Alford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

FELICIA ALFORD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-94-VMC-SPF

PASCO-PINELLAS HILLSBOROUGH

COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.

d/b/a ADVENTHEALTH WESLEY

CHAPEL,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on consideration of

Defendant Pasco-Pinellas Hillsborough Community Health

System, Inc.’s (“AdventHealth”) Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 72), filed on March 9, 2026. Plaintiff Felicia Alford

responded on April 16, 2026 (Doc. # 80), AdventHealth filed

a reply on April 30, 2026 (Doc. # 84), and Ms. Alford filed

a sur-reply, with leave of Court, on May 8, 2026. (Doc. #

87). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. Background:

A. The Parties

According to the complaint, Ms. Alford is a Black woman.

(Doc. # 45 at ¶ 3). Ms. Alford worked as a “PRN Social Work

Care Manager” at AdventHealth’s hospital in Wesley Chapel

from February 2021 until her termination in June 2024. (Doc.

# 72-2 at 23:2-9, 186:11-2; Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 5; Doc. # 72-

21 at ¶ 1). Ms. Alford’s immediate supervisor was Sheila

Hammond. (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 9). AdventHealth’s Director of

Care Management, Jennifer Iglesias, was Ms. Alford’s second-

level manager. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3).

B. AdventHealth’s Policies

AdventHealth’s Rules of Conduct require employees “to

observe all AdventHealth’s rules, policies, and procedures.”

(Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 7). Employees “can face discipline and

termination for insubordination, disrespectful behavior,

failure to follow a supervisor’s instructions or to perform

assigned work, or poor performance.” (Id.). “Pursuant to its

Corrective Action Policy, AdventHealth has discretion to

administer any level of discipline to correct violations or

performance concerns, and disciplinary steps may include a

Documented Discussion, a Written Warning, a Final Warning,

and termination, in any order.” (Id. at ¶ 8).

“PRN means pro re nata, or ‘as needed’ or ‘when

necessary.’” (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 4). A PRN employee “is not

guaranteed shifts and may not always get her preferred

shifts.” (Id. at ¶ 29). It is undisputed that, pursuant to

AdventHealth’s written Policy CW HR 244, PRN employees are

required to “be available to work” at least four shifts per

month. (Doc. # 75-12 at 1). But the parties disagree as to

what being “available to work” means. According to

AdventHealth, PRN employees “are required to work at least

four shifts per month . . . in order to maintain their PRN

status.” (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 29; Doc. # 72-22 at ¶ 11). At her

deposition, Ms. Alford initially agreed that PRN employees

had to work “[f]our shifts per month.” (Doc. # 72-2 at 90:7-

10). However, Ms. Alford later testified that Policy CW HR

244 merely required PRN employees to submit four days in which

they were available to work during a month. (Id. at 235:12-

237:13). According to Ms. Alford, if she was not scheduled on

the dates she submitted, she did not have to pick up any

additional shifts offered to her to satisfy the four-shifts-

per-month requirement. (Id. at 236:19-237:13, 267:4-7,

268:16-24). However, Ms. Alford did not dispute that,

regardless of the language of Policy CW HR 244, AdventHealth

required PRN employees to work four shifts per month. See

(Id. at 306:13-23) (acknowledging that AdventHealth

terminated her for failing to comply with its requirement

that PRN employees work four shifts per month).

C. Ms. Alford’s Tenure at AdventHealth

Ms. Alford had various documented performance issues

while working for AdventHealth. In July 2021, Ms. Alford

received a written “corrective action” after she failed to

report for a scheduled shift and did not secure coverage.

(Doc. # 72-9 at 1; Doc. # 72-21 at ¶¶ 6-8). On May 24, 2022,

Ms. Alford told Ms. Iglesias that she needed to leave early

to take her father to a doctor’s appointment. (Doc. # 72-21

at ¶ 10). The situation became tense when Ms. Iglesias told

Ms. Alford that “there was no coverage that we could arrange

last minute,” and Ms. Alford ultimately left without securing

coverage. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12). On June 22, 2022, Ms. Alford

complained to HR that Ms. Iglesias was bullying and

retaliating against her, but did not identify any instances

of bullying or retaliation. (Doc. # 75-15 at 4-8). On June

24, 2022, Ms. Alford received a corrective action for the May

2022 incident. (Doc. # 72-10; Doc. 72-21 at ¶¶ 9-12). After

the June 2022 corrective action, Ms. Alford and Ms. Iglesias

had a conversation in which they discussed their issues and

“moved forward.” (Doc. # 72-2 at 170:2-25). Ms. Alford did

not have any conflict with Ms. Iglesias for approximately one

year and a half. (Id. at 170:2-171:7).

In fall 2023, Ms. Iglesias “issued Ms. Alford an annual

written performance evaluation,” which stated that Ms. Alford

and Ms. Iglesias had “an in-person performance discussion” on

November 5, 2023. (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 17). On December 17,

2023, Ms. Alford complained to HR that the evaluation

inaccurately stated that she and Ms. Iglesias had an in-

person conversation. (Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 13). “Separately, Ms.

Alford also complained that Ms. Iglesias treated her

‘differently’ from other PRNs when Ms. Iglesias: (1) warned

Ms. Alford that she would be removed from the schedule if she

failed to complete her overdue [AdventHealth Learning Network

trainings], and (2) made her sit with Ms. Hammond for training

on an updated part of the initial evaluation within the

electronic health record software called EPIC.” (Id. at ¶

14). Regional Employee Relations Specialist Telia Dowdell

scheduled a meeting with Ms. Alford to discuss her complaints

after the holidays. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 14).

On January 4, 2024, Ms. Alford sarcastically told a

coworker that she was going to quit. (Doc. # 72-2 at 196:7-

197:7). Ms. Alford later overheard Ms. Iglesias discussing

the comment with the department’s scheduler. (Id. at 197:9-

14; Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 18). According to Ms. Alford, Ms.

