Panzarino

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

CHRISTINE PANZARINO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-00968-WFJ-AAS

THE GOODKIND GROUP, LLC,

and YUKI TSAROYA, individually,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant The Goodkind Group, LLC’s (“Goodkind”)

Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 60. Plaintiff Christine Panzarino (“Panzarino”)

has responded in opposition, Dkt. 63, and Defendant Goodkind replied. Dkt. 66.

Upon careful consideration, the Court denies Defendant Goodkind’s motion for

summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual History

Goodkind is a New York-based company specializing in staffing placements.

Dkt. 64 ¶ 1. Defendant Yuki Tsaroya (“Tsaroya”) is the CEO of Goodkind as of

August 2022. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. As the CEO of Goodkind, Tsaroya manages the

administrative team, which comprises account managers and recruiters. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.

Goodkind hired Christine Panzarino as a recruiter on August 10, 2020. Id. ¶ 20.

Panzarino was based in Goodkind’s New York office until July 2022, when she

moved to Florida and began working remotely. Id. ¶¶ 20, 43.

After being hired at Goodkind, Panzarino developed a substantial client

relationship with Enzo Pharmaceuticals. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. Enzo was Panzarino’s main

client. Id. Around October 2022, Enzo terminated its business with Goodkind, and

as a result, Panzarino lost her largest client and continued to seek placements through

other general, non-exclusive positions. Id. ¶¶ 45–46. Around this time, Goodkind

also conducted multiple rounds of layoffs due to a decrease in demand for staffing

placements. Id. ¶¶ 15–19. Five recruiters were laid off in December 2022; one in

January 2023; three in February 2023; three in March 2023; and one more in April

2023. Id.

In January 2023, Tsaroya informed Goodkind’s Vice President of Human

Resources, Kris Bryan, that Tsaroya wanted to fire Panzarino for her difficult nature

and lack of productivity. Dkt. 63-9. Defendants state that Panzarino was not fired at

that time because Panzarino was still responsible for collecting certain outstanding

payments from Enzo; however, Panzarino denies this assertion. Dkt. 64 ¶ 52. These

payments were settled in March 2023. Dkt. 63-8 at 1–2.

On May 3, 2023, Panzarino was admitted to the hospital for heart issues. Dkt.

64 ¶ 54. Panzarino’s husband notified Goodkind’s human resources department

(“HR”) that she was admitted to the emergency room and would not be at work the

next day. Id. ¶¶ 55–57. HR notified Panzarino on May 7, 2023, of their intention to

send paperwork for FMLA leave. Id. ¶ 59. Panzarino ultimately never received this

paperwork. Id. ¶ 67. According to the Goodkind employee handbook, employees

“must use any accrued paid time while taking unpaid FMLA leave.” Dkt. 57-4 at 34.

Accordingly, Panzarino was on paid leave between May 3, 2023, and May 11, 2023.

Dkt. 64 ¶ 64.

From May 7, 2023, to May 12, 2023, Panzarino sent multiple updates to HR

advising them of her medical situation. Id. ¶¶ 58, 61–62. On the morning of May 12,

2023, Panzarino notified HR that she had been discharged from the hospital and

would return to work that day. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. On the same day, Panzarino also notified

HR that she would “follow up with my doctor next week in his office.” Dkt. 63-3 at

1.

On May 19, 2023, Tsaroya informed Panzarino by phone that her employment

was being terminated. Dkt. 64 ¶¶ 71–72. Panzarino claims that during the call,

Tsaroya mentioned that he “could not carry [her] anymore.” Dkt. 63-1 at 95:21–25.1

1 Citations to depositions refer to the pages listed in the transcript rather than the electronic pages automatically

generated by CM/ECF.

