The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
MOHAMMAD AQEEL HUSSAINI,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:26-cv-582-JEP-PDB
BAKER COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.
___________________________________/
ORDER
Through counsel, Petitioner, a detainee of the United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking, among other relief, an order
directing Respondents to release him or alternatively, to provide him with a
bond hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (See Doc. 1 at 9). Petitioner
alleges that he is a citizen of Afghanistan who entered the United States on
October 2, 2023, and “surrendered to immigration authorities.” (Id. at 3). He
was released on his own recognizance, but subsequently re-detained on
November 30, 2025, at his residence. (Id. at 4).1 He contends, among other
1 The Federal Respondents contend that ICE re-detained Petitioner “during a
check-in at an Intensive Supervision Appearance Program . . . facility” on December
1, 2025. (Doc. 12 at 2). Either way, the Court’s analysis is the same.
things, that his mandatory detention without an individualized bond hearing
violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (See id. at 2, 5-8). At the
heart of this case is Petitioner’s contention that his detention is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)—not § 1225(b)(2)(A). (See generally Doc. 1; see also Doc. 12 at
7-12).
This Court previously addressed claims and arguments similar to those
raised in this case, concluding that the Court has jurisdiction, but the relevant
statutory language and context support the Federal Respondents’ position that
an alien without lawful admission who has resided in the United States for
some appreciable period of time is subject to mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Diaz Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t of Removal Operations,
817 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2026); see also Lozano Sousa v. Ripa, No. 3:25-
cv-1617-JEP-PDB, 2026 WL 958794 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2026).2 However, on
2 To the extent the Federal Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies prior to filing this case, the Court rejects their argument.
At the time Petitioner filed this case, any administrative request for a bond hearing
would have been futile, because the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had
conclusively determined that immigration judges had no authority to consider bond
requests from aliens like Petitioner. See In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,
220-28 (BIA 2025). Because the BIA had “predetermined” the issue, requiring
Petitioner to pursue further administrative remedies before the Petition was filed
would have been futile. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992) (recognizing
that a petitioner need not exhaust administrative remedies if “the administrative
body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it”); see,
e.g., Fonseca v. Ripa, No. 3:26-cv-309-MMH-MCR, 2026 WL 1072778, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 21, 2026) (“Requiring [the petitioner] to appeal [the immigration judge’s denial
of his request for a custody redetermination] to the BIA or make any further
administrative request for a bond hearing would be futile.”); Puga v. Assistant Field
May 6, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the opposite approach
on the substantive issue under the INA, concluding that Ҥ 1225 applies to
arriving aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens
unlawfully in the interior.” Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr.
Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1276 (11th Cir. 2026).3 This Court is bound by the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case.4
Therefore, it is ORDERED:
1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim that his detention
without an individualized bond hearing violates the INA.5 Within
Off. Dir., Krome N. Serv. Processing Ctr., No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (“Since the result of [the p]etitioner’s custody
redetermination and any subsequent bond appeal to the BIA is nearly a foregone
conclusion under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, any prudential exhaustion requirements
are excused for futility.”).
3 Although the mandate has not yet issued, the Eleventh Circuit’s published
opinion has immediate precedential effect. See Martin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944,
945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that a published opinion “is the law in this circuit
unless and until it is reversed, overruled, vacated, or otherwise modified by the
Supreme Court of the United States or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc,” and
that a stay of the mandate “in no way affects the duty of . . . the courts in this circuit
to apply now the precedent established by” the published opinion “as binding
authority”); 11th Cir. IOP—Cir. R. 36.2 (“Under the law of this circuit, published
opinions are binding precedent. The issuance or non-issuance of the mandate does
not affect this result.”).
4 Although an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United
States on June 27, 2025, that order is not yet final. (See Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 12 at 2).
5 Because the Court grants relief on Petitioner’s claim under the INA, the
Court need not address Petitioner’s other claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,
seven days of this Order, Respondents shall either afford
Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) or release Petitioner. If Respondents release Petitioner,
they shall facilitate his transportation from the detention facility
by notifying his counsel when and where he can be collected.
2. The Warden’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) is DENIED for the same
reasons stated in Lanvin- Valdez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft,
No. 3:26-CV-180-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 1004569, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 14, 2026).
3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment granting the petition,
terminate any pending motions as moot, and close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on June 8, 2026.
JORDAN E. PRATT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
689 n.10 (2004) (declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after
granting relief on another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that
claim would be cumulative’).
c:
Counsel of Record