Patel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

PAMELA PATEL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-01886-WFJ-AAS

BAYCARE HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.,

Defendant.

_________________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant BayCare Health System, Inc.’s (“BayCare”)

Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 58. Plaintiff Pamela Patel (“Patel”) has

responded in opposition, Dkt. 71, and BayCare has replied. Dkt. 79. On April 1,

2026, the Court held a motion hearing on this matter. Dkt. 84. Upon careful

consideration, and with the benefit of able argument by both sides, the Court finds

that summary judgment is due to be granted as to all counts.

BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiff’s Position and Employment

On April 11, 2022, BayCare hired Ms. Patel as Executive Assistant to the

Hospital President, Becky Schulkowski, and three other C-Suite Executives—the

Chief Medical Officer, the Director of Operations, and the Director of Patient

Services—at the newly constructed BayCare Hospital Wesley Chapel (“the

Hospital”). Dkt. 60 46:7-18; Dkt. 72 ¶ 1; Dkt. 72-1. Schulkowski was Patel’s direct

supervisor, though Patel provided some assistance to the other Executives. Dkt. 59

¶ 3; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 3.

At the time of Ms. Patel’s hire, the Hospital was still under construction. Dkt.

59 ¶ 5; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 5. During that pre-opening period, Patel and the Executives

worked from temporary offices at the BayCare Integrated Service Center (“BISC”)

in Temple Terrace, where at least one other Executive Assistant was also on staff.

Dkt. 59 ¶ 6; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 6. While at the BISC, Patel performed a relatively limited

set of duties—scheduling, call routing, mail distribution, document organization,

supply ordering, meeting coordination, and related administrative tasks—and

worked from home one to two days per week. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 7, 9; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 7, 9; see

also Dkt. 60-1 at 1 (showing BayCare’s “Job Description” for the executive assistant

role). Before the Hospital’s opening, BayCare asserts that it was repeatedly

communicated in staff meetings that, upon relocation to the Hospital, all

administrative executives and staff, including Patel, were expected to work in person

and on-site. Dkt. 59 ¶ 10. Plaintiff claims she was never informed of such

expectations in staff meetings. Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 10.

On December 20, 2022, Hospital leadership and staff moved into the

Administration Suite at the new Hospital. Dkt. 59 ¶ 13; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 13. While there

may have been other administrative support employees in the Hospital, Patel’s

position was the only assistant role for the C-Suite executives. Dkt. 59 ¶ 14; Dkt. 71-

2 ¶ 14.

With the move to the Hospital, Patel’s responsibilities changed. Dkt. 59 ¶ 17;

Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 17. BayCare asserts Patel’s new duties now involved: serving as the

receptionist of the Administration Suite; ensuring no unauthorized visitors passed

into Executive offices (which she described as the “biggest part” of her job); greeting

and escorting visitors from Guest Services to the Administration Suite; managing

Schulkowski’s calendar and serving as a daily sounding board; answering and

routing calls; receiving and distributing mail; managing conference room

reservations and setting up all audio/visual equipment; preparing Board Books and

printed materials for Board meetings; attending Board meetings and recording

minutes; filing, printing, and shredding documents; ordering supplies; and

performing other tasks as assigned. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 18–23; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 18–23.

Patel testified that she sometimes needed to be in person “to get things done,”

since Schulkowski’s responsiveness to emails was variable. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 26–27; Dkt.

71-2 ¶¶ 26–27. Once the Hospital opened, she occasionally worked remotely on

Fridays but was otherwise in-person Monday through Friday. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 28, 30; Dkt.

71-2 ¶¶ 28, 30. The Hospital opened to patients on March 7, 2023. Dkt. 59 ¶ 37; Dkt.

71-2 ¶ 37.

II. Plaintiff’s FMLA Leave and Extensions

Ms. Patel began maternity leave on March 14, 2023, the same day she gave

birth. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 39, 43; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 39, 43. Because she had not yet satisfied the

twelve-month eligibility requirement for FMLA leave at that time, Plaintiff had been

approved for continuous Company Medical Leave from March 14, 2023, through

May 1, 2023, as a bridge. Dkt. 59 ¶ 50; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 50. On May 2, 2023, Patel became

FMLA-eligible and was approved for twelve weeks of FMLA leave, running from

May 2, 2023, through July 24, 2023—her full statutory entitlement. Dkt. 59 ¶ 54;

Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 54. Upon exhaustion of her FMLA leave, additional Company Medical

Leave was approved for Patel through August 1, 2023, resulting in a total of 20

weeks of approved leave following the birth of her child. Dkt. 59 ¶ 57; Dkt. 71-2 ¶

57.

On July 18, 2023, before her leave ended, Patel emailed Schulkowski

requesting flexible scheduling and remote work, indicating she anticipated needing

these accommodations until at least April 5, 2024—more than a year after her child’s

birth and approximately eight additional months beyond her scheduled return date.

Dkt. 59 ¶ 59; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 59. In the email, Patel cited dehydration, fatigue, back pain,

delayed childbirth recovery, postpartum depression, separation anxiety, and

concerns about exposure to pathogens and off-gassed toxins at the new hospital

facility. Dkt. 59 ¶ 60; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 60; see Dkt. 60-11 at 2 (showing Plaintiff’s email).

Consistent with BayCare policy, Patel was provided a “BayCare Employee

Health Work Clearance Form” for her OB-GYN physician to complete. Dkt. 59 ¶

61; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 61; Dkt. 60-14 (showing Work Clearance Form). On July 20, 2023,

the doctor completed the form, circling “No” to the question of whether Ms. Patel

had “a physical or mental impairment that limits [her] ability to perform an essential

function of [her] job,” and identified no physical, environmental, or other restrictions

or limitations. Dkt. 60-14; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 62. The doctor’s sole notation stated: “If

patient can work from home, she will be able to perform her duties as expected,”

with the end date of these restrictions being “uncertain.” Dkt. 60-14; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 63.

The doctor later testified that, at the time she completed the form, she was unaware

of Patel’s specific job duties or whether those duties could be performed remotely;

instead, she was merely supporting Patel’s preference to work from home. Dkt. 59

¶¶ 64–65; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 64–65.

III. The Interactive Process

On July 25, 2023, BayCare’s Team Member Relations Coordinator, Joi

Daniel, notified Patel that her request to work remotely in her Executive Assistant

role could not be accommodated. Dkt. 59 ¶ 70; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 70. The parties then

agreed to virtually meet on August 3, 2023, to engage in the interactive process and

further discuss Patel’s options. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 72–73; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 72–73.

On August 3, 2023, Sheila Redfearn, Director of Team Resources, and Joi

Daniel held a videoconference with Patel and her husband to discuss accommodation

options. Dkt. 59 ¶ 80; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 80. During that meeting, Patel shared a list of

suggested accommodations she and her husband had prepared, including requests

for a reverse osmosis water filter system,1 monthly water testing, IQ Air HealthPro

Plus GC air filtration in all areas of the Hospital, a closed-door private office with

UV and HyperHEPA filtration systems, monthly testing of all air filtration

equipment, a massage chair, and other items. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 83–84; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 83–84;

see Dkt. 60-21 at 1 (showing copy of Plaintiff’s requests).

BayCare understood that these were additional accommodations Ms. Patel

required to return to in-person work at the Hospital. Dkt. 59 ¶ 85. However, Patel

admitted during her deposition that she did not know what many of the items were,

what EWG standards or PFAS are, or which chemicals would be off-gassed by the

building. Dkt. 59 ¶ 88; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 88. No physician recommended all of these

suggested accommodations. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 91–92; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 91–92. Ms. Patel’s

husband, a preconstruction manager, helped prepare the list. Dkt. 59 ¶ 88; Dkt. 71-

2 ¶ 88.

1 Specifically, Plaintiff preferred the “RO water to ensure toxins, PFAS, pesticides, and excessive minerals in Pasco

County water are removed and comply with EWG standards. Hardness to be 75ppm or less. Monthly testing by 3rd

party to ensure compliance with EWG standards and maintenance per the manufacturer[’s] suggested schedule.” Dkt.

