The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MAURICIO PRADO DIAZ, et al., Case No. 1:26-cv-00066-JLT-CDB (HC)
12 Petitioners, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
13 v. CORPUS
14 KRISTI NOEM, et al., (Doc. 1)
15 Respondents. 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD
16
17 Petitioners Mauricio Prado Diaz and Jaime Barcenas Dominguez (“Petitioners”), federal
18 detainees proceeding by counsel, initiated this action on January 5, 2026, with the filing of a petition
19 for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion for temporary restraining order
20 (“TRO”). (Docs. 1, 3). Petitioners are in custody the of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
21 (“ICE”) at the California City Detention Facility, located in California City, California. Id. ¶ 1.
22 Respondents are Kristi Noem (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security), Todd Lyons
23 (Acting ICE Director), Pamela Bondi (Attorney General of the United States), Nancy Gonzalez
24 (Acting Director of Bakersfield ICE Field Office), and Christopher Chestnut (Warden, California
25 City Detention Facility). See id. On January 5, 2026, the Court denied Petitioners’ motion for
26 TRO. (Doc. 4).
27 For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that Petitioners’ petition for
28 writ of habeas corpus be granted.
1 I. Relevant Background
2 The relevant facts largely are undisputed. See (Doc. 9 at 2). Petitioners are both natives
3 and citizens of Mexico who unlawfully entered the United States. See (Doc. 3-1 at 9, 18). Petitioner
4 Prado Diaz entered the United States from Mexico at or near San Ysidro, California, on or about
5 February 10, 1997. Id. at 9. It is unclear from where and when Petitioner Dominguez entered the
6 United States. See id. at 18 (“[Petitioner Dominguez] entered the United States at or near Unknown,
7 on or about unknown date[.]”).
8 The Petitioners do not allege and the record does not reflect that they were initially arrested
9 and placed in immigration custody at or near the time they respectively entered the United States;
10 Respondents confirm that Petitioners entered the United States without inspections (see Doc. 9 at
11 2). Petitioner Dominguez was arrested by ICE and issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) on August
12 31, 2025, and was placed in pending removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA and
13 currently does not have any hearing scheduled. (Doc. 1 at 10); see (Doc. 3-1 at 18). Petitioner
14 Prado Diaz was arrested by ICE and issued a NTA on October 6, 2025, and was also placed in
15 pending removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA with a hearing set for March 10, 2026.
16 (Doc. 1 at 10); see (Doc. 3-1 at 9). In the NTAs, DHS alleges that Petitioners were “not then
17 admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer[ or at] that time [Petitioners] arrived
18 at a time and place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” See (Doc. 3-1 at 9, 18).
19 Petitioners were deemed removable under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and
20 Nationality Act (“INA”) because DHS considered Petitioners “an alien present in the United States
21 without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other
22 than as designated by the Attorney General.” See id. Petitioners are currently detained at the
23 California City Detention Facility. (Doc. 1 at 9, 10).
24 Petitioners allege that according to the policy of the Executive Office for Immigration
25 Review (“EOIR”), they are not eligible for a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration
26 judge in light of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) precedent decision in Matter of Yajure
27 Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), as Petitioners are charged with having entered the United
28 States without inspection or admission. Id.
1 In their documents filed in support of their motion for TRO, immigration judge Carlos
2 Maury issued denials of Petitioners’ requests for custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
3 1236 on November 25, 2025, and on December 23, 2025, although it is unclear which Petitioner(s)
4 made each request. (Doc. 3-1 at 2, Declaration of Megan Brewer (“Brewer Decl.”) ¶ 6); see id. at
5 24-29. In the November 25, 2025, decision, the immigration judge notes that the custody
6 redetermination request was denied based on “INA section 235(b) and [the] Laken Riley Act” while
7 in the December 23, 2025, decision, the immigration judge denied the request on the grounds of
8 “[n]o jurisdiction” based on the opinion in Bautista v. Noem, 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.),
9 and further, that the partial grant of summary judgment “does not constitute a judgment.” Id. at 24-
10 29. The December 23, 2025, decision further denied relief upon reconsideration based on “[n]o
11 jurisdiction. No changed circumstances have been established for motion to reconsider the
12 [immigration court’s] prior custody redetermination decision.” Id. at 28-29; see Brewer Decl. ¶ 6
13 (“…December 23, 2025 denial of a motion to reconsider.”).