Iglesias stated that she wished Ms. Alford would quit because

Ms. Iglesias “was so over her.” (Doc. # 72-2 at 197:11-14).

Ms. Alford approached the scheduler’s cubicle and asked Ms.

Iglesias why she was discussing her “personal business with

the secretary.” (Id. at 197:15-17). Ms. Iglesias said they

were “talking about the schedules.” (Id. at 197:17-18). Ms.

Alford said they did not “have to go back and forth” and that

she would “just call HR.” (Id. at 197:18-21). Ms. Iglesias

told Ms. Alford to go upstairs and speak to HR in person.

(Id. at 197:21-24). Ms. Alford then “went to grab the phone

to call” HR, but Ms. Iglesias “grabbed [her] arm and said, I

told you to go upstairs.” (Id. at 197:25-198:3). Ms. Iglesias

“pushed [Ms. Alford] out of the way,” repeating that Ms.

Alford should go upstairs.” (Id. at 198:4-7).1 Ms. Iglesias

then called security and asked them “to escort Ms. Alford to

HR.” (Doc. # 72-21 at ¶ 19). Ms. Alford reported the incident

to HR. (Doc. # 72-22 at ¶ 6).

Employee Relations investigated Ms. Alford’s claims

regarding the January 4, 2024, incident. (Id. at ¶ 7). On

January 17, 2024, Ms. Alford, Ms. Iglesias, Ms. Dowdell, and

Human Resources Director Jasmine Ramnarine met to discuss Ms.

Alford’s complaints. (Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 18; Doc. # 72-22 at

¶ 2). Ms. Alford was told that AdventHealth “could not

substantiate her allegations that Ms. Iglesias had physically

assaulted her.” (Doc. # 72-20 at ¶ 18). However, AdventHealth

proposed that Ms. Alford “address her work-related concerns

directly with her immediate supervisor, Ms. Hammond, going

forward to cut out any unnecessary contact with Ms. Iglesias”

1 Ms. Iglesias disputes Ms. Alford’s characterization of the

incident. According to Ms. Iglesias, she “told the scheduler

something along the lines of that I wished Ms. Alford would

talk to me personally if she was planning to quit.” (Doc. #

72-21 at ¶ 18). Ms. Iglesias denies grabbing Ms. Alford’s arm

and claims that Ms. Alford “push[ed] her from behind to reach

the scheduler’s desk phone.” (Id. at ¶ 19).

and to involve Ms. Hammond or HR if Ms. Alford “needed to

address something with Ms. Iglesias directly.” (Id.). “As

part of the meeting, it was determined that Ms. Iglesias had

made a mistake with respect to the November 5, 2023

performance discussion date but that the discussion itself

had already taken place.” (Id. at ¶ 19). “With respect to ALN

trainings, it was determined that it was AdventHealth’s

standard procedure for employees to be taken off the schedule

for not timely completing ALNs, and Ms. Alford was not an

exception. With respect to EPIC trainings, it was determined

they were arranged for Ms. Alford’s benefit due to her limited

availability and resulting limited opportunity to learn the

IE update.” (Id.).

In February 2024, Ms. Alford received a written

“documented discussion” for: (1) clocking in prior to her

scheduled start time, (2) failing to complete all her

assignments, (3) failing to complete assignments correctly,

(4) lack of communication, and (5) dishonesty about when she

took her lunch break. (Doc. # 72-15).

Ms. Alford worked less than four shifts per month from

February 2024 through May 2024. (Doc. # 72-17 at 1). Ms.

Alford did not pick up additional shifts offered to her during

that period. (Id.).

On May 17, 2024, Ms. Alford, Ms. Hammond, Ms. Iglesias,

and Ms. Ramnarine met to discuss “the leadership’s concerns

around Ms. Alford’s performance and responsiveness.” (Doc. #

72-21 at ¶ 32). Ms. Alford did not work any shifts after May

17, 2024. (Doc. # 72-17 at 2).

On June 14, 2024, AdventHealth terminated Ms. Alford for

failing to comply with Policy CW HR 244, which requires PRN

employees “to work four (4) shifts in a four-week schedule

period,” since February 2024. (Id. at 1).

D. The EEOC and FCHR Charges

Ms. Alford filed a charge of discrimination with the

EEOC and Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) on

May 10, 2024. (Doc. # 72-18 at 1-2). The charge alleged only

that AdventHealth retaliated against Ms. Alford for filing

complaints about Ms. Iglesias. (Id.). Ms. Alford filed a

second charge with the EEOC and FCHR on July 8, 2024, which

elaborated on the retaliation alleged in the first charge

(Doc. # 72-19 at 1-2). Neither charge asserted claims of race

or sex discrimination or mentioned Ms. Alford’s membership in

any protected class. (Doc. # 72-18 at 1-2; Doc. # 72-19 at 1-

2).

E. Procedural History

Ms. Alford’s second amended complaint asserts five

claims against AdventHealth: race-based discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e, the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla.

Stat. § 760.01 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I);

hostile work environment based on race in violation of Title

VII, the FCRA, and Section 1981 (Count II); sex-based

discrimination in violation of Title VII and the FCRA (Count

III); hostile work environment based on sex in violation of

Title VII and the FCRA (Count IV); and retaliation in

violation of Title VII, the FCRA, and Section 1981 (Count V).

(Doc. # 45).

The Court granted AdventHealth’s motion to dismiss the

claims brought pursuant to Title VII and the FCRA in Counts

I through IV. (Doc. # 70). The Court dismissed with prejudice

Counts I and II, to the extent they allege violations of Title

VII and the FCRA, and Counts III and IV. (Id.). Thus, only

Counts I and II, to the extent they allege violations of

Section 1981, and Count V remain.

AdventHealth moves for summary judgment. (Doc. # 72).

The Motion is fully briefed (Doc. ## 80, 84, 87) and is ripe

for review.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to

defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude

a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving

party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742

(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if

it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.

