The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Case No.: 2:25-cv-07794-MEMF-AGR
11 MARINE AMIKHANYAN et al,
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
[DKT. NO. 11]
13 v.
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15 LAURIE SELBER SILVERSTEIN et al,
Defendants.
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20 Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Zeyad Elalami, Mona Elalami,
21 and Luxor Funding Group. Dkt. No. 11 (“Motion”). For the reasons stated herein, the Court
22 GRANTS the Motion.
23
24 / / /
25 / / /
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 I. Background
2 A. Factual Background1
3 i. The Loan
4 Plaintiffs and Defendant Romy Lasam are residents of California. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶
5 1-13.
6 On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff Marine Amirkhanyan borrowed from PS Funding, Inc. (“PS
7 Funding”), $665,000 at an interest rate of 8.990%, secured by real property. Id. ¶ 13. The loan had a
8 maturity date of March 1, 2023. Id. Plaintiffs signed a Note and Deed of Trust. Id. Plaintiffs paid on
9 time mortgage payments of $4,981.96 from 2021 to March 1, 2023 and made three additional
10 mortgage payments from March 1, 2023 to June 2023. Id. ¶ 14. In June 2023, PS Funding informed
11 Plaintiffs that it could not accept payments and should not have accepted Plaintiffs’ three payments
12 from March 1, 2023 to June 2023 as it was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Id. ¶ 15. PS Funding’s
13 bankruptcy was assigned to Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein and was subject to an automatic stay
14 under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Id. ¶ 16.
15 In August 2023, Plaintiffs received a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of
16 Trust from California TD Specialist, an affiliate of PS Funding. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs attempted to
17 contact California TD Specialist but California TD Specialist refused Plaintiffs’ request. Id. In
18 December 2023, California TD Specialist sent Plaintiffs a Notice of Trustee’s Sale, claiming that
19 Plaintiffs owed PS Funding $764,180.97 and that the sale would take place on December 27, 2023,
20 at 10:30 a.m. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs then contacted Jennifer Duran, a real estate negotiator for assistance
21 on the upcoming auction. Id. ¶ 19.
22 In January 2024, California TD Specialist held the Trustee’s Sale and provided a Demand for
23 Payoff regarding Plaintiffs’ loan. Id. ¶ 21. Romy Lasam signed off on the demand, indicating that the
24 Lender Agrees with the Amount in the Demand for the loan payoff. Id.
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26
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28 1 Except as otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Dkt. No. 1
1 Duran, during negotiations with California TD Specialist, requested an extension of time to
2 meet with the perspective private lender and the extension was granted providing a new payoff date
3 of April 15, 2024. Id. ¶ 22. During the negotiations, Plaintiffs were informed to file Chapter 13
4 bankruptcy for the amount owed under the loan. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy petition regarding
5 the property loan was discharged as the writer of the petition did not mark the box to contest
6 California TD Specialist’s motion to discharge the property from the petition. Id.
7 i. Trustee Sale
8 On April 16, 2025, California TD Specialist initiated a Trustee Sale on the property. Id. ¶ 24.
9 The Auction Levying Officer issued a Post Foreclosure Trustee Sale, rather than a regulatory
10 Trustee’s Sale, and did not inform any bidder that the property was subject to a Mandatory
11 California Redemption Law and California Code of Civil Procedures 729.030. Id.
12 ii. Bidder
13 On April 16, 2024, Paladar Capital Investments, L.P. (“Paladar”), a bidder claiming to be at
14 the Plaintiffs’ property auction, filed an unverified Complaint against Plaintiffs for declaratory relief
15 and quiet title. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiffs filed an Answer on April 26, 2024, and an amended Answer on
16 May 22, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Paladar amended its Complaint on May 22, 2024. Id. ¶ 31. The amended
17 Complaint alleged that Mona Elalami filed a false affidavit claiming to be the highest bidder at the
18 April 16, 2024 auction. Id. ¶ 33.
19 Defendant Mona Elalami had not produced her Affidavit as she claimed in the month of
20 April 2024. Id. ¶ 34. She claimed she was the highest bidder at the said auction on the “Subject
21 Property” as stated also in Paladar’s amended Complaint. Id. She lied and instead, allowed her father
22 Zeyad R. Elalami and Luxor Funding Group, Inc., to act as a Lender for another bidder, Walid
23 Wasifi, who bid on the Property and was the highest bidder. Id. Essentially, defendants Luxor
24 Funding Group and Zeyad R. Elalami provided monies to Wasifi to purchase the Property at the
25 foreclosure auction. Id. Luxor was “Not Licensed” as a California Lender with California
26 Department of Protection and Innovation nor was Luxor registered with the National Mortgage
27 Licensing Act and Registry System. Id. ¶ 37. Defendants allegedly knew that PS Funding was in a
28 Chapter 11 proceeding in the Wilmington, Delaware District Bankruptcy Court and took advantage
1 of PS Funding’s Bankruptcy situation and added themselves to the auction bidding as though
2 Defendant Mona Elalami bid. Id. ¶ 39. Lasam and their associate California TD Specialist
3 commenced with a Trustee Sale of the Subject Property on April 16, 2024, and commenced with a
4 Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee Sale of the Subject Property starting in 2023 through 2024
5 with PS Funding, Inc. Id. ¶ 34. Lasam issued a Trustee Deed Upon Sale to Wasifi, and thus allowing
6 their associate, California TD Specialist, to commence with a Trustee Sale on the Subject Property,
7 while PS Funding was under the Bankruptcy Court Judge’s Automatic Stay Order. Id. ¶¶ 41-42.
