The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DAVID RADEMAKER, No. 2:26-cv-0234 CSK P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 SIRCOYA WILLIAMS, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
18 § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This
19 proceeding was referred to this Court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
20 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
21 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.
23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in
24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the Court will
25 direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account
26 and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly
27 payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account.
28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time
1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.
2 § 1915(b)(2).
3 Plaintiff is granted an opportunity to elect to proceed on her Eighth Amendment claims
4 against certain defendants, or she may elect to amend the complaint as discussed below. In
5 addition, plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
6 I. SCREENING STANDARDS
7 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
8 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
9 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally
10 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
11 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
12 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
13 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
14 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an
15 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
16 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
17 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
18 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
19 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
20 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at
21 1227.
22 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain
23 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
24 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
25 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
26 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a
27 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations
28 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.
1 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the
2 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.
3 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal
4 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as
5 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the
6 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
7 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
8 II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
9 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a federal
10 constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under
11 the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d
12 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the
13 facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal
14 connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation.
15 See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44
16 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable
17 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
18 (2009). The requisite causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
19 violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights can be established in a number of ways, including
20 by demonstrating that a supervisor’s own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision,
21 or control of his or her subordinates was a cause of plaintiff’s injury. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
22 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011).
23 III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
24 Plaintiff, who identifies as transgender, alleges that since she was transferred to California
25 Medical Facility (“CMF”) on June 23, 2023, she has been refused single cell status, despite
26 having been single celled for 25 years in state and county custody due to her mental health issues
27 and gender status.1 Around January 25, 2024, plaintiff stopped receiving ducats for EOP groups
28 1 Plaintiff receives mental health care at the enhanced outpatient (“EOP”) level. “CDCR’s
1 and case manager for mental health treatment. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff sets forth multiple
2 health care request forms submitted to multiple defendants from January 2024 through April 2024
3 that went unanswered. Plaintiff twice wrote defendant Warden Daniel E. Cuevia concerning
4 mental health professionals’ failure to respond, but received no response. On April 10, 2024,
5 another prisoner was housed in plaintiff’s cell, and plaintiff alleges she got into a cell fight due to
6 seeking mental health care for months and not receiving it, causing her to deteriorate. (Id. at 10.)
7 Plaintiff was injured during the use of force to break up the fight, and still takes medications for
8 those injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff’s requests for mental health care after the cell fight also went
9 unanswered. (Id. at 10-11.) Later, during a mental health evaluation conducted by defendant
10 Chelsea Hagen, Clinical Supervisor, in connection with the rules violation report (“RVR”)
11 plaintiff sustained after the cell fight, defendant Chelsea Hagen falsified a law enforcement state
12 document, allegedly violating California Penal Code §§ 125 and 134, by claiming plaintiff was
13 stable in the weeks prior to the RVR and stating clinicians indicated that plaintiff was not
14 demonstrating observable signs of any mental illness, despite plaintiff’s multiple health care
15 requests for mental health treatment for months prior to the cell fight. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff alleges
16 she also filed a government tort claim against defendant Chelsea Hagen. (Id. at 29.)
17 Plaintiff names eleven defendants employed at CMF: Sircoya Williams, Warden; Daniel
18 E. Cuevia, Warden (retired); Tracy Patterson, Chief, Mental Health; J. Spaich, Associate Warden,
19 Health Care Access Unit; Jarrod Campbell, Chief Psychologist; Curtis Edwards, Clinical
20 Psychologist; Sarah Smith, Clinical Psychologist; Benjamin Hulkower, Clinical Psychologist;
21 Burris Lee, Clinical Psychiatrist; Shadavia France, Senior Supervising Psychologist; and Chelsea
22 Hagen, Senior Psychologist. Plaintiff also names defendants John and Jane Does 1-5. (ECF No.
23 1 at 3.)
24 Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment and money damages. (ECF No. 1 at 32.)
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26 Mental Health Services Delivery System Program Guide provides four levels of mental health
care services: Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS); Enhanced Outpatient
27 (EOP); Mental Health Crisis Bed (MHCB) and inpatient hospital care . . . .” Coleman v. Brown,
No. CIV. S-90-520 LKK, 2013 WL 6491529, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013).
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1 IV. DISCUSSION
2 The Court finds that plaintiff states potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claims
3 against the following defendants who worked at CMF in early 2024: Daniel E. Cuevia, Tracy
4 Patterson, J. Spaich, Jarrod Campbell, Curtis Edwards, Sarah Smith, Benjamin Hulkower, Burris
5 Lee, and Shadavia France, for violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to adequate mental
6 health care at California Medical Facility.