1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing

the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are

no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260

(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its

burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the

pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,

593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

324).

If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations

or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to

be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344

F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder

evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference

from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine

issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary

judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846

F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s

response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his

conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only

proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034

(11th Cir. 1981).

III. Analysis

A. Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Section

1981

AdventHealth argues that it is entitled to summary

judgment on Count II as there is no evidence that the alleged

harassment of Ms. Alford was based upon her race. (Doc. # 72

at 25). In response, Ms. Alford explicitly abandons her

hostile work environment claim. (Doc. # 80 at 18).

As Ms. Alford has abandoned her hostile work environment

claim, AdventHealth is granted summary judgment on Count II

to the extent it alleges violation of Section 1981. See

Ekokotu v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 523 F. App’x 629, 632 (11th Cir.

2013) (affirming grant of summary judgment for the defendant

on national origin discrimination claims where plaintiff

“explicitly and unequivocally disavowed them in response to

[defendant’s] motion for summary judgment”).

B. Time-Barred Claims

AdventHealth argues that Ms. Alford’s retaliation claims

under Title VII and the FCRA are partially time-barred. (Doc.

# 72 at 18-19). In response, Ms. Alford acknowledges that she

“cannot recover for untimely events.” (Doc. # 80 at 15). In

its reply, AdventHealth argues for the first time that Ms.

Alford cannot rely on “these time-barred events” to establish

the prima facie elements of her Section 1981 race

discrimination and retaliation claims. (Doc. # 84 at 3).

Plaintiff does not address this argument in her sur-reply.

The Court agrees with AdventHealth as to the Title VII

and FCRA retaliation claims but not as to the Section 1981

discrimination and retaliation claims.

1. The Title VII and FCRA Retaliation Claims

“As a prerequisite to filing both a Title VII and a FCRA

action, a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies

by filing a timely charge with the appropriate agency.” Jones

v. Bank of Am., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Since Florida is a

deferral state, a charge must be filed within 300 days of the

last discriminatory act.” Davis v. Polk Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,

170 F. App’x 598, 600 (11th Cir. 2005). “[U]nder the FCRA, an

employee may file an administrative complaint with the

Florida Civil Rights Commission within 365 days of the alleged

violation.” Essick v. Fid. Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-

cv-949-MMH-J_K, 2016 WL 3615677, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 6,

2016).

Here, Ms. Alford filed her first EEOC charge on May 10,

2024. (Doc. # 72-18). Accordingly, Ms. Alford’s Title VII

retaliation claim is time-barred to the extent it is based on

any allegedly retaliatory actions that occurred before July

15, 2023. See O’Hara v. Univ. of W. Fla., 494 F. App’x 972,

973 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming judgment dismissing Title VII

claims as time-barred because the alleged misconduct occurred

more than 300 days before plaintiff filed her charge of

discrimination). Ms. Alford’s FCRA retaliation claim cannot

be based on allegedly retaliatory actions that occurred

before May 11, 2023. See Bourne v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty.,

508 F. App’x 907, 909 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal

of FCRA claim as time barred where plaintiff did not file

charge of discrimination until 367 days after her last day of

work).

2. The Section 1981 Discrimination and

Retaliation Claims

As an initial matter, AdventHealth improperly raises its

argument that Ms. Alford’s Section 1981 discrimination and

retaliation claims are partially time barred for the first

time in its reply. WBY, Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty., Georgia, 695

F. App’x 486, 491–92 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Although Rutland did

raise his current theory of probable cause in a reply brief

in support of his motion for summary judgment, reply briefs

are not a vehicle to present new arguments or theories.”).

In any event, AdventHealth’s argument is meritless

because 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not require claimants to go

through the EEOC administrative process as a prerequisite of

suit. Minnifield v. City of Birmingham Dep’t of Police, 791

F. App’x 86, 88 n.1 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Mathis v.

Leggett & Platt, 263 F. App’x 9, 12 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“Mathis’s claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §

1981 survives despite Mathis’s untimely Title VII race

discrimination charge because § 1981 actions are not subject

to the administrative exhaustion requirement.”).

C. Race-Based Discrimination in Violation of Section

1981

Section 1981 “prohibit[s] intentional racial

discrimination in employment contracts.” Melton v. I-10 Truck

Ctr. Inc, 166 F.4th 905, 912 (11th Cir. 2026). “An employee

must prove ‘(1) intentional racial discrimination (2) that

caused a contractual injury.’” Id. at 912-13 (quoting Ziyadat

v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir.

2021)). “To establish intentional racial discrimination, an

employee may rely on either direct evidence or circumstantial

evidence.” Id. at 913. Title VII claims and corresponding

Section 1981 claims “have the same requirements of proof and

utilize the same analytical framework.” Smelter v. S. Home

Care Servs. Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1284 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018).

“In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff

alleging intentional discrimination must present sufficient

facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor.”

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220

(11th Cir. 2019). “One way that she can do so is by satisfying

the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas

[Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, (1973)].” Id. A plaintiff

can also “demonstrate a convincing mosaic of circumstantial

evidence that warrants an inference of intentional

discrimination.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms.

Alford cannot succeed under either avenue.

1. Ms. Alford Has Not Met Her Prima Facie Burden

Under the McDonnell Douglas Framework

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has

the initial burden of proving her prima facie case. McAlpin

v. Sneads, 61 F.4th 916, 927 (11th Cir. 2023). To do so, the

plaintiff must show that “(1) she belongs to a protected

class, (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action,

(3) she was qualified to perform the job in question, and (4)

her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her

class more favorably.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88

F.4th 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The prima facie showing entitles the plaintiff to

a rebuttable presumption of intentional discrimination.” Id.

The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut that

presumption “by offering evidence of a valid, non-

discriminatory justification for the adverse employment

action.” Id.