8 On June 17, 2024, Plaintiffs mailed and had independent confidential mail carried to service
9 to Defendant Zeyad Elalami and Wasifi a request for information as to the Notice to Occupant to
10 Vacate Premises. Id. ¶ 45. Wasifi had filed in Van Nuys Superior Court of California, Case Number:
11 24VEUD01210, numerous Ex-Parte Unlawful Detainer Motions to evict the Plaintiffs from the
12 Subject Property. Id. Defendant Wasifi filed for a Writ of Possession. Id. Plaintiffs had not received
13 any kind of notice from Wasifi, and due to that his false swearing, the court issued the writ in
14 February of 2025. Id.
15 On May 9, 2025, while Plaintiffs left to work that morning, Wasifi, Zeyad Elalami and Zeyad
16 Elalami’s Brother, Mamdouh Elalami, went with a Peace Officer under a Peaceful Escort to change
17 the Subject Property’s Locks while the Plaintiffs were at work, and upon returning, Plaintiffs could
18 not enter the Subject Property and was not able to retrieve basic care items and necessities. Id. ¶ 46.
19 B. Procedural History
20 On August 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court. Compl. The Complaint asserted
21 twenty-five causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and
22 fair dealing, (3) fraud and misrepresentation, (4) fraud in factum, (5) violation of notice law, (6)
23 violation of disclosure law, (7) violation of California Financial Code § 22000 et seq., (8) violation
24 of the S.A.F.E. Act, (9) violation of the National Mortgage Licensing Act and Registry System, (10)
25 fraud and misrepresentation upon the FHA, (11) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, (12) violation of 18
26 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, (13) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, (14) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, (15)
27 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, (16) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, (17) violation of California
28 Business and Professional Code § 17200, (18) usury, (19) unlawful foreclosure, (20) violation of
1 California Senate Bill 1079, (21) fraud and misrepresentation upon California Senate Bill 1079, (22)
2 illegal eviction, (23) violation of ponzi schemes, (24) violation of the RICO Act, and (25) Intentional
3 Infliction of Emotional Distress. See id.
4 On September 11, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Motion. Motion. Per the Court’s Civil
5 Standing Order, Plaintiffs’ Opposition was due on September 25, 2025. Civil Standing Order §
6 VIII(B).
7 On November 21, 2025, Plaintiffs and Defendant Luxor Funding filed a stipulation to
8 continue the motions hearing. Dkt. No. 44. On December 8, 2025, Defendant’s counsel emailed the
9 Court, stating the continuance was no longer needed.
10 On December 12, 2025, Plaintiffs submitted, via mail, a Request for Extension to File an
11 Opposition.
12 The hearing on Defendants’ Motion was scheduled for December 18, 2025. The Court, on
13 December 17, 2025, took the matter under submission. Dkt. No. 46.
14 II. Applicable Law
15 A. Federal Court Subject Matter Jurisdiction
16 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and can only hear cases where there is a
17 valid basis for federal jurisdiction. Richardson v. United States, 943 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991).
18 One possible basis for jurisdiction is federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
19 which states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
20 the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Another basis for jurisdiction is diversity
21 jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (“Section 1332”). Diversity jurisdiction requires “requires
22 complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy greater than $75,000.” Canela v.
23 Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2020). While citizenship to a state is not
24 necessarily tied to residence, a “party with the burden of proving citizenship may rely on the
25 presumption of continuing domicile, which provides that, once established, a person's state of
26 domicile continues unless rebutted with sufficient evidence of change.” Adams v. W, Marine Prods.,
27 Inc., 958 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020).
28
1 When a plaintiff files an action in state court over which federal courts might have
2 jurisdiction, the Defendant may remove the action to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446. “As
3 specified in § 1446(a), a Defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that
4 the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold; the notice need not contain
5 evidentiary submissions.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89
6 (2014). There are two different possible deadlines for a Defendant to remove, depending on the
7 circumstances. See 28 U.S.C § 1446(b)(1); see also Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d
8 689, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2005). If the “case clearly is removable on the basis of jurisdictional facts
9 apparent from the face of the complaint,” then the Defendant must file a notice of removal within 30
10 days of service. Harris, 425 F.3d at 692. However, if “it is unclear from the complaint whether the
11 case is removable,” then the Defendant need not immediately remove, and instead must remove
12 “within thirty days after the Defendant receives ‘an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper’
13 from which it can be ascertained from the face of the document that removal is proper.” Id. at 694
14 (citing 28 U.S.C § 1446(b)(1)). “Notice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined through
15 examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a
16 duty to make further inquiry.” Id. at 694.
