Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. 8:26-cv-00287-KES Date: March 30, 2026

Title: LORELIE CLEMENS v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.

PRESENT:

THE HONORABLE KAREN E. SCOTT, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Jazmin Dorado Not Present

Courtroom Court Reporter

Clerk

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR

PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT:

None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): Order Taking Hearing Off Calendar

and GRANTING Plaintiff’s Motion

to Remand (Dkt. 8)

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 6, 2026, Defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Defendant”)

removed this case from the Orange County Superior Court (“OCSC”). (Dkt. 1.)

On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff Lorelie Clemens (“Plaintiff”) timely filed a motion to

remand the case to the OCSC. (Dkt. 8.) Defendant filed an opposition. (Dkt. 9.)

Pursuant to its authority under Local Rule 7-15, the Court takes the hearing

set for April 7, 2026, off calendar. See L.R. 7-15.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion.

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant and Does

1 through 20 in the OCSC alleging negligence and premises liability based on a

fall she allegedly sustained on or around August 3, 2024, while walking inside a

Home Depot store in Anaheim, California. (“Complaint” at Dkt. 1 at 11-16.)

Plaintiff served Defendant with the Summons and Complaint on January 7, 2026,

and Defendant filed its answer on February 5, 2026. (Id. at 25, 27-33.)

On February 6, 2026, Defendant removed the case to federal court based on

diversity jurisdiction, stating that “for purposes of removal jurisdiction, Plaintiff is

a citizen of California and Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. is a citizen of Delaware” and

“the amount in controversy exceeds Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00)

not including interest and attorney fees.” (Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 9-10.) Defendant served

Plaintiff with the Notice of Removal (Dkt. 4) on February 6, 2026. (Dkt. 5.)

On February 9, the Court issued a notice to the parties explaining that the

case had been randomly assigned to Magistrate Judge Scott for all purposes and

giving them an opportunity to submit a declination of consent. (Dkt. 6.) Neither

party declined consent, meaning the case proceeds before Magistrate Judge Scott

for all purposes. (Dkt. 7.)

On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave of court to file a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and remand the case to the state court. (Dkt. 8.)

Plaintiff seeks amendment to substitute Home Depot employee Brian Wallace, a

citizen of California, in place of Doe 1, which would destroy complete diversity

and necessitate remand. (Id. at 6-8.) Defendant contends in its opposition that

Plaintiff is attempting a fraudulent post-removal joinder of a diversity-destroying

defendant. (Dkt. 9.) Plaintiff did not file a reply. As discussed below, the Court

finds that amendment is proper.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“Although the permissive standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)

allows for amendment as a matter of course prior to the service of a responsive

pleading, the proper standard for deciding whether to allow post-removal joinder of

a diversity-destroying defendant is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).” Khoshnood v.

Bank of Am., No. 2:11-cv-04551-AHM-FFM, 2012 WL 751919, at *1, 2012 U.S.

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Dist. LEXIS 30625, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012) (citing Clinco v. Roberts, 41

F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). The relevant statute provides: “If after

removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would

destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder

and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). The Court’s

exercise of discretion is guided by the following factors:

(1) whether the party sought to be joined is needed for just adjudication

and would be joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a);

(2) whether the statute of limitations would prevent the filing of a new

action against the new defendant in state court; (3) whether there has

been an unexplained delay in seeking to join the new defendant;

(4) whether plaintiff seeks to join the new party solely to defeat

federal jurisdiction; (5) whether denial of the joinder would prejudice

the plaintiff; (6) the strength of the claims against the new defendant.

Boon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing

Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1082). “A court need not consider all the issues, as any

factor can be decisive, and no one of them is a necessary condition for joinder.”

Leyba v. Walmart, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-07604-ODW-E, 2021 WL 8893640, at *2,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 259072, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2021).

IV. PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on or around August 3, 2024, she

“tripped on an object protruding into … the aisleway and/or customer walkway”

while walking inside a Home Depot store in Anaheim, California, “causing her to

fall and sustain serious bodily injuries.” (Dkt. 1 at 13-14, ¶¶ 10, 18.) She further

alleges that Defendant knew or should have known that the protruding object,

believed to be a pallet, “constituted a dangerous condition, which caused

foreseeable harm to Plaintiff.” (Id. at 14-15, ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff’s proposed FAC adds Mr. Wallace, a Home Depot employee, as a

defendant, (Dkt. 8 at 25, ¶ 3), and alleges, “[Mr. Wallace] is believed to have been

leading Plaintiff through the store aisles of [Home Depot] when Plaintiff tripped on

an object protruding into the aisleway and/or customer walkway ....” (Id. at 26,

¶ 14; see also id. at 29, ¶ 26.)