60-21.

On August 8, 2023, Sheila Redfearn sent Patel a detailed letter explaining

BayCare’s accommodation position and enclosing a medical questionnaire for her

physician, asking the physician to identify (i) whether each requested

accommodation was necessitated by a specific physical or psychological limitation;

(ii) whether the limitation affected Patel’s ability to perform the essential functions

of her job; (iii) how the accommodation would help her perform those functions; and

(iv) the expected duration. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 99–100; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 99–100. Patel never

provided the questionnaire to her doctor and never authorized BayCare to contact

her doctor directly. Dkt. 59 ¶ 92; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 92.

Throughout the interactive process, BayCare agreed to accommodate some of

Ms. Patel’s suggestions, including pump breaks, additional bathroom breaks,

flexible scheduling for doctor and therapy appointments, and the ability to bring and

drink her own water. Dkt. 59 ¶ 101; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 101; Dkt. 60-21. On August 18,

2023, BayCare also offered Patel the services of a Placement Coordinator to assist

in finding a remote or in-person position at another facility and to accommodate her

scheduling needs in any such position. Dkt. 59 ¶ 106; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 106. The

Placement Coordinator contacted Patel on August 21, 2023. Dkt. 59 ¶ 107; Dkt. 71-

2 ¶ 107. That same day, Ms. Patel rejected the Placement Coordinator’s assistance.

Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 108–109; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 108–109.

Patel never returned to work in person. Dkt. 60-36. By September 18, 2023,

BayCare had hired a temporary employee to fill the Executive Assistant position.

Dkt. 59 ¶ 116; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 116. On September 22, 2023, seven months after the

child’s birth and more than seven weeks after Patel’s FMLA leave had exhausted,

BayCare terminated her employment. Dkt. 59 ¶ 120; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 120.

IV. Procedural History

On August 11, 2024, Ms. Patel filed suit against BayCare. Dkt. 1. In her

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges ten counts against Defendants: a Fair Labor

Standards Act claim, Count I; Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) claims for

interference and retaliation, Counts II and III; Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

(“PWFA”) claims for failure to accommodate, retaliation, and interference, Counts

IV–VI; and Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) claims for retaliation, retaliatory

hostile work environment, and discrimination, Counts VII–X.2 See Dkt. 32. On

January 30, 2026, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment on

Counts II–X. See Dkt. 58.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is “no genuine issue as to

any material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a).

2 Count I is not before the Court on summary judgment, as the parties have settled this claim. See Dkt. 37.

An issue of fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the

governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is

“genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving

party. See id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986).

The moving party has the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, and all factual inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.

See Allen v. Tyson Foods Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997); Pennington v.

City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting a court must

“review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party”). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, it shifts to the

non-moving party to come forward with evidence showing a genuine issue of

material fact that precludes summary judgment. Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d

1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), (c).

Speculation or conjecture cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Cordoba v.

Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). The court may not weigh the

evidence to resolve a factual dispute; if a genuine issue of material fact exists, the

court must deny summary judgment. Hutcherson v. Progressive Corp., 984 F.2d

1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 1993). Likewise, the court should deny summary judgment if

reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed

facts. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir.

1992).

Additionally, a district court is only required to consider “the cited materials”

when deciding a motion for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and

“[m]aking district courts dig through volumes of documents and transcripts would

shift the burden of sifting from petitioners to the courts. . . . [D]istrict court judges

are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record.” Chavez v.

Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011). “[T]here is no

burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made

based on the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the

parties to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon

in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672

F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d

587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995)).

DISCUSSION

Based on a careful review of the record, the Court finds that BayCare is

entitled to summary judgment on all counts because there is no genuine dispute that

BayCare complied with federal law before terminating Plaintiff’s employment. This

Order will address each one of Plaintiff’s counts in turn.

I. FMLA Claims (Counts II and III)

The FMLA allows employees to take leave for certain medical reasons under

29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 and 2612. For these reasons, an eligible employee may take up

to 12 weeks of leave due to a serious health condition that renders her unable to

perform the functions of her position. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Upon return from FMLA

leave, the statute also guarantees an eligible employee the right to be restored to her

former position or an equivalent position at the end of her leave, provided she can

perform the essential functions of her job. See id. § 2614(a)(1). “But if, after twelve

weeks, the employee cannot perform an essential function of her job, her employer

may choose to end her employment.” Ramji v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 992

F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c)).

To ensure these FMLA rights are enforced, the statute “creates two types of

claims: interference claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer denied

or otherwise interfered with his substantive rights under the Act . . . , and retaliation

claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer discriminated against him

because he engaged in activity protected by the Act.” Jones v. Gulf Coast Health

Care of Delaware, LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation modified).

a. FMLA Interference Claim—Count II

“Under the FMLA, a covered employer may not interfere with, restrain, or

deny the employee’s exercise or attempted exercise of her FMLA rights to coverage,

leave entitlement, notice, benefits continuation, and job restoration.” Ramji, 992

F.3d at 1241 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654; 29 C.F.R. §§

825.100–825.803). “To establish an FMLA interference claim, an employee must

show she was entitled to a benefit under the FMLA and her employer denied her that

benefit.” Id. (citation omitted). Once Plaintiff has shown a denial of a benefit, “the

employee must also demonstrate some harm from the alleged interference, and that

harm must be remediable by either damages or equitable relief.” Id. (citation

modified). An employee establishes an FMLA interference claim when the

employee “demonstrate[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled

to an FMLA benefit that was denied.” Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320,

1331 (11th Cir. 2018)

“Unlike retaliation claims, a plaintiff bringing an interference claim is not

required to make any showing regarding the employer’s motives.” Lapham v.

Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 896 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Where, as is

the case here, “the alleged interference was the decision to terminate an employee, .

. . the employer may defend against an FMLA interference claim by establishing that

the employee would have been terminated anyway.” Id. (citation modified); see also

Spakes v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 631 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (“If an

employer demonstrates that it would have discharged an employee for a reason

wholly unrelated to the FMLA leave, the employer is not liable under the FMLA for

damages for failure to reinstate.” (citation modified)).

As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Patel’s childbirth entitled her to

12 weeks of FMLA leave and that she received all 12 weeks. First, the record shows

that Patel did not yet qualify for FMLA leave at the time of her child’s birth on

March 14, 2023, so she was granted nearly seven weeks of “Company Medical

Leave” as a bridge to FMLA eligibility on May 2, 2023. See Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 43, 50, 54;

Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 43, 50, 54. Second, once Plaintiff began FMLA leave on May 2, 2023,

Plaintiff was approved for 12 weeks of FMLA leave, until July 24, 2023. Dkt. 59 ¶

54; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 54. Third, once the FMLA leave ended, additional “Company

Medical Leave” was provided to Plaintiff as an extension, from July 25, 2023, to

August 1, 2023. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 54–57; Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 54–57.

Plaintiff, however, argues that BayCare interfered with her “reinstatement

rights” upon the end of her FMLA leave. Dkt. 71 at 4. The problem for Patel is that

the Eleventh Circuit has already found that an employer need not reinstate an

employee who takes additional leave after exhausting her FMLA leave. See Jones,

854 F.3d at 1268 (“Relevant caselaw suggests that an employer does not interfere

with an employee’s right to reinstatement if that employee is terminated after taking

leave in excess of the 12 weeks permitted by the FMLA.”). Indeed, “[t]he FMLA

‘provides for only 12 weeks of leave’ and ‘does not suggest that the 12 week

entitlement may be extended.’” Id. at 1267 (quoting McGregor v. AutoZone, Inc.,

180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999)).

Here, the undisputed record shows that Plaintiff had exhausted her FMLA

leave and then received additional non-FMLA leave. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 54–57. The fact that

Redfearn called the additional “Company Medical Leave” time FMLA leave, Dkt.