II. Procedural History

On October 7, 2024, Panzarino brought suit against Defendants in the Eastern

District of New York, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”) and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). Dkt. 1. The

case was subsequently transferred to the Middle District of Florida. Dkt. 18. On

August 7, 2025, Panzarino filed the operative amended complaint asserting four

counts: (1) interference under the FMLA, (2) retaliation under the FMLA, (3)

disability discrimination under the NYSHRL, and (4) aiding and abetting disability

discrimination under the NYSHRL. Dkt. 43.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the NYSHRL claims of Counts III and

IV for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which this Court granted on November 14,

2025. Dkt. 48. On March 27, 2026, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary

judgment as to the remaining FMLA claims of Counts I and II. Dkt. 60.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is “no genuine issue as to

any material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citation omitted); Fed

R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the

case under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). It is “genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for

the non-moving party. See id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The moving party has the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, and all factual inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.

See Allen v. Tyson Foods Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997); Pennington v.

City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting a court must

“review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party” (citation omitted)). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden,

it shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with evidence showing a genuine

issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284

F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e),

(c). Speculation or conjecture cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Cordoba

v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). The court may not weigh

the evidence to resolve a factual dispute; if a genuine issue of material fact exists,

the court must deny summary judgment. Hutcherson v. Progressive Corp., 984 F.2d

1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 1993). Likewise, the court should deny summary judgment if

reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed

facts. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir.

1992).

Additionally, a district court is only required to consider “the cited materials”

when deciding a motion for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and

“[m]aking district courts dig through volumes of documents and transcripts would

shift the burden of sifting from petitioners to the courts. . . . [D]istrict court judges

are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record[.]” Chavez

v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011). “[T]here is no

burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made

based on the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the

parties to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon

in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672

F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d

587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995)).

DISCUSSION

I. FMLA Interference

The Family and Medical Leave Act provides, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any

employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,

any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). “[T]o succeed on an

FMLA interference claim an employee need only demonstrate by a preponderance

of the evidence that she was entitled to an FMLA benefit that was denied.” Batson

v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “But a

technical FMLA violation alone is not enough. Rather, the employee must also

‘demonstrate some harm’ from the alleged interference[.]” Ramji v. Hosp.

Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 992 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Evans v.

Books-A-Million, 762 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2014)). In FMLA interference

claims, the employer’s intent is irrelevant. Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd.

of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 2001).

Panzarino alleges that Defendants interfered with Panzarino’s exercise of her

FMLA rights by “[failing to] provide necessary application paperwork to Plaintiff,

and [by firing] Plaintiff before she could use FMLA leave as entitled.” Dkt. 43 ¶ 49.

The Court will address each argument in turn.

a. Failure to Provide Notice under FMLA

When an employer learns that an employee’s leave “may be for an FMLA-

qualifying reason . . . [t]he employer must also provide notice to the employee of her

eligibility for and rights under the FMLA within a certain timeframe.” Ramji, 992

F.3d at 1243 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.300). “Failure to follow the notice requirements

. . . may constitute an interference with . . . an employee’s FMLA rights.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 825.300(e). Once the plaintiff demonstrates a violation of the notice requirement,

they must also establish harm or prejudice as a result of the employer’s failure to

provide notice. See Ramji, 992 F.3d at 1245. (“Finally, we must determine whether

[the plaintiff] can demonstrate harm, or prejudice, resulting from the employer’s

interference with her exercise (or attempted exercise) of an FMLA benefit to which

she is entitled.” (citation omitted)).

Here, it is undisputed that Goodkind failed to provide Panzarino with any

formal notice of her FMLA rights. See Dkt. 64 ¶ 67. However, Panzarino does not

demonstrate that Goodkind’s failure to provide proper notice caused any harm or

prejudice. Panzarino received all of her requested time off prior to returning to work

on May 12, 2023, was paid during the entire leave, and Goodkind’s failure to provide

notice was never alleged to have affected Panzarino’s decision-making or otherwise

truncated her leave. Id. ¶¶ 54–69; see also Graves v. Brandstar, Inc., 67 F.4th 1117,

1122 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Under our precedent, an employee doesn’t suffer harm from

an employer’s technical non-compliance with the FMLA’s notice requirements

when she receives all her requested time off and is paid for her absences.” (citation

omitted)); Chandler v. Sheriff, Walton Cnty., No. 22-13698, 2023 WL 7297918, at

*3 (11th Cir. Nov. 6, 2023) (affirming summary judgment against a plaintiff’s

FMLA interference claim because the plaintiff “was not denied leave, pressured to

return early, or purposefully made unaware of the possibility that he could take

leave”). Additionally, Goodkind’s requirement that Panzarino use her accrued paid

time concurrently with her unpaid FMLA leave is permissible. See Dkt. 57-4 at 34

(“Employees must use any accrued paid time while taking unpaid FMLA leave.”);

Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1205 (“[T]he employer may require that the employee use

his FMLA leave entitlement and his paid sick leave concurrently.”).