17 “If the plaintiff subsequently challenges the removal, the burden is on the removing
18 Defendant to prove that removal is proper.” See Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex
19 rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2010); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
20 1992) (“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the Defendant always has
21 the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”).
22 B. Failure to State a Claim
23 Defendants bring their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek to dismiss a complaint for
25 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
26 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
27 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
28 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
1 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
2 the misconduct alleged.” Id. Labels, conclusions, and “formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s
3 elements” are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
4 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context-
5 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Generally, a court must accept the factual allegations in the pleadings as true
7 and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 918
8 (9th Cir. 2017); Lee, 250 F.3d at 679. But a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
9 couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
10 When a party claims “fraud or mistake, a party a party must state with particularity the
11 circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
12 person's mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen.
13 Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining the “heightened
14 pleading standard of Rule 9(b) and how fraud must state with particularity the circumstances
15 constituting fraud).
16 As a general rule, leave to amend a dismissed complaint should be freely granted unless it is
17 clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St.
18 Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
19
III. Discussion
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Defendants base the Motion on the following arguments: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to state a
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claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6), and (2) the Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over
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Defendants under Rule 12(b)(1). See Motion. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that
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Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the Court lacks
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jurisdiction over Defendants.
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A. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Does Not State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be
26 Granted
27 Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts twenty-five causes of action against Defendants. See Compl.
28 Defendants argue that twenty-four causes of action either: (1) “fails to plead sufficient facts to
1 establish all required elements,” or (2) does not provide Plaintiffs with a “private right of action.”
2 Motion at 4-5. The Court will address the arguments set forth as to each cause of action.
3 i. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead Sufficient Facts With Respect to Several of Their
Claims.2
4
1. Breach of Contract and Deed of Trust
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Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ allegations “are directed primarily at other defendants,” and
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“Plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a contract or deed of trust between Plaintiffs and
7
Defendants.” Motion at 11.
8
The elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) Plaintiffs’
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performance of the contract; (3) defendant’s material breach of the contract; and (4) damages to
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plaintiff resulting from the breach. Abdelhamid v Fire Ins. Exchange, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 32 (Cal.
11
Ct. App. 2010).
12
Plaintiffs’ Complaint states “Despite Plaintiffs’ performance, Defendants PS Funding, Inc.,
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Brewster Johnson, and Romy Lasam . . . wrongfully declared Plaintiffs in default, recorded a Notice
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of Default, and later a Notice of Trustee’s Sale.” Compl. ¶ 57. The subsequent sentences alleges that
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Defendants committed acts “in contravention of the express terms of the Deed of Trust and
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applicable law.” Id. Although Plaintiffs assert the existence of a loan contract, their performance,
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breach, and damages, the allegations set forth are not directed at the Defendants in the instant
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Motion. Id. ¶¶ 57-59; Abdelhamid, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 32. Plaintiffs may argue that they included
19
“Defendants,” and thus, the cause of action includes Defendants. However, the Complaint appears to
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qualify “Defendants” with regard to the breach of contract allegation by initially listing “Defendants
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PS Funding, Inc., Brewster Johnson, and Romy Lasam.” Id. Notably, there is no allegation of the
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existence of a contract between the Plaintiff and the instant Defendants. Given the qualifying
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24
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26 2 In light of Plaintiffs’ late Request for Extension of Time to File an Opposition, the Court, although finding that
amendment would be futile, will permit amendment to the dismissed claims under this subsection.
27
Further, when manually submitting filings to the Court, Plaintiffs are instructed to file the documents with the Intake
28 Window. If Plaintiffs do not file the documents with the Intake Window, Plaintiffs shall email the documents, in
1 language and lack of contract between the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
2 sufficiently plead a breach of contract. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the breach of contract claim as to Defendants
4 with leave to amend.
5 2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
6 Defendants similarly contend that because “no contract exists between Plaintiffs and
7 Defendants, there can be no implied covenant claim.” Motion at 12.
8 Under California law, “there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
9 contract.” 3500 Sepulveda, LLC v. Macy’s W. Stores, Inc. 980 F.3d 1317, 1324 (9th Cir. 2020)
10 (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1988)). “A party can breach
11 the covenant without ‘breach of a specific provision of the contract.’” Id. (citing Carma Dev. (Cal.),
12 Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 727 (Cal. 1992)). The “question is whether the
13 party's conduct, ‘while not technically transgressing the express covenants . . . frustrates the other
14 party's rights to the benefits of the contract.’” Id. (citing Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Parks &
15 Rec., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
16 Plaintiffs’ Complaint acknowledges the necessity of a contract to plead an implied covenant
17 claim. Compl. ¶ 61. As stated above, the Court does not find the existence of a contract between
18 Plaintiffs and Defendants. And the same qualifying language discussed is included in Plaintiffs’
19 second cause of action allegations. Id. ¶ 63. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
20 sufficiently plead a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Fed. R. Civ. P.