14 II. Governing Authority
15 A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
16 Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United
17 States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus
18 shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should
19 not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not
20 entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
21 Relevant here, “in cases that do not involve a final order of removal, federal habeas corpus
22 jurisdiction remains in the district court” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the petitioner
23 “challenges his confinement on statutory and constitutional grounds.” Nadaraja v. Gonzales, 443
24 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir.
25 2008) (holding “the district court has jurisdiction over Torres’s habeas petition challenging his
26 detention” in ICE custody).
27 B. Statutory Immigration Framework (8 U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226)
28 Two statutes govern the detention and removal of inadmissible noncitizens from the United
1 States: 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. Relevant here is the legal background accurately presented by
2 the district court in Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503 (N.D.
3 Cal. Sept 12, 2025):
4 1. Full Removal Proceedings and Discretionary Detention
(§ 1226)
5
The “usual removal process” involves an evidentiary hearing before
6 an immigration judge. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C.
7 § 1229(a), also known as “full removal,” by filing a Notice to Appear
with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N.
8 Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011). Section § 1226 provides that while
removal proceedings are pending, a noncitizen “may be arrested and
9 detained” and that the government “may release the alien on ...
conditional parole.” § 1226(a)(2); accord Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at
10 108 (during removal proceedings, applicant may either be “detained”
or “allowed to reside in this country”). When a person is apprehended
11 under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial custody
determination. Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022)
12 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). A noncitizen will be released if he or
she “demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer that such release
13 would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is
likely to appear for any future proceeding.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R.
14 § 236.1(c)(8)).
15 “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a)
receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings v.
16 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (citing 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1)).
If, at this hearing, the detainee demonstrates by the preponderance of
17 the evidence that he or she is not “a threat to national security, a
danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a
18 poor bail risk,” the IJ will order his or his release. Diaz, 53 F.4th at
1197 (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)).
19 Once released, the noncitizen’s bond is subject to revocation. Under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), “the DHS has authority to revoke a noncitizen’s
20 bond or parole ‘at any time,’ even if that individual has previously
been released.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 968 (N.D.
21 Cal. 2019). However, if an immigration judge has determined the
noncitizen should be released, the DHS may not re-arrest that
22 noncitizen absent a change in circumstance. See Panosyan v.
Mayorkas, 854 F. App’x 787, 788 (9th Cir. 2021). Where the release
23 decision was made by a DHS officer, not an immigration judge, the
Government’s practice has been to require a showing of changed
24 circumstances before re-arrest. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp.
3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
25
2. Expedited Removal and Mandatory Detention (§ 1225)
26
While “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States,”
27
U.S. immigration law also “authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under
28
1 §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” a process that provides for expedited
removal. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (2018). Under § 1225, a
2 noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United
States” is considered “an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C.
3 § 1225(a)(1). For certain applicants for admission, 8 U.S.C. § 1225
authorizes “expedited removal.” § 1225(b)(1). § 1225(b)(1) provides
4 that:
5 “If an immigration officer determines that an alien
(other than an alien described in subparagraph (F))
6 who is arriving in the United States or is described in
clause (iii) is inadmissible under section
7 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)
or 1182(a)(7)], the officer shall order the alien
8 removed from the United States without further
hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an
9 intention to apply for asylum under section 208 [8
USCS § 1158] or a fear of persecution.”
10
Sections 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) and 1182(a)(7) respectively refer
11 to noncitizens who are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or
failure to meet document requirements. Clause (iii) of § 1225(b)(1)
12 allows the Attorney General (who has since delegated the
responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security Secretary) to
13 designate for expedited removal noncitizens “who ha[ve] not been
admitted or paroled into the United States, and who ha[ve] not
14 affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer,
that the alien has been physically present in the United States
15 continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of
the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.”
16 § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).
17 To summarize, under § 1225(b)(1), two groups of noncitizens are
subject to expedited removal. First, there are “arriving” noncitizens
18 who are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or failure to meet
document requirements. The implementing agency regulations
19 define “arriving alien” as applicants for admission “coming or
attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8
20 C.F.R. § 1.2. The second group –designated noncitizens –includes
noncitizens who meet all of the following criteria: (1) they are
21 inadmissible due to lack of a valid entry document or
misrepresentation; (2) they have not “been physically present in the
22 United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior
to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”; and (3) they are
23 among those whom the Secretary of Homeland Security has
designated for expedited removal. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 109; §
24 1225(b)(1).