71-2 ¶ 56; Dkt. 60-16 (showing Redfearn’s email to Patel on July 27, 2023), does

not extend the statute’s fixed 12-week entitlement. See Meade v. Gen. Motors LLC,

317 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1279 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (“[T]he fact that Defendant granted

Plaintiff additional unpaid leave – and even called it FMLA leave – cannot extend

the statute’s fixed entitlement of 12 weeks.”). Patel cannot prevail on her FMLA

interference claim, as she was not entitled to reinstatement “after taking leave in

excess of the 12 weeks permitted by the FMLA.” Jones, 854 F.3d at 1268; see

Penaloza v. Target Corp., 549 F. App’x 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2013) (“As to

interference, Target gave Ms. Penaloza over 12 weeks of leave before her

termination. She was terminated two weeks after her 12–week leave period ended.

Thus, Penaloza cannot show that she was denied any benefit to which she was

entitled under the FMLA.”); Giles v. Daytona State Coll., Inc., 542 F. App’x 869,

874–75 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court properly granted summary judgment

to Daytona State on Giles’s FMLA interference claim. The record confirms that

Giles used all of her available FMLA leave on June 22, 2009, and thus, there is no

evidence that she was denied an FMLA benefit to which she was entitled.”). Put

simply, when BayCare exceeded the baseline 12 weeks by providing more leave

than what the FMLA requires, Defendant “should not find itself sued for violating

FMLA.” McGregor, 180 F.3d at 1308 (“Because . . . plaintiff was absent for more

than the protected period of time, she did not have a right to be restored to her prior

or similar position.”).

To the extent Plaintiff claims that her FMLA interference claim is grounded

in BayCare’s “refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation,” Dkt. 71 at 4, the

FMLA does not entitle employees to accommodations. “The FMLA leave provisions

are ‘wholly distinct’ from the reasonable accommodation employers are obligated

to provide under the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Yoosun Han v. Emory Univ.,

658 F. App’x 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a)). Because

BayCare undisputedly provided 12 weeks of leave, plus an additional non-FMLA

extension, Patel cannot show that she was denied any benefit to which she was

entitled under the FMLA. The Court grants summary judgment on the FMLA

interference claim in Count II.

b. FMLA Retaliation Claim—Count III

Next, the Court considers Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim in Count III.

Where, as is the case here, the plaintiff fails to provide direct evidence of retaliatory

and discriminatory animus, a court can analyze an “FMLA retaliation claim under

the same burden-shifting framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801–05 (1973).” McAlpin v.

Sneads, 61 F.4th 916, 927 (11th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). Under the McDonnell

Douglas burden shifting framework, “the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving

his prima facie case.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the plaintiff successfully establishes

a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate reason

for the adverse action.” Id. (citation modified). “If the defendant can do so, the

burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the legitimate reason is merely [a] pretext for prohibited, retaliatory conduct.”

Id. (citation modified).

To establish a prima facie case for FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must show

that “(1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse

employment decision, and (3) the decision was causally related to the protected

activity.” Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 2010)

(citation omitted). BayCare concedes that Patel’s medical leave for childbirth

qualifies as protected activity under the FMLA. Dkt. 58 at 9–10. And, there is no

dispute that Patel’s termination satisfies the second prong of an FMLA prima facie

case. See Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th

Cir. 2006) (“[T]ermination is certainly an adverse employment action”). As such,

the Court focuses its analysis on the third prong—the causal connection between the

two.

As to the causal connection requirement, “the plaintiff must prove only that

the protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely

unrelated.” McAlpin, 61 F.4th at 932 (citation modified). “While the burden of

causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily

protected activity and the adverse employment action, mere temporal proximity,

without more, must be very close.” Id. (citation modified). The relevant causation

period is “measured from the last day of an employee’s FMLA leave until the

adverse employment action at issue occurs.” Jones, 854 F.3d at 1272. Additionally,

the Eleventh Circuit has held that “the proper causation standard for FMLA . . .

retaliation claims is but-for causation.” Lapham, 88 F.4th at 893; see also id. at 894

(“For purposes of McDonnell Douglas, this but-for standard demarcates the

causation component of the employee’s initial, prima facie showing requirement and

also shapes the subsequent burdens of both the employer (i.e., to proffer a legitimate

reason sufficient to justify the termination) and the employee (i.e., to show that the

reason proffered by the employer is pretextual).”).

Here, the relevant period begins on Patel’s last day of FMLA leave, July 24,

2023, and ends on her termination on September 22, 2023. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 56, 120. This

close temporal proximity between the FMLA leave and her termination—just under

two months—is sufficient to show a causal connection. Cf. Thomas v. Cooper

Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting a three-to-four-month

disparity is not enough for temporal proximity). As a result, the burden now shifts

to BayCare to “proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse

employment action.” McAlpin, 61 F.4th at 932 (citation modified).

BayCare argues that it terminated Patel’s employment not because she took

FMLA leave, but because “she had not returned to work [after the FMLA leave

exhausted], she was not cooperating with BayCare’s attempts to evaluate her need

for accommodations, including by refusing to obtain clarification from her doctor

regarding her limitations and requested accommodations, she did not seek additional

leave, and she rejected the Placement Coordinator.” Dkt. 58 at 10. The record

evidence supports these legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons, as documentation shows

that BayCare was not uncooperative and sent at least 11 separate communications to

Patel in an effort to find a workable accommodation. See Dkt. 60 at 223:18-224:8,

243:23-244:5, 251:12-252:23; Dkt. 60-13; Dkt. 60-16; Dkt. 60-17; Dkt. 60-20; Dkt.

60-22; Dkt. 60-23; Dkt. 60-25; Dkt. 60-27; Dkt. 60-29; Dkt. 60-31; Dkt. 60-33; Dkt.

73-11. These communications also included a request from BayCare for Ms. Patel

to reach out to her doctor and have her physician complete a questionnaire specifying

the accommodations necessary for Plaintiff to perform her job. See Dkt. 60-22 at 1,

13–25.

A plaintiff’s refusal to comply with a defendant’s request to fill out paperwork

and an extended absence from work can be legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to

terminate the plaintiff’s employment. See Agee v. Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int’l, Inc.,

646 F. App’x 870, 876 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiff repeatedly refused to comply with

Defendant’s request that she fill out the FMLA paperwork. She was asked to supply

more information about the nature of her restrictions so Defendant could try to work

out an accommodation, but she failed to do so. . . . But Plaintiff was absent from

work for several weeks without an excuse, so Defendant had

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate her employment.”); see also

Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement, No. 1:19-CV-5683-MHC-

LTW, 2021 WL 4286460, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2021) (finding “Plaintiff failed

to submit any additional documentation for weeks, and she refused to return to the

office” as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination), aff’d, 52 F.4th

1327 (11th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Court finds BayCare has provided a legitimate, non-

retaliatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination.

Because BayCare has met its burden to proffer a legitimate, nonretaliatory

reason, the burden shifts back to Patel to establish that the reasons proffered by

BayCare were “false and merely a pretext for h[er] termination.” McAlpin, 61 F.4th

at 932 (citation omitted). “A plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating

‘weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in

the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder

could find them unworthy of credence.’” Id. (quoting Matamoros v. Broward

Sheriff’s Off., 2 F.4th 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2021)).

Assuming Patel established a prima facie case on her FMLA retaliation claim,

the Court finds she failed to prove that BayCare’s proffered reasons were pretextual.

While Plaintiff’s response to the summary judgment is somewhat difficult to parse,

she seems to make two arguments about pretext. First, Plaintiff claims the

“inconsistent application of BayCare’s accommodation policies as additional

circumstantial evidence of discrimination, as well as pretext.” Dkt. 71 at 18. Second,

Plaintiff points to “BayCare’s insistence that Patel confer with a placement

coordinator was disingenuous and pretext for her termination[,] [since] [t]here was

no viable position available for Patel at BayCare.” Id. at 8. Neither of these

arguments creates a genuine dispute of material fact.