21 12(b)(6).
22 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the breach of implied covenant of good faith
23 and fair dealing cause of action as to Defendants with leave to amend.
24 3. Fraud and Misrepresentation
25 Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged that “Defendants made any
26 misrepresentations to Plaintiffs which caused them harm.” Motion at 12.
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28
1 To establish fraud, there must be: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent
2 to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damages. Lazar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981,
3 984-85 (Cal. 1996).
4 Plaintiffs’ Complaint claims “Defendants Mona Elalami, Zeyad Elalami, [and] Luxor
5 Funding Group, Inc. [] misrepresented that Mona Elalami was the highest bidder.” Compl. ¶ 68. The
6 Complaint also alleges that Defendants falsely claimed that “Luxor Funding Group, Inc. and/or
7 Zeyad Elalami were licensed lenders in California.” Id. ¶ 69. The Court finds these allegations
8 resemble legal conclusions rather than particular factual allegations as they fail to detail what acts
9 each Defendant committed, when they were committed, and the knowledge of falsity. Also, the
10 Court, as Defendants explain, finds that these alleged misrepresentations were made to third-party
11 auctioneers of Plaintiffs’ property. Motion at 12. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not illustrate how the
12 misrepresentations affected the default and foreclosure issues or how Plaintiffs were harmed by
13 reasonably relying on the misrepresentations. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not pleaded
14 sufficient facts to assert a claim for fraud or misrepresentation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
15 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the fraud and misrepresentation cause of
16 action as to Defendants with leave to amend.
17 4. Fraud in Factum
18 Defendants contend that because fraud in factum requires a written instrument or contract,
19 this cause of action should be dismissed as Plaintiffs “do not allege any contract or inducement
20 involving Defendants.” Motion at 13.
21 Under California law, fraud can take two forms: factum and inception. Rosenthal v. Great W.
22 Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1073 (Cal. 1996). Fraud in factum occurs when “the promisor is
23 deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend
24 to enter into a contract at all.” Id. Fraud in the inception is when the promisor knows what is being
25 signed but the promisor’s consent is induced by fraud. Id.
26 Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendants “created and recorded a Deed of Trust . . . that
27 falsely stated the loan was backed and insured by the Federal Housing Administration.” Compl. ¶ 75.
28 As discussed, Defendants’ misrepresentations were made to third parties, not Plaintiffs. Further,
1 there is no contractual agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to
2 sufficiently plead a cause of action for fraud in factum. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the fraud in factum cause of action as to
4 Defendants with leave to amend.
5 5. Violation of 42 U.S.C. 1986
6 Defendants argue that a Section 1986 claim “requires an underlying violation of [] Section
7 1985.” Motion at 13. Because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not allege any Section 1985 violation,
8 Defendants conclude that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled this cause of action. Id.
9 Section 1986 provides that if wrongful act under Section 1985 is committed, a party is
10 entitled to recover “all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable
11 diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case.” 42
12 U.S.C. 1986. Section 1985 sets forth three potential violations requiring “two or more persons”: (1)
13 preventing an officer from performing duties, (2) obstructing justice in federal or state courts, and
14 (3) depriving persons of rights and privileges. 42 U.S.C. 1985.
15 Plaintiffs allege that “[e]ach and [e]very Defendant knew or should have that actions
16 undertaken by themselves and/or their co-defendants . . . constituted violations of Plaintiffs’
17 constitutionally protected rights.” Comp. ¶ 122. The Complaint further states that Defendants had the
18 ability to prevent or mitigate the wrongful conduct. Id. ¶¶ 123-24. Defendants emphasize that
19 Plaintiffs do not allege any section 1985 violation or a conspiracy specifically involving Defendants.
20 The Court agrees. The Complaint states that Defendants violated Section 1985 but with no reference
21 or detail as to the specific acts any of the Defendants committed. Id. ¶ 125. Although some
22 Defendants are specifically named in the Complaint, one cannot discern which specific Defendants
23 the Complaint intends to refer to as to the Section 1986 allegations. Id. As a result, none of the
24 Defendants have sufficient notice of their alleged misconduct. Therefore, the Court finds that
25 Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action for Section 1986 violations. Fed. R. Civ.
