Vega

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JUAN F. VEGA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-304-KCD-NPM

FNU HORN,

Defendants,

/

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

Plaintiff Juan F. Vega, a civilly committed resident of the Florida Civil

Commitment Center (FCCC), brought this pro se civil rights complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Horn

wrote a misleading disciplinary report based upon his (Horn’s)

misinterpretation of Plaintiff’s comments. The complaint is before the Court

for initial screening.

After careful review, the Court dismisses the amended complaint

without prejudice because it does not state a claim on which relief may be

granted.

I. Complaint

The facts from Vega’s complaint are straight-forward. He alleges that

two other residents of the FCCC had an argument on December 8, 2025. (Doc.

1 at 4). When a third resident attempted to intervene, Vega told him to “stay

out of it and mind your own business because there’s over 600 residents and

they can do what they want and who’s going to stop them; the residents run

this place so don’t make matters [worse].” (Id. at 5). Defendant Horn overheard

the comment and wrote a behavior management report against Vega. But Horn

“changed the contents and meaning of the communication” to allege that:

On December 8, 2025, [Vega] disrupted the normal operation

of the facility by stating “There is over 600 residents, and

they can do what they want because who’s going to stop them

the residents run this case.”

(Id.) Vega was found guilty of “[i]nciting, attempting to incite, or participate

in riots, strikes, mutinous acts, or disturbances by conveying [an]

inflammatory, riotous, or mutinous communication by word of mouth, in

writing, or by sign, symbol, or gesture.” (Id. at 6).

Vega asserts that his comment to the other resident was speech

protected by the First Amendment, which Defendant twisted to Vega’s

detriment. (Id.) He seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7).

II. Legal Standards

Vega did not include the filing fee with his complaint, so the Court

assumes that he wishes to proceed as a pauper. When a plaintiff seeks to

proceed in forma pauperis, the district court must review the complaint and

dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).1 The statute’s mandatory

language provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof,

that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the

case at any time if the court determines that-

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), (B). A complaint should be dismissed as frivolous if

it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325

(1989). And a claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things,

the defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a right that

clearly does not exist. Id. at 327.

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d

1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). As such, when screening a complaint under §1915,

well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are viewed as true and

1 Although Vega is not a prisoner, his pleadings are subject to review under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). See Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002).

reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Brown v. Johnson,

387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). But mere “labels and conclusions” are

not accepted as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (noting that courts “are not

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”)).

III. Discussion

For starters, Vega’s operative complaint is unsigned. This deficiency

alone renders it subject to dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (“Every

pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one

attorney of record in the attorney's name—or by a party personally if the

party is unrepresented.”). However, the Court will not direct Vega to return

a signed complaint because, as explained below, the facts alleged do not

contain a viable claim.

First, Vega has not stated a First Amendment claim. As a civilly

committed sexually violent predator, Vega simply does not have complete

freedom to say whatever he wants. While “an inmate is considered to be

exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech when he complains

to the prison’s administrators about the conditions of his confinement,” Smith

v. Mosely, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008), the right doesn’t protect

speech, such as Vega’s inflammatory comments here, that could reasonably

be interpreted to contain a threat or call for violence. In short, “an inmate’s

First Amendment right to free speech is not protected if affording protection

would be inconsistent with the inmate’s status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Id. at 1276.

Next, to the extent Vega seeks to raise a due process claim based on

Defendant’s allegedly misleading report, the filing of false disciplinary

charges, standing alone, does not state a constitutional claim. The

Constitution requires only that the plaintiff be afforded due process at the

institutional hearing (on the allegedly false charge), which represents the

plaintiff’s opportunity to expose falsities or inaccuracies. See Freeman v.

Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing that the protections

from actions such as false disciplinary reports are found in “the procedural

due process requirements as set forth in [Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539

(1974)]”). Vega does not claim that he failed to receive due process at his

disciplinary hearing where he could have explained his comments.

IV. Conclusion

Vega’s complaint is subject to dismissal because it is unsigned and does

not state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

And because the facts alleged here cannot give rise to a claim, amendment

would be futile. Thus, the dismissal is without leave to amend. Sifford v. Ford,

701 F. App’x 794, 796 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A] district court need not allow even

a pro se plaintiff leave to amend where amendment would be futile.”).

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions, close this

case and enter judgment accordingly.

ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 2, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge