Opinion

Firsov

Court
District Court, N.D. California
Filed
May 14, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 SERGEY FIRSOV, Case No. 25-cv-03198-JST

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

9 v. DISMISS

10 LBF TRAVEL, INC, Re: ECF No. 65

Defendant.

11

12

13 Before the Court is Defendant LBF Travel’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Sergey Firsov’s

14 first amended complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 65. The Court will grant the motion.

15 The FAC alleges the following. On April 2, 2025, Firsov purchased a ticket through

16 Skyscanner and its California agent, LBF Travel. ECF No. 5 at 4. After he completed the

17 purchase, “LBF Travel created [C]opa [A]irlines booking BVX9HY with promis[e] to issue ticket

18 number during 24 hours,” but the next day, “Defendant asked [Firsov] to pay $600 more.” Id.

19 Because Firsov refused to pay the additional amount, “LBF [T]ravel made unauthorized refund.”

20 Id. He went through the same process—purchasing a ticket at a certain price only to be told that

21 he needed to pay more and refunded when he refused—twice more in the subsequent days. Id. at

22 5. On April 11, 2025, LBF Travel called Firsov and attributed the issue to a glitch in Copa

23 Airlines’ booking system. Id. “LBF Travel cancelled other 2 bookings because Plaintiff could not

24 buy 3 similar tickets.” Id. Firsov seeks $1174.50, the cost of 2 new tickets that he purchased,

25 $329.25 “as paid for new ticket due refund abuse,” damages for emotional distress, and punitive

26 damages. Id. at 14.

27 The FAC invokes federal question jurisdiction, ECF No. 5 at 2, and purports to allege

1 abuse” in violation of California state law,1 and violations of the California False Advertising

2 Law, the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, the California Unfair Competition Law,

3 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Montreal Convention. Id. at 6–13.

4 Although the motion to dismiss argues that Firsov fails to state a claim with respect to both

5 federal causes of action—the FTC Act and the Montreal Convention—Firsov’s opposition

6 addresses only the Montreal Convention. See ECF No. 65 at 10–11; ECF No. 72. Because Firsov

7 does not address the FTC Act in his opposition, he has abandoned those claims, which are

8 therefore dismissed with prejudice. See Valdez v. Naderi, No. 24-CV-01087-TSH, 2025 WL

9 2391444, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2025) (dismissing claims with prejudice because the plaintiff

10 failed to address the defendant’s arguments for dismissal). Even if Firsov had not abandoned his

11 FTC Act claims, the Court would still dismiss with prejudice because the FTC Act does not

12 provide a private right of action to enforce Section 5. See Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720,

13 730 (9th Cir. 1981).

14 With respect to the Montreal Convention claims, Firsov’s opposition is based on facts not

15 pleaded in the complaint—namely, that on December 18, 2025, he was “denied boarding and lost

16 paid tickets [and] hotels” and that his baggage was “delayed in SFO, California ‘forever.’” ECF

17 No. 72 at 2. He writes that he “occupied only 1 seat instead of paid 4,” apparently referring to the

18 three ticket purchase attempts described in the complaint. Id.; ECF No. 5 at 4–5. Likewise, he

19 “was able to register only 1 baggage instead of paid 4,” so he had “to drop 3 baggages in airport

20 and lost cost of them.” ECF No. 72 at 2. By contrast, the complaint alleges that LBF Travel

21 violated the Montreal Convention by charging a certain price for airlines tickets and then

22 withholding those tickets while demanding more funds, and by not disclosing the fact that a refund

23 would be issued if he refused. ECF No. 5 at 6. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court may

24 not consider facts newly pleaded in the opposition. See, e.g., Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151

25 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). The Montreal Convention claims are therefore dismissed.

26

1 Under the “refund abuse” heading, the FAC also states that “Doff-Frank Act protects Plaintiff as

27

a consumer in financial side,” but does not explain why the Dodd-Frank Act affords Firsov a

] Even if Firsov had amended his complaint based on the new facts alleged in the

2 || opposition, he could not state a viable claim for a violation of the Montreal Convention. The

3 Convention provides a remedy for international passengers seeking damages against airline

4 || carriers for certain types of loss and injury. See Narayanan v. British Airways, 747 F.3d 1125,

5 1127 (9th Cir. 2014). These include death or bodily injury of a passenger, destruction to, loss of,

6 || or damage to checked baggage or cargo, and damage caused by delay of passengers, baggage, or

7 || cargo. Chubb Ins. Co. of Eur. S.A. v. Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc., 634 F.3d 1023, 1026

8 (9th Cir. 2011). The FAC alleges that LBF Travel is an agent of a travel aggregator, not an airline

9 || carrier. ECF No. 5 at 4. Moreover, Firsov does not allege damages within any of the above

10 || categories. At most, his opposition alleges that he lost three bags because his pre-payment for

11 them was not honored, and therefore that he abandoned them at SFO. This is not the type of loss

12 || contemplated by the Convention, including because these bags were never actually checked in or

13 || registered with the airline. ECF No. 72 at 2. Accordingly, because amendment would be futile,

14 || dismissal of the Montreal Convention claims is with prejudice.

3 15 Having dismissed both of Firsov’s federal claims with prejudice, the Court declines to

a 16 || exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. A district court “may

17 || decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has

Zz 18 original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In deciding whether to exercise supplemental

19 || jurisdiction, courts “consider and weigh . . . the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

20 || and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). When federal claims

21 are eliminated at an early stage of litigation, the district court has “a powerful reason to choose not

22 || to continue to exercise jurisdiction.” /d. at 351. Firsov’s state law claims are therefore dismissed

23 || without prejudice, which means that Plaintiffs may refile them in state court. The Clerk shall enter

24 || judgment and close the file.

25 IT IS SO ORDERED.

26 || Dated: May 14, 2026 .

27 JON S. TIGAR

28 ited States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.