7 Plaintiff also names Chelsea Hagen, Senior Psychologist, who plaintiff alleges is in charge
8 of doing mental health evaluations after the inmate enrolled in EOP receives an RVR to see if
9 mental illness caused or contributed to the RVR. (ECF No. 1 at 22.) Plaintiff alleges defendant
10 Chelsea Hagen falsified a state law enforcement document to claim plaintiff was not suffering
11 from a mental illness prior to the cell fight. The falsification of medical records alone does not
12 constitute an independent basis for relief under Section 1983. See Landrigan v. City of Warwick,
13 628 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding “the existence of a false police report . . . does not by itself
14 deprive[ ] a person of a right secured by the Constitution and its laws.”). Nonetheless, if true, this
15 allegation may support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th
16 Cir. 1997) (holding whether prison physician falsified medical data is a question of fact that
17 speaks to whether the physician was deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s well-being in violation
18 of Eighth Amendment); Delacruz v. Coeur D’Alene Police Dep’t, 2010 WL 1817776, at *7-8 (D.
19 Idaho May 6, 2010) (while prisoner’s falsification of medical records claim could not proceed as
20 independent civil rights claim, it could be a basis for the Fourteenth Amendment claim related to
21 medical care allegations). Plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Chelsea Hagen falsified a state law
22 enforcement document raises an implication that plaintiff did not receive adequate mental health
23 care as a result. Thus, plaintiff may proceed with the falsification report claim as a basis for her
24 Eighth Amendment claim related to the lack of mental health care she alleges.
25 However, plaintiff also claims that defendant Chelsea Hagen’s actions violated California
26 penal code sections. However, criminal statutes do not give rise to civil liability. Allen v. Gold
27 Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, plaintiff’s state law claims are
28 dismissed with leave to amend.
1 Unlike plaintiff’s allegations as to Warden Daniel E. Cuevia, plaintiff provided no facts
2 demonstrating defendant Sircoya Williams’ personal involvement in the events of early 2024.
3 Rather, plaintiff alleges that Sircoya Williams was responsible for ensuring all inmates, including
4 plaintiff, were properly classified under the Mental Health Services Delivery System. (ECF No. 1
5 at 14.) Such allegations are based on defendant Sircoya Williams’ supervisory role as warden.2
6 Therefore, plaintiff’s allegations as to defendant Sircoya Williams are dismissed without
7 prejudice.
8 Plaintiff also names defendants John and Jane Does 1-5. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff’s use
9 of Doe defendants is problematic, see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980),
10 and ultimately unnecessary. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not state law “Doe”
11 pleading practices, governs whether new defendants may be added and if so, whether the claims
12 against them would relate back to the filing of the initial complaint. Should plaintiff learn the
13 identities of the “Doe” parties she wishes to serve, she must promptly move pursuant to Rule 15
14 to file an amended complaint to add them as defendants. See Brass v. County of Los Angeles,
15 328 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2003). If the timing of plaintiff’s amended complaint raises
16 questions as to the statute of limitations, plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of Rule 15(c),
17 which is the controlling procedure for adding defendants whose identities were discovered after
18 the action is commenced. Additionally, unknown persons cannot be served with process until
19 they are identified by their real names, and the court will not investigate the names and identities
20 of unnamed defendants.
21 V. PLAINTIFF’S OPTIONS
22 Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendants Daniel E. Cuevia, Tracy Patterson, J.
23 Spaich, Jarrod Campbell, Curtis Edwards, Sarah Smith, Benjamin Hulkower, Burris Lee,
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2 Importantly, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation website reflects
25 Sircoya Williams was appointed as warden at CMF in January 2026, and previously served as
acting warden since December 2024. This information was obtained from the CDCR Inmate
26 Locator website, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/facility-locator/cmf/ (accessed Jan. 29, 2026). The
Court may take judicial notice of public records available on online inmate locators. See United
27 States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of Bureau of
Prisons’ inmate locator available to the public); see also Foley v. Martz, 2018 WL 5111998, at *1
28 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2018) (taking judicial notice of CDCR’s inmate locator).
1 Shadavia France, and Chelsea Hagen for violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to
2 adequate mental health care at California Medical Facility, and may pursue plaintiff’s potentially
3 cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against only those defendants, or she may delay serving
4 any defendant and attempt to state a cognizable claim against defendant Sircoya Williams and a
5 cognizable state law claim against defendant Chelsea Hagen. If plaintiff elects to proceed
6 forthwith against the ten listed defendants against whom plaintiff stated potentially cognizable
7 Eighth Amendment claims for relief, then within thirty days plaintiff must so elect on the attached
8 form. In this event the Court will construe plaintiff’s election as consent to dismissal of the
9 Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Sircoya Williams, and the state law claims against
10 defendant Chelsea Hagen, without prejudice. Under this option, plaintiff does not need to file an
11 amended complaint.
