Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Plaintiff, Case No. 8:25-cv-116-KKM-SPF

v.

DARRYL J. MADISON,

MALIK F. EUGENE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

The United States moves for default judgment and entry of a permanent

injunction against Darryl Madison, (Doc. 95), as well as to hold Madison Tax

Services in contempt, (Doc. 96). The United States Magistrate Judge entered

a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the motion for default

judgment be granted and that the contempt motion be granted in part and

denied in part. R. & R. (Doc. 107). Darryl Madison, proceeding pro se, filed a

timely objection.1 Obj. (Doc. 111). Considering the record, the Court reserves

ruling on the Report and Recommendation and requests supplemental briefing

1 Madison purported to file a second objection on May 27, 2026. See (Doc. 112). That

objection is untimely, as it was filed beyond the time permitted by 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(d) and 72(b)(2).

from the United States on the propriety of entering default judgment against

only a subset of defendants before a final adjudication as to the remaining

defendants.

After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and

recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate

judge’s Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party files a

timely and specific objection to a finding of fact by a magistrate judge, the

district court must conduct a de novo review with respect to that factual issue.

Stokes v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1567, 1576 (11th Cir. 1992). The district court

reviews legal conclusions de novo, even absent an objection. See Cooper-

Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994); Ashworth v. Glades

Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1246 (M.D. Fla. 2019).

Before addressing Madison’s objection, I note a threshold issue. The

Report and Recommendation recommends granting default judgment against

Darryl Madison—who must disgorge ill-gotten gains and face a permanent

injunction—and his tax preparation business, Madison Tax Services. See R. &

R. at 14–15. At the same time, defendants Malik Eugene, Yvette Madison, and

Marlesa Brown are not in default and the government’s claims against them

remain pending. See id. at 2 n.1 (explaining that “none of these individuals are

subject to the United States’ instant motions”).

Ordinarily, in cases involving multiple defendants, a judgment should

not be entered against a defaulted party alleged to be jointly liable until the

matter has been adjudicated with respect to all defendants. See Gulf Coast

Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Imps., Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984)

(citing Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872)). Further, it is “sound policy”

that “when defendants are similarly situated, but not jointly liable, judgment

should not be entered against a defaulting defendant if the other defendant

prevails on the merits.” Id.; see Drill S., Inc. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1232,

1237 n.8 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Frow has been interpreted to apply only when there

is a risk of inconsistent adjudications.”).

Although the government details allegations against Madison and

Madison Tax Services related to the preparation of specific tax returns, see

Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 11–31, 121–164, the relief sought appears to apply equally

to all defendants, see id. ¶ 258 (requesting that the Court “[f]ind that the

Defendants repeatedly and continually engaged in conduct subject to penalty

under [the Internal Revenue Code]” and “[e]nter a permanent injunction

prohibiting the Defendants . . . from directly or indirectly” performing various

tax preparation activities) (emphasis added). Thus, despite the defaulted

defendants’ troubling litigation conduct, see R. & R. at 3–7 (detailing

noncompliance with multiple court orders), all defendants still appear

“similarly situated” for liability purposes based on the allegations in the

complaint, see Gulf Coast Fans, 740 F.2d at 1512.

Before the Court will consider the Report and Recommendation and

Madison’s objection, the government is therefore directed to explain why the

Court should deviate from the “preferred practice . . . to withhold granting a

default judgment until [resolution] of the action on the merits against the

remaining defendants.” Essex Ins. Co. v. Moore, No. 6:11-cv-515-Orl-19KRS,

2011 WL 3235685, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2011).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. The Court RESERVES RULING on the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation (Doc. 107), Darryl Madison’s

Objection (Doc. 111), and the United States’ Motion for Default

Judgment (Doc. 95) and Motion to Hold Madison Tax Services in

Contempt (Doc. 96).

2. No later than June 15, 2026, and in a brief not to exceed ten pages,

the United States is directed to address whether entry of default

judgment is presently appropriate as against only a subset of the

defendants in this action.

3. No later than June 15, 2026, and in a brief not to exceed ten pages,

Defendant Darryl Madison is permitted to address the above

question.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 1, 2026.

ae 4 Mizelle

United States District Judge