25 “Initially, DHS’s predecessor agency did not make any designation
[under (3)], thereby limiting expedited removal only to ‘arriving
26 aliens,’” that is, noncitizens encountered at ports of entry. Make the
Rd. N.Y. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-190 (JMC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27 169432, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025). In the following years, DHS
extended by designation expedited removal to noncitizens who arrive
28 by sea and who have been present for fewer than two years, and to
1 noncitizens apprehended within 100 air miles of any U.S.
international land border who entered within the last 14 days. Id. This
2 was the status quo until January 2025, when the Department of
Homeland Security revised its § 1225 designation to “apply
3 expedited removal to the fullest extent authorized by statute.”
Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan.
4 24, 2025). Under this designation, expedited removal applies to
noncitizens encountered anywhere within the United States, who
5 have been in the United States for less than two years and are
inadmissible for lack of valid documentation or misrepresentation. In
6 short, expedited removal was expanded to apply for the first time to
vast numbers of noncitizens present in the interior of the United
7 States.
8 Under the expedited removal statute § 1225(b)(1), if an applicant
“indicates either an intention to apply for asylum” or “a fear of
9 persecution,” the immigration officer “shall refer the alien for an
interview by an asylum officer.” §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). If the
10 asylum officer determines that the applicant has a “credible fear,” the
applicant “receive[s] ‘full consideration’ of his asylum claim in a
11 standard removal hearing.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 110. If the
officer determines there is no “credible fear,” the officer “shall order
12 the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or
review.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, the officer’s decision may
13 be appealed by the applicant to an immigration judge, who must
conduct the review “to the maximum extent practicable within 24
14 hours, but in no case later than 7 days after the date of the
determination.” Id. Detention under § 1225(b)(1) is “mandatory”
15 “pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and if
found not to have such a fear, until removed.” Id. (citing
16 § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (“Any alien subject to the procedures under
this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible
17 fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until
removed.”)
18
[Section] 1225 also contains a provision that applies to applicants for
19 admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287.
This provision, 1225(b)(2), states that, subject to statutory
20 exceptions, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,
if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
21 admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a [full
22 removal proceedings] of this title.” § 1225(b)(2). In other words,
noncitizens subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited
23 removal but are subject to mandatory detention while their full
removal proceedings are pending. This is in contrast to the default
24 detention regime under § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary
release and review of detention through a bond hearing.
25
3. The Government’s Recent Change in Position
26
Until this year, the DHS has applied § 1226(a) and its discretionary
27 release and review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens
allegedly in this country without valid documentation. This practice
28 was codified by regulation. The regulations implementing the Illegal
1 Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”) state that “Despite being applicants for admission, aliens
2 who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly
referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible
3 for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323
(Mar. 6, 1997). In fact, the government has conceded in other
4 contexts that “DHS’s long-standing interpretation has been that
1226(a) [discretionary detention] applies to those who have crossed
5 the border between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter
apprehended.” Dkt. No. 17 (citing Solicitor General, Transcript of
6 Oral Argument at 44:24–45:2, Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785
(2022) (No. 21-954)) . . .
7
In 2025, however, the Government’s policy changed dramatically.
8 The DHS revised its § 1225 designation to “apply expedited removal
to the fullest extent authorized by statute.” Designating Aliens for
9 Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025) (emphasis
added). The Secretary of Homeland Security memorandum directed
10 federal immigration officers to “consider ... whether to apply
expedited removal” to “any alien DHS is aware of who is amenable
11 to expedited removal but to whom expedited removal has not been
applied.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 33. Officers are encouraged to “take steps
12 to terminate any ongoing removal proceeding and/or any active
parole status.” Id. The memorandum states that DHS shall take the
13 actions contemplated by the memorandum “in a manner that takes
account of legitimate reliance interests,” but states that “the
14 expedited removal process includes asylum screening, which is
sufficient to protect the reliance interests of any alien who has
15 applied for asylum or planned to do so in a timely manner.” Huffman
Memorandum (Jan. 23, 2025).