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V. ANALYSIS

A. Just Adjudication.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) “requires joinder of persons whose

absence would preclude the grant of complete relief, or whose absence would

impede their ability to protect their interests or would subject any of the parties to

the danger of inconsistent obligations.” Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 19(a). “This standard is met when failure to join will lead to separate

and redundant actions, but it is not met when defendants are only tangentially

related to the cause of action or would not prevent complete relief.” Boon, 229 F.

Supp. 2d at 1022 (citation modified).

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Wallace must be added in order to hold him

“accountable for his conduct and for his failures to act.” (Dkt. 8 at 6.) Defendant,

not surprisingly, disagrees.

First, citing Perez v. Van Gronigen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962 (1986),

Defendant contends that Mr. Wallace cannot be an indispensable party pursuant to

Rule 19(a) because his liability would be imputed to Defendant, his employer.

(Dkt. 9 at 6-7.) That is an oversimplification of the law. The fact that Mr. Wallace

is an employee of Defendant “does not absolve [him] of individual liability for

h[is] alleged negligent acts.” Claar v. Centaur Holdings U.S. Inc., No. 5:22-cv-

00742-SHK, 2023 WL 359489, at *8, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11456, at *20 (C.D.

Cal. Jan. 19, 2023); see also Liepmann v. Camden Co., No. 2:19-cv-07348-DMG-

E, 2019 WL 5420281, at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184472, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal.

Oct. 22, 2019) (quoting Perkins v. Blauth, 127 P. 50, 52 (Cal. 1912)) (“[L]ong-

settled California law provides that ‘[i]f a tortious act has been committed by an

agent acting under authority of his principal, the fact that the principal thus

becomes liable does not of course exonerate the agent from liability.’”).

Second, Defendant contends that there is “no causal connection” between

Mr. Wallace’s conduct and Plaintiff’s alleged injury. (Dkt. 9 at 7.) Without citing

the record, Defendant characterizes Mr. Wallace’s role in the incident as simply an

employee who “assisted Plaintiff at a computer terminal prior to her fall.” (Id. at

7.) That is not what Plaintiff’s FAC alleges. She contends that Mr. Wallace was

“leading” her through the store at the time of her alleged fall—conduct that is not

as passive as Defendant describes. (See Dkt. 8 at 26, ¶ 14; id. at 29, ¶ 26.) She

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further alleges that Mr. Wallace should have been looking out for potential trip

hazards, since he was choosing the pathway by leading her. (Id. at 26, ¶ 15; id. at

29, ¶ 27.) Plaintiff alleges that he was aware of the surroundings yet did not warn

her. (Id. at 26, ¶ 16; id. at 29, ¶ 28.)

The Court finds that joinder of Mr. Wallace is indispensable to a just

adjudication. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of permitting amendment.

B. Statute of Limitations.

“Generally, if a statute of limitations does not bar a plaintiff from filing suit

in state court, a federal court may be less inclined to permit joinder of a non-diverse

defendant because the plaintiff could still theoretically seek relief from state court.”

Yang v. Swissport USA, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-03823-SI, 2010 WL 2680800, at *4,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76789, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (citing Clinco, 41 F.

Supp. 2d at 1083). That said, “where … a plaintiff would be required to litigate

essentially duplicative federal and state lawsuits arising out of the same facts, the

interest in conserving judicial resources and the risk of inconsistent results weighs

in favor of allowing joinder.” Id. (citing IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Campañía

Mexicana de Aviación, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).

Although neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has raised the statute of limitations

as an issue, the Court recognizes the risk of duplicative litigation should it decline

to allow amendment. As such, this factor tips the scale in Plaintiff’s favor.

C. Unexplained Delay.

To determine whether to allow amendment to add a diversity-destroying

defendant, “courts consider whether the amendment was attempted in a timely

fashion.” Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. Six months after removal and four days

before a summary judgment hearing is considered too late, Lopez v. Gen. Motors

Corp., 697 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1983), but less than three months after

removal is presumptively reasonable, Boon, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.

Delay is not a concern here, as Plaintiff filed her motion to remand on the

basis of adding a nondiverse defendant within one month of Defendant’s removal.

Plaintiff’s timeliness supports the granting of her motion.

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D. Motive for Joinder.

“[T]he motive of a plaintiff in seeking the joinder of an additional defendant

is relevant to the trial court’s decision to grant the plaintiff leave to amend his [or

her] original complaint.” Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (quoting Desert Empire

Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1980)). “Motive is

particularly important in removal jurisdiction cases where the consequences of

joining a new defendant may defeat the court’s jurisdiction.” Boon, 229 F. Supp.

2d at 1023 (citing Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083).

