Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARLON JHOAN MENDEZ

ROJAS,

Case No. 2:26-cv-1907-KCD-NPM

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE

FACILITY SOUTH, ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF THE UNITED

STATES,

Respondents.

/

ORDER

Petitioner Marlon Jhoan Mendez Rojas is a citizen of Venezuela

currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).

He asks this Court to release him, arguing that his bond hearing was

inadequate and his detention violates the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1.)1

Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 3.) For the reasons below, Rojas’s pro

se habeas corpus petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The underlying facts are straightforward. Rojas entered the United

States in 2021 and was released on parole. ICE took him into custody on

February 10, 2026. Then, on April 30, 2026, he was ordered removed from the

United States to Venezuela. (Doc. 3-3.)

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a

noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90

days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period,

detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the

noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the

individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6).

But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis, the

authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious

constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the

statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period

“reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And to

make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first

six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that

period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is

no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the

burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut

that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002).

Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must

show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must

provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.

Applied here, Rojas cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement.

ICE took him into custody on February 10, 2026, and his removal order just

became final. (Doc. 3-6.) As such, he remains within the window in which his

detention is presumptively reasonable. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No.

25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v.

Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026

WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case

No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025)

(finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been

detained for more than six months”).

Finally, as Rojas acknowledges, he also already received a bond hearing

before an immigration judge. (Doc. 1.) He has thus received process. The

Court does not have jurisdiction to overturn the immigration judge’s bond

decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Rojas has avenues available to challenge a

bond determination made by the Executive Office for Immigration Review.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(7) (allowing Board of Immigration Appeals

jurisdiction over appeals of bond determinations made under 8 C.F.R. §

1236). He also may seek a new bond hearing before the immigration judge if

he can demonstrate a material change in circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. §

1003.19(e). But this Court does not sit in appellate review of the bond

hearing, which is what Rojas asks. See Guerrero v. Decker, No. 19-CV-8092

(RA), 2019 WL 5683372, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2019); Mugiraneza v.

Whitaker, No. 6:19-CV-06140-MAT, 2019 WL 2395316, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June

6, 2019) (“District courts sitting in habeas review therefore have no

jurisdiction to review an IJ's discretionary decision denying bond.”).

Rojas’s due process claim under Zaduydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas

petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition

should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can

demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly,

terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 28, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek os ot

United States District Judge