Edison

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

LISA EDISON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-03110-JLB-TGW

BARNETT OUTDOORS, LLC d/b/a

BARNETT CROSSBOWS,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

Invoking this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff Lisa Edison brings

claims against Defendant Barnett Outdoors, LLC d/b/a Barnett Crossbows

(“Barnett”) for strict products liability (Count I), negligence (Count II), breach of

warranty (Count III), and punitive damages (Count IV) after one of Barnett’s

crossbows injured her thumb. (Doc. 1). Barnett moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint (Doc. 1) as a shotgun pleading. (Doc. 17). And it moves to dismiss

Counts I, III, and IV, in particular, for failure to state a claim under North Carolina

law. (Id.). Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 22), and Barnett replied (Doc. 25). After

review, the Court GRANTS Barnett’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 17). Plaintiff’s claims

for strict products liability and punitive damages (Counts I and IV, respectively) are

DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim because North Carolina law

neither recognizes strict products liability nor standalone claims for punitive

damages. Counts II and III are DISMISSED without prejudice with leave to

amend.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff is a North Carolina resident. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6). Barnett is a Florida

LLC with its principal place of business in Tarpon Springs, Florida. (Id. at ¶ 7). On

November 23, 2022, Plaintiff was using a Barnett Recruit Crossbow at her home in

North Carolina. (Id. at ¶ 11). Upon pulling the crossbow’s trigger, the bowstring

came forward and severed her left thumb. (Id.). At the time, the crossbow did not

have an underside guard to prevent Plaintiff’s fingers from entering the path of the

bowstring. (Id. at ¶ 12). Plaintiff alleges that, because of the injury, she has

incurred substantial medical expenses, physical limitations, and mental anguish.

(Id. at ¶¶ 14–17).

On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint. (Id.). She pleads strict

products liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and punitive damages claims

against Barnett. (Id.). Barnett moves to dismiss (Doc. 17), Plaintiff responded

(Doc. 22), and Barnett replied (Doc. 25).

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to be dismissed

1 “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and

the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999)

(citation omitted). Accordingly, this background section relies on the facts recited in

the Complaint. (See Doc. 1). Furthermore, the Complaint names two defendants.

But the parties stipulated that Barnett Outdoors, LLC, d/b/a Barnett Crossbows, is

the only remaining defendant in this action. (Doc. 15).

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint also must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Bare “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action,” do not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A district court should

dismiss a claim when a party does not plead facts that make the claim facially

plausible. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is facially plausible when a court

can draw a reasonable inference, based on the facts pled, that the opposing party is

liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This plausibility

standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (cleaned up)).

When considering dismissal, courts must accept all factual allegations in the

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). To

warrant dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it

must be “clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be

proved consistent with the allegations.” Blackston v. State of Alabama, 30 F.3d 117,

120 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Complaint Is a Shotgun Pleading Because It Incorporates

All Preceding Paragraphs into Each Claim.

Barnett is correct that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is a shotgun pleading. A

complaint is a shotgun pleading if it “contain[s] multiple counts where each count

adopts the allegations of the preceding counts, causing each successive count to

carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire

complaint.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th

Cir. 2015). Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) does that. Each count “incorporates by

reference all of the preceding paragraphs” with no explanation to clarify that

Plaintiff meant to incorporate only certain paragraphs. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 24, 29, 34).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not “give [Barnett] adequate notice of the

claims against [it] and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1323. Dismissal of the entire complaint is proper on that basis alone. Vibe

Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018).

II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Strict Products Liability or

Punitive Damages under North Carolina Law.

Barnett also asks the Court to dismiss several of Plaintiff’s claims for failure

to state a claim under North Carolina law. (Doc. 17 at 2–9). Plaintiff objects,

arguing that the Court should refrain from making choice-of-law determinations at

the motion to dismiss stage. (Doc. 22 at 2–5). The Court concludes that it may

make a choice-of-law determination regarding the strict products liability (Count I)

and punitive damages (Count IV) claims at this juncture, and that dismissal of

those counts with prejudice is warranted under North Carolina law.

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Alleges All Facts Necessary for the Court

to Make a Choice-of-Law Determination.

Plaintiff is correct that district courts often wait until the summary judgment

stage to make choice-of-law determinations because of the fact-intensive inquiry

that such determinations normally require. See Project Travel, LLC v. Terra Dotta,

LLC, No. 8:24-cv-02817-WFJ-LSG, 2026 WL 890422, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2026).

