McWilliams

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 NATHAN B. MCWILLIAMS, Case No. 26-cv-02984-TLT

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER OF SERVICE; DENYING

9 v. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION

10 CYNTHIA ROJAS, et al.,

Re: Dkt. No. 9, 11

Defendants.

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13 Plaintiff, a prisoner at Correctional Training Facility (CTF), filed a pro se civil rights

14 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was related to 25-cv-02820-TLT, McKenzie v. Borla,

15 which raises similar or identical allegations, and stayed pending resolution of McKenzie, which

16 was set as a bellwether case. Plaintiff has agreed to the bellwether process. See Dkt. No. 9 at 3.

17 The complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

18 Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

19 For the reasons stated below, the complaint is ordered served on defendants Rojas and

20 Macomber and plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 9) is denied.

21 DISCUSSION

22 A. Standard of Review

23 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks

24 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

25 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims

26 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek

27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),

1 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020).

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

3 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not

4 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

5 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).

6 “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more

7 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

8 do. . .. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

9 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must

10 proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. All or part

11 of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner’s claims lack an

12 arguable basis in either law or in fact.

13 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1)

14 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the

15 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v.

16 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

17 B. Plaintiff’s Claims

18 The complaint names the CTF Warden Cynthia Rojas and the Secretary of the California

19 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Jefferey Macomber as defendants and

20 alleges that defendants have violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by housing him in an

21 unconstitutionally small double cell with another prisoner since June 26, 2022. He alleges his cell

22 has only 19 square feet of unencumbered space, or only 9.5 square feet per prisoner, which

23 violates CDCR’s guidelines and the Constitution. He alleges prisoners at CTF have been double-

24 celled in certain North Yard buildings since 2011 although the rooms in these buildings were not

25 built to be double cells.

26 Plaintiff seeks damages.

27 C. Analysis

1 have the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

2 (1981). “[T]he Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency

3 that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 Liberally construed, plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Rojas and

5 Macomber for inadequate living space.

6 D. Motion for preliminary injunction

7 Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, stating that his filing has been met with retaliatory

8 reprisal as correctional officers have used progressive disciplinary measures such as excessive

9 searches, verbal harassment, and property confiscation on him to force him to live with a cellmate.

10 He asks the court to order defendants, officers, agents, and successors to refrain from double-

11 celling him and grant him single-cell status. His motion identifies no specific details constituting

12 retaliation or disciplinary action against him personally.

13 Plaintiff also filed a separate request for the court to consider his motion for a preliminary

14 injunction, to which he attached a series of documents regarding grievances against Officer

15 Ramirez who he alleges targeted him with excessive searches. Dkt. No. 11. Plaintiff’s 1/31/2026

16 grievance alleges that Ramirez searched his cell eight times in the prior three months. He alleges

17 that Ramirez noticed him helping another prisoner with a grievance and “stared at [plaintiff] in an

18 intimidating fashion,” after which more searches and confiscations of property took place.

19 Ramirez referred to his legal work as “only talking trash,” and later asked “we good?” and said, “if

20 not you can 602 me—I know you like doing that.” Plaintiff attaches a cell search receipt dated

21 1/29/26 indicating no property confiscated, and one dated 1/31/26 indicating confiscation of a

22 bucket, a roll of small bags, cardboard, and plastic being used as a window covering.

23 Plaintiff has not met the standard for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining

24 order (TRO). A TRO preserves the status quo and prevents irreparable harm until a hearing can be

25 held on a preliminary injunction application. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters

26 & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). A temporary restraining order is an

27 “extraordinary remedy” that a court should award only when a plaintiff makes a clear showing that

1 substantive standards for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary

2 injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7

3 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a

4 likelihood of irreparable harm that will result if an injunction is not issued, (3) the balance of

5 equities tips in favor of the plaintiff, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter, 555

6 U.S. at 20. The irreparable injury must be both likely and immediate. See id. at 22; see also

7 Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A plaintiff

8 must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must

9 demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”).

