The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DARIN SUTTON ET AL, Case No. 5:25-cv-03544-MRA-MAR
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Plaintiff,
9 ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
v.
10 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
LORI POZUELOS ET AL.,
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Defendant.
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14 I.
15 INTRODUCTION
16 On December 24, 2025, Plaintiffs Darin Sutton and Youtha Baker
17 (“Plaintiffs”), proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and pro se, filed a civil rights
18 complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”). ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”)
19 1. The Court has screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the
20 reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the complaint with leave to amend.
21 If Plaintiffs desire to pursue this action, they are ORDERED to file a First
22 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) within twenty-eight (28) days of the service date of
23 this Order, by April 17, 2026. If Plaintiffs fail to timely file a First Amended
24 Complaint or fail to remedy the deficiencies of this pleading, the Court may
25 recommend that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend and with
26 prejudice for failure to state a claim and follow the Court’s orders.
27 ///
1 SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT
2 A. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
3 Plaintiffs filed a complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to section 1983. Dkt. 1.
4 Plaintiffs name the following Defendants:
5 (1) Lori Pozuelos, in her Individual and Official Capacity as an Investigator
6 with the California Department of Insurance; and
7 (2) Does 1–10, individuals.
8 Id. at 3.
9 Plaintiffs allege as follows:
10 Plaintiffs are independent contractors who completed work in Missouri.
11 Complaint ¶ 15. Plaintiffs filed multiple claims with insurance companies. Id. ¶ 19.
12 They allege one of the insurance companies filed a “suspected fraud claim” (SFC)
13 regarding Missouri LLC’s G Mentality and Deverric and Dillon Remodeling. Id. ¶ 16.
14 Defendant Pozuelos, an investigator employed by CD and assigned to the California
15 Department of Insurance (“CDI”) Fraud Division in Rancho Cucamonga, California
16 was assigned to investigate Plaintiffs’ independent contractor work in Missouri. Id. ¶¶
17 11, 15.
18 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant stated she was unable to locate valid business
19 licenses, legal entities and/or valid state licenses for Deverric and Dillon Remodeling,
20 G Mentality, Frannon Financial Inc., and Frannon Inc. Id. ¶ 21.1 Plaintiffs allege that
21 “Deverric and Dillon Remodeling LLC and G Mentality LLC were listed as
22 construction and remodeling businesses. Frannon Inc. was listed as a real estate
23 business. Both types of businesses would require state licensing with the State of
24 California to operate.” Id. ¶ 22.2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants executed various
25 search warrant to investigate whether Plaintiffs’ business was a “real business” even
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27 1 It is unclear from the Complaint in what context this statement is alleged to have been made.
1 after Defendant had already verified with the California Secretary of State as well as
2 the California Department of Real Estate. Id. ¶ 26.
3 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant presented “contradictory and misleading
4 testimony” to a grand jury, which led to their April 2023 arrests without probable
5 cause. Id. ¶ ¶ 30, 32–33. This testimony apparently represented that Plaintiffs’
6 business Frannon, Inc. was a “fake” business. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs further allege that
7 they were not read their “Miranda Rights” after their arrest. Id. ¶ 36. They allege that
8 after their arrests, Defendant placed a “lis pendens” on their home so that it could not
9 be used as collateral, and that Plaintiffs were unlawfully detained for four extra days
10 after bail was posted. Id. ¶ 30–31. Further, Plaintiffs allege they were approached for
11 questioning again in November 2023 while their lawyer was not present. Id. ¶ 37.
12 Plaintiffs allege that six co-defendants in the underlying criminal proceedings were
13 dismissed with prejudice. Id. ¶ 39.
14 B. CLAIMS
15 Plaintiff asserts thirteen claims:
16 (1) Conspiracy;
17 (2) Unreasonable Seizure of Person;
18 (3) Excessive Bail;
19 (4) Unreasonable Seizure of Property;
20 (5) Deliberate Fabrication of Evidence and Withholding of Material
21 Information;
22 (6) Malicious Prosecution;
23 (7) Retaliation;
24 (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
25 (9) Assault;
26 (10) Battery;
27 (11) False Arrest;
1 (12) False Imprisonment; and
2 (13) Abuse of Process.
3 Dkt. 1 at 11–27.
4 C. RELIEF SOUGHT
5 Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Complaint at 28.
6 III.
7 STANDARD OF REVIEW
8 Where a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, a court must screen the
9 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and is required to dismiss the case at any time if it
10 concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may
11 be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
12 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th
13 Cir. 1998).
14 Dismissal for failure to state a claim can be warranted based on either a lack of
15 a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal
16 theory. See, e.g., Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th
17 Cir. 2008). A complaint may also be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
18 discloses some fact or complete defense that will necessarily defeat the claim.