12 Or, plaintiff may delay serving any defendant and attempt again to state a cognizable
13 Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Sircoya Williams and state law claim against
14 defendant Chelsea Hagen. If plaintiff elects to attempt to amend the complaint to state cognizable
15 claims against defendants Sircoya Williams and Chelsea Hagen, plaintiff has thirty days to
16 amend. Plaintiff is not granted leave to add new claims or new defendants.
17 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought
18 in the right place, plaintiff has complied with the California Government Claims Act, and plaintiff
19 is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must contain a request for particular relief.
20 Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial
21 way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743
22 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he or she
23 does an act, participates in another’s act, or omits to perform an act he or she is legally required to
24 do that causes the alleged deprivation).
25 A district court must construe a pro se pleading “liberally” to determine if it states a claim
26 and, prior to dismissal, tell a plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and give plaintiff an
27 opportunity to cure them. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). While
28 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
1 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
2 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff
3 must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
4 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).
5 A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
6 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for
7 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
8 defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.
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10 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions
11 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are
12 not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.
13 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.
14 Local Rule 220; see Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015)
15 (“an ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-
16 existent.’” (internal citation omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original
17 pleading is superseded. Plaintiff is not granted leave to add new claims or new defendants.
18 VI. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
19 Plaintiff requests that the court appoint counsel. District courts lack authority to require
20 counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist.
21 Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request an attorney
22 to voluntarily represent such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d
23 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990).
24 When determining whether “exceptional circumstances” exist, the court must consider plaintiff’s
25 likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro
26 se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970
27 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse discretion in declining to appoint counsel). The
28 burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id. Circumstances
1 common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not
2 establish exceptional circumstances that warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel.
3 Having considered the factors under Palmer, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to
4 meet her burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of
5 counsel at this time.
6 VII. ORDERS
7 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
8 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
9 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff
10 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
11 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the
12 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently
13 herewith.
14 3. Eighth Amendment claims against defendant Sircoya Williams and state law claims
15 against defendant Chelsea Hagen are dismissed with leave to amend. Within thirty days of
16 service of this order, plaintiff may amend the complaint to attempt to state cognizable claims
17 against defendants Sircoya Williams and Chelsea Hagen. Plaintiff is not obligated to amend the
18 complaint.
19 4. The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state potentially cognizable Eighth
20 Amendment claims against defendants Daniel E. Cuevia, Tracy Patterson, J. Spaich, Jarrod
21 Campbell, Curtis Edwards, Sarah Smith, Benjamin Hulkower, Burris Lee, Shadavia France, and
22 Chelsea Hagen. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If plaintiff chooses to proceed solely as to such claims,
23 plaintiff shall so indicate on the attached form and return it to the Court within thirty days from
24 the date of this order. In this event, the Court will construe plaintiff’s election to proceed
25 forthwith as consent to an order dismissing the defective claims without prejudice.
26 5. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action
27 proceed solely on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Daniel E. Cuevia,
28 Tracy Patterson, J. Spaich, Jarrod Campbell, Curtis Edwards, Sarah Smith, Benjamin Hulkower,
1 | Burris Lee, Shadavia France, and Chelsea Hagen.
2 6. Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) is denied without
3 || prejudice.
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5 || Dated: February 3, 2026
6 Cha Spo \L
CHI SOO KIM
7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
8 || /1/rade0234.140
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DAVID RADEMAKER, No. 2:26-cv-0234 CSK P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. NOTICE OF ELECTION
14 SIRCOYA WILLIAMS,
15 Defendants.
16
Plaintiff elects to proceed as follows:
17
______ Plaintiff opts to proceed with the Eighth Amendment claims against
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defendants Daniel E. Cuevia, Tracy Patterson, J. Spaich, Jarrod Campbell,
19 Curtis Edwards, Sarah Smith, Benjamin Hulkower, Burris Lee, Shadavia
France, and Chelsea Hagen. Under this option, plaintiff consents to
20 dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Sircoya
Williams, and the state law claims against defendant Chelsea Hagen,
21 without prejudice.
22 OR
23 _____ Plaintiff opts to file an amended complaint and delay service of process.
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DATED: _______________________________
25 Plaintiff
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