Harper

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

SARAH JANE HARPER,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 6:25-cv-2280-SJH

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

______________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Unopposed Petition for EAJA

Fees Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2412(d) (“Petition”). Doc. 27. For the reasons herein, the

Petition is due to be granted to the extent stated herein.

Carol Avard and Michael G. Sexton, counsel for Plaintiff, successfully

represented Plaintiff in this appeal of an adverse decision by the Social Security

Administration. See Docs. 24–25. The case came before this Court and was reversed

and remanded. Id. The Petition requests $9,481.72 in attorney’s fees for the

representation of Plaintiff pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d). Doc. 27 at 1, 6–8. Defendant does not object to the Petition. Id. at

4.

Under EAJA, unless otherwise provided by statute, a court must “award to a

prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses … incurred by

that party in any civil action … brought by or against the United States … unless the

court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). EAJA also

limits individuals eligible to recover fees to those “whose net worth did not exceed

$2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).

Plaintiff, having obtained a sentence-four reversal of a denial of benefits and

remand, is a “prevailing party.” See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300–02 (1993).

In light of the lack of opposition, the Court will not find that Defendant’s position was

substantially justified. See Andersen v. Kijakazi, No. 8:22-cv-630-AAS, 2023 WL

269567, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2023); Bennett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:19-

cv-1158-MCR, 2021 WL 9772226, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 29, 2021). Further, there are

no special circumstances that make the award unjust. In addition, the Petition

represents that Plaintiff’s net worth when this proceeding was filed was less than $2

million, Doc. 27 at 2, which is also shown by the affidavit filed by Plaintiff with her

application to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 2; see also Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 3:19-cv-1096-J-PDB, 2020 WL 3440659, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2020). Thus,

an award of attorney’s fees under EAJA is appropriate.

Regarding the amount to be awarded, EAJA requires that the fees be

“reasonable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The amount of fees “shall be based upon

prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished” and “shall

not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” Id.

The Petition seeks fees based on 36.3 total hours of attorney work between Ms.

Avard and Mr. Sexton: 0.6 hours in 2025 and 35.7 hours in 2026 (which includes 2.3

hours preparing the Petition). See Doc. 27 at 3; Doc. 27-1 at 18–19. The Petition seeks

fees based on a 2025 hourly attorney rate of $258.46 and a 2026 hourly attorney rate

of $261.25. Doc. 27 at 2. Considering the lack of opposition, the Court finds the hourly

rates reasonable, and the cost-of-living adjustment warranted.1 See Bennett, 2021 WL

9772226, at *1. The Court also finds reasonable the number of hours spent by

Plaintiff’s counsel on the case. Thus, the Court finds that $9,481.72 is a reasonable

amount for attorney’s fees in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).2

Accordingly, it is ordered:

1. The Petition, Doc. 27, is granted to the extent that the Clerk of Court

shall enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of

$9,481.72 for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).

1 If the hourly rates were contested, the Court’s determination as to the reasonableness

of the rates might be different.

2 The Petition requests payment directly to Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court will permit

the government in its discretion to honor any assignment from Plaintiff if the government

determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, but the Court will not order the

government to do so. See Nichols v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:23-cv-2860-PDB, 2024 WL

3650675, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2024); see also Farid v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:23-cv-2225-

DNF, 2024 WL 6882613, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2024); Marcum v. Kijakazi, No. 3:19-cv-

959-JRK, 2021 WL 3190545, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2021); Dietz v. Saul, No. 3:19-cv-95-J-

34PDB, 2020 WL 13337796, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2020); Beard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

6:16-cv-1706-Orl-37KRS, 2017 WL 3387409, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2017).

2. The Court leaves it to the discretion of the Commissioner to determine

whether to honor Plaintiff's assignment of EAJA fees to counsel if the United States

Department of Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a debt to the United

States Government.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on July 1, 2026.

[Z J. Horovitz

United States Magistrate Judge

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Counsel of Record