16
Since mid-May of 2025, the Department of Homeland Security has
17 made a practice of appearing at regular removal proceedings in
immigration court, moving to dismiss the proceedings, and then re-
18 arresting the individual in order to place them in expedited removal
proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 35–40. If the immigration judge does
19 not dismiss the full removal proceedings, ICE still makes an arrest,
apparently in reliance on § 1225(b)(2)’s detention provision.
20
21 Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503 at *1-4 (internal footnotes omitted).
22 III. Exhaustion
23 A. Governing Authority
24 “Section 2241 … ‘does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before
25 filing petitions for habeas corpus.’” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
26 Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth Circuit, however, requires
27 that, “as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative
28 remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047 (citing United
1 States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Under the doctrine of exhaustion, ‘no one is
2 entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed ... remedy has been
3 exhausted.’” Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)).
4 “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If exhaustion is required by statute, it
5 may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have discretion to waive a prudential requirement.”
6 Id. at 998 (citing El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d
7 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1991); Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Although
8 courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when it is prudentially required, this
9 discretion is not unfettered…. Lower courts … [must] first determin[e whether] the exhaustion
10 requirement has been satisfied or properly waived.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see Murillo v.
11 Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 762, n.8 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although the application of the rule requiring
12 exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but calls for the sound exercise of judicial discretion, it is not lightly
13 to be disregarded.”).
14 B. Analysis
15 Petitioners contend in their since-denied motion for TRO that the prudential exhaustion
16 requirement should be waived as exhaustion does not require them “to be forced to endure the very
17 harm they are seeking to avoid by seeking a bond hearing before the immigration judge.” (Doc. 3
18 at 24). Petitioners assert that each day they remain in detention “is one in which their statutory and
19 constitutional rights have been violated.” Id.
20 Respondents do not address exhaustion of administrative remedies in their response to the
21 petition. See generally (Doc. 9).
22 The undersigned finds that the prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived as it
23 would be futile to seek release by administrative means. Specifically, because Respondents
24 contend that Petitioners are subject to indefinite mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), see
25 (Doc. 9 at 2), under that framework, Petitioners have no statutory right to a bond hearing during
26 their respective courses of detention and therefore lack recourse through statutory or administrative
27 means. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 282 (2018) (“§§ 1225(b) … do[e]s not give
28 detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention.”); Rodriguez
1 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F. 4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022). Further, the BIA has recently held that all
2 noncitizens present within the country without admission are seeking admission pursuant to § 1225,
3 rendering any administrative relief futile. See J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO
4 (HC), 2025 WL 3013328, at *7 n.9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (“In addition, pursuit of administrative
5 remedies would almost certainly be futile given the BIA’s recent holding that all noncitizens present
6 in the United States without admission are ‘seeking admission’ for purposes of 8 U.S.C. §
7 1225(b)(2)(A) and must be detained.”) (citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A.
8 2025)).
9 For these reasons and because Respondents do not object to and do not otherwise address
10 Petitioners’ arguments that exhaustion should be waived, the undersigned recommends that the
11 prudential exhaustion requirement be waived for Petitioners’ claims for habeas corpus relief. See,
12 e.g, Chavez v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 2730228, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24,
13 2025) (waiving prudential exhaustion requirement because the BIA “already applied its expertise
14 in deciding and designating” Hurtado as precedential, pursuant to which detainees are subject to
15 mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d
16 1239, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“The Ninth Circuit has recognized ‘the irreparable harms imposed
17 on anyone subject to immigration detention.’”) (citing Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995
18 (9th Cir. 2017)); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *7 n.9.
19 IV. Discussion
20 Petitioners assert four causes of action in their petition: violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for
21 unlawful denial of bond hearing (Claim 1); violation of the Administrative Procedure Act for
22 unlawful denial of bond (Claim 2); violation of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment
23 to the U.S. Constitution (Claim 3); and violation of the INA (Claim 4). (Doc. 1 at 10-13).
24 As set forth below, because the undersigned finds that Respondents have violated
25 Petitioners’ statutory rights as their detention is properly governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and they
26 have not been afforded a bond redetermination hearing, and because Petitioners’ other claims seek
27 the same or similar relief (i.e., a bond hearing), the undersigned declines to address Petitioners’
28
1 other claims.1
2 A. Statutory Scheme: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) Applies
3 Petitioners contend that they are being held in violation of their right to a bond hearing
4 before in immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), based on Respondents’ reliance on the
5 BIA’s holding in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that individuals charged
6 with having entered the United States without inspection are ineligible for bond redetermination
7 hearings before an immigration judge as such individuals are seeking admission and fall within the
8 detention scheme under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 27). Petitioners contend that §
9 1226(a) applies, not § 1225(b), and therefore Petitioners’ detention without affording them a bond
10 redetermination before an immigration judge violates their statutory rights under § 1226(a). Id.