Beginning with the inconsistent applications of BayCare’s policies, Plaintiff

points to three policies that required Defendant to explore remote work

accommodations in good faith—“Policy #105, accommodation of persons with

disabilities; BayCare Policy #430, accommodation of pregnant and postpartum

workers; BayCare Policy #603, personal leave of absence.” Id. at 12 (citing Dkts.

73-2, 73-3, 73-4). But Plaintiff never explains how BayCare applied these policies

inconsistently. Instead, Plaintiff cites these three ADA, PWFA, and FMLA policies

and then summarily concludes “[d]enying Patel remote work as an accommodation

despite the existence of multiple policies accommodating nonpregnant, pregnant,

and post-partum employees suggests that the employer’s reason is ‘not sufficiently

strong.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 230

(2015)).

While Plaintiff is correct that Young discusses instances when an employer’s

stated policies can be pretextual, the rule from Young concerned instances when “the

employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the

employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to

justify the burden.” Young, 575 U.S. at 229. The Court cannot find, and Plaintiff

does not cite, to any instance where BayCare’s inconsistent application involved

placing a significant burden on pregnant workers, such as a policy where non-

pregnant workers were given an accommodation but pregnant workers were not. See

id. at 230 (“[The plaintiff] can show that [the defendant] accommodates most

nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to

accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations.”).

Additionally, Young states that a “plaintiff can create a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the

employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to

accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.” 575 U.S. at 229–30. But

Young is inapposite, as Plaintiff concedes there are no non-childbirth comparators in

the record. See Dkt. 71 at 3. To the extent there was some deviation in any of the

three policies, “[s]tanding alone, deviation from a company policy does not

demonstrate discriminatory animus.” Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1355–56

(11th Cir. 1999) (discussing an ADEA claim). Again, Plaintiff needed to show that

other comparators enjoyed the benefits of BayCare’s policies, while Plaintiff did not

due to the birth of her child, but she has failed to do so. See Berg v. Florida Dep’t.

of Labor & Emp. Sec., Div. of Vocational Rehab., 163 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir.

1998) (“[The plaintiff], however, failed to show that the policies at issue were ever

applied to other . . . clients (although obviously they must have been), let alone

applied in an inconsistent fashion. Thus, the fact that the [defendant] may have failed

to follow its own policies in [the plaintiff]’s case cannot serve as the basis for an

inference of intentional discrimination.”). Though Ms. Patel may have felt that

BayCare’s application of its policies was inconsistent, the inquiry at the pretext stage

“centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs and, to be blunt about

it, not on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker’s head.” Todd v. Fayette

Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1218 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Alvarez v. Royal Atl.

Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010)).

As to the Placement Coordinator being disingenuous and a pretext, the Court

cannot find any support in the record on this issue. In her deposition, Plaintiff claims

that BayCare did not provide any open position for Patel’s consideration and that

she was instructed to identify an available position on her own. Dkt. 60 at 213:14-

214:24. However, when confronted with the Placement Coordinator’s email,

Plaintiff conceded that the Placement Coordinator did offer assistance in finding

employment, asked Plaintiff to schedule a time to meet “to discuss current open

positions at BayCare,” and provided a link where Plaintiff could schedule a time to

call the Placement Coordinator. Id. at 215:7-218:6; see also Dkt. 60-13 at 2.

The undisputed email also clearly shows that the language about Plaintiff

having to find an available position on her own was referring to a scenario in which

Plaintiff independently found a position and applied for it. In such cases, the

Placement Coordinator requested that Plaintiff promptly notify her so she could let

the recruiter know that the application should be reviewed “ASAP” by a hiring

manager. Dkt. 60-13 at 2 (“I ask that anytime you apply for a position online, to

please email the posting numbers to PlacementCoordinator@baycare.org. This will

prompt us to notify the recruiters ASAP and get that application reviewed by the

hiring manager. I work closely with the recruiters to notify them anytime you apply

to a position, so they are aware you are working with Placement Services and aware

you have a limited timeframe to secure a position.”). As such, the Court cannot find

any genuine dispute showing that the offer of a Placement Coordinator was

disingenuous or a futile endeavor. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Ms.

Patel who refused to engage with the Placement Coordinator, believing it violated

“federal employment laws.” See Dkt. 60-13 at 1–2. But again, the pretext inquiry

“centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs.” Todd, 998 F.3d at

1218 (citation omitted).

Because Patel did not meet her burden in establishing that BayCare’s

proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination was pretextual,

the Court grants summary judgment as to the FMLA retaliation claim in Count III.3

II. Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Claims (Counts IV–VI)

“The PWFA’s effective date of June 2023 means that caselaw interpreting it,

especially at the summary judgment stage, is scant.” Trego v. Penske Logistics, LLC,

No. 3:24-CV-00460, 2026 WL 402501, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2026) (citation

omitted). The few federal courts that have considered PWFA claims have largely

treated them as analogous to ADA claims. See id. (collecting cases); Gelinas v. S.

Dentistry, No. CV 1:25-0004-TFM-N, 2026 WL 1181334, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 13,

2026) (treating PWFA claims as ADA claims), report and recommendation adopted,

3 Plaintiff’s response also mentions that the “convincing mosaic” framework applies to Patel’s claims. Dkt. 71 at 2.

The “convincing-mosaic framework” is only “a metaphor, not a legal test” and asks, “whether the evidence permits a

reasonable factfinder to find that the employer retaliated against the employee.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP,

84 F.4th 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2023). There are “three nonexclusive categories of circumstantial evidence that can

raise a reasonable inference of unlawful conduct: evidence of suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or other

information from which unlawful intent may be inferred; evidence of systematically better treatment of similarly

situated employees; or evidence that the employer’s justification for its action is pretextual.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s response merely recites the legal standard for the convincing-mosaic theory and then never cites or

mentions it again in her opposition briefing. See Dkt. 71 at 2–3. Regardless, based on a review of the record, the Court

cannot find any evidence that falls into the three categories of circumstantial evidence. Indeed, Plaintiff even admits

there are no comparators in this case. Id. at 3.

2026 WL 738154 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2026); Keiper v. CNN Am., Inc., No. 24-CV-

875, 2024 WL 5119353, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 2024) (“Congress intended the

PWFA to expand protections for pregnant employees and modeled it largely off the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).”). As such, the Court will apply the ADA’s

standards to Plaintiff’s PWFA claims.

a. Failure to Accommodate (Count IV)

Like the ADA, the PWFA prohibits employers from refusing to “make

reasonable accommodations to the known limitations related to the pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions of a qualified employee,” unless the

employer can demonstrate “that the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship” on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-1(1). Further, it prohibits an

employer from taking an “adverse action . . . against a qualified employee” because

the employee requested reasonable accommodations. Id. § 2000gg-1(5).

“Under the PWFA, the plaintiff must state: (1) she had a medical condition

related to the pregnancy; (2) she was placed on work restrictions by a medical

professional; (3) she is requesting reasonable accommodations; and (4) the

defendant failed to accommodate those restrictions.” Carnegie v. Heritage Park

Nursing Ctr. LLC, No. 8:25-CV-00739-CEH-AEP, 2025 WL 2697857, at *4 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 4, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2695234 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 22, 2025); see also Keiper, 2024 WL 5119353, at *2 (“To establish a prima

facie case for failure to accommodate under the PWFA, [the plaintiff] must allege

facts sufficient to show: (1) she is a qualified individual; (2) the employer was aware

of her limitation; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the

limitation.”).

