Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

YARIEL JIMENEZ MAYEA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01757-SPC-NPM

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE

DETENTION CENTER et al.,

Respondents,

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are petitioner Yariel Jimenez Mayea’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 6). For the

below reasons, the Court grants the petition.

Jimenez Mayea is a native of Cuba who was paroled into the United

States on February 2, 2022. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)

issued a final administrative removal order on July 3, 2023. On September 8,

2023, ICE released Jimenez Mayea under an order of supervision. On January

10, 2026, Jimenez Mayea reported to ICE for a check-in appointment, and ICE

revoked his release, arrested him, and detained him at Alligator Alcatraz. ICE

scheduled Jimenez Mayea for removal to Mexico on January 30, 2026, but an

ICE deportation officer reports the attempt failed because Jimenez Mayea

stated he did not want to be removed to Mexico. ICE returned him to Alligator

Alcatraz and has made no further removal efforts.

“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the

Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney

Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).

The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,

which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id.

Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not

reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention

unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01

(2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its

statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”

Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably

foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for

the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a

“presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day

removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting

framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id.

The government argues Jimenez Mayea’s petition is premature because

his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume a six-month

presumptively reasonable period of detention starts each time a noncitizen is

detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively

allow DHS to arbitrarily detain noncitizens and avoid judicial scrutiny by

limiting consecutive periods of detention to 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit

recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a

presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal

supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the

removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir.

2002).

Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention

has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Jimenez Mayea

has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE was

unable to remove him in 2023, there is no indication Cuba is likely to accept

him now, and ICE was unable to remove him to Mexico.

The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its January

2026 attempt to send Jimenez Mayea to Mexico. But the evidence before the

Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure, not

an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and

constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization

Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who

are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the

United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they

will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to

due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp.

3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current

third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear-

based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to

show it can lawfully remove Jimenez Mayea in the reasonably foreseeable

future.

The Court finds no significant likelihood Jimenez Mayea will be removed

in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention

under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable

future, ICE can detain Jimenez Mayea to “assur[e] [his] presence at the

moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Yariel Jimenez Mayea’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is

GRANTED.

1. The respondent shall release Jimenez Mayea within 24 hours of this

Order and provide him telephone access so he can arrange his

transportation from the facility.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 10, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies: All Parties of Record