Ms. Alford belongs to a protected class. (Doc. # 72-2 at

186:11-12); Melton, 166 F.4th at 914. As Ms. Alford was

discharged from a previously held position, she does not need

to demonstrate she was qualified to perform the job in

question. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc.,

196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Our caselaw quite

clearly instructs that plaintiffs, who have been discharged

from a previously held position, do not need to satisfy the

McDonnell Douglas prong requiring proof of qualification.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, to meet her

prima facie burden, Ms. Alford must present evidence that she

was subjected to an adverse employment action and that

AdventHealth treated similarly situated employees outside her

class more favorably.

a. Adverse Employment Actions

Claims of race discrimination under Section 1981

“require a showing that the employer subjected the employee

to an adverse employment action.” Davis v. Legal Servs. Ala.,

Inc., 19 F.4th 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “When, as here, we are not talking about a

hostile-work-environment claim, adverse employment actions

include ‘tangible employment actions,’ which are those

actions ‘that affect continued employment or pay — things

like terminations, demotions, suspensions without pay, and

pay raises or cuts — as well as other things that are

similarly significant standing alone.’” Id. at 1266 (quoting

Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir.

2020)).

Ms. Alford claims that Ms. Iglesias subjected her to the

following adverse employment actions: (1) the issuance of

three write-ups and an allegedly falsified performance

evaluation, (2) harassment and physical assault, (3)

micromanagement and temporary relocation of her workstation,

and (4) reduction in hours and termination. Each will be

addressed in turn.

i. The Write-Ups and the Performance

Evaluation

Ms. Alford claims that she was “discipline[d]” for

“requiring time off for family emergencies” in 2021 and 2022

and for “coming in too early” in 2024. (Doc. # 80 at 16). Ms.

Alford does not elaborate on the “discipline” she received.

However, it appears Ms. Alford is referring to the following

documents: (1) the July 2021 corrective action she received

for failing to work a scheduled shift, (2) the June 2022

corrective action she received for leaving a shift early, and

(3) the February 2024 documented discussion she received for,

among other things, clocking in before the start of her

shifts. (Doc. # 80 at 9-11 ¶¶ 5-7, 10; 13 ¶ 16).

“The reprimand of an employee does not constitute an

adverse employment action when the employee suffers no

tangible harm as a result.” Summerlin v. M&H Valve Co., 167

F. App’x 93, 97 (11th Cir. 2006). “[M]emoranda of reprimand

or counseling that amount to no more than a mere scolding,

without any following disciplinary action, do not rise to the

level of adverse employment actions.” Barnett v. Athens Reg’l

Med. Ctr. Inc., 550 F. App’x 711, 713 (11th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th

Cir. 2001)).

Here, Ms. Alford does not allege that the corrective

actions or documented discussion had any effect on her

employment. Therefore, even if these documents are properly

deemed reprimands or “discipline,” Ms. Alford has not

established they are adverse employment actions. See Barnett,

550 F. App’x at 713 (“Barnett has failed to establish his

prima facie case of discrimination because he was not

subjected to an adverse employment action. The written

reprimands and negative performance review had no effect on

Barnett’s employment.”); Summerlin, 167 F. App’x at 97

(finding that written reprimand was not an adverse employment

action as plaintiff did not allege that it “affected any

important condition of his employment, such as salary,

benefits, title, or job duties”).

Ms. Alford further contends that the allegedly falsified

performance evaluation is an adverse employment action. (Doc.

# 80 at 16). However, Ms. Alford does not allege that the

evaluation impacted any condition of her employment. Rather,

Ms. Alford acknowledges that the performance review was

positive. (Doc. # 72-2 at 212:2-7; Doc. # 80 at 12 ¶ 15).

Accordingly, Ms. Alford has not demonstrated that the

allegedly false statement in the performance review is an

adverse employment action. See Lamont v. City of Albany, No.

1:12-CV-82 WLS, 2015 WL 93874, at *10 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2015)

(“[R]epeated false accusations alone, without accompanying

negative employment consequences, are not adverse employment

actions.”); Soloski v. Adams, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1356 (N.D.

Ga. 2009) (“False accusations without negative employment

consequences are not employment decisions actionable under

Title VII.”).

ii. Harassment and Physical Assault

Ms. Alford claims that she was “harassed about requiring

time off for family emergencies” in July 2021 and May 2022.

(Doc. # 80 at 16). As Ms. Alford does not provide details of

the alleged harassment, the nature of Ms. Alford’s contention

is unclear. Yet, Ms. Alford’s response only describes one

incident which could be considered harassment during this

period: when Ms. Iglesias stated that Ms. Alford’s job would

be in jeopardy if she did not come in as scheduled in July

2021. (Id. at 9-10 ¶ 5). Ms. Alford also alleges that Ms.

Iglesias “harassed her and physically assaulted her” on

January 4, 2024. (Id. at 16).

“Harassment and hostility are not, by themselves,

adverse employment actions.” Muse v. Jax 02 LLC, No. 3:25-

cv-1095-WWB-LLL, 2026 WL 776165, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19,

2026); see Salyer v. AmSouth Bank, No. 8:04-cv-2543-EAK-MAP,

2007 WL 9723547, at *16 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2007)

(“[O]stracism and hostility by a supervisor is not an adverse

employment action.”). “Indeed, hostile work environment,

discrimination, and retaliation claims are each founded on a

separate transaction or occurrence and require the plaintiff

to establish different facts.” Muse, 2026 WL 776165, at *3

(internal quotation marks omitted). “When an employee

complains of ‘harassment’ by a supervisor, that claim is

actionable only if it rises to the level of a hostile work

environment, which requires ‘proof that the workplace is

permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and

insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.’” Amos v. Mobile Cnty. Health Dep’t, 767

F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1272 (S.D. Ala. 2011), aff’d, 460 F. App’x

893 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan

Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Here, Ms. Alford has abandoned her hostile work

environment claim and does not contend that the alleged

harassment and physical assault “rose to the level of a

hostile work environment.” Amos, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.