As an initial matter, the Court assumes that the first and second elements have

been satisfied. First, Patel is likely a qualified individual since she “can perform the

essential functions of the employment position,” even if she was temporarily unable

to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg(6)(A)–(C). Second, “the term ‘known limitation’

means physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of

pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions that the employee or employee’s

representative has communicated to the employer whether or not such condition

meets the definition of disability specified in . . . the [ADA][.]” 42 U.S.C. §

2000gg(4). “Communicated to the employer” includes making “the employer aware

of the limitation by communicating with a supervisor, a manager, someone who has

supervisory authority for the employee or who regularly directs the employee’s

tasks.” 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(d). On July 18, 2023, before her leave ended, Patel

communicated to her employer by requesting flexible scheduling and remote work

due to “dehydration, fatigue, back pain, delayed childbirth recovery, post-partum

depression, . . . separation anxiety[,]” concerns about exposure to potential

pathogens at the new hospital and higher amounts of “VOC and SVOC toxins off

gassed” getting into her breastmilk. Dkt. 60-11 at 2. As such, the Court focuses on

the third element—whether BayCare discriminated against Plaintiff by failing to

provide a reasonable accommodation.

On this issue, Plaintiff argues that “[a]fter . . . communicat[ing] her limitations

and corresponding need for remote telework work accommodation to BayCare, her

supervisor—the decisionmaker—immediately refused the accommodation

recommended by Patel’s physician.” Dkt. 71 at 7. On the other hand, BayCare

contends that “[r]emote work was not reasonable” since “to accommodate fully

remote work would eliminate these essential functions for an indefinite period.”

Dkt. 58 at 18. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with BayCare.

The PWFA explicitly incorporates the ADA’s definition of “reasonable

accommodation,” 42 U.S.C § 2000gg(7), which defines the term as “making existing

facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with

disabilities,” along with “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,

reassignment to a vacant position, [and] acquisition or modification of equipment or

devices.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)–(B). PWFA regulations similarly state that a

“reasonable accommodation” includes: “[m]odifications or adjustments to a job

application process”; [m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to

the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily

performed”; “[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s employee

. . . to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other

similarly situated employees without known limitations”; or “[t]emporary

suspension of essential function(s) and/or modifications or adjustments that permit

the temporary suspension of essential function(s).” 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(h)(1)(i)–(iv).

With these regulations in mind, “[a]n accommodation is only reasonable if it

allows the disabled employee to perform the essential functions of the job in

question.” Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation

omitted). “The employee has the burden of identifying an accommodation and

demonstrating that it is reasonable.” Id. (citing Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257

F.3d 1249, 1255–56. (11th Cir. 2001)). “Assuming she cannot do so, the employer

has no affirmative duty to show undue hardship.” Id. (citing Earl v. Mervyns, Inc.,

207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Here, in the July 18, 2023, email requesting flexible scheduling and remote

work, Plaintiff estimated she would need these accommodations until April 5, 2024.

Dkt. 60-11. This timeframe is over a year after the birth of Plaintiff’s child on March

14, 2023, and eight additional months of absence following the end of her FMLA

leave on July 24, 2023. Dkt. 59 ¶¶ 43, 56, 59; Dkt. 60 at 208:22-209:4. Notably,

when questioned about how she arrived at this April 2024 date, Plaintiff admitted

she was only “estimating” and was “not sure” when she could actually return to

work. Dkt. 60 at 208:19-209:14.

Similarly, when Patel’s physician completed BayCare’s Work Clearance

Form, the doctor certified that Patel had no physical or mental impairment that

limited her ability to perform the essential functions of her job, identified no physical

or environmental restrictions, and did not specify a need for medical equipment or

supplies. Dkt. 60-14. Yet, in the blank space for whether Patel needed an

accommodation, the doctor wrote “work from home,” with an “uncertain date” to

when that accommodation would end. Id. When asked about this medical opinion in

her deposition, the doctor plainly stated she was not aware whether Plaintiff’s job

could be done remotely and admitted that remote work would be indefinite until

Plaintiff’s postpartum depression or anxiety finally resolved. Dkt. 62 at 68:13-23

(“Q. Is it fair to say that based on that note, you were not aware at this time whether

or not her job was something that could be performed from home, but if it was, you

thought that she could do it from home -- she could work from home? A. Correct.

Q. And it notes, ‘Restrictions effective until uncertain date.’ Is that right? A. Correct.

Probably until her postpartum depression or anxiety would be relieved or whatever,

however you say it, resolved.”).

Plaintiff’s requested accommodation for extended remote work was

unreasonable. See Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1256 (“Plaintiff’s request for an

indefinite extension of light-duty status was unreasonable as a matter of law.”). “The

ADA covers people who can perform the essential functions of their jobs presently

or in the immediate future,” Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003),

and the PWFA regulations follows a similar path by defining the “temporary period”

of being unable to perform an essential function as “lasting for a limited time, not

permanent, and may extend beyond ‘in the near future.’” 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(f)(2)(i).

For an active pregnancy, “in the near future” is further defined as being able to

perform an essential function “within generally 40 weeks of its suspension.” Id. §

1636.3(f)(2)(ii). But Plaintiff’s return date of April 5, 2024—that was admittedly

only an estimation—was over a year after giving birth, well past the 40 weeks (i.e.,

the length of a full-term pregnancy) listed in the PWFA’s regulations as being “in

the near future.” See also Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1256 (noting the plaintiff “later

admitted at the due process hearing that she did not know how much time she needed

or whether any amount of time would be sufficient”).

Worse still, Plaintiff’s physician could not even provide a firm end date, see

Dkt. 60-14, only guessing the indefinite accommodation would end when Plaintiff’s

“postpartum depression or anxiety . . . resolved.” Dkt. 62 at 68:19-23; see Monroe

v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 793 F. App’x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[The plaintiff’s]

doctor did not give, and could not have given, a date when [the plaintiff] could return

to work. Our case law is clear that indefinite leave is not a reasonable

accommodation and that it was [the plaintiff’s] duty to identify such an

accommodation.”). In short, the request for extended remote work was not

reasonable. While the PWFA regulations do list temporary “telework” and “remote

work” as examples of a reasonable accommodation, 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(i)(2), the

PWFA does not require BayCare to grant Plaintiff an extended remote work

accommodation until she could finally return to the Hospital “at some uncertain

point in the future.” Wood, 323 F.3d at 1314; see 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(h)(1)(iv)

(noting reasonable accommodations are only “[t]emporary suspension of essential

function(s)”); 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(f)(2)(i) (defining “temporary” suspension of

essential functions).

Additionally, Patel’s failure to accommodate claim fails because she caused

the breakdown of the interactive process. As mentioned above, the PWFA

incorporates some of the ADA’s definitions. See 42 U.S.C § 2000gg(7)

(incorporating the ADA definition of “reasonable accommodation,” including “the

interactive process that will typically be used to determine an appropriate reasonable

accommodation”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-1(2) (requiring accommodation arrived at

through the interactive process referred to in section 2000gg(7)). During this

process, “the employer ‘initiate[s] an informal, interactive process’ with the

employee to discuss the employee’s specific limitations, explore potential

accommodations, and select the most appropriate accommodation for both the

employer and the employee.” Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement,

52 F.4th 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing to ADA regulations). Similarly, the

PWFA regulations state the “[i]nteractive process means an informal, interactive

process between the covered entity and the employee seeking an accommodation

under the PWFA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(k). “Therefore, when an employee triggers

an employer’s accommodation duties, the employer must expend time and expense

to explore the universe of reasonable accommodations, identify one that is mutually

agreeable to the parties, and implement it.” Owens, 52 F.4th at 1335. However,

“liability for failure to provide reasonable accommodations ensues only where the

employer bears responsibility for the breakdown.” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s

Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Beck v. Univ.

of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Here, before and after the August 3, 2023, interactive process meeting,

BayCare sent at least 11 communications seeking workable accommodations for

Plaintiff. See Dkt. 60-13; Dkt. 60-16; Dkt. 60-17; Dkt. 60-20; Dkt. 60-22; Dkt. 60-

23; Dkt. 60-25; Dkt. 60-27; Dkt. 60-29; Dkt. 60-31; Dkt. 60-33. During the August

3, 2023, interactive process meeting, it is undisputed that the parties mutually agreed

to some of Plaintiff’s requested accommodations, see Dkt. 60-21 (showing

Plaintiff’s suggested accommodations), including pump breaks, bathroom breaks,

flexible scheduling for medical and therapy appointments, and the ability to bring

and drink her own water throughout the workday—all of which are listed in PWFA

regulations as not “impos[ing] an undue hardship under the PWFA when they are

requested as workplace accommodations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(j)(4); see Dkt. 60-22

at 1; Dkt. 60-27 at 1; Dkt. 60-29 at 2; Dkt. 73-11. There is also no dispute that

BayCare offered Plaintiff a Placement Coordinator to assist with identifying a

remote or alternative in-person position to accommodate her other needs. Dkt. 60-

13 at 2 (showing email from BayCare’s Placement Coordinator); see 29 C.F.R. §

1636.3(i)(2) (listing “[j]ob restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules;

reassignment to a vacant position” as examples of a reasonable accommodation); 29

C.F.R. § 1636.3(f)(2)(iii) (“[T]he employee performing the functions of a different

job to which the covered entity temporarily transfers or assigns the employee.”).