11 Petitioners therefore seek the Court order that Respondents provide them with a bond hearing
12 before an immigration judge pursuant to § 1226(a). Id. ¶ 9.
13 Respondents contend that Petitioners are “applicants for admission” within the meaning of
14 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) and are subject to mandatory detention by ICE under § 1225(b)(2) during the
15 pendency of their removal proceedings. (Doc. 9 at 2). Respondents rely upon Matter of Yajure
16 Hurtado in arguing that Petitioners, as applicants for admission, are subject to mandatory detention
17 and are thus ineligible for bond hearings. Id. Respondents acknowledge that two district courts
18 within the Ninth Circuit have recently vacated or stayed DHS’s July 8, 2025, “Interim Guidance
19 Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission” which “takes the position that all
20 applicants for admission within the meaning of [] § 1225(a) are subject to mandatory detention
21 under [] § 1225(b)” as contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Id. at 3
22 (citations omitted).
23
24 1 It is unclear whether Petitioners’ procedural due process claims are meritorious because
the record does not indicate Petitioners were ever initially detained and released from immigration
25
custody such that Petitioners have a liberty interest to remain free from re-detention. Nevertheless,
the undersigned need not reach Petitioners’ constitutional claim given that Petitioners are entitled
26
to the full relief they request on their claim alleging a statutory violation by Respondents of the
27 INA. See, e.g., Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2025); Ramazan
M. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01356-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3145562, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
28 10, 2025).
1 Based on the allegations of the petition and the record summarized above, the Court
2 presumes that Petitioners were first arrested and detained by immigration authorities (ICE) upon
3 the reported dates of their arrest resulting in their current terms of detention: for Petitioner
4 Dominguez, on August 31, 2025, and for Petitioner Prado Diz, on October 6, 2025. Petitioners
5 were issued NTAs following their arrests by ICE and placed in removal proceedings under section
6 240 of the INA. (Doc. 1 at 10); see (Doc. 3-1 at 9, Ex. 1; at 18, Ex. 2).
7 Section 1225 governs the detention of noncitizens “seeking admission” into the United
8 States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018); see id. at 282 (“§§ 1225(b) … do[e]s
9 not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention.”).
10 In contrast, § 1226 sets forth a “default rule” for noncitizens already present within the United
11 States. Id. at 288. Relevant here, § 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens “arriving in the United States” or
12 aliens who have “not been admitted or paroled into the United States” and have not “affirmatively
13 shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in
14 the United States continuously for the [two]-year period immediately prior to the date of the
15 determination of inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)1)(A)(i), (iii)(II).
16 Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
17 admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
18 clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
19 under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). For § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, an
20 examining immigration officer must determine that the individual is (1) an “applicant for
21 admission,” (2) “seeking admission,” and (3) “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
22 admitted.” See Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Martinez v.
23 Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)).
24 Here, bother Petitioners already were present in the United States when they were arrested
25 and detained by ICE in 2025. With respect to Petitioner Prado Diaz, the record reflects he was in
26 the United States for over 28 years following his entry in 1997. Although immigration officials
27 were unable to determine when Petitioner Dominguez arrived in the United States, it is clear that
28 he was arrested and detained after he was already present in the United States for some unspecified
1 time. Moreover, Respondents do not argue, nor do the records show, that Petitioner Dominguez
2 has not been physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year period
3 immediately prior the date of the determination of inadmissibility under § 1225(b)(1) to lawfully
4 place him in expedited removal proceedings and mandatory detention under that statutory regime.
5 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).
6 Based on these facts, the plain language of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it is inapplicable to
7 Petitioners. Petitioners are not “arriving” in the United States but rather arrived here some time
8 before they were arrested in 2025. Further, Respondents have not shown that an examining
9 immigration officer made any determination under § 1225(b)(2)(A) that Petitioners are “seeking
10 admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” See Lepe, 801 F. Supp.