19 Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other
20 grounds by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). Although the plaintiff must
21 provide “more than labels and conclusions,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
22 544, 555 (2007), “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the [complaint] need only give the
23 defendant[s] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
24 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citations and quotation marks
25 omitted).
26 In considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true
27 all of the material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892–93
1 (9th Cir. 2011). However, a court need not accept as true “allegations that are merely
2 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re
3 Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). The court must also
4 construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the pleading party and resolve all
5 doubts in the pleader’s favor. See, e.g., Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir.
6 2005). Pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and are held to a less stringent
7 standard than those drafted by a lawyer. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir.
8 2010) (“Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not
9 alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings; accordingly, we continue to construe pro se
10 filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.”).
11 If a court finds the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, a
12 court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203
13 F.3d 1122, 1126–30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it
14 appears possible the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if the
15 plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130–31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106
16 (9th Cir. 1995). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear a complaint cannot
17 be cured by amendment, a court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d
18 at 1105, 1107–11.
19 IV.
20 DISCUSSION
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A. PLAINTIFFS SUE IMMUNE DEFENDANT(S)
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1. Applicable Law
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24 An “[o]fficial capacity suit[] . . . generally represent[s] only another way of
25 pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. . . . an official
26 capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity
27 . . . [such a suit] is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest
1 is the entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66 (citations and internal quotation marks
2 omitted); see also Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, 623 F.3d 945, 966-
3 67 (9th Cir. 2010) (an official capacity suit is treated as a suit against the entity). A
4 plaintiff may seek monetary damages under section 1983 from state employees in their
5 individual capacity. See Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 1982) (“State
6 officials must be sued in their individual capacity in an action for monetary
7 damages.”). However, because “a suit against a state official in his or her official
8 capacity . . . is no different from a suit against the State itself,” state officials sued in
9 their official capacity, like the State itself, are generally entitled to immunity in a
10 section 1983 action. Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation
11 omitted).
12 The Supreme Court has “recognized one vital exception to this general rule:
13 When sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official in his official capacity is
14 considered a ‘person’ for § 1983 purposes,” and the Eleventh Amendment will not
15 bar such relief. Id. at 825. As the Supreme Court explains, “a state official in his or
16 her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983
17 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions
18 against the State.’” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989)
19 (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14). Accordingly, a suit for prospective injunctive
20 relief against a state employee in his official capacity may be cognizable when properly
21 pled. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839(9th Cir. 1997); see
22 also Hason v. Med. Bd. of California, 279 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
23 Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief brought
24 against state officers ‘in their official capacities, to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation
25 of federal law.’”) (quoting Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d
26 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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1 Prosecutors have absolute immunity to suits under section 1983 when the
2 prosecutor acts within the scope of his or her authority and in a quasi-judicial
3 capacity. Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Vill., 723 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir.
4 1984) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976)). However,
5 prosecutors are not immune to suits for actions outside of this scope. Bly-Magee v.
6 California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that prosecutors were not
7 “immune for any actions that [were] wholly unrelated to or outside of their official
8 duties”). Accordingly, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity turns on
9 the nature of their actions, not necessarily whether they have committed
10 misconduct. See, e.g., Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A
11 prosecutor’s decision not to preserve or turn over exculpatory material before trial,
12 during trial, or after conviction is a violation of due process . . . It is, nonetheless, an
13 exercise of the prosecutorial function and entitles the prosecutor to absolute
14 immunity from a civil suit for damages.” (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431–32 n.34));
15 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (prosecutor absolutely immune for functions
16 performed in probable cause hearing).
17 2. Analysis
18 Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint names Pozuelos in her individual and official
19 capacity as an Investigator for the California Department of Insurance. Plaintiffs seek
20 monetary relief. Pozuelos is immune from suit for monetary relief in her official
21 capacity. Flint, 488 F.3d at 824–25. Therefore, the claims brought against Pozuelos
22 in her official capacity are dismissed. However, it is not clear to the Court which
23 claims Plaintiffs bring against Pozuelos in her individual capacity. In any amended
24 Complaint Plaintiffs should clearly identify which claims are brought against Pozuelos
25 in her individual capacity and the grounds on which each claim is brought. Dura
26 Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (“[T]he ‘short and plain statement’
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1 [required by Rule 8] must provide the defendant with ‘fair notice of what the
2 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”).
3 Plaintiffs’ Complaint also names Does 1–10 as “unknown prosecutors” who
4 worked with Pozuelos to “secure indictments against Plaintiffs.” Complaint ¶ 50.