Nevertheless, Plaintiff declined every option. See Dkt. 60-26; Dkt. 60-28; Dkt.

60-30. At the August 3, 2023, interactive process meeting, Plaintiff suggested

various accommodations in order to return to in-person work, including a reverse

osmosis water filtration system, an IQ Air HealthPro Plus GC air filtration in all

areas of the Hospital, a closed-door private office with UV and HyperHEPA

filtration systems, and monthly third-party inspections of all equipment. See Dkt.

60-21; Dkt. 60 at 244:6-245:16 (“Q. If you had all of these accommodations or only

some of them? A. Preferably all of them, you know. These are really what would

have made me feel comfortable to return.”). But it is undisputed that no physician

recommended such accommodations, and Plaintiff herself could not explain what

many of the listed items were or how much they would cost BayCare. Dkt. 60 at

246:21-250:1; see also Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1286 (noting “a qualified individual with

a disability is not entitled to the accommodation of her choice, but only to a

reasonable accommodation” (citation modified)). Critically, none of these suggested

accommodations from Plaintiff’s list are mentioned or even relate to the PWFA’s

examples. See 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(i).

Following the impasse at the August 3, 2023, interactive process meeting,

BayCare requested supporting documentation to help determine if Plaintiff’s list of

suggested accommodations was reasonable in light of any medical conditions, as

permitted under the PWFA regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(l)(1) (“A covered

entity may seek supporting documentation from an employee who requests an

accommodation under the PWFA only when it is reasonable under the circumstances

. . . to determine whether the employee has a physical or mental condition related to,

affected by, or arising out of . . . childbirth[.]”). Plaintiff never provided the medical

questionnaire to her doctor and never authorized BayCare to contact the physician

directly. Dkt. 60 at 251:10-252:18; Dkt. 62 at 68:24-69:15; see Dkt. 60-22 at 5, 13–

25 (showing the medical questionnaire); Dkt. 60-29 at 3 (showing BayCare’s emails

asking Plaintiff to provide the questionnaire to her doctor); Dkt. 60-31 at 2 (showing

BayCare’s email following up on whether the medical questionnaire was provided

to her doctor). Instead, Plaintiff repeatedly claimed that the questionnaire violated

the PWFA and demanded that BayCare allow her to work remotely while she waited

for an appointment with her OB-GYN. See Dkt. 60-30 at 5.

As to the Placement Coordinator, the record is clear that Plaintiff flatly

declined the coordinator’s services, and even claimed contacting her was an

“intentional violation of applicable federal employment laws.” See Dkt. 60-13 at 1;

Dkt. 60 at 216:6-218:6 (being questioned on why Plaintiff declined the Placement

Coordinator’s assistance). But the Placement Coordinator is not in violation of the

PWFA; on the contrary, the applicable regulations even list “[j]ob restructuring” and

“reassignment to a vacant position” as reasonable accommodations. 29 C.F.R. §

1636.3(i)(2); see also id. § 1636.3(f)(2)(iii) (“The inability to perform the essential

function(s) can be reasonably accommodated. . . . by temporary suspension of the

essential function(s) . . . including . . . the employee performing the functions of a

different job to which the covered entity temporarily transfers or assigns the

employee[.]”).

Even when construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

any failure in the interactive process must be attributed to the Plaintiff because she

rejected BayCare’s various reasonable accommodations, and her demand for

extended remote work was unreasonable. See Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1257

(“Defendant tried to initiate such a process . . . Plaintiff’s only response was to

request an indefinite extension of her light-duty status, an unreasonable

accommodation as a matter of law. Any failure in the interactive process must

therefore be attributed to Plaintiff.”). Because the PWFA and analogous ADA

principles hold that an employer cannot be held liable where the employee’s own

intractability causes the breakdown, Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287, the Court finds that

BayCare is entitled to summary judgment on Count IV.

b. PWFA Retaliation—Counts V

The PWFA’s anti-retaliation provision contains two distinct prohibitions. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-2(f). First, no person shall “discriminate against any employee

because such employee has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this

chapter or because such employee made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” Id. §

2000gg-2(f)(1). Second, the PWFA prohibits coercing, intimidating, threatening, or

interfering with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or

protected by the statute. Id. § 2000gg-2(f)(2).

Beginning with the retaliation claim, federal courts usually evaluate

retaliatory-discharge claims under the same burden-shifting framework used to

assess Title VII retaliation claims. See Todd, 998 F.3d at 1219 (collecting cases

showing Title VII retaliation standard applies to FMLA, ADA, and Rehabilitation

Act retaliation claims). The same standard will apply to PWFA retaliation claims,

since the PWFA’s retaliation provision mirrors the ADA’s provision.4 As such, the

Court applies the previously articulated retaliation standard that requires a plaintiff

to establish: “(1) she participated in conduct that the statute protects; (2) she suffered

an adverse employment action; and (3) the protected conduct and the adverse

employment action are causally related.” Id. If the plaintiff sets forth a prima facie

case, “the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employment decision.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the employer carries

that burden, then the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to show that the proffered

nondiscriminatory reasons ‘are a pretextual ruse designed to mask retaliation.’” Id.

(quoting Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287).

Here, the Court’s evaluation of this count is functionally the same as its prior

analysis of the FMLA retaliation claim in Count III. Assuming Plaintiff has met the

prima facie elements by “requesting . . . a reasonable accommodation to the known

limitations related to . . . childbirth,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-1, during the August 2023

meeting and then got terminated shortly thereafter on September 22, 2023,5 Plaintiff

has still not demonstrated that BayCare’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

4 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-2(f)(1) (“No person shall discriminate against any employee because such employee

has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such employee made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”), with 42 U.S.C.

§ 12203(a) (“No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or

practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”).

5 To the extent Plaintiff claims that this close temporal proximity between the accommodations request and termination

is evidence of pretext, the Eleventh Circuit has already rejected this argument. See Todd, 998 F.3d at 1219–20

(“[T]emporal proximity by itself generally cannot prove that an employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual.” (citing

Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1137 n.15 (11th Cir. 2020))).

her termination was a pretext for retaliation. Incorporating by reference the Court’s

prior analysis, BayCare pointed to several nondiscriminatory reasons. These include

Plaintiff’s extended absence from work, declining to participate in the interactive

process, and refusing to provide supporting documentation to her medical provider.

Dkt. 58 at 10. Plaintiff’s two arguments about the “inconsistent application of

BayCare’s accommodation policies,” and the Placement Coordinator being

“disingenuous and [a] pretext for her termination,” still fail to satisfy her burden to

show that the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Dkt. 71 at 8, 18.