Therefore, Goodkind’s failure to provide FMLA paperwork does not

constitute an interference with Panzarino’s FMLA rights as to Plaintiff’s request for

leave on May 3, 2023.

b. Right to Commence FMLA Leave

Next, Panzarino alleges that Defendants interfered with her right to ongoing

leave by terminating her employment after she stated that she would need to attend

a follow-up appointment with her doctor. Dkt. 43 ¶ 49; Dkt. 63 at 10–11. The FMLA

provides a right to intermittent leave when medically necessary. See 29 U.S.C. §

2612(b)(1) (“[L]eave [because of a serious health condition that makes the employee

unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee] may be taken

intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule when medically necessary.”).

Panzarino sufficiently asserted her FMLA right to leave in accordance with 29

C.F.R. § 825.301(b) and Goodkind company policy. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)

(stating that an employee does not need to expressly mention the FMLA but only

explain the reasons for leave as to “allow the employer to determine whether the

leave qualifies under the [FMLA].”); Dkt. 57-4 at 31 (showing Goodkind company

policy that lists “continuing care of a health care provider” as an example of an

explanation that could “trigger FMLA leave protections”).

However, the right to commence FMLA leave is not absolute, and “an

employee can be dismissed, preventing her from exercising her right to commence

FMLA leave, without thereby violating the FMLA, if the employee would have been

dismissed regardless of any request for FMLA leave.” Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp.,

602 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2010). One way for the employer to establish such a

situation is by introducing unrebutted evidence that the decisionmaker was unaware

of the employee’s request to commence FMLA leave. Id.

In Herren v. La Petite Acad., Inc., the Eleventh Circuit vacated a grant of

summary judgment for the employer defendant on the basis that the defendant

“failed to satisfy its burden of establishing – beyond dispute – that the reason for

terminating [the plaintiff’s] employment was ‘wholly unrelated’ to [the plaintiff’s]

FMLA leave request.” No. 22-11499, 2023 WL 4842346, at *3 (11th Cir. July 28,

2023). Although the defendants provided extensive records of plaintiff’s continually

unsatisfactory job performance, the court cited a lack of unrebutted evidence that

establishes (1) the decisionmaker did not know about the plaintiff’s request for

FMLA leave, and (2) a final decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment was

made before the request for FMLA leave. Id.2

2 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited when the Court

finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022).

In this case, Panzarino has established a prima facie case of FMLA

interference: she requested leave and was dismissed before she could take that leave.

It is therefore the Defendants’ burden to show that Panzarino’s dismissal was

“wholly unrelated” to her request for FMLA leave. Like Herren, this Court does not

find that burden to be met beyond dispute.

First, although the record reflects that Panzarino only communicated her

follow-up doctor’s appointment with Goodkind’s HR personnel, Dkt. 63-3 at 1; Dkt.

63-1 at 69:15–70:10, Defendants present no evidence that Tsaroya was unaware of

Panzarino’s request for additional leave on May 12, 2023. Second, the timing of a

final decision on Panzarino’s dismissal is shrouded with conflicting accounts in the

record. Defendants had considered terminating Panzarino’s employment as early as

January 2023 for perceived communication and performance issues. See Dkt. 63-9.

Indeed, Enzo stopped conducting business with Panzarino around October 2022,

Dkt. 64 ¶ 45, and emails between Tsaroya and HR in January 2023 note Panzarino’s

lack of productivity and poor communication skills. See Dkt. 63-9 at 1–2 (“I do not

think she has much on billing . . . and she has bad attitude across the board.”).

However, in Tsaroya’s sworn EEOC statement, he states that the reason for

not terminating Panzarino’s employment in January 2023 was “to give Ms.