11 3d at 1113. Indeed, the NTAs issued to Petitioners indicate that upon their arrest, Petitioners were
12 placed into removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA, further illustrating that DHS chose
13 to place Petitioners in removal proceedings with greater procedural protections instead of pursuing
14 expedited removal under § 1225. See Garcia v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01907-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL
15 3771348, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (citing Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, No. 25-cv-493-
16 LJV, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 143 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (“Because DHS chose to place Mata Velasquez
17 in section 240 proceedings instead of pursuing expedited removal in the first instance—even though
18 it was not required to do that—the government vested Mata Velasquez with the rights that Congress
19 guaranteed non-citizens in those proceedings.”).
20 Nor do Respondents argue that Petitioners are properly subject to mandatory detention
21 under some other qualifying detention provision. The record does not show that Petitioners are
22 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) by reason of having committed a
23 qualifying offense as considered in that statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); Kakkar v. Chestnut, 1:25-
24 CV-1627 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 3638298, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025). Petitioners’ removal
25 proceedings remain pending, no orders of removal have become administratively final, and
26 therefore Petitioners’ detention is not justified under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. See 8 U.S.C. §
27 1231(a)(1)&(2).
28 Under these circumstances, and having determined that the mandatory detention framework
1 under § 1225(b) does not apply to Petitioners, the undersigned finds that § 1226(a) provides the
2 proper framework for noncitizens already residing in the United States. See, e.g., Garcia v. Noem,
3 803 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1076-77 (S.D. Cal. 2025). In Garcia, three petitioners entered the United
4 States and resided in the country for some time before they were arrested and placed into
5 immigration detention in June and July 2025. Id. at 1070. These petitioners, like Petitioners here,
6 were charged by ICE with inadmissibility as being present in the United States without being
7 admitted or paroled. Id. The Garcia court found that § 1225(b) did not apply to these petitioners
8 because they were not “seeking admission” within the meaning of that statute and that the
9 petitioners’ detention therefore was governed by § 1226(a), including for discretionary detention
10 and a bond determination hearing. Id. at 1076-78; see also Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 221
11 (“[S]ection 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the country,’ whereas
12 section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already in the country.’”) (citing Jennings, 583
13 U.S. at 288-89).
14 Other courts likewise have found that the text of sections 1225 and 1226, coupled with
15 application of commonly used canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and ICE’s
16 historical practices predating DHS’s recent shift in policy, weigh in favor of finding that section
17 1226(a)’s discretionary framework governs the detention of noncitizens who, like Petitioners, are
18 already in the country when encountered by immigration authorities. See Rodriguez v. Bostock,
19 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1336 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Otero v. Robbins, et al., No. 1:25-cv-1790 CSK,
20 2025 WL 3704453, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2025) (collecting cases, adopting the reasoning of the
21 Lepe court, and finding that “[t]his Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide,
22 including the Eastern District of California, in rejecting respondents’ interpretation of Sections
23 1225 and 1226”); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at
24 *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases and noting “Courts nationwide, including this one,
25 have overwhelmingly rejected respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful”);
26 J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-02083-AB, 2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (citing
27 cases and noting that this conclusion is “consistent with the holdings of dozens of district courts
28 across the country”); Barco Mercado v. Francis,-- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4
1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this statutory interpretation “has been challenged in at least
2 362 cases in federal district courts,” with the challengers having prevailed “either on a preliminary
3 or final basis, in 350 of those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty
4 different courts”).
5 “Under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, a detainee may request a bond hearing
6 before an IJ at any time before a removal order becomes final.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197
7 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19). “If at this hearing the detainee demonstrates by the
8 preponderance of the evidence that he is not a threat to national security, a danger to the community
9 at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk, the IJ will order his release.” Id. (internal
10 quotation and citations omitted).
11 During their detention, Petitioners requested custody redetermination as provided for under
12 section 1226(a) that were ultimately denied by an immigration judge based on a finding of “no
13 jurisdiction” and no changed circumstances from the initial denial under section 235(b) of the INA
14 and the Laken Riley Act. See (Doc. 3-1 at 24-29). Because Petitioners’ detention is governed
15 under § 1226(a) and because they were denied a bond hearing for which they were entitled by
16 statute, the undersigned finds that Petitioners have shown a violation of their rights under § 1226(a).
17 Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend the Court grant Petitioners’ petition on their claims
18 for violation of § 1226(a) and recommend the Court order Respondents to provide Petitioners with
19 a statutorily-compliant bond hearing as set forth below.