In Clinco, the district court noted that “the first amended complaint add[ed]

a one-sentence allegation to the first cause of action and slightly alter[ed] the sixth

cause of action” but was otherwise “substantially similar.” 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083

& n.2. On that basis, the court concluded that “one could justifiably suspect that

[the plaintiff]’s amendment of the complaint was caused by the removal rather than

an evolution of his case.”1 Id. at 1083. “In contrast, in IBC, the court declined to

attribute improper motive to the plaintiff ‘simply because [it] s[ought] to add a

nondiverse defendant post-removal’; rather, given the important role of the new

defendant in the underlying events, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s desire to

add the new defendant was reasonable and justifiable.”2 Zhang v. Saks, Inc., 3:09-

cv-04447-EMC, 2009 WL 5125815, at *5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118333, at *14

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (citing 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012).

Plaintiff maintains that she “always intended to name the relevant Home

Depot store employee as a defendant … but the employee’s name was not initially

known.” (Dkt. 8 at 6.) The declaration of Plaintiff’s attorney, Nichole Lahmani,

provides: “Through her investigation, Plaintiff recently learned that [Mr. Wallace]

was the Home Depot employee who was assisting Plaintiff at a computer terminal

1 Additionally, the court in Clinco found the timing of Plaintiff’s amended

complaint to be suspicious, as it named a nondiverse defendant and was served on

the defendants just two days after removal and filed with the district court, not the

state court, only five days after removal. 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.

2 The IBC court also contemplated the legislative history of § 1447(e) and

interpreted the statute as providing flexibility and discouraging a reflexive inference

of suspicion when faced with a party’s request for amendment of the complaint to

add a non-diverse party. 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.

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shortly before Plaintiff and Mr. Wallace had to start walking in the aisleway ....”

(Dkt. 8 at 10, ¶ 4.) To the contrary, Defendant argues that Mr. Wallace is a “sham

defendant” who is being added for the fraudulent purpose of forcing remand to the

state court. (Dkt. 9 at 5 (quoting Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 F. Supp. 2d

804, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1998)).

The Court recognizes that the Complaint initially filed in the OCSC did not

contain any allegations against a Doe defendant who specifically assisted Plaintiff

at a computer terminal and then walked with her in the aisleway where she fell. It

simply alleges that Plaintiff “was walking” when the incident occurred (Dkt. 1 at

13-14, ¶ 10, 18.) There is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that anyone was

walking with Plaintiff, let alone “leading” her, as the proposed FAC states. (See

Dkt. 8 at 26, ¶ 14; see also id. at 29, ¶ 26.) Moreover, as in Clinco, the Complaint

and the proposed FAC are “substantially similar,” with the only additions being

factual allegations related to Mr. Wallace that were not previously alleged against a

Doe defendant in the original Complaint. See Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.

Furthermore, the present matter is distinguishable from IBC, where the

district court permitted the addition of a nondiverse defendant based on his

“important role … in the underlying events.” Zhang, 2009 WL 512815, at *5,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118333, at *14 (citing IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012). In

that case, the diversity-destroying defendant “refused to cooperate with [the

plaintiff], failed to provide equipment as provided in the [parties’] agreement,

interfered with [the] performance of the contract, and denigrated [the plaintiff] to

[its] affiliates and customers.” IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1010. In comparison, Mr.

Wallace is an employee of Defendant, who allegedly led Plaintiff through the store

and failed to “monitor[] the premises for the presence of dangerous conditions.”

(Dkt. 8 at 26, ¶¶ 14-15; id at 29, ¶¶ 26-27.) Whereas the nondiverse defendant in

IBC was alleged to have actively engaged in intentional interference and personally

contributed to “the breakdown of the relationship between [the plaintiff] and

[defendants],” IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1010, 1012, the FAC does not allege that

Mr. Wallace’s individual conduct created or amplified the underlying danger.

Therefore, regarding Mr. Wallace, this Court finds that he did not play the

“important role” that allowed the IBC court to justify the reasonableness of the

plaintiff’s requested amendment and reject the defendants’ allegations of improper

motive. The present matter is more akin to Clinco, since the only facts relating to

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an employee walking and “leading” Plaintiff at the time of the incident appear

exclusively in the proposed FAC. Accordingly, as the district court found to be

true in Clinco, it is reasonable to question Plaintiff’s motive for joinder. This

factor weighs in favor of Defendant and against amendment.

E. Prejudice.

“Courts have found significant prejudice where claims against proposed

nondiverse defendants are so intimately connected to those against an original

defendant that denial of joinder would force a plaintiff to choose whether to pursue

redundant litigation in another forum at the risk of inconsistent results, or forego

valid claims against the nondiverse defendants.” Yang, 2010 WL 2680800, at *5,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76789, at *15 (citing IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1013); see

also Oettinger v. Home Depot, No. 4:09-cv-01560-CW, 2009 WL 2136764, at *4,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64786, at *14 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (rejecting Home

Depot’s argument that “because [it] can fully satisfy a judgment [on its own],

Plaintiff loses nothing by not having [the individual] … Defendant in the case”).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by the denial of

joinder “as the joinder is fraudulent, and sought solely to defeat federal diversity

jurisdiction.” (Dkt. 9 at 7.) It continues, “Plaintiff’s claims are addressed and

may, if proven, be remedied by Home Depot, and joinder of [Mr.] Wallace is

totally unnecessary to Plaintiff’s claims.” (Id.)