Therefore, these incidents cannot be considered adverse

employment actions. See Id. (“Amos has made no attempt to

demonstrate that Stiegler’s treatment of her rose to the level

of a hostile work environment. Consequently, it cannot be

considered an adverse employment action.”).

In any event, Ms. Alford does not allege that Ms.

Iglesias’s statement that Ms. Alford’s job was in jeopardy

had any effect on her employment. See Howard v. Walgreen Co.,

605 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The only alleged

discrimination about which Howard complained was Krzastek’s

message threatening that Howard’s job was in jeopardy. An

allegation such as this falls well short of an adverse

action.”); Mistretta v. Volusia Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., 61 F.

Supp. 2d 1255, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (“[T]hreats of

termination do not constitute adverse employment actions.”).

Ms. Alford further has not claimed that the alleged physical

altercation had a tangible effect on her employment. See

McNichols v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 02-23034-CIV, 2006 WL

1104336, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2006) (“McNichols further

alleged in her second EEOC charge that in retaliation for her

filing her first EEOC charge: 1) her assigned work truck was

vandalized; 2) she was intimidated; and 3) she was pushed.

These allegations do not establish adverse employment

actions.”); Smiley v. Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 12 F.

Supp. 2d 1377, 1382 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (“Plaintiff’s allegations

that Jeffries slapped him, verbally abused him, criticized

his job performance and demanded a doctor’s excuse are

insufficient for the Court to find that he suffered any

adverse employment action.”). Accordingly, even if Ms.

Alford’s claims that Ms. Iglesias threatened her job and

grabbed and pushed her are not deemed acts of harassment and

hostility that must rise to the level of a hostile work

environment, Ms. Alford still has not demonstrated that they

are adverse employment actions.

iii. Micromanagement and Temporary

Relocation of Workstation

Ms. Alford claims that she was micromanaged by being

“forced to sit with her immediate supervisor, [Ms.] Hammond,

or another employee designated by [Ms.] Iglesias,” while Ms.

Hammond “was ordered to document everything [Ms. Alford] did

during her shift.” (Doc. # 80 at 16-17). However, heightened

scrutiny of an employee’s work does not constitute an adverse

employment action. See Tamez v. A/C Storage Place, Ltd., No.

6:15-cv-1541-CEM-TBS, 2017 WL 10059003, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June

20, 2017) (“Plaintiff argues that Vance ‘micromanaged’ her by

instructing others to double check Plaintiff’s work,

particularly her banking and deposit related work. Such

heightened scrutiny does not constitute an

adverse employment action.”); Lamont v. City of Albany, No.

1:12-CV-82 WLS, 2015 WL 93874, at *10 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2015)

(“[T]he Court finds that increased supervision and monitoring

of LaMont’s work is not an adverse employment action.”).

Further, “[m]ere inconveniences, including dissatisfaction

with work spaces, do not constitute adverse employment

actions.” Scotton v. Nicholson, No. 8:04-cv-1440-JDW-EAJ,

2006 WL 8429880, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

As Ms. Alford has not alleged any tangible, negative

effect on her employment other than increased supervision and

a temporary office relocation, she has not demonstrated that

she suffered adverse employment actions. See Id. (“The

location . . . of an office does not meet the requisite level

of substantiality to be considered adverse absent some other

tangible, negative effect on Plaintiff’s employment.”); Arora

v. Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., No. 23-cv-20962, 2024 WL 4286220,

at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2024) (“In short, Mr. Arora’s claim

that he suffered an adverse employment action with regard to

Ms. Johnson’s increased supervision and scrutiny of his daily

tasks falls far short of serious and material changes in the

terms and conditions of employment.”).

iv. Reduction in Hours and Termination

Ms. Alford alleges that she suffered an adverse

employment action when Ms. Iglesias “refused to schedule [Ms.

Alford] for shifts on dates which she was available, although

she provided her availability well in advance of the schedule

being posted.” (Doc. # 80 at 17). Ms. Alford claims that,

despite timely submitting her availability, she was not

scheduled for any shifts in March or June 2024 and was only

scheduled for two shifts in April 2024. (Doc. # 80 at 13-15

¶¶ 19-23; Doc. # 72-2 at 90:7-20; Doc. # 75-7 at ¶¶ 34-35,

37, 40). Ms. Alford further alleges that she “was terminated

for a pretextual reason, that she had violated the PRN policy

of working 4 shifts per month.” (Doc. # 80 at 17) (emphasis

in original); see (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶¶ 42, 44) (asserting that

Ms. Iglesias mischaracterized AdventHealth’s “PRN attendance

policy” in the June 2024 corrective action issued in

connection with Ms. Alford’s termination).

“A reduction in an employee’s hours, which reduces the

employee’s take-home pay, qualifies as a tangible employment

action.” Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.,

434 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006). Termination also is an

adverse employment action. Melton, 166 F.4th at 914.

Accordingly, Ms. Alford has sufficiently alleged that she

suffered an adverse employment action by having her hours

reduced and, ultimately, by being terminated.

b. Treating Similarly Situated Employees

More Favorably

A plaintiff meets her prima facie burden of

demonstrating that her employer treated similarly situated

employees outside her class more favorably “when the

plaintiff presents evidence of a comparator — someone who is

similarly situated in all material respects.” Tynes, 88 F.4th

at 944 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, this

means that a comparator will (1) have engaged in the same

basic conduct as the plaintiff; (2) have been subject to the

same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff;

(3) have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor

as the plaintiff; and (4) share the plaintiff’s employment or

disciplinary history.” Phillips v. Legacy Cabinets, 87 F.4th

1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2023). Ms. Alford has not met her

burden.