26 P. 12(b)(6).
27 Accordingly, the Court does finds reason to dismiss the Section 1986 cause of action against
28 Defendants with leave to amend.
1 6. Usury
2 Defendants then assert that Plaintiffs’ usury cause of action cannot stand because there is no
3 allegation that Defendants “extended a loan to [Plaintiffs] or that Plaintiffs paid or owed interest to
4 Defendants.” Motion 13-14.
5 The essential elements for a usury cause of action are: “(1) The transaction must be a loan or
6 forbearance; (2) the interest to be paid must exceed the statutory maximum; (3) the loan and interest
7 must be absolutely repayable by the borrower; and (4) the lender must have a willful intent to enter
8 into a usurious transaction.” Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 883 P.2d 960, 965 (Cal. 1994).
9 Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendants “engaged in a deliberate scheme to profit from
10 a purported ‘loan’ secured by a deed of trust against Plaintiffs’ property and fabricated fraudulent
11 loan documentation to assert a false debt obligation.” Compl. ¶ 170. The Complaint also claims that
12 Defendants “attempted to receive payments from Plaintiffs under false pretenses, using the threat of
13 eviction to extort payments.” Id. ¶ 172. Although Plaintiffs allege the existence of a loan and
14 usurious intent, they do not assert there is a loan or forbearance with the Defendants. The loan at
15 issue involves Plaintiff and Defendant PS Funding. There is no loan or owed interest to Defendants.
16 Motion at 14. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts for a usury cause of action. Fed. R.
17 Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
18 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the usury cause of action as to Defendants
19 with leave to amend.
20 7. Unlawful Foreclosure3
21 Defendants argue that this cause of action is directed at other Defendants, and they had no
22 role in the foreclosure. Motion at 14.
23 “A foreclosure initiated by one with no authority to do so is wrongful for purposes of such
24 an action.” Yvanova v New Century Mortgage Corp., 365 P.3d 845, 851 (Cal. 2016). Plaintiffs
25 Complaint alleges a failure to comply with California Civil Code Sections 2923.5 and 2924. Compl.
26
27
28 3 There does not appear to be a cause of action for Unlawful Foreclosure. The Court takes the position that Plaintiffs
1 ¶ 177. Sections 2923.5 and 2924 set forth requirements for notices of default and notices of trustee
2 sales. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2923.5, 2924.
3 Similar to Plaintiffs’ earlier causes of action, the unlawful foreclosure cause of action seems
4 to be limited through qualifying language as paragraph 177 of the Complaint only asserts violations
5 as to “Defendants PS Funding, Inc., Brewster Johnson, and Romy Lasam.” Compl. ¶ 177. Given that
6 the allegations do not implicate Defendants, Defendants did not purchase the property, and
7 Defendants were not involvement in the foreclosure, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed
8 to sufficiently plead a cause of action for unlawful foreclosure. See generally Compl.; Fed. R. Civ. P.
9 12(b)(6).
10 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the unlawful foreclosure cause of action as to
11 Defendants with leave to amend.
12 8. Violation of the RICO Act
13 Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to plead facts with particularity under
14 Rule 9(b), as the allegations are merely conclusory assertions. Motion at 14-16.
15 With respect to RICO claims specifically, the Ninth Circuit has generally applied Rule
16 9(b) to require “a pleader of fraud to detail with particularity the time, place, and manner of each act
17 of fraud, plus the role of each defendant in each scheme.” Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley
18 Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992). All RICO claims
19 involving fraud must be alleged with particularity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Id. (“The Ninth Circuit
20 has repeatedly insisted that [Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement] be followed
21 in RICO actions alleging the predicate act of mail fraud.”); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
22 Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)'s heightened
23 pleading requirement to allegations of mail and wire fraud). However, the non-fraud aspects of
24 a RICO claim are not subject to Rule 9(b). Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide 265,
25 267 (5th ed. 2018) (“Rule 9(b) applies to the allegations of a RICO complaint only to the extent that
26 they sound in fraud.”).
27 Plaintiffs’ Complaint describes how Defendants “constituted an ‘enterprise’ within the
28 meaning of [Section] 1961(4), as they were in fact for the common purpose of executing a fraudulent
1 foreclosure and investment scheme involving Plaintiffs’ property and funds. Compl. ¶¶ 203-09. It
2 specifies that Defendants sent “fraudulent foreclosure notices, loan documents, and
3 communications” via U.S. mail and wires to illegally obtain property and funds—in violation of 18
4 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. Id. Despite this, the Complaint lacks the particularity required under Rule
5 9(b). Plaintiffs appear to group all Defendants together, failing to elaborate on how each Defendant
6 played a role in the alleged RICO violation. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp., 940 F.2d at 405 (emphasis
7 added). The Complaint fails to provide any further detail, at minimum, as to which Defendants
8 contributed to the fraud, or in what way. See Compl. ¶¶ 203-09. Although some Defendants are
9 specifically named in the Complaint, one cannot discern which specific Defendants the Complaint
10 intends to refer to as to the RICO allegations. Id. As a result, none of the Defendants have sufficient
11 notice of their alleged misconduct. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
12 sufficiently plead a cause of action for RICO violations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
13 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the RICO cause of action as to Defendants
14 with leave to amend.
