Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-02579-DOC-JDE Date: April 10, 2026

Title: Christopher Albanese v. Navient Corporation et al

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE

Karlen Dubon Not Present

Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR

PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT:

None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER REMANDING CASE TO

STATE COURT SUA SPONTE AND

DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO

DISMISS [28]

Before the Court is the Motion to Remand (Dkt. 28) filed by Plaintiff Christopher

Albanese. The Court has read the briefing associated with this matter and heard oral

arguments. After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions and relevant law, the

Court hereby REMANDS this case in its entirety to the Superior Court of California,

County of Orange. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended

Complaint (Dkt. 31) is DENIED as moot.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is alleging that he was misled into enrolling in a higher education

program where he was pressured to take out largely high-interest, private student loans to

pay for his exorbitant tuition. Plaintiff claims that Defendants—Navient Corporation,

Navient Solutions LLC, and Higher Education Loan Authority of the State of Missouri

(doing business as MOHELA)—were aware of how he was misled and have profited off

his nearly seventeen years of private student loans payments that he is still attempting to

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pay off. As a result, Plaintiff claims that his credit and ability to secure loans on favorable

terms have suffered.

In addition to damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief, Plaintiff indicated

in his complaint that he seeks a public injunction. Dkt. 1-1 at 4. Specifically, Plaintiff

seeks to “enjoin Navient and MOHELA from engaging in the unfair student loan

servicing conduct alleged herein as to the general public, including those who might have

student loans serviced by Navient and/or MOHELA in the future.” Id. This public

injunction would, “require that Navient and MOHELA conduct good faith evaluations of

borrower claims of school misconduct, that Navient and MOHELA implement policies

and procedures to ensure that they provide timely and complete responses to borrower

qualified written requests for information and notices of error under to the Student

Borrower Bill of Rights, and that Navient and MOHELA implement policies and

procedures to prevent harassing and abusive telephone calls as well as unlawful debt

collection contacts with third parties.” Id. This matter was removed from the Superior

Court of California, County of Orange, on November 17, 2025.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his complaint in Superior Court of California, County of Orange on

October 3, 2025. The matter was removed by Defendant Navient Corporation on

November 17, 2025 (Dkt. 1). Defendants Navient Corporation and Navient Solutions,

LLC filed their Motion to Dismiss on December 23, 2025 (Dkt. 15). Defendant Higher

Education Laon Authority of the State of Missouri filed its Motion to Dismiss on

December 24, 2025 (Dkt. 17). Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on January 9,

2026 (Dkt. 21).

The Motion to Remand Case to Superior Court of Orange County was filed by

Plaintiff on January 23, 2026 (Dkt. 28). Defendants Navient Corporation and Navient

Solutions, LLC filed their Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint on February 6,

2026 (Dkt. 31). On the same day, Defendant Higher Education Loan Authority of the

State of Missouri filed their Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 33). Defendants Navient

Corporation and Navient Solutions, LLC filed their Opposition to the Motion to Remand

(Dkt. 36) on February 20, 2026 and on February 23, 2026 Defendant Higher Education

Loan Authority of the State of Missouri joined the opposition (Docket 37). The Court

heard oral arguments on the Motion to Remand on March 16, 2026 and allowed

supplemental briefing on the matter. On March 26, 2026, Defendants Navient

Corporation and Navient Solutions, LLC filed their Opposition to Remand (Dkt. 42) with

Defendant Higher Education Loan Authority of the State of Missouri filing their joinder

on the same day also (Dkt. 44). Plaintiff filed their Supplement to the Motion to Remand

(Dkt. 43) on March 26, 2026 as well.

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II. Legal Standard

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal of a case

from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in

relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of

the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of

the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This statute “is strictly construed against removal

jurisdiction,” and the party seeking removal “bears the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988)

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Federal diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be citizens of different states

and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For diversity

jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign

state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its

principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The presence of any single plaintiff

from the same state as any single defendant destroys “complete diversity” and strips the

federal courts of original jurisdiction over the matter. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah

Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).

Generally, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. Guglielmino v.

McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2008). If the complaint affirmatively

alleges an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, the jurisdictional requirement is

“presumptively satisfied.” Id. In that situation, a plaintiff who then tries to defeat removal

must prove to a “legal certainty” that a recovery of more than $75,000 is impossible. St.

Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938); Crum v. Circus

Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). This framework applies equally to

situations where the complaint leaves the amount in controversy unclear or ambiguous.

See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. Monumental Life

Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1996).

A removing defendant “may not meet [its] burden by simply reciting some

‘magical incantation’ to the effect that ‘the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of

[$75,000],’ but instead, must set forth in the removal petition the underlying facts

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supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].” Richmond v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Gaus, 980 F.2d at

567). If the plaintiff has not clearly or unambiguously alleged $75,000 in its complaint or

has affirmatively alleged an amount less than $75,000 in its complaint, the burden lies

with the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional

minimum is satisfied. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka,

599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010); Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699.