In her response, Ms. Alford claims that Ms. Iglesias

refused to schedule her “for shifts on dates which she was

available,” but “did not refuse to schedule non-black

employees for all dates for which they indicated

availability.” (Doc. # 80 at 17). Yet Ms. Alford does not

cite any record evidence in support. In any event, a

conclusory allegation that Ms. Iglesias did not refuse to

schedule unnamed non-Black employees on dates they were

available is not sufficient. See Jones v. Saugahatchee

Country Club, No. 3:23-CV-34-ECM, 2026 WL 734415, at *3 (M.D.

Ala. Mar. 16, 2026) (“Her suggestion that unnamed white

employees ‘were treated more favorably’ is not enough.”);

Wells v. Miami Dade Cnty., No. 15-22431-CIV, 2016 WL 7492560,

at *6 n.7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016) (“Wells’ discrimination

claim lacks merit also because she has not identified a

similarly situated, non-Black employee who received more

favorable treatment than she received.”). Further, Ms. Alford

does not even allege that any similarly situated employees

who failed to work at least four shifts per month were not

terminated.

Accordingly, Ms. Alford has not met her prima facie

burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Adewumi v.

Wellstar Med. Grp., No. 24-12243, 2025 WL 831584, at *6 (11th

Cir. Mar. 17, 2025) (finding that plaintiff failed to meet

his initial burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework as

he “failed to establish a proper comparator”); Moultrie v.

Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 703 F. App’x 900, 907 (11th Cir. 2017)

(same).

2. Ms. Alford Has Not Presented a Convincing

Mosaic of Circumstantial Evidence

“Aside from the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee

can still survive summary judgment by presenting

circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue

concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Jenkins v.

Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “A triable issue of fact exists if the record,

viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents

a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would

allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the

decisionmaker.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d

1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “A convincing mosaic may be shown by evidence that

demonstrates, among other things, (1) suspicious timing,

ambiguous statements . . . , and other bits and pieces from

which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn,

(2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated

employees, and (3) that the employer’s justification is

pretextual.” Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Ms. Alford argues that she has presented a convincing

mosaic of circumstantial evidence establishing discriminatory

intent. (Doc. # 80 at 17-18). Specifically, Ms. Alford

alleges as follows:

[Ms. Alford] was reliable, but harassed about

taking leave for family emergencies, while white

co-workers called out, arrived late or left early

with no consequences. When [Ms. Alford] reported

[Ms.] Iglesias to HR for misconduct, [Ms.] Iglesias

issued her discipline, physically assaulted her and

forced her supervisor to babysit and monitor her

while she worked. After the January 2024 meeting

with HR and [Ms.] Iglesias to report [Ms.] Iglesias

for falsifying documents and for physically

assaulting her, [Ms.] Iglesias refused to schedule

[Ms. Alford] for shifts which she reported her

availability. [Ms.] Iglesias then used [Ms.

Alford’s] lack of shifts to terminate her.

(Id. at 17).

“While evidence of ‘systematically better treatment of

similarly situated employees’ can support an inference of

discriminatory intent,” here, Ms. Alford has not presented

evidence that similarly situated non-Black employees

routinely received better treatment. Adewumi, 2025 WL 831584,

at *8 (quoting Jenkins, 26 F.4th 1250). Ms. Alford’s

circumstantial evidence, viewed as a whole, is insufficient

to survive summary judgment under the convincing mosaic

approach.

Ms. Alford testified at her deposition that unnamed

white employees called out of work on short notice, but she

did not know whether they were disciplined. (Doc. # 72-2 at

135:17-141:10). However, in her affidavit, Ms. Alford claimed

that unnamed “[n]on-Black employees were not subjected to

discipline for their failure to report for scheduled shifts

and were allowed to call out at the last minute without

consequences.” (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶ 12). Ms. Alford further

testified that non-Black employees Alicia Williams, Thuy

Kimbal, and Karen Schneider were allowed to leave work early

to handle personal appointments. (Doc. # 72-2 at 287:3-

288:5). In her affidavit, Ms. Alford identified only Ms.

Williams, Ms. Kimbal, and Amy Crow as employees who were

permitted to leave early. (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶ 15). Ms. Alford

averred that the following non-Black employees “under the

charge of [Ms.] Iglesias were not disciplined for arriving to

work early”: Ms. Hammond, Susan Beathler, McKenna Welton-

Rabe, Ms. Williams, Darla Durrett, Wilda Neifa, Ms. Kimbal,

Julie Hatchett, Cynthia Serota, and Sara Resch. (Id. at ¶

32). Finally, Ms. Alford averred that other “non-black

employees, including Leah Rabel, were regularly tardy for

shifts but received no discipline for the misconduct.” (Id.).

“[C]onclusory allegations have no probative value at

summary judgment unless supported by specific evidence.”

Kelley v. Howden, No. 21-13573, 2022 WL 17259720, at *1 (11th

Cir. Nov. 29, 2022); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d

1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, Ms. Alford did not explain

the circumstances of any of these alleged instances of

disparate treatment or otherwise provide details that would

support a finding that similarly situated non-Black employees

were treated better than she was. Accordingly, her conclusory

allegations that certain named and unnamed non-Black

employees were allowed to call out on short notice, leave

early, and arrive early or late, without more, do not raise

a reasonable inference that AdventHealth intentionally

discriminated against her. See Hill v. Oil Dri Corp. of

Georgia, 198 F. App’x 852, 858 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Plaintiffs’

EEOC affidavits were too conclusory and lacking in specific

facts to create genuine issues of material fact as to . . .

whether white employees were similarly situated.”).