Panzarino another chance,” Dkt. 63-6 ¶ 16, while in his March 2023 summary

judgment affidavit, he states that the reason was “because there were significant

account receivables with Enzo that needed to be collected for which Panzarino was

responsible.” Dkt. 57-9 ¶ 36. Conflicting testimony as to a material fact creates a

triable issue of credibility. See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 954 (11th

Cir. 1986) (“Variations in a witness’s testimony and any failure of memory

throughout the course of discovery create an issue of credibility as to which part of

the testimony should be given the greatest weight if credited at all.”). Indeed, the

fact that Panzarino was fired in May 2023, despite the Enzo payments being settled

in March 2023, creates a factual dispute as to whether Defendants’ more recent

explanation for deferring Panzarino’s dismissal is credible, especially since

Panzarino was not included in the additional round of layoffs in April 2023. Dkt. 64

¶ 19. The uncertainties in the record as to the timing of a final decision to terminate

Panzarino’s employment, paired with the lack of evidence showing Tsaroya was

unaware of Panzarino’s request for additional leave, create genuine issues of

material fact as it relates to Defendants’ claim that Panzarino would have been

dismissed regardless of her request for FMLA leave. Because a jury must resolve

these factual disputes, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to

FMLA interference in Count I.

II. FMLA Retaliation

“To prove FMLA retaliation, an employee must show that his employer

intentionally discriminated against him for exercising an FMLA right.” Martin v.

Brevard Cnty. Pub. Schs., 543 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff may

introduce direct evidence to demonstrate retaliation. Id. at 1268. “Direct evidence

reflects a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or

retaliation complained of by the employee,” and if believed, “proves the existence

of a fact without inference or presumption.” Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del.,

LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation modified).

In retaliation cases where a plaintiff can only point to circumstantial evidence,

courts have historically applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

See Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 889 (11th Cir. 2023). The plaintiff may

build a prima facie case by showing she (1) engaged in protected conduct, (2)

suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal relation between

the two events, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a non-

discriminatory reason for the adverse action, followed by a return of the burden to

the plaintiff to demonstrate that the non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. Id. This,

however, was a rigid standard that created confusion as to what circumstantial

evidence would allow a plaintiff to survive summary judgment. See Smith v.

Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (“However,

establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and never

was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment

motion in an employment discrimination case.”). The Eleventh Circuit has recently

clarified:

In Smith, we held (1) that a “plaintiff will always survive summary

judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable

issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent” and (2) that a

“triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of

circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional

discrimination by the decisionmaker.”

Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 760 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Smith, 644 F.3d

at 1328). As such, the “convincing mosaic” standard is simply a restatement of the

Rule 56 summary judgment standard in the context of employment discrimination.

Id. The Ismael court went on to explain:

McDonnell Douglas, like res ipsa [loquitor], offers plaintiffs an

evidentiary advantage if their case satisfies a preliminary assessment,

namely, the prima facie case. If plaintiffs cannot satisfy that test, the

inquiry does not end. Rather, a district court must turn to evaluate the

evidence before it, applying the duly promulgated Rule 56 summary

judgment standard.

Id. at 765. The Court will evaluate the record in accordance with these principles

and “advance[s] directly to the convincing mosaic inquiry.” Id.3

3 The Court advances directly to the convincing mosaic inquiry since Plaintiff would likely fail to establish a prima

facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Ismael, 161 F.4th at 764 (“If the plaintiff cannot establish a

prima facie case, she does not automatically lose on summary judgment.” (citation omitted)). Ordinarily, temporal

proximity is sufficient to establish causation between an adverse employment action and a protected activity. See

Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A ‘close temporal proximity’ between the protected

expression and an adverse action is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a causal connection for purposes of a prima

facie case.” (citation omitted)). However, “when an employer contemplates an adverse employment action before an

employee engages in protected activity, temporal proximity between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse

employment action does not suffice to show causation.” Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). Here,

it is undisputed that Tsaroya contemplated Panzarino’s dismissal months prior to her FMLA leave. See Dkt. 63-9 at 2

(showing an email from Tsaroya to HR in January 2023 describing his wish to terminate Panzarino’s employment).