5 Therefore, it is likely that Does 1–10 would also be immune from suit. Burns, 500
6 U.S. 478. However, the Court cannot determine whether Does are immune because
7 Plaintiffs fail to allege any actions taken by Does to “secure indictments.” Therefore,
8 the claim against Does is dismissed for (1) failure to comply with Rule 8 and (2)
9 failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S.
10 at 346.
11 B. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS APPEAR TIME-BARRED
12 The statute of limitations for section 1983 claims is the applicable state statute
13 of limitations for personal injury actions. Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th
14 Cir. 2009). California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two (2)
15 years from the date the action accrues. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. A section 1983
16 “cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
17 that is the basis of the action. Thus, ‘[a]n action ordinarily accrues on the date of the
18 injury.’” Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
19 109, reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 489 (2016) (citing Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128
20 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (holding federal
21 law determines when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations
22 begins to run for a section 1983 claim). However, in certain circumstances, the statute
23 of limitations may be tolled. A federal court must give effect to a state’s tolling
24 provisions to the extent that they are not inconsistent with federal law. Lukovsky v.
25 City & Cty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Azer v.
26 Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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1 Here, Plaintiffs bring claims apparently related to acts that occurred in 2022
2 and 2023. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 134. To the extent Plaintiffs bring claims concerning
3 events from 2022 and 2023, because these events occurred over two years ago, claims
4 based on these events appear barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Cal.
5 Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations of personal injury actions). In
6 any amended complaint, Plaintiffs should clearly identify the dates for the relevant
7 incidents and explain any basis for tolling of the statute of limitations.
8 V.
9 LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
10 For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is subject to dismissal. As the Court
11 is unable to determine whether amendment would be futile, leave to amend is granted.
12 See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
13 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT by April 17, 2026, Plaintiffs must
14 choose one (1) of the following three (3) options:
15 1. Plaintiffs may file a First Amended Complaint to attempt to cure the
16 deficiencies discussed above. If Plaintiffs choose to file a First Amended Complaint,
17 he must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First Amended
18 Complaint,” it must bear the docket number assigned to this case, and it must be
19 retyped or rewritten in its entirety, preferably on the court-approved form. Plaintiffs
20 shall not include new defendants or allegations that are not reasonably related to the
21 claims asserted in the Complaint. In addition, the First Amended Complaint
22 must be complete without reference to the Complaint, or any other pleading,
23 attachment, or document.
24 The Clerk of Court is instructed to mail Plaintiffs a blank Central District
25 civil rights complaint form to use for filing an Amended Complaint, which the
26 Court encourages Plaintiffs to use. The Clerk of Court is also directed to mail
27 Plaintiffs a copy of the Complaint, Dkt. 1, for their reference.
1 Plaintiffs are advised that this Court’s determination that the allegations in the
2 Complaint are insufficient to state a particular claim should not be seen as dispositive
3 of that claim. Accordingly, although this Court believes that Plaintiffs have failed to
4 plead sufficient factual matter in their pleading, accepted as true, to state a claim to
5 relief that is plausible on its face, Plaintiffs are not required to omit any claim or
6 defendant in order to pursue this action. However, if Plaintiffs decides to pursue a
7 claim in a First Amended Complaint that this Court has found to be insufficient, then
8 this Court, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, ultimately may submit to the
9 assigned district judge a recommendation that such claim be dismissed with prejudice
10 for failure to state a claim, subject to Plaintiff’s right at that time to file Objections
11 with the district judge as provided in the Local Rules Governing Duties of Magistrate
12 Judges
13 2. Alternatively, Plaintiffs may file a notice with the Court that they intend
14 to stand on the allegations in their Complaint. If Plaintiffs choose to stand on the
15 Complaint despite the deficiencies in the claims identified above, then the Court will
16 submit a recommendation to the assigned district judge that the Complaint be
17 dismissed with prejudice for failure comply with Rule 8, subject to Plaintiff’s
18 right at that time to file Objections with the district judge as provided in the Local
19 Rules Governing Duties of Magistrate Judges.
20 3. Finally, Plaintiffs may voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice,
21 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). The Clerk of Court is directed
22 to mail Plaintiff a blank Notice of Dismissal Form, which the Court
23 encourages Plaintiff to use if they choose to voluntarily dismiss the action.
24 Plaintiffs are explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file an Amended
25 Complaint may result in this action being dismissed with prejudice for failure
26 to state a claim, or for failure to prosecute and/or obey Court orders pursuant
27 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
2 | Dated: March 20, 2026
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4 HONORABLE MARGO A. ROCCONI
United States Magistrate Judge
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