20 B. Maldonado Bautista Action
21 Petitioners refer in their petition to Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, Case No. 5:25-cv-
22 01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.) (“Maldonado Bautista”) and represent that they are members of the
23 “Bond Eligible Class” that are entitled to consideration for release on bond under § 1226(a). See
24 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 34-40; at 12); (Doc. 3-1 at 119, Ex. 5) (“Bond Eligible Class: All noncitizens in the
25 United States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without
26 inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be
27 subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department
28 of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.”); (Maldonado Bautista, Doc. 93 at
1 51; Doc. 94). Petitioners assert that Respondents are parties to Maldonado Bautista and therefore
2 bound by the declaratory judgment rendered in that case. (Doc. 1 at 12). Petitioners further allege
3 that by denying Petitioners a bond hearing under § 1226(a), Respondents violate their statutory
4 rights under the INA and the judgment rendered in Maldonado Bautista. Id.
5 District courts within the Ninth Circuit have diverged in addressing claims similar to
6 Petitioners’ implicating the Maldonado Bautista class. A district judge within the Eastern District
7 of California concluded that a petitioner who alleges membership in the Maldonado Bautista
8 certified class may not seek relief in this district and, instead, must seek to enforce the out-of-district
9 judgment where it was entered (the Central District of California). See Brave & Free Santa Cruz
10 v. Aragon, No. 2:24-cv-02312-DAD-JDP, 2025 WL 2324172, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2025)
11 (collecting cases and noting “that the undersigned, a district judge in the U.S. District Court for the
12 Eastern District of California, lacks the authority to ‘enforce’ an injunction issued in the U.S.
13 District Court for the Northern District of California”) (citing, inter alia, Klett v. Pim, 965 F.2d
14 587, 590 (8th Cir. 1992)). Another district judge of this Court concluded that the Maldonado
15 Bautista judgment was not binding in this district for different reasons. Falcon v. Wofford, No.
16 1:26-cv-00181-WBS-EFB, 2026 WL 171927, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2026). In contrast, another
17 magistrate judge of this Court concluded, in still-pending findings and recommendations, that a
18 petitioner-member of the Maldonado Bautista may seek to enforce in this district the judgment
19 entered in that action. J.S. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-02016 DC SCR, 2026 WL 125258, at *7 (E.D.
20 Cal. Jan. 16, 2026) (“Petitioner is a member of the Maldonado Bautista “Bond Eligible” class and
21 thus entitled to class-wide, declaratory relief regarding the illegality of the DHS Interim
22 Guidance.”).
23 The undersigned need not resolve the issue of the enforceability of the Maldonado Baustista
24 judgment here given that Petitioners are entitled to the full relief they seek in light of Respondents’
25 violation of their statutory rights under section 1226(a). See H.F. v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01795-
26 TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3691081, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (“Because the Court finds
27 Petitioner’s statutory and due process rights were likely violated, it need not address the parties’
28 arguments as to whether Petitioner is a member of the class certified in [Maldonado Bautista]”).
1 C. Petitioner’s Other Claims
2 Because the undersigned finds that the Court may grant the full relief Petitioners seek—a
3 bond hearing under § 1226(a)—in recommending that the writ should issue as to Petitioners’ claims
4 for violation of § 1226(a), the undersigned declines to address Petitioners’ other claims which seek
5 the same or similar relief, including their claims for violation of procedural due process under the
6 Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
7 V. Conclusion and Recommendation
8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
9 1. Petitioners’ petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be GRANTED.
10 2. Respondents be ORDERED to provide Petitioners with a bond hearing in accordance
11 with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the date of this Order, in which the
12 parties will be allowed to present evidence and argument about whether Petitioners are
13 a danger to the community and present a flight risk if not detained. If Respondents do
14 not provide Petitioners with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein,
15 Petitioner must be immediately released from detention; and
16 3. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor for Petitioners and
17 close this case.
18 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge
19 assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after
20 being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written
21 objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to
22 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave
23 of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections,
24 but a party may refer to exhibits in the record by CM/ECF document and page number. Any pages
25 filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing
26 these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). A party’s failure to file any
27 ///
28 ///
1 | objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson
2 | v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).
3 | ITIS SOORDERED.
Dated: _ February 6, 2026 | bo
5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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