In any event, even if Ms. Alford’s allegations were not

conclusory, they would still be insufficient as she failed to

establish that any of the non-Black employees were similarly

situated to her. See Adewumi, 2025 WL 831584, at *8 (holding

that plaintiff’s allegations that his supervisor

“micromanaged him and subjected his medical errors to more

scrutiny than his white colleagues” did not establish

systemically better treatment of similarly situated employees

as plaintiff “failed to present evidence of how his white

counterparts within the practice group were managed or peer

reviewed”); Robert v. City of Boca Raton, No. 21-13779, 2024

WL 3066604, at *5 (11th Cir. June 20, 2024) (holding that

circumstantial evidence, including that two dissimilar

employees were not terminated or asked to resign, was

“insufficient for a reasonable jury to infer intentional race

discrimination”).

While it is apparent that Ms. Alford had a contentious

working relationship with Ms. Iglesias, Ms. Alford has not

explained why this suggests Ms. Iglesias had discriminatory

intent. As previously discussed, Ms. Alford has not offered

any record support for her conclusory claim that Ms. Iglesias

refused to schedule Ms. Alford “for shifts on dates which she

was available” but “did not refuse to schedule non-black

employees for all dates for which they indicated

availability.” (Doc. # 80 at 17). Accordingly, Ms. Alford has

not presented evidence suggesting discriminatory intent. See

Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 986 (11th Cir. 1989)

(“Hawkins presented evidence that Rascoe did not like him,

but a dislike alone is not evidence of racial

discrimination.”); Hudson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp.

2d 1301, 1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“A mere personality clash

among co-workers, no matter how severe, is not grounds for a

Title VII discrimination complaint.”).

Finally, Ms. Alford does not offer any support for her

assertion that she “was terminated for a pretextual reason.”

(Doc. # 80 at 7). Even crediting Ms. Alford’s claim that Ms.

Iglesias required PRN employees to follow a staffing policy

more stringent than AdventHealth’s written policy (Doc. # 75-

7 at ¶ 42), Ms. Alford does not allege that Ms. Iglesias only

required Black PRN employees to work four shifts per month or

that only Black PRN employees were disciplined for failing to

work the minimum amount of shifts. In contrast, AdventHealth

has identified 12 non-Black PRN employees who, like Ms.

Alford, were terminated in 2024 and 2025 for “failure to keep

the four-shifts-per-month schedule.” (Doc. # 72-22 at ¶ 13).

Accordingly, Ms. Alford has not presented any evidence that

AdventHealth’s decision to terminate her was pretextual. See

Connell v. Postmaster Gen., U.S. Postal Serv., 518 F. App’x

702 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming summary judgment in favor of

defendant where plaintiff “failed to present evidence that

the legitimate reasons offered for her termination were

pretextual”); Decoste v. City of Boynton Beach, 818 F. Supp.

3d 1360, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2026) (“Decoste offers no evidence

that shows that the City’s decision to terminate her following

the Final Report was pretext, which is also fatal to her

convincing mosaic framework.”).

In sum, Ms. Alford has not presented “a convincing mosaic

of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer

intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Smith, 644

F.3d at 1328. AdventHealth is granted summary judgment on

Count I to the extent it alleges violation of Section 1981.

D. Retaliation in Violation of Title VII, the FCRA,

and Section 1981

“Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee

because that employee has ‘opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].’” Gant v. Kash’n

Karry Food Stores, Inc., 390 F. App’x 943, 945 (11th Cir.

2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). The FCRA and Section

1981 also prohibit employers from retaliating against

employees who engage in protected conduct. Michaels v.

Sasser’s Glass Works Inc., No. 23-11166, 2025 WL 588648, at

*2-3 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025). “Claims under both § 1981 and

the FCRA are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII.”

Gant, 390 F. App’x at 945. “Claims of retaliation can be

supported with either direct or circumstantial evidence.”

Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 889 (11th Cir. 2023).

Where, as in the instant case, “a plaintiff alleging

retaliation presents only circumstantial evidence and no

direct evidence,” courts apply the McDonnell Douglas

framework. Id.

To meet her initial burden of proving a prima facie case,

the plaintiff must show that: (1) she “engaged in statutorily

protected expression”; (2) she “suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) there is some causal relation

between the two events.” McAlpin, 61 F.4th at 927 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “If the plaintiff cannot establish

a prima facie case, she does not automatically lose on

summary judgment.” Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 764

(11th Cir. 2025). Rather, a court “should advance directly to

the convincing mosaic inquiry.” Id. at 765. Ms. Alford cannot

defeat summary judgment under either test.

1. Ms. Alford Has Not Established a Prima Facie

Case

Ms. Alford alleges that she engaged in the following

protected activity prior to her termination: (1) making

complaints to HR in June 2022 and December 2023 and (2) filing

an EEOC charge of discrimination in May 2024. (Doc. # 80 at

18-19). AdventHealth does not dispute that these actions are

protected activity. Accordingly, the Court will assume,

without deciding, that Ms. Alford has met her prima facie

burden of establishing that she engaged in protected

activity.

With respect to the second prong, Ms. Alford claims that

she suffered a materially adverse employment action as she

“was fired allegedly for failing to work a minimum number of

shifts, an impossibility when [Ms.] Iglesias refused to

schedule her to work.” (Doc. # 80 at 20). A reduction in hours

that results in a loss of pay is a materially adverse action.

Jones v. Aaron’s Inc., 748 F. App’x 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2018).

“Termination is a materially adverse action.” Jefferson v.

Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018).

Therefore, Ms. Alford has met her prima facie burden in this

regard.

Finally, Ms. Alford alleges that there is a causal

connection between her protected conduct and the adverse

action as she “made multiple verbal and written complaints

about [Ms.] Iglesias who then disciplined and fired her.”

(Doc. # 80 at 20).

“To establish a causal link for purposes of the third

element, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the protected

activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.”

Matamoros v. Broward Sheriff’s Off., 2 F.4th 1329, 1336 (11th

Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff

makes this showing if she provides sufficient evidence that

the decisionmaker became aware of the protected conduct and

that there was a close temporal proximity between this

awareness and the adverse action.” Id. “If there is a delay

of more than three months between the two events, then the

temporal proximity is not close enough, and the plaintiff

must offer some other evidence tending to show causation.”