However, district courts may resolve choice-of-law issues at the motion-to-dismiss

stage when the facts necessary to resolve the issues are apparent on the face of the

complaint, and no further factual development is necessary. See In re: Takata

Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-2599-MD-MORENO, 2016 WL 6072406, at *3

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2016); Tufts v. Hay, No. 6:18-cv-572-Orl-37DCI, 2018 WL

11249187, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2018); see also Middleton v. The Hollywood

Reporter LLC, 137 F.4th 1287, 1295 (11th Cir. 2025) (affirming a dismissal on

choice-of-law grounds); Nix v. ESPN, Inc., 772 F. App’x 807, 809–13 (11th Cir. 2019)

(same).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges all facts necessary for the Court to resolve

the choice-of-law issue. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a North

Carolina resident who was injured at her place of residence in North Carolina and

that Barnett’s principal place of business is in Florida, where it manufactures its

crossbows.2 (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 6–7, 11). Accordingly, the Court will proceed with its

choice-of-law analysis.

B. North Carolina Law Applies.

A federal court is Erie-bound to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in

which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). For

claims sounding in tort, Florida courts apply the “most significant relationship” test

from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Grupo Televisa, S.A. v.

Telemundo Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 485 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted).

To apply this test, courts first consider which states are connected with the

lawsuit based on the list of contacts enumerated in section 145(2) of the

Restatement. Id. The relevant contacts are: (1) the place where the injury

occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the

domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the

parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is

centered. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of L. § 145(2)). In most cases,

the state where the injury occurred is “the decisive consideration” under Florida

law. Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980); see also

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of L. § 146 (presumptively adopting the law of the

state where the injury occurred).

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specifically allege that the Barnett designs and

manufactures its crossbows in Florida, but the Court draws that reasonable

inference in Plaintiff’s favor. See Pielage, 516 F.3d at 1284.

Here, North Carolina and Florida are the states most closely connected to

this lawsuit.3 North Carolina was the place of the injury, and it is Plaintiff’s

domicile. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 6, 11). Florida is the alleged place where the conduct

causing the injury – the crossbow’s design defect – occurred, and it is Barnett’s

principal place of business. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 13).

Next, the Court must discern which state’s law applies to this case using the

factors listed in section 6 of the Second Restatement. Grupo Televisa, S.A., 485 F.3d

at 1242 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of L. § 6). These factors include: (1)

the needs of the interstate and international systems; (2) the relevant policies of the

forum; (3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests

of those states in the determination of the particular issue; (4) the protection of

justified expectations; (5) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (6)

certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and (7) ease in the determination

and application of the law to be applied. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of L. § 6.

Based on these factors, North Carolina has the most significant relationship

to this lawsuit. Most obviously, North Carolina law presumptively applies to this

case because it is the state where Plaintiff was injured. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 11); see Bishop,

389 So. 2d at 1001; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of L. § 146. Additionally, this

case involves an injury to a North Carolinian that occurred in North Carolina. (Doc.

1 at ¶¶ 6, 11). Thus, applying North Carolina law advances North Carolina’s

3 Barnett notes that, as an LLC, it is also a resident of Delaware and Louisiana,

where its other members reside (Doc. 25 at 3), but no party argues that those states’

laws should apply. Therefore, the Court discusses only North Carolina and Florida.

interest in regulating the standard of care owed to its residents and to consumers of

products within its borders. While Florida has an interest in ensuring that its

manufacturers do not engage in tortious conduct, Florida’s interest in this case is

minimal because Plaintiff is not a Florida resident and there is no reason to suspect

that the State of Florida will bear any costs of Plaintiff’s medical care. (Id. at ¶ 6).

Finally, applying North Carolina law upholds uniformity of results in this case

because North Carolina would have applied its own law had Plaintiff sued there, as

it follows the traditional place-of-injury conflict rule. See Mosqueda v. Mosqueda,

721 S.E.2d 755, 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). Thus, the Court concludes that North

Carolina has the most significant relationship to this case, and its law governs

Plaintiff’s tort claims.4

C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Strict Products Liability or

Punitive Damages under North Carolina Law Because North

Carolina Does Not Recognize Such Claims.

Having concluded that North Carolina law governs Plaintiff’s tort claims, the

Court also concludes that it is proper to dismiss Plaintiff’s strict products liability

and punitive damages claims (Counts I and IV) with prejudice for failure to state a

claim.

4 As discussed in Section III of this Order, the Court does not address choice-of-law

regarding Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim. This is because that claim sounds in

contract, see generally Fla. Stat. § 672.316, and Florida follows the traditional

doctrine of lex loci contractus regarding contract claims, “which selects the law of

the state where the contract was made or to have been performed.” Declan Flight,

Inc. v. Textron Eaviation, Inc., –– F.4th ––, 2026 WL 1466405, at *11 (11th Cir.