The Court disagrees with Defendant’s contention that the sought joinder is

clearly fraudulent and for the sole purpose of necessitating remand. Additionally,

the fact that Home Depot can satisfy a full judgment does not mean that it should,

or it must, do so—particularly where individual liability is also at stake. See

Oettinger, 2009 WL 2136764, at *4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64786, at *14. The

central point of the prejudice factor is whether denial of joinder would put Plaintiff

in a difficult position whereby she must decide whether to sue Mr. Wallace in state

court in a duplicative action or, alternatively, give up any claims she may have

against him.

The Court finds that Plaintiff would wind up in this particular conundrum

should joinder be denied, and therefore this factor supports amendment.

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F. Strength of Claims.

Finally, courts consider “whether a new claim sought to be added seems to

have merit.” Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083; see also Yang, 2010 WL 2680800, at

*5, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76789, at *14 (citing IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012).

Consideration of this factor requires an analysis of the newly alleged claims and

their relative strength, Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083, which, in this case, are

negligence and premises liability as attributed to Mr. Wallace. (Dkt. 8 at 24-30.)

“A claim for negligence requires alleging duty, breach of duty, causation,

and damages.” Mayall v. USA Water Polo, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (C.D.

Cal. 2016) (citing Friedman v. Merck & Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 454, 463 (2003)).

“In order to state a plausible claim, plaintiff must at a minimum indicate the facts

that support each of those necessary elements.” Brown v. Contra Costa Cnty., No.

3:12-cv-01923-PJH, 2012 WL 4804862, at *6, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145431, at

*16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2012). Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Wallace acted negligently

when he led her to trip on an object that was protruding into one of the store aisles.

(Id. at 26, ¶ 14.) The Court finds that Plaintiff’s negligence claim is sufficiently

strong on the merits at this early point in the litigation.

The same elements apply to premises liability: “a plaintiff must prove duty,

breach, causation, and damages.” Orellana v. Target Corp., No. 2:18-cv-09047-

DSF-JC, 2019 WL 4565174, at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131824, at *3 (C.D.

Cal. Aug. 5, 2019) (citing Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1205 (2001)).

“Premises liability ‘is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant

right to control and manage the premises’; accordingly, ‘mere possession with its

attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the

imposition of an affirmative duty to act.’” Manion v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No.

3:26-cv-00898-AJB-MMP, 2026 WL 751426, at *2, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

55742, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2026) (citing Kesner v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 5th

1132, 1158 (2016)); see also Dirkes v. Sam’s West, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-03466-JLS-

MAR, 2022 WL 17098672, at *5, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212995, at *12 (C.D.

Cal. Sep. 7, 2022) (“As noted above, several decisions in th[e Central] District [of

California] have held that store managers employed by the owner of the premises

may be individually liable for negligence.”). Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Wallace

“should have been monitoring the premises for the presence of dangerous conditions

which could cause Plaintiff to trip on and/or over and sustain severe bodily injuries.”

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(Dkt. 8 at 29, ¶ 27.) She does not allege that Mr. Wallace was a store manager

with a “right to control and manage the premises.” See Kesner, 1 Cal. 5th at 1158.

Indeed, Defendant mentions that Mr. Wallace is a “sales associate.” (Dkt. 9 at 6.)

The premises liability claim against Mr. Wallace is more uncertain than Plaintiff’s

negligence claim. However, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Wallace led her down the

aisleway with the trip hazard, walking in front of her, enabling him to see the

hazard, but he did not warn her. (Dkt. 8 at 26, ¶¶ 14-16.) Since there does appear

to be a basis for individual negligence liability against Mr. Wallace, this factor

supports amendment.

VI. ORDER

Although there is reason to question Plaintiff’s motive for joinder due to the

substantial similarity between her original Complaint and the proposed FAC but

for the new factual allegations against Mr. Wallace, the need for just adjudication,

paired with the other factors weighing in favor of amendment, warrant the granting

of Plaintiff’s motion.

The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file her FAC, which adds

the nondiverse defendant Mr. Wallace, and consequently requires remand of this

case to the OCSC. Plaintiff shall file the FAC no later than April 6, 2026. Once

the FAC is filed, this case will be ordered REMANDED to the state court for

further proceedings as it no longer satisfies the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Initials of Deputy Clerk jd