Henderson v. FedEx Express, 442 F. App’x 502, 506 (11th Cir.

2011). “Moreover, there is no causal connection between a

protected act and an adverse action, where the adverse action

was caused by intervening act of misconduct.” Brisk v.

Shoreline Found., Inc., 654 F. App’x 415, 417 (11th Cir.

2016).

Although there is a close proximity between the May 2024

EEOC charge and Ms. Alford’s termination, it is insufficient

to demonstrate a causal connection because there is no

evidence that Ms. Iglesias knew of the charge while Ms. Alford

was employed at AdventHealth. See Matamoros, 2 F.4th at 1337

(“Without some showing of awareness, the causal chain falls

apart and the claim fails.”). Therefore, Ms. Alford must

establish a causal connection between her June 2022 and

December 2023 HR complaints and the alleged retaliation.

Ms. Alford does not allege that Ms. Iglesias refused to

schedule her on her available dates prior to March 2024. (Doc.

# 80 at 13-15 ¶¶ 19-23; Doc. # 72-2 at 90:7-20; Doc. # 75-7

at ¶¶ 34-35, 37, 40). Accordingly, the nearly two-year gap

between Ms. Alford’s June 2022 HR complaint and the alleged

retaliation is insufficient, in and of itself, to show a

causal connection. Henderson, 442 F. App’x at 506.

Regarding the December 2023 HR complaint, Ms. Alford

alleges that her reduction in hours began slightly more than

two months later, when she sent her availability for March

2024 but was told that she “was not needed on any of [her]

available days.” (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶¶ 23, 34). Two months may

be a sufficiently close temporal proximity to establish

causation. See Henderson, 442 F. App’x at 506 (stating that

a delay of more than three months is not sufficiently close

proximity to establish causation, without more). However, Ms.

Alford’s intervening misconduct severed any causal connection

between the complaint and the alleged retaliation. Brisk, 654

F. App’x at 417.

It is undisputed that Ms. Alford did not comply with the

PRN staffing policy enforced by AdventHealth from February

2024 through May 2024 by failing to work four shifts per

month. (Doc. # 72-22 at ¶¶ 11-13). Ms. Alford merely claims

that, based on her interpretation of AdventHealth’s written

policy, she only needed to provide four dates per month that

she was available to work, which she did. (Doc. # 75-7 at ¶¶

44-45). However, Ms. Alford’s personal interpretation of the

language of the written policy is irrelevant. She does not

dispute that AdventHealth interpreted the policy as requiring

PRN employees to work four shifts per month and that

AdventHealth enforced the policy accordingly. (Doc. # 72-21

at ¶ 29; Doc.# 72-22 ¶¶ 11-13).

Further, Ms. Alford does not offer any record support

for her claim that Ms. Iglesias refused to schedule her “for

shifts on dates which she was available.” (Doc. # 80 at 17).

The fact that Ms. Alford was not scheduled on all her

available dates is not evidence that PRN employees such as

Ms. Alford were needed on such dates and that Ms. Iglesias

intentionally chose not to schedule Ms. Alford. Moreover, Ms.

Alford does not dispute that AdventHealth offered her

additional shifts to pick up from February 2024 through May

2024 so that she could comply with the four-shifts-per-month-

requirement, which she declined. (Doc. # 72-17 at 1); See

(Doc. # 72-2 at 102:24-103:7) (explaining that Ms. Alford did

not pick up additional shifts offered to her in 2024 because

of family and personal obligations). Without record support,

the Court cannot credit Ms. Alford’s conclusory claim that

Ms. Iglesias intentionally refused to schedule her.

Due to Ms. Alford’s intervening failure to work the

required number of shifts, she has not demonstrated a causal

connection between her protected activity and the adverse

action. See Brisk, 654 F. App’x at 417 (“With regard to

Brisk’s retaliation claim based on his termination, the

district court correctly granted summary judgment because

there was no causal connection between the protected conduct

— Brisk taking FMLA leave — and the adverse event,

termination, when the temporal proximity of four months was

tenuous and there was an intervening cause of poor work

performance.”); Henderson, 442 F. App’x at 507 (“Henderson’s

falsification of his time card was an intervening act of

misconduct that diminished any inference of causation that

may have arisen out of the temporal proximity between his

September 14 interview and his termination.”). Accordingly,

Ms. Alford has not established a prima facie retaliation

claim.

2. Ms. Alford Has Not Presented a Convincing

Mosaic of Circumstantial Evidence

Ms. Alford also “fails to establish a convincing mosaic

of circumstantial evidence to create a triable issue as to”

AdventHealth’s retaliatory intent for any of her retaliation

claims. Nevins v. DCH Health Sys., No. 25-12124, 2026 WL

1103517, at *5 (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026). Ms. Alford has not

presented any evidence in support of her conclusory claim

that she “was regularly denied the opportunity to work . . .

in retaliation for [her] protected activity.” (Doc. # 75-7 at

¶ 45). Ms. Alford also has not shown that AdventHealth’s

stated reasons for terminating her were pretextual, such as

by revealing “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies or contradictions in [the employer’s] proffered

legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable

factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Springer v.

Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewing the

record cumulatively and in the light most favorable to Ms.

Alford, the “shards of evidence do not come together to

produce an image of retaliation.” Johnson v. Miami-Dade

Cnty., 169 F.4th 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2026). Therefore,

“there is no evidence that would allow a jury to infer

intentional retaliation by” AdventHealth. Nevins, 2026 WL

1103517, at *5.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 72) is

GRANTED.

(2) Summary judgment in favor of Defendant is granted on

Counts I and II, to the extent they allege violations of

Section 1981, and Count V.

(3) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of

Defendant and against Plaintiff.

(4) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to cancel all

hearings, the trial scheduled for August 2026, terminate

all deadlines, and CLOSE this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 4th

day of June, 2026.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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