Castello-Casali

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ARTURO CASTELLO-CASALI,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-451-JEP-SJH

WARDEN, BAKER COUNTY

DETENTION CENTER, et al.,

Respondents.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Petitioner, a detainee of the United States Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”), filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking, among other relief, an order directing Respondents

to release him or alternatively, provide him with a bond hearing. (Doc. 1 at 7).

Petitioner is a citizen of Cuba who entered the United States without

inspection on April 6, 2022; he was detained by immigration authorities but

then released on his own recognizance. (Doc. 8 at 2). ICE re-detained him on

December 9, 2025, following his arrest during a traffic stop. (Id.; see Doc. 8-3

at 2). He contends, among other things, that his detention without a bond

hearing is unlawful and violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

(Doc. 1 at 6; see Doc. 10 at 2 (“Petitioner has been in custody since December

8, 2025, and is being held without a bond hearing or an individualized

determination of flight risk.”).1

This Court previously addressed claims and arguments similar to those

raised in this case, concluding that the Court has jurisdiction, but the relevant

statutory language and context support the Federal Respondents’ position that

an alien without lawful admission who has resided in the United States for

some appreciable period of time is subject to mandatory detention under

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Diaz Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t of Removal Operations,

817 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2026); see also Lozano Sousa v. Ripa, No. 3:25-

cv-1617-JEP-PDB, 2026 WL 958794 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2026).2 However, on

1 In light of the Court’s obligation to liberally construe pro se filings, see United

States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2024), the Court construes

Petitioner’s allegations as contesting his classification under 8 U.S.C. § 1225

(mandatory detention) instead of under § 1226 (opportunity for a bond), as well as

raising a due process challenge. See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, --- F.4th ---, No.

25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395, at *14 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026) (concluding that Ҥ 1225

applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens

unlawfully in the interior”). Indeed, the Federal Respondents addressed separately

whether Petitioner was properly held under § 1225 or § 1226 and whether his

detention violates due process. (Doc. 8 at 7-12).

2 To the extent the Federal Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies prior to filing this case, the Court rejects their argument.

At the time Petitioner filed this case, any administrative request for a bond hearing

would have been futile, because the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had

conclusively determined that immigration judges had no authority to consider bond

requests from aliens like Petitioner. See In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,

220-28 (BIA 2025). Because the BIA had “predetermined” the issue, requiring

Petitioner to pursue further administrative remedies before the Petition was filed

would have been futile. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992) (recognizing

that a petitioner need not exhaust administrative remedies if “the administrative

body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it”); see,

May 6, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the opposite approach

on the substantive issue under the Immigration and Nationality Act,

concluding that Ҥ 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the border,

whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in the interior.” Hernandez Alvarez

v. Warden, --- F.4th ---, No. 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395, at *14 (11th Cir. May

6, 2026).3 This Court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case.

Therefore, it is ORDERED:

1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

(Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim that his detention

without an individualized bond hearing is unlawful under the

e.g., Fonseca v. Ripa, No. 3:26-cv-309-MMH-MCR, 2026 WL 1072778, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

Apr. 21, 2026) (“Requiring [the petitioner] to appeal [the immigration judge’s denial

of his request for a custody redetermination] to the BIA or make any further

administrative request for a bond hearing would be futile.”); Puga v. Assistant Field

Off. Dir., Krome N. Serv. Processing Ctr., No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *2

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (“Since the result of [the p]etitioner’s custody

redetermination and any subsequent bond appeal to the BIA is nearly a foregone

conclusion under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, any prudential exhaustion requirements

are excused for futility.”).

3 Although the mandate has not yet issued, the Eleventh Circuit’s published

opinion has immediate precedential effect. See Martin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944,

945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that a published opinion “is the law in this circuit

unless and until it is reversed, overruled, vacated, or otherwise modified by the

Supreme Court of the United States or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc,” and

that a stay of the mandate “in no way affects the duty of . . . the courts in this circuit

to apply now the precedent established by” the published opinion “as binding

authority”); 11th Cir. IOP—Cir. R. 36.2 (“Under the law of this circuit, published

opinions are binding precedent. The issuance or non-issuance of the mandate does

not affect this result.”).

INA.‘ Within seven days of this Order, Respondents shall either

afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a) or release Petitioner. If Respondents release

Petitioner, they shall provide Petitioner with access to a telephone

to arrange transportation from the detention facility.

2. The Warden’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is DENIED for the same

reasons stated in Lanvin- Valdez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft,

No. 3:26-CV-180-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 1004569, at *2—-8 (M.D. Fla.

Apr. 14, 2026).

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment granting the petition,

terminate any pending motions as moot, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on June 4, 2026.

JORDAN E. PRATT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

C:

Counsel of Record

4 Because the Court grants relief on Petitioner’s claim under the INA, the

Court need not address Petitioner’s other claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,

689 n.10 (2004) (declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after

granting relief on another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that

claim would be cumulative’).