While not argued by Plaintiff, upon the Court’s own review of the record,

there is a statement from the August 3, 2023, meeting in which Redfern allegedly

told Patel, “You cannot return to your original position because you requested

accommodations.” Dkt. 71-2 ¶¶ 96, 101, 144. However, no reasonable jury could

infer that, based on this statement, BayCare used the interactive process as a pretext

to retaliate against Patel for exercising her PWFA rights. Redfern’s comment was

made in reference to Patel’s laundry list of in-person accommodations—i.e.,

requesting a reverse osmosis water filter system, monthly water testing, IQ Air

HealthPro Plus GC air filtration in all areas of the Hospital, a closed-door private

office with UV and HyperHEPA filtration systems, monthly testing of all air

filtration equipment, and a massage chair—that BayCare said it could not provide

because it would be an undue burden. See Dkt. 60-21; Dkt. 60 at 246:6-248:18 (“Q.

Okay. But you understand that . . . was because there was an undue burden and they

could not accommodate you. That was the position of BayCare. A. Unfortunately,

yeah. And we asked what the undue burden was and they were unable to tell us that

as well. Q. Who was unable to tell you? A. In the interactive process, I did not find

out why, what was the undue burden. Q. Well, I think the document will speak for

itself, but okay.”).

Moreover, as discussed above, it is undisputed that BayCare did allow Patel

to return to her original position with accommodations due to her childbirth,

including pump breaks, additional bathroom breaks, flexible scheduling for doctor

and therapy appointments, and the ability to bring and drink her own water. Dkt. 59

¶ 101; Dkt. 60-22 at 1; Dkt. 60-29 at 2; Dkt. 73-11. Again, all of these are

accommodations that BayCare agreed to during the August 3, 2023, interactive

process meeting, see Dkt. 60-22 at 1; Dkt. 60-27 at 1, and the PWFA explicitly

approves of them as not constituting an undue burden on the employer. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 1636.3(i)(4); id. § 1636.3(j)(4)(i)–(iv). For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s

arguments do not carry her burden of establishing that BayCare’s proffered reasons

for ending her employment were a pretext for retaliation. The Court grants summary

judgment on the PWFA retaliation claim in Count V.

c. PWFA Interference—Count VI

Turning to Plaintiff’s PWFA interference claim, the statute prohibits coercing,

intimidating, threatening, or interfering with any individual in the exercise or

enjoyment of any right granted or protected by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-

2(f)(2). Because this language is almost identical to the ADA’s prohibition on

interference, the Court will apply the ADA’s standard to this count. See 42 U.S.C. §

12203(b). It appears the Eleventh Circuit has “not yet had occasion to explain the

proper standard for evaluating an ADA anti-interference claim.” Atchison v. Bd. of

Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 802 F. App’x 495, 508 (11th Cir. 2020).

However, district courts within this circuit has found that an ADA interference

claim requires a plaintiff must show: “(1) he exercised a right protected by the ADA;

(2) the defendant coerced, intimidated, threatened, and/or interfered with plaintiff's

exercise or enjoyment of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions were motivated

because the plaintiff exercised a right protected by the ADA.” Collins v. Dekalb

Cnty., GA, No. 1:24-CV-01252-LMM, 2026 WL 623676, at *20 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27,

2026) (collecting district court cases). “Persuasive authority also supports that the

ADA’s anti-interference provision prohibits only ‘discriminatory conduct that is so

severe or pervasive that it will have the effect of causing a protected person to

abandon the exercise of his or her ADA rights.’” Schwarcz v. Walt Disney Parks &

Resorts U.S., Inc., No. 6:25-CV-640-JSS-RMN, 2026 WL 864829, at *7 (M.D. Fla.

Mar. 30, 2026) (quoting Mosley v. AM/NS Calvert, LLC, No. CV 1:20-00517-KD-

M, 2022 WL 843773, at *9 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2022)).

Here, the PWFA interference claim fails because no reasonable jury could

find that BayCare’s conduct was so “severe or pervasive” that it coerced,

intimidated, threatened, or interfered with Patel’s exercise of her PWFA rights. To

the contrary, as the Court has extensively discussed above, BayCare proactively

engaged in an interactive process despite Patel’s failure to request a legally

cognizable accommodation.

Additionally, almost all interactions between BayCare and Plaintiff occurred

via email, see, e.g., Dkts. 60-28, 60-30, 60-31, 60-34, which look nothing like other

ADA interference cases in which summary judgment was denied. See Schwarcz,

2026 WL 864829, at *8 (denying summary judgment on ADA interference claim

where the defendant refused to adjust the air conditioner in the plaintiff’s hotel room,

told the plaintiff she was free to leave the hotel and never return, directed

its resort employees to follow the plaintiff and monitor her, denied her access to

restaurants and other areas in the resort, and trespassed her from the defendant’s

properties); Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1370

(N.D. Ga. 2025) (denying summary judgment on an ADA interference claim because

the defendant was overly scrutinizing the plaintiff’s restroom breaks and “once

followed [the] [p]laintiff to the restroom while timing her”). On the other hand, the

email communications between the parties fail “to meet the level of severity that

would cause a reasonable person to abandon her ADA rights (i.e., such that would

be reasonably likely to interfere with the exercise or enjoyment of ADA rights).”

Mosley, 2022 WL 843773, at *9. Indeed, Plaintiff did not abandon any rights, as she

continued to demand accommodations from Defendant and threatened to file a

discrimination charge. See, e.g., Dkt. 60-28; Dkt. 60-30 at 7; Dkt. 60-31 at 1; Dkt.

60-34 at 2. Because the record reveals insufficient evidence that BayCare interfered

with Plaintiff’s exercise or enjoyment of her PWFA rights, the Court grants

summary judgment on Count VI.

III. Pregnancy Discrimination Act Claims (Counts VII–X)

The PDA amended Title VII to provide that discrimination “because of sex”

or “on the basis of sex” includes discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). As such, the Court

will apply Title VII’s standards to these PDA claims, including the McDonnell

Douglas burden shifting framework. See Young, 575 U.S. at 212.

a. PDA Failure to Accommodate and Discrimination claims (Counts VII

and X)6

To establish a PDA discrimination claim based on disparate treatment, a

plaintiff must show that: “(1) she is a member of the protected class; (2) she

6 The Court characterizes these counts as disparate treatment claims because Counts VII and X of the Amended

Complaint state “BayCare treated Patel differently from, and less preferably than, other employees by not uniformly

applying its workplace policies.” Dkt. 32 ¶¶ 93, 112.

requested accommodation; (3) the employer refused her request; and (4) the

employer nonetheless accommodated others ‘similar in their ability or inability to

work.’” Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp., 955 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Young, 575 U.S. at 229).

“After a plaintiff satisfies her prima facie burden, the employer may come

forward with ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons’ for denying the plaintiff’s

requested accommodation.” Id. (quoting Young, 575 U.S. at 229). “[A]n employer

cannot simply say that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant

women to the category of those (similar in their ability or inability to work) whom

the employer accommodates, since that reason alone would generally be inconsistent

with the [PDA’s] basic objective.” Id. (citation modified).

Once the nondiscriminatory reason is provided, the burden shifts back to the

plaintiff “to demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason is ‘in fact pretextual.’” Id.

(quoting Young, 575 U.S. at 229). The plaintiff can “survive summary judgment if

she shows both that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant

workers and that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are not

sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the

burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” Id.

(citation modified).

As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff satisfies the first

three prongs of the prima facie test. As a woman who gave birth, Patel was obviously

part of the class protected by the PDA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“The term[ ]

‘because of sex’ . . . include[s] . . . because of or on the basis of . . . childbirth[.]”).