Here, Panzarino contends that during her termination call, Tsaroya

commented that he “could not carry [her] anymore,” which Panzarino believes to be

“an obvious inference to her ongoing medical condition and need for [FMLA

leave].” Dkt. 63 at 15. This does not constitute direct evidence of retaliation because,

as Plaintiff admits, it would necessarily require an inference that the comment was

related to her recent leave. Id. Similar reasoning applies to Panzarino’s note

regarding the timing of her dismissal after taking leave in May 2023, rather than in

March 2023, when the Enzo payments settled. Id. at 16–17. Without inference or

presumption, the timing alone does not prove the existence of retaliation. However,

as discussed below, these aspects may instead be considered as circumstantial

evidence that precludes summary judgment.

A convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence includes “(1) suspicious

timing, ambiguous statements . . . , and other bits and pieces from which an inference

of discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2) systematically better treatment of

similarly situated employees, and (3) that the employer’s justification is pretextual.”

Ismael, 161 F.4th at 760 (quoting Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 934 F.3d 1169,

1185 (11th Cir. 2019)).

Therefore, temporal proximity between Panzarino’s dismissal and her FMLA leave will not establish a causal

connection for a prima facie case.

First, while temporal proximity in this case may not suffice to establish a

causal element, it still speaks to suspicious timing when viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant. Panzarino notes that, while the proffered reason for

postponing her dismissal in January was that Goodkind was awaiting receivables

from the Enzo account, Dkt. 57-9 ¶ 36, those payments were settled in March 2023,

Dkt. 63-8 at 1–2, and Panzarino was not dismissed until May 2023, after she took

FMLA leave. Dkt. 64 ¶¶ 71–72. Moreover, Goodkind conducted a round of firings

in April 2023, which did not include Panzarino. Id. ¶ 19. Panzarino contends that if

Defendants truly wished to fire her according to their proffered reasons, they should

have done it during the April 2023 round. Dkt. 63 at 16–17. Neither the record nor

Defendants’ reply provides an explanation for these observations.

Additionally, as mentioned above, Tsaroya offers two different explanations

for why Panzarino’s dismissal was deferred. See Dkt. 63-6 ¶ 16 (stating Goodkind

“decided to give Ms. Panzarino another chance”); Dkt. 57-9 ¶ 36 (“[T]he decision

was made not to terminate [Plaintiff’s] employment in January 2023 because there

were significant account receivables with Enzo that needed to be collected for which

Panzarino was responsible.”). These inconsistencies present issues concerning

Defendants’ asserted legitimate reasons for Panzarino’s dismissal. See Tippens, 805

F.2d at 954 (“Variations in a witness’s testimony and any failure of memory

throughout the course of discovery create an issue of credibility as to which part of

the testimony should be given the greatest weight if credited at all.”).

Second, Panzarino asserts that Tsaroya said that he and Goodkind “could not

carry [her] anymore” during her termination call, Dkt. 63 at 4–5, which is an

ambiguous statement. Panzarino understood this statement to be in relation to her

hospitalization:

Q: And was it your understanding that when Mr. Tsaroya said that to you, that

he could not carry you anymore, that he was referring to the fact that you had

been hospitalized and not working? . . .

A: Yes.

Dkt. 63-1 at 96:1–8. Conversely, Tsaroya “do[es] not recall” making such a

statement during the termination call. Dkt. 63-5 at 46:20–23. A trier of fact is needed

to make a credibility determination as to whether this statement was actually made

and, if so, what Tsaroya intended by it. See Combs v. King, 764 F.2d 818, 827 (11th

Cir. 1985) (holding that summary judgment is improper when there are conflicting

versions of material facts and competing factual inferences).

In light of the foregoing and viewing these facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff has presented a convincing mosaic of

circumstantial evidence that creates a genuine issue of whether Defendants retaliated

against her for taking FMLA leave. The evidence before the Court is not purely

speculative and not so sparse that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Plaintiff.

Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to FMLA

retaliation in Count II.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant the

Goodkind Group’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 60, is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 25, 2026.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record