15 9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)
16 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ IIED allegations are directed at other Defendants. Motion at
17 16.
18 To establish a tort claim for IIED, a plaintiff must establish: (1) extreme and outrageous
19 conduct by the defendant, (2) intent of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
20 emotional distress, (3) severe or extreme emotional distress, and (4) actual and proximate causation
21 of the emotional distress. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 819-20 (Cal. 1993).
22 Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts that Defendants engaged in “extreme and outrageous” related to
23 the foreclosure, eviction, loan, and deed of trust. Compl. ¶ 212. Allegedly, these actions were
24 intended to cause severe emotional distress or constituted a reckless disregard of the probability of
25 causing emotional distress—resulting in Plaintiffs “severe emotional distress.” Id. ¶¶ 213-14.
26 Plaintiffs appear to argue that each Defendant involved in the entire factual circumstances
27 committed IIED. The Complaint, however, merely restates the elements of IIED—without detailing
28 how each Defendant’s conduct satisfied each element. Id. ¶¶ 212-27. The Complaint does not
1 elaborate on the extreme and outrageous conduct specifically to Defendants. As such, the Court does
2 not find Plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts for their IIED cause of action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the IIED cause of action as to Defendants
4 with leave to amend.
5 10. Illegal Eviction
6 Defendants argue that there is no “Illegal Eviction” cause of action. Assuming one exists,
7 Defendants state emphasizes that there was a writ of possession provided by the court in an unlawful
8 detainer action and thus, the “eviction could not inherently be ‘illegal.’” Motion at 19.
9 The Complaint alleges that Defendants, “without obtaining a valid court order for possession,
10 engaged in illegal evictions by” causing Plaintiffs to be removed from the property. Compl. ¶ 194.
11 Plaintiffs cite to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1159 to 1179a. Id. ¶ 193. Although the
12 Court does not believe an “Illegal Eviction” cause of action exists, Plaintiffs cite to state statutes and
13 explicitly allege “unlawful detainer actions.” Id. As such, the Court will address the allegations
14 under those claims. Section 1159 to 1179a concern unlawful entry into one’s property and
15 requirements under unlawful detainer actions. Cal. Code Civ. P. §§ 1159-79a. Plaintiffs express that
16 the writ of possession was obtained through misrepresentation by Defendant Wasifi. Compl. ¶ 45.
17 But there appears to be an absence of an unlawful entry. As such, the Court finds Plaintiffs
18 sufficiently pled a cause of action for an unlawful detainer action.
19 Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Illegal Eviction cause of action as to Defendants with
20 leave to amend.
i. Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Private Right of Action As to Several of Their
21
Claims.
22
1. Violation of the Notice Law
23
Defendants claim that there is no recognized “private cause of action for “violation of notice
24
law.” Motion at 13. Under this cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants recorded a notice of
25
default and proceeded with a notice of trustee sale, knowing that Plaintiffs were not in default and
26
that they had no lawful authority. Compl. ¶¶ 80-81. Plaintiffs also provide that Defendants failure to
27
respond to Plaintiffs’ written notices and concerns substantiates their unlawful conduct.
28
1 The Court is unaware of a private cause of action for “violation of notice law.” Aside from a
2 bankruptcy-related stay federal statute, the Complaint does not cite a federal or state statute for
3 which the cause of action is based upon. As such, the Court does not find a private right of action.
4 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the Violation of Notice Law cause of action as
5 to Defendants without leave to amend.
6 2. Violation of the Disclosure Law; California Financing Law, Cal.
Fin. Code § 22000 et seq.
7
Defendants argue that these causes of action are regulatory statutes, and do not provide a
8
private right of action. Motion at 17.
9
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges failures to disclose material information related to Defendants’
10
loans and licensing. Compl. ¶¶ 90, 99-101. The Complaint also asserts that Defendants refused to
11
respond to Plaintiffs’ concerns and Plaintiffs were harmed due to the deprivation of critical
12
information. Id. ¶¶ 92-96, 102.
13
Each cause of action implicates California Financial Code Section 22000 et seq.—a
14
regulatory statute. Cal. Fin. Code § 22000 et seq. As such, Plaintiffs have no private right of action
15
as to either cause of action.
16
Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the Violation of Notice Law cause of action as
17
to Defendants without leave to amend.
18
3. Violation of Section 1507 of the S.A.F.E. Act, 12 U.S.C § 5106 &
19
12 C.F.R. § 1007; Violation of the Nationwide Mortgage License
20 System and Registry
Defendants assert that the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008
21
(“S.A.F.E. Act”) establishes a “system for registering mortgage loan originators but does not provide
22
a private right of action.” Motion at 17.