And Plaintiff sought an accommodation from BayCare, requesting flexible

scheduling and remote work. See Dkt. 60-11 at 2. As to the third prong, Plaintiff

established that BayCare declined to allow remote work for an additional eight

months. Dkt. 60-16; Dkt. 60-22. As such, the Court focuses on the fourth prong—

whether BayCare accommodated others who had not given birth but were “similar

in their ability or inability to work.” Young, 575 U.S. at 229. On this prong, the

Eleventh Circuit has explained, “in contrast to Title VII’s more general comparator

analysis, ‘the comparator analysis under the PDA focuses on a single criterion—

one’s ability to do the job.’” Durham, 955 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Lewis v. City of

Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1228 n.14 (11th Cir. 2019)).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the fourth prong, as there is nothing in the

record showing that BayCare accommodated workers who had not recently given

birth but were “similar in their ability or inability to work.” As previously discussed,

Plaintiff concedes there is no evidence of a similarly situated comparator. Dkt. 71 at

3. Thus, Plaintiff’s PDA accommodation and discrimination claims cannot survive

summary judgment.

Plaintiff, however, attempts to get around this fatal issue by arguing “[w]ith

BayCare’s policies concerning accommodations for pregnant and non-pregnant

employees, the probative value of a similarly situated comparator is unnecessary.”

Id. There are two problems with this meritless argument. First, this statement directly

conflicts with binding precedent holding that Plaintiff must identify any (non-

childbirth) colleague who was equally unable to perform the duties of an executive

assistant but was still provided with an accommodation. See Durham, 955 F.3d at

1286; Young, 575 U.S. at 229. Second, Young explicitly found that an employer’s

application of its policies requires the plaintiff to identify comparators, explaining

“the plaintiff may reach a jury . . . by providing sufficient evidence that the

employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the

employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to

justify the burden, but rather . . . give rise to an inference of intentional

discrimination.” Young, 575 U.S. at 229. In other words, even if Plaintiff established

a prima facie case of discrimination under Young, she would still need to disprove

BayCare’s nondiscriminatory reasons by pointing to evidence showing BayCare’s

policies accommodated non-childbirth employees with remote work while failing to

accommodate Plaintiff with remote work. Again, such evidence would require

Plaintiff to point to comparators who benefited from BayCare’s policies, which she

has totally failed to do.

As the Court discussed in Count III, the record is devoid of instances in which

BayCare’s inconsistent application of its policies placed a significant burden on

workers who had given birth, such as a policy that gave non-childbirth workers an

accommodation but not workers who had given birth. See Young, 575 U.S. at 230

(“[The plaintiff] can show that [the defendant] accommodates most nonpregnant

employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate

pregnant employees with lifting limitations.”). In sum, Patel cannot establish her

prima facie case because she identified no other employee with similar

responsibilities who was permitted to work remotely or forego their essential in-

person duties. The Court grants summary judgment on Counts VII and X.

b. PDA Relation Claim—Count VIII

Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees for engaging in protected

conduct, including filing a charge of discrimination under Title VII and opposing

practices made unlawful by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a). For the sake of

brevity, the Court does not reiterate the Title VII retaliation standard that it has

previously outlined in prior counts.

Here, the Court incorporates by reference its prior analysis on the retaliatory-

termination claims in Counts III and V. Again, Plaintiff “bears the burden to show

that the employer’s reasons are pretextual, which merges with the ultimate burden

of establishing a genuine triable issue of retaliatory intent.” Thibodeaux v. City of

Atlanta, Georgia, No. 24-12921, 2025 WL 2505600, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2025).

For the reasons discussed above, assuming Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,

the Court still finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy its burden to show BayCare’s

reasons for terminating her were pretextual. Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary,

see Dkt. 71 at 8, 18, are nothing more than conclusory allegations of discrimination

or retaliation, which are insufficient to carry Plaintiff’s burden. See Mayfield v.

Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court grants the

motion for summary judgment on Count VIII.

c. PDA Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment—Count IX

Plaintiff’s retaliatory-hostile-work-environment claim fares no better. “Title

VII prohibits the creation of a hostile work environment in retaliation for an

employee’s engagement in protected activity.” Tonkyro v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans

Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 835 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “A retaliatory-hostile-

work-environment claim complains that the employer created or tolerated a hostile

work environment in retaliation for an employee’s participation in protected activity

under Title VII.” Buckley v. Sec’y of Army, 97 F.4th 784, 799 (11th Cir. 2024).

“[R]etaliatory hostile work environment claims, like retaliation claims based on

discrete acts, prevail if the conduct complained of well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Tonkyro,

995 F.3d at 836 (citation modified). As such, a plaintiff must show that (1) she

engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered a hostile work environment because

of that activity; and (3) the work environment “might well have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Terrell

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.4th 1343, 1356 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting

Monaghan v. Worldpay U.S., Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862–63 (11th Cir. 2020)).

Importantly, “[t]he standards for judging hostility are intended to be

sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility

code.” Id. (citation modified). “The Supreme Court has emphasized that ‘a plaintiff

must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged

action materially adverse,’ separating ‘significant from trivial harms’ such as ‘petty

slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.’” Id. (quoting

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).

Here, assuming the first two elements are met, Plaintiff cannot meet her

burden of showing that any resulting hostility “well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” See

Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 863. Plaintiff claims the hostile work environment stemmed

from being “instructed to find a non-existent alternative position, demanded to

appear in-person to discuss accommodations, and . . . terminated.” Dkt. 71 at 2; see

also id. at 10 (“The complaints are a basis for . . . a hostile work environment claim

against BayCare because of the scrutiny of her motives seeking accommodation and

having to unilaterally secure an alternate job with BayCare.”). But no reasonable

jury could find that any of these things would dissuade a reasonable worker from

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.

First, there is no dispute that the August 3, 2023, interactive process meeting

was held virtually. Dkt. 59 ¶ 80; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 80. Indeed, Plaintiff preferred that the

meeting be held virtually, and the record shows that BayCare complied with that

preference. Dkt. 59 ¶ 79; Dkt. 71-2 ¶ 79. Nor did BayCare ever demand that Plaintiff

come in person. See Dkt. 60-17 at 1 (showing email where Redfearn states that she

“look[s] forward to our teams call [on August 3, 2023]. If you would prefer to meet

in person, we can also work to support this preference”); Dkt. 60-20 at 2 (providing

Plaintiff with dates to meet in-person or keep the virtual meeting on August 3, 2023).

Put simply, the scheduling emails for the August 3, 2023, meeting between BayCare

and Patel contain no evidence of hostility that would dissuade a reasonable worker

from filing a discrimination charge.

Second, as to the Placement Coordinator being evidence of a retaliatory

hostile work environment, the Court cannot find any support for such an argument.

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s deposition initially claimed that BayCare did not

provide any open position for Patel’s consideration and forced her to find a position

on her own. Dkt. 60 at 213:14-214:24. However, when provided with the Placement

Coordinator’s email, Plaintiff admitted that the Placement Coordinator offered

assistance in finding employment within BayCare, asked Plaintiff to schedule a time

to meet “to discuss current open positions at BayCare,” and provided a link where

Plaintiff could schedule a time to call the Placement Coordinator. Id. at 215:7-218:6;

see also Dkt. 60-13 at 2. In short, the Placement Coordinator’s email shows that

Plaintiff never had to find an available position on her own. Instead, if Plaintiff

independently found a position and applied for it, the Placement Coordinator

requested that Plaintiff promptly notify BayCare so the application could be

reviewed “ASAP” by a hiring manager. Dkt. 60-13 at 2. The Court is unsure how

this accommodation from BayCare creates a genuine dispute about whether a

reasonable worker would be dissuaded from exercising their rights. Nor does

Plaintiff’s response provide or cite to any authority showing that an accommodation

from an employer can dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge of

discrimination.

In sum, the conduct Plaintiff identifies does not even reach the level of “petty

slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners,” much less reach a

level that can dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination. Terrell, 98 F.4th at 1356. Therefore, the Court finds that summary

judgment is due to be granted on Count IX.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendant BayCare’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 58, is GRANTED as

to all pending counts.

2. The Clerk is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor of Defendant BayCare

Health System, Inc. and against Plaintiff Pamela Patel on Counts II, III, IV, V,

VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of the Amended Complaint.

3. The Clerk is also directed to TERMINATE all deadlines and CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on May 27, 2026.

/s/ William F. Jung__________________

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record