Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Feb 18, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CYDNEY LOBB, Case No. 2:25-cv-0623-WBS-JDP (SS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of

Social Security,

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Defendant.

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18 Plaintiff challenges the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

19 Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability, Disability

20 Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of

21 the Social Security Act. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 10 & 14.

22 For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be

23 granted, and the Commissioner’s be denied.

24 Standard of Review

25 An Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision denying an application for disability

26 benefits will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record and if the correct

27 legal standards have been applied. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th

28 Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

1 preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

2 support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007).

3 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

4 testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001)

5 (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

6 one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.

7 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court will not affirm on grounds upon

8 which the ALJ did not rely. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are

9 constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”).

10 A five-step sequential evaluation process is used in assessing eligibility for Social Security

11 disability benefits. Under this process the ALJ is required to determine: (1) whether the claimant

12 is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a medical impairment (or

13 combination of impairments) that qualifies as severe; (3) whether any of the claimant’s

14 impairments meet or medically equal the severity of one of the impairments in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404,

15 Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the

16 claimant can perform other specified types of work. See Barnes v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 702, 704

17 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018). The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps of the inquiry,

18 while the Commissioner bears the burden at the final step. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d

19 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001).

20 Background

21 Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning June 1, 2019.

22 Administrative Record (“AR”) 277-90. After his application was denied both initially and upon

23 reconsideration, plaintiff testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Id. at

24 42-72, 166-71, 175-81. Then, on October 29, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff

25 was not disabled; the Appeals Council denied her request for review. Id. at 1-4, 19-41. Notably

26 for purposes of this case, this initial decision also found that, with regard to plaintiff’s migraine

27 headaches, “the medical evidence of record does not establish that the claimant’s symptoms would

28 prevent her from performing all work-related activities.” Id. at 29. Plaintiff appealed, and,

1 approximately two years later, on August 25, 2023, this district approved a stipulation between

2 plaintiff and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) for voluntary remand. Id. at 969-973. As

3 part of the stipulation, it was agreed that the Appeals Council would instruct the ALJ to evaluate

4 plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony and her residual functional capacity. Id. at 972.

5 On remand, after conducting a hearing, the ALJ issued another decision unfavorable to

6 plaintiff on October 25, 2024. Id. at 935-49.

7 The ALJ made, in relevant part, the following specific findings:

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1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social

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Security Act through June 30, 2023.

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2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

11 June 1, 2019, the alleged onset date.

12 * * *

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3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: bipolar

14 disorder, depressive disorder, panic disorder and generalized

anxiety disorder.

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* * *

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4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

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impairments that that meets or medically equals the severity of one

18 of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1.

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* * *

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5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

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finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

22 perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the

following nonexertional limitations: The claimant is limited to 1-to

23 2-step job tasks. The claimant is limited to occasional social

interaction with coworkers and the public. The cla imant is limited

24 to occasional changes in the work setting.

* * *

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26 6. The claimant has no past relevant work.

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1 7. The claimant was born [in] 1988 and was 30 years old, which is

defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability

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onset date.

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8. The claimant has at least a high school education.

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9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant

5 does not have past relevant work.

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10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and

7 residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

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* * *

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11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the

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Social Security Act, from June 1, 2019, through the date of this

11 decision.

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13 Id. at 935-49 (citations to the code of regulations omitted).

14 Analysis

15 As an initial matter, plaintiff characterizes her claim as one contesting the ALJ’s

16 alleged failure to follow the Appeals Council’s order that he “consider the claimant’s statements,

17 as well as the severity of the claimant’s migraines, consistent with the applicable regulations and

18 rulings.” Id. at 982. A review of the substantive argument, however, reveals that this is ultimately

19 a challenge as to whether the ALJ was correct in his determination that her headaches were not a

20 severe impairment. Turning to that issue, I find plaintiff’s argument convincing, and, for the

21 reasons that follow, recommend that this case be remanded for additional proceedings.

22 “The step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.”

23 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). At this step, the ALJ determines which of

24 the claimant’s alleged impairments are “severe”; a “severe” impairment is one that “significantly

25 limits” a claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R.

26 § 404.1520(c). “An impairment is not severe if it is merely ‘a slight abnormality (or combination

27 of slight abnormalities) that has no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work

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1 activities.’” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Social Security Ruling

2 (“SSR”) 96-3p).

3 Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s headaches were not a severe impairment because the

4 symptoms were “generally responsive to treatment.” AR at 939. The cited records, however,

5 contain numerous indicators that plaintiff’s headaches remained more than a “slight abnormality.”

6 For instance, the ALJ notes that medical records from April 2021 indicate that her headache

7 symptoms were improved with medication. Id. at 794, 939. But these records also indicate that

8 her headaches caused her “nausea at baseline” and were a daily occurrence. Id. at 793. The ALJ

9 cites records from July 2021 showing that plaintiff “endorsed a positive response” to prescription

10 medication, acupuncture, and chiropractic adjustments. Id. at 866-67, 939. The records also state,

11 however, that “the problem has worsened” and that the “symptoms are constant.” Id. at 867.

12 Indeed, the ALJ himself notes that, in August 2021, plaintiff presented for further treatment and

13 “reported daily headaches with associated photophobia, phonophobia, nausea and

14 vomiting about 1-2 times per week.” Id. at 939. He goes on to cite her treatment with Botox as

15 being, in plaintiff’s own words, “very effective.” Id. Even on Botox, however, plaintiff indicated

16 that once or twice a week her headaches were severe, and she suffered “photobia, phonobia, and

17 severe nausea and vomiting.” Id. at 1565.

18 “An impairment or combination of impairments can be found not severe only if the

19 evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s

20 ability to work.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

21 omitted). This circuit has noted that “[s]tep two, then, is a de minimis screening device [used] to

22 dispose of groundless claims, and an ALJ may find that a claimant lacks a medically severe

23 impairment or combination of impairments only when his conclusion is clearly established by

24 medical evidence.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks

25 and citations omitted). Here, the medical evidence does not clearly establish that plaintiff’s

26 headaches were not severe. The ALJ’s finding on this issue was not supported by substantial

27 evidence. Id. at 686 (“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

28 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”). Finally, this error was not harmless insofar as there

1 | isno indication that plaintiff’s migraines were considered at step four of the residual functional

2 | capacity analysis. See AR 943-48. Given this determination, it is unnecessary to consider

3 | plaintiffs alternate arguments in favor of remand.

4 Thus, I recommend that the matter be remanded for further proceedings. See Dominguez v

5 | Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court may reverse the decision of the

6 | Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing, but the

7 || proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigatior

8 | or explanation.”) (internal quotes and citations omitted); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105 (9th Cir.

9 | 2014) (‘Where ... an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the

10 | proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”’).

11 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

12 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 10, be GRANTED.

13 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 14, be DENIED.

14 3. The matter be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

16 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of

17 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

18 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to

19 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed

20 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

21 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

22 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

23 | 1991).

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95 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ February 18, 2026 QH———

27 JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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