23
The Complaint argues that Defendants violated the S.A.F.E. Act by acting as a loan
24
originator in connection with the at issue property without having the proper license. Compl. ¶ 105-
25
06. Although the S.A.F.E. Act provides requirements pertaining to loan originators, the statute does
26
not set forth language granting a private right of action. Rather, it refers parties to several different
27
acts. See 12 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. As the Complaint cites only the S.A.F.E. Act, without any other
28
1 statute providing a private right of action, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently
2 plead causes of action under the S.A.F.E. Act. Id.; Compl. ¶¶ 103-14.
3 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the S.A.F.E. Act causes of action as to
4 Defendants without leave to amend.
5 4. Fraud and Misrepresentation Upon the Federal Housing
Administration
6
Defendants claim that fraud claims upon the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) “must
7
be pursued through administrative remedies.” Motion at 17.
8
“The overall purpose of the FHA mortgage insurance program is to encourage leading
9
lenders, in exchange for a government guarantee of the loan, to extend mortgages to those carrying
10
higher credit risks. . . . Thus, the regulations do not control directly the relationship between the
11
mortgagor and mortgagee and may not be invoked by the mortgagor as a sword in an offensive cause
12
of action against the mortgagee.” Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673,
13
688 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
14
The Complaint cites to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, alleging that Defendants “engaged in fraud and
15
misrepresentation upon the FHA by submitting false and/or misleading” loan documents. Compl. ¶¶
16
116-17. Although the Complaint details the alleged misrepresentation and a party may be fined
17
under Section 1001 for misrepresentations, Plaintiffs’ cause of action centers around the FHA.
18
Pursuant to California law, there is no private right of cause of action through the FHA as to the
19
parties’ mortgage dispute. As such, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled this cause of action.
20
Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the Fraud and Misrepresentation Upon the
21
FHA cause of action as to Defendants without leave to amend.
22
5. Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1001, 1341, 1343, 1621
23
Defendants contend that Sections 241, 242, 1001, 1341, 1343, and 1621 are “criminal
24
statutes and do not provide a private right of action.” Motion at 18.
25
The Complaint asserts that by knowingly and willfully making misrepresentations and
26
engaging in a conspiracy, Defendants violated Sections 241, 242, 1001, 1341, 1343, and 1621. See
27
generally Compl,
28
1 Sections 241, 242, 1001, 1341, 1343, and 1621, however, are criminal statutes and thus, can
2 only be brought by the government. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1001, 1341, 1343, 1621. They do not
3 provide a private right of action. Id. As such, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled these causes of
4 action.
5 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1001,
6 1341, 1343, and 1621 causes of action as to Defendants without leave to amend.
7 6. Fraud and Misrepresentation Under Senate Bill 1079
8 Defendants advance that only a state regulatory agency can enforce compliance of senate bill
9 1079. Motion at 18.
10 The Complaint alleges violations of senate bill 1079 due to Defendants’ “fraud and
11 misrepresentation regarding SB 1079 by representing that they would comply with the post-sale
12 rights and notice provisions mandated under California Civil Code § 2924m.” Compl. ¶ 187. As
13 argued by Defendants, senate bill 1079 does not confer a private right of action. Even if it did,
14 Plaintiffs have failed to meet the Rule 9(b) particularity standards to properly plead the claimed
15 fraud. Plaintiffs generally assert that each Defendant violated senate bill 1079 without detailing
16 particular violative acts committed by Defendants. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed
17 to sufficiently plead their senate bill 1079 cause of action.
18 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the senate bill 1079 causes of action as to
19 Defendants without leave to amend.
20 7. Violation of Ponzi Schemes
21 Defendants contend that a ponzi scheme is a “form of fraud” and statutes regulating such
22 schemes “do not create a private right of action.” Motion at 19.
23 Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges violations of California Penal Code Section 532, the Federal
24 Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 based on Defendants’ alleged
25 misrepresentations and “[s]oliciting Plaintiffs to invest or participate in purported secured real estate
26 transactions.” Compl. ¶ 199. First, California Penal Code Section 532 is a criminal statute and thus,
27 does not provide a private right of action. Second, contrary to Defendants’ assertions, several
28 sections of the Federal Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a, “creates private rights of
1 action to aid the enforcement of obligations pertaining to securities offerings.” Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver
2 County Employees Ret. Fund, 583 U.S. 416, 420 (2018). This is also true for the Securities Exchange
3 Act of 1934. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 156-57 (2008)
4 (discussing the private right of action pertaining to fraudulent conduct and the purchase or sale of
5 any security under 15 U.S.C. § 78j). Despite the existence of private rights of action, the Complaint
6 fails to specify the relevant section under either statute or detail the violative acts as to each
7 Defendant. As a result, none of the Defendants have sufficient notice of their alleged misconduct.
8 Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action for Ponzi
9 Scheme violations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
10 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss the Ponzi Scheme cause of action as to
11 Defendants without leave to amend.
12 B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
13 As the Court does not find a single federal cause of action properly pled, there is no federal
14 question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court will address the existence of federal diversity
15 jurisdiction.