While the defendant must “set forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion

that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum,” the standard is not so

taxing so as to require the defendant to “research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims

for damages.” Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (C.D.

Cal. 2010) (emphases added). In short, the defendant must show that it is “more likely

than not” that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum. Id. Summary

judgment-type evidence may be used to substantiate this showing. Matheson v.

Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2003); Singer v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). For example, defendants

may make mathematical calculations using reasonable averages of hourly, monthly, and

annual incomes of comparable employees when assessing the amount in controversy in a

wrongful termination suit. Coleman, 730 F. Supp. 2d. at 1148–49.

If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any action it takes is ultra vires and

void. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101–02 (1998). The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be

raised at any time by either the parties or the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). If subject

matter jurisdiction is found to be lacking, the court must dismiss the action, id., or

remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A court may raise the question of subject matter

jurisdiction sua sponte. See Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. Discussion

On December 23, 2025, Defendants Navient Corporation and Navient Solutions,

LLC filed a Notice of Motion to Dismiss arguing that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing

to bring a claim for public injunctive relief in federal court because “federal equitable

requirements apply regardless of whether state law might authorize injunctive relief on a

lesser showing.” Dkt. 15 at 13. Defendants reiterated these arguments at oral argument.

Plaintiff now seeks a remand of this case entirely, or in the alternative of the public

injunctive relief portion of this case. After consideration of the Article III standard in

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federal court, principles of federalism and federal-state relations, as well as judicial

economy, the Court finds remand of the entire matter to state court most appropriate.

Article III standing is a “core component of standing is an essential and

unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defs. of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). However, as

noted by the Ninth Circuit, state courts are not bound by the same constraints of Article

III as federal courts. Polo v. Innoventions Int'l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.

2016). The Ninth Circuit has provided further guidance by stating that when a plaintiff

lacks Article III standing, “"[r]emand is the correct remedy because a failure of federal

subject-matter jurisdiction means only that the federal courts have no power to adjudicate

the matter." Id. Therefore, the Court finds that remand to the state court is appropriate in

the present matter.

The Court also looked to principles of federalism and federal-state relations when

deciding to remand. Sister courts have also considered these principles when deciding to

remand cases back to state court. For example, in Clevenger v. Welch Foods Inc the

Court remanded the entire matter back to state court after finding that plaintiffs lacked

equitable jurisdiction for their UCL claim in federal court. Clevenger, No. SACV 23-

00127-CJC (JDEx), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38305 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2023). This Court

has great respect for its colleagues in state courts and finds that depriving Plaintiff of an

unwaivable right based in California state public policy would be an affront to the

delicate balance of federal-state relations. Further, the promises of federalism require this

Court to consider its duty in not undermining the authority of state law.

Though Defendants have the right to remove cases, where appropriate, the

consequence cannot be that this tool is used to deprive Plaintiffs of the relief they seek

without litigation on the merits. The Court in Clevenger also remanded the entire matter

back to state court because it found that “…a defendant should not be able to avail itself

of federal jurisdiction only to turn around and argue that jurisdiction does not exist in

order to have the case dismissed.” Clevenger, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38305, at *13. This

Court agrees. Many other courts have also found that the absence of equitable jurisdiction

defeats removal and therefore remanded back to state court. See, e.g., Horton v. Kraft

Heinz Foods Co., LLC, No. 24-CV-909 TWR (SBC), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168925,

2024 WL 4211182, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2024); Guthrie, 561 F. Supp. 3d at 880-

81; Clevenger v. Welch Foods Inc., No. 23-cv-00127, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38305,

2023 WL 2390630, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2023); Linton, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

113669, 2023 WL 4297568, at *4; Granato, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124318, 2023 WL

4646038, at *5; Ruiz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100731, 2024 WL 2844625, at *5-

6; Rogoff, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221309, 2024 WL 5010642, at *4; Youssef v. Great

Am. Life Ins. Co., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153586, *12.

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Finally, the Court considered judicial economy when deciding the remand the case

back to state court in full. Central to Plaintiff’s case is the public injunctive relief he

seeks to prevent the allegedly unlawful practices of Defendants. Splitting this matter

between state and federal court would result in double litigation over the challenged

policies and practices of Defendants—wasting judicial resources. Rather than risk

potential inconsistent rulings and increase litigation time, the Court finds that remanding

the case in whole is the most economical use of judicial resources.

IV. Disposition

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby REMANDS this case in its

entirety to the Superior Court of California, County of Orange. Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 31) is DENIED as moot. All pending

hearings are hereby vacated and taken off calendar.

The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.

MINUTES FORM 11 Initials of Deputy Clerk: kdu

CIVIL-GEN