10 Moreover, prior to issuing a preliminary injunction, notice to the adverse party is required.

11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). A preliminary injunction therefore generally will not issue before the

12 parties to the action are served. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727–28 (9th Cir. 1983). A

13 temporary restraining order (TRO) may issue without written or oral notice to the adverse party or

14 that party’s attorney if: (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by verified

15 complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before

16 the adverse party can be heard in opposition, and (2) the movant’s attorney (or the movant himself

17 in this case, as he proceeds pro se) certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the

18 reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

19 Plaintiff has not described any efforts he has made to provide notice of the motion to

20 defendants. In addition, he has not named Ramirez nor any other correctional officers as

21 defendants. A court only has jurisdiction to order injunctive relief against defendants in the lawsuit

22 in front of it that relates to the claims in the lawsuit. Plaintiff’s lawsuit alleges only that defendants

23 Rojas and Macomber violated his Eighth Amendment rights by double-celling him in an

24 unconstitutionally small cell; it does not allege retaliation claims against Ramirez. If plaintiff has

25 reason to believe that Ramirez has retaliated against him because of his filing grievances and/or

26 the current underlying lawsuit, he may seek to amend his complaint to add Ramirez and those

27 claims. If plaintiff has reason to believe that Ramirez has retaliated against him because of other

1 may file a separate lawsuit against Ramirez. Disciplinary action can only be considered retaliatory

2 if it is in response to protected activity. Refusing to double-cell in and of itself is not protected

3 activity; filing a lawsuit or grievance is protected activity.

4 Plaintiff has not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that double-

5 celling in his cell is unconstitutional. See Dkt. No. 102 in McKenzie. There is no existing

6 precedent squarely placing the conditions he alleges outside of the bounds of the Constitution. The

7 Supreme Court in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) overturned a district court’s finding

8 that double-celling was unconstitutional at an Ohio prison where the cells were 63 square feet

9 (including encumbered space) and prisoners had dayroom access from 6:30 AM to 9:30 PM.

10 Although plaintiff may ultimately be able to distinguish his case from Rhodes, he cannot at this

11 time, based on the allegations that he has made, demonstrate that he is likely to be able to do so.

12 The motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

13 CONCLUSION

14 1. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

15 2. Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Rojas

16 and Macomber.

17 3. The Court ORDERS that service on the following defendants shall proceed under

18 the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) e-service program for

19 civil rights cases from prisoners in the CDCR’s custody:

20 a. Cynthia Rojas, Warden of CTF

21 b. Jefferey Macomber, Secretary of CDCR

22 In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on the CDCR via email the

23 following documents: the operative complaint (Dkt. No. 1), this Order of Service, a CDCR Report

24 of E-Service Waiver form, and a summons. The Clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on the

25 plaintiff.

26 No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on the CDCR, the CDCR shall

27 provide the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court which

1 the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) and which defendant(s) decline to waive service or

2 could not be reached. The CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service

3 Waiver to the California Attorney General’s Office which, within 21 days, shall file with the Court

4 a waiver of service of process for the defendant(s) who are waiving service.

5 Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the Clerk shall prepare for each

6 defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver a

7 USM-285 Form. The Clerk shall provide to the USMS the completed USM-285 forms and copies

8 of this order, the summons, and the operative complaint for service upon each defendant who has

9 not waived service. The Clerk also shall provide the USMS a copy of the CDCR Report of E-

10 Service Waiver.

11 4. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12 requires defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and

13 complaint. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if defendants had been served on the

14 date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii), defendants will not be

15 required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the CDCR

16 provides a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver to the California Attorney General’s

17 Office. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of

18 summons is necessary.) If defendants have not waived service and have instead been served by

19 the USMS, then defendants shall serve and file an answer within twenty-one (21) days after being

20 served with the summons and complaint.

21 5. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of

22 Civil Procedure.

23 6. Dispositive briefing is currently stayed pending resolution of the McKenzie

24 bellwether case. After the Court resolves the motion to set a bellwether case, the Court will either

25 stay the non-bellwether cases (if it grants the motion) or set a briefing schedule in each of the

26 related cases (if it denies the motion).

27 7. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants or

] 8. It is plaintiffs responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

2 || informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion.

3 Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11, a party proceeding pro se whose address changes

4 || while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new

5 address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail

6 || directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and (2)

7 || the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro se

8 || party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b).

9 9. Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be

10 || granted provided they are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend.

11 10. This order terminates Docket No. 11.

L2 IT IS SO ORDERED.

13 Dated: May 8, 2026

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= 16 United States District Judge

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