16 Defendants argue that the parties lack complete diversity because the Plaintiffs and
17 Defendants are California residents. Motion at 19. Because the Complaint claims that Plaintiffs all
18 named Defendants reside in California, the parties are not diverse under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Compl. ¶
19 1, 8-10. Therefore, there is no basis for federal diversity jurisdiction.
20 Accordingly, the Court finds reason to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of subject
21 matter jurisdiction.
22 IV. Conclusion
23 For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED and the Court ORDERS as
24 follows:
25 1. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of contract is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO
26 AMEND. Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to do so may
27 warrant dismissal without further warning;
28
1 2. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
2 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the
3 claim and failure to do so may warrant dismissal without further warning;
4 3. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for fraud and misrepresentation is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE
5 TO AMEND. Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to do so
6 may warrant dismissal without further warning;
7 4. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for fraud in factum is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO
8 AMEND. Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to do so may
9 warrant dismissal without further warning;
10 5. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of notice law is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE
11 TO AMEND;
12 6. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of disclosure law is DISMISSED WITHOUT
13 LEAVE TO AMEND;
14 7. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of California Financial Code § 22000 et seq. is
15 DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;
16 8. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of the S.A.F.E. Act is DISMISSED WITHOUT
17 LEAVE TO AMEND;
18 9. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of the National Mortgage Licensing Act and
19 Registry System is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;
20 10. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for fraud and misrepresentation upon the FHA is DISMISSED
21 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;
22 11. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 is DISMISSED WITH
23 LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to
24 do so may warrant dismissal without further warning;
25 12. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 is DISMISSED
26 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;
27 13. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is DISMISSED WITHOUT
28 LEAVE TO AMEND;
1 14. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 is DISMISSED WITHOUT
2 LEAVE TO AMEND;
3 15. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 is DISMISSED WITHOUT
4 LEAVE TO AMEND;
5 16. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 is DISMISSED WITHOUT
6 LEAVE TO AMEND;
7 17. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for usury is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
8 Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to do so may warrant
9 dismissal without further warning;
10 18. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for unlawful foreclosure is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO
11 AMEND. Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to do so may
12 warrant dismissal without further warning;
13 19. Plaintiffs’ cause of action violation of California Senate Bill 1079 is DISMISSED
14 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;
15 20. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for fraud and misrepresentation upon California Senate Bill
16 1079 is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;
17 21. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of ponzi schemes is DISMISSED WITHOUT
18 LEAVE TO AMEND;
19 22. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of the RICO Act is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE
20 TO AMEND. Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to do so
21 may warrant dismissal without further warning;
22 23. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for illegal eviction is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO
23 AMEND. Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to do so may
24 warrant dismissal without further warning;
25 24. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for IIED is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
26 Plaintiffs shall have ninety days to amend the claim and failure to do so may warrant
27 dismissal without further warning;
28 25. The Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction; and
1 26. The deadline for Plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint shall be ninety (90) days from
2 this Order. The Amended Complaint may include the following claims:
3 a. Breach of Contract;
4 b. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;
5 c. Fraud;
6 d. Fraud in Factum;
7 e. Violation of 42 U.S.C. 1986;
8 f. Usury;
9 g. Unlawful Foreclosure;
10 h. Violation of the RICO Act;
11 i. Illegal Eviction; and
12 j. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
13 V. Resources for Pro Se Litigants
14 Although Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, i.e., without legal representation, she nonetheless
15 is required to comply with Court orders, the Local Rules, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
16 See C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-2.2.3. The Local Rules are available on the Court's website,
17 http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/court-procedures/ local-rules.
18 The Court cannot provide legal advice to any party, including pro se litigants, i.e., parties
19 who are not represented by a lawyer. There is a free “Pro Se Clinic” that can provide information
20 and guidance about many aspects of civil litigation in this Court.
21
- Public Counsel runs a free Federal Pro Se Clinic where pro se litigants can get
22
information and guidance. The Clinic is located at the Roybal Federal Building and
23 Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012 (note that the clinic may
not be open for in-person appointments during the pandemic). Pro se litigants must call or
24 submit an on-line application to request services as follows: on-line applications can be
submitted at http://prose.cacd.uscourts.gov/los-angeles, or call (213) 385-2977, ext. 270.
25
26
- Public Counsel also has extensive resources for pro se litigants at its website located at
https://publiccounsel.org/services/federal-court/.
27
28
1 First Street Courthouse at 301 W. First Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, also has extensive
resources for pro se litigants. The LA Law Library can be reached via email at
2 reference@lalawlibrary.org, or via telephone at (213) 785-2513.
3
4
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
7 Dated: March 25, 2026
8 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG
9 United States District Judge
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