2026) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain sufficient

allegations for the Court to make that determination. (See Doc. 1).

First, North Carolina does not recognize the tort of strict products liability.

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 99B-1.1 (“There shall be no strict liability in tort in product

liability actions.”); see also Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 631, 632

(E.D.N.C. 2009) (granting summary judgment because North Carolina does not

recognize strict products liability).

Second, “North Carolina follows the general rule that ‘punitive damages do

not and cannot exist as an independent cause of action, but are mere incidents of

the cause of action.’” Bryant v. Wake Forest Univ. Baptist Med. Ctr., 870 S.E.2d

269, 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, courts applying

North Carolina law have dismissed punitive damages claims, even where other

claims within the complaint survived a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Thomas v.

McFadden, 810 F. Supp. 3d 732, 751 (W.D.N.C. 2025) (citation omitted) (“[U]nder

North Carolina law, an independent claim for punitive damages does not exist.

Punitive damages may only be awarded as a remedy where permitted under a

substantive cause of action.”); McMahon v. Synthron, Inc., No. 1:05CV324, 2006 WL

149054, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 18, 2006) (“As a matter of state law, punitive damages

is not a cause of action, but is instead a remedy available in very limited

circumstances.”); Jones v. City of Greenboro, No. 1:24CV450, 2025 WL 969360, at

*10 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2025).

Plaintiff argues that the Court should not dismiss her punitive damages

claim because her negligence claim (Count II) provides a basis for her to assert a

derivative claim for punitive damages. (Doc. 22 at 8–11). However, the Court is not

convinced that this case is distinguishable from the cases cited above, which barred

punitive damages claims on the ground that punitive damages are remedial in

nature. See, e.g., Thomas, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 751. While Plaintiff may seek

punitive damages at a later time in this lawsuit, punitive damages do not represent

a separate, standalone cause of action. See BluSky Restoration Contractors, LLC v.

Brown, No. 21 CVS 10032, 2022 WL 12083359, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 20,

2022). Consequently, because Counts I and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint are not valid

causes of action under North Carolina law, the Court dismisses those claims with

prejudice.

III. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Breach of Warranty under Both

Florida and North Carolina Law Because She Did Not Allege Privity.

Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim should also be dismissed under both

Florida and North Carolina law because she did not allege that she was in privity

with Barnett. Courts need not resolve choice-of-law issues when the laws of

different states would produce the same result. In re Jan. 2021 Short Squeeze

Trading Litigation, 76 F.4th 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Tune v. Philip

Morris Inc., 766 So. 2d 350, 352–53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)).

Both Florida and North Carolina law require breach-of-warranty plaintiffs to

allege that they were in privity with the defendant. See Tindle Enters., Inc. v.

Plastic Trends, Inc., No. 3:09cv86/RV/EMT, 2009 WL 1011884, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Apr.

15, 2009) (dismissing under Florida law for failure to allege privity); McCoy v.

Nestlé USA, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1235 (N.D. Fla. 2024) (same); Energy

Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 441, 446 (N.C. 2000)

(citation omitted) (“As for [plaintiff’s] claim for breach of warranty, it too must fail

in that the complaint has not alleged contractual privity between [plaintiff] and

defendants, nor does it allege that any warranty was addressed to it as an ‘ultimate

consumer or user.’”).

Here, Plaintiff did not allege that she was in privity with Barnett or even

that she was the purchaser of the crossbow that injured her. (See Doc. 1). Instead,

she attempts to remedy the pleading defect by admitting in her response that she

purchased the crossbow and arguing that her Complaint is sufficient to state a

claim even without specific allegations regarding privity. (Doc. 22 at 7). This does

not solve the problem. The law is clear that a plaintiff’s failure to allege facts that

plausibly entitle her to relief without the aid of any “further factual enhancement”

is fatal to her claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. As the Court explained in

Twombly, “[t]he need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not

merely consistent with) [an essential element of plaintiff’s claim] reflects the

threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft

to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). A

complaint that merely comes “close to stating a claim,” without being able to stand

on its own, must fail. See id. Thus, because Plaintiff did not allege any facts to

suggest that she was in privity with Barnett, dismissal of her breach of warranty

claim set forth in Count III is proper under both Florida and North Carolina law.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Barnett Outdoors, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is

GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff Lisa Edison’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

3. Counts I and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) are DISMISSED

with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

4. Plaintiff Lisa Edison shall have twenty-one days from the date of this

Order to file an amended complaint. No new claims may be raised.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 25, 2026.

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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