025, the court2 issued an order to show cause why the matter should not
16 be dismissed for, among other reasons, failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing
17 in this Court. (ECF No. 6, pp. 1, 5). Plaintiff filed a response on April 28, 2025, stating that the
18 Court should not dismiss the case because “it’s in the Court’s best interest to understand the
19 complexities of the case.” (ECF No. 8). Regarding exhaustion in particular, Plaintiff’s
20 response stated that “I have exhausted all my administrat[ive] remedies,” and that “this was an
21 error on a question. I didn’t fully understand in responding answering the question correctly.”
22 (Id.).
23 On January 8, 2026, the Court issued a Screening Order, finding “Plaintiff’s Complaint
24 is subject to dismissal because it states on the face of the complaint that he has not exhausted
25 administrative remedies.” (ECF No. 11 at 4). However, “in light of Plaintiff’s response to the
26 Court’s order to show cause, in which he states that he did not fully understand the question”
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28 2 This order was issued by Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin, who was the assigned Magistrate Judge at
the time.
1 the Court granted Plaintiff leave amend his complaint. (Id., p. 1, 4-5). The Court ordered, that
2 “within 30 days from the date of service of the Screening Order, Plaintiff must file a First
3 Amended Complaint or notify the Court in that he wants to stand on his Complaint.” (Id., p. 5).
4 Despite leave to amend, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or otherwise
5 responded to the Court’s screening order.
6 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
7 A. Section 1983
8 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
9 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
10 District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
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thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
12 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
13 proceeding for redress....
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely
15 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,
16 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see
17 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los
18 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.
19 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
20 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted
21 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the
22 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
23 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing
24 “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the
25 meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or
26 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
27 complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th
28 Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal
1 connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which
2 the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.”
3 Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of
4 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”
5 Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City
6 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
7 B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
8 Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) provides that
9 “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any
10 other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
11 such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
12 Prisoners are required to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing
13 suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199–1201
14 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to
15 prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion is required regardless of the
16 relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, unless “the
17 relevant administrative procedure lacks authority to provide any relief or to take any action
18 whatsoever in response to a complaint.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736, 741 (2001); Ross
19 v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016).
20 As discussed in Ross, 578 U.S. at 639, there are no “special circumstances” exceptions
21 to the exhaustion requirement. The one significant qualifier is that “the remedies must indeed
22 be ‘available’ to the prisoner.” Id.
23 If the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust, the proper remedy is dismissal
24 without prejudice of the portions of the complaint barred by section 1997e(a). Jones, 549 U.S.
25 at 223–24; Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2005). When it is clear on the
26 face of the complaint that a plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, dismissal is
27 proper. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014).
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1 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal because it states
2 on the face of the complaint that he has not exhausted administrative remedies. Specifically, as
3 described above, Plaintiff checked the box indicating he did not submit a request for
4 administrative relief on Claim I. (ECF No. 1, at p. 3). For Claim II, he checked the box for
5 “yes” and “no” as to whether he requested administrative relief but then indicated he did not
6 appeal any request for relief. (Id., p. 4). For Claim III, Plaintiff answered that he had requested
7 administrative relief but did not appeal his request to the highest level. (Id., p. 5). Thus,
8 Plaintiff’s complaint indicates on its face that he failed to satisfy the requirement to exhaust all
9 available administrative remedies.
10 In response to the Court’s order to show cause why the matter should not be dismissed
11 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing his lawsuit (ECF No. 6), Plaintiff
12 responded that “this was an error on a question. I didn’t fully understand in responding
13 answering the question correctly.” (ECF No. 8). However, the Court later issued a Screening
14 Order that again explained that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege exhaustion and provided
15 him with an opportunity to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 11). However, he has not filed
16 any amended complaint or otherwise responded to the screening order.
17 IV. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY WITH COURT ORDER
18 The Court will likewise recommend dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute
19 this case and to comply with the Court’s screening order. (ECF No. 11). The Screening Order
20 required a response within 30 days, which could include filing an amended complaint or
21 notifying the Court in writing that he wants to stand on this complaint. (Id., p. 5). It advised that
22 the failure to do so could result in dismissal. (Id., p. 6 (“Failure to comply with this order may
23 result in the dismissal of this action.”)). However, Plaintiff failed to respond to the order and
24 the time to do so has passed.
25 In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to
prosecute or failure to comply with a court order, the Court must
26 weigh the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious
resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket;
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(3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the
28 availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy
favoring disposition of cases on their merits.
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Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d
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1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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“‘The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’”
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Id. (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, the
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first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
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As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to
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determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the
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public interest. . . . It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to
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routine noncompliance of litigants. . ..” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to respond to
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the Court’s screening order. (ECF No. 11). This failure to respond is delaying the case and
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interfering with docket management. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
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Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in
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and of itself to warrant dismissal.” Id. (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991). However, “delay
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inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade, and evidence will become
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stale,” id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and to prosecute this
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case that is causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
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As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to
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prosecute this action and has failed to comply with the Court’s order, despite being warned of
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possible dismissal, there is little available to the Court which would constitute a satisfactory
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lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce
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resources. Considering Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status, it appears that monetary sanctions
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are of little use to prompt him to comply with future orders. Given the stage of these
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proceedings, the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is not available. Further, as noted above,
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Plaintiff’s complaint indicates on the face of the complaint that he failed to comply with the
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exhaustion requirement before filing this lawsuit. Moreover, he failed to respond to the Court’s
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Screening Order despite being given the relevant legal standards and the opportunity to file an
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amended complaint. (ECF No. 11). Thus, the lack of any viable claim supports a dismissal with
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1 || prejudice rather than a lesser sanction. Therefore, the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
2 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this final factor weighs
3 || against dismissal. /d.
4 After weighing the factors, the Court concludes that dismissal without prejudice is
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6 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:
8 1. This action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust administrative
9 remedies, failure to prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.
10 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
11 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
12 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty
13 || (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file
14 || written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
15 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no
16 || more than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits.
17 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in
18 || the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)
19 || (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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>] IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ February 25, 2026 [Je hey
23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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