Wofford

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JUAN KEENY PERALTA AYALA, No. 1:26-cv-00555-DJC-AC

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Petitioner,

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v. ORDER

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M. WOFFORD, et al.,

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Respondents.

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17 Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Pet. (ECF No. 1)) and a

18 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Mot. (ECF No. 2)) seeking release from the

19 custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Petitioner raises claims that

20 are functionally identical to those this Court has already addressed in prior orders.

21 Petitioner entered the country in 2022, and he was detained shortly after entry. (Pet.

22 ¶ 7.) He was released from custody on his own recognizance. (Id.) Petitioner has now

23 been re-detained by ICE. (Id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner’s present re-detention was enacted

24 without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

25 The Court’s prior orders are dispositive on the issues raised in the Petition and

26 Motion. See Lopez v. Lyons, No. 2:25-cv-03174-DJC-CSD, 2025 WL 3124116 (E.D.

27 Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01543-DJC-SCR, 2025 WL 3248059

28 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025); Mariagua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01744-DJC-CSK, 2025 WL

1 3551700 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025); Ortega v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01663-DJC-CKD,

2 2025 WL 3511914 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025); Souza v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01597-DJC-

3 JDP, 2025 WL 3263897 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2025). For the reasons stated in those

4 cases, Petitioner has established that he has a likelihood of success on the merits.

5 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued release. See Zadvydas v. Davis,

6 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Applying the balancing test described in Mathews v.

7 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and for the reasons identified in the Courts’ prior

8 orders, the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private interest in maintaining

9 his out-of-custody status, the risk of erroneous deprivation here is considerable, and

10 Respondents’ interest in detention is low as the effort and costs required to provide

11 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal.

12 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s present detention is justified under 8 U.S.C.

13 § 1231 as an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed on November 26, 2025.

14 (Opp’n (ECF No. 7) at 2.) But this is inaccurate as, by Respondents’ own admission,

15 Petitioner has appealed that order to the Board of Immigration Appeals who stayed

16 Petitioner’s removal. (Id.) Under section 1231(a), detention is required during the

17 “removal period.” But that statute also explicitly provides that the removal period

18 does not begin at least until the date the order of removal becomes administratively

19 final. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). “[I]f a non-citizen has received a stay of removal from

20 the BIA pending further administrative review, then the order of removal is not yet

21 ‘administratively final.’ The non-citizen has not been ‘ordered removed,’ and the

22 removal period has not begun, so § 1231(a) is inapplicable.” Rodriguez v. Robbins,

23 804 F.3d 1060, 1086 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds

24 sub nom., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). Respondents citation to Prieto-

25 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) is unpersuasive. Prieto-Romero

26 addresses an entirely different factual posture where a removal order is

27 administratively final. Petitioner’s removal order is not final and thus the removal

28 period has not begun. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).

1 Respondents also contend that there are changed circumstances that warrant

2 Petitioner’s detention. Based on the information provided by Respondents, this

3 seems to be true. Respondents state that Petitioner was arrested on September 15,

4 2025, in connection with unrelated criminal offenses. (Opp’n at 3.) Certainly, these

5 are the sorts of subsequent events that might constitute a change in circumstances.

6 Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed above and in the Court’s prior orders,

7 Petitioner is still entitled to a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker who can

8 determine whether Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger to the community such

9 that continued detention is warranted.1

10 Petitioner has also established irreparable harm based on the deprivation of

11 constitutional rights via immigration detention. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d

12 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir.

13 2017). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s TRO is improper as it seeks to alter the

14 status quo. (Opp’n at 3–4.) The Court has heard and rejected similar arguments in the

15 past. Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 190 (E.D. Cal. 2025). The Court rejects

16 them for the same reasons here. Respondents also argue that Petitioner cannot

17 establish irreparable harm based on the delay in seeking relief. (Opp’n at 4.)

18 Respondents are incorrect that a delay in seeking relief, let alone one of merely four

19 months, renders detention less harmful or the need for relief less urgent. Detained

20 individuals are harmed each additional day they are deprived of their liberty.

21 Petitioner has thus established irreparable harm.

22 The balance of the equities and public interest are merged as the Government

23 is the non-moving party, and these factors clearly weigh in Petitioner’s favor. See

24 Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002; Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The

25 government also cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable

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27 1 Respondents also argue that Petitioner is not a member of the Maldonado Bautista class. As the Court

does not grant on the basis of Petitioner’s purported membership in that class, the Court does not

28 address that issue here.

1 | sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” (internal citations and

2 | quotation marks omitted)); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1037 (N.D. Cal.

3 | 2025) (“[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against

4 | unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of

5 | immigration detention are staggering.”).

6 Accordingly, as all of the Winter factors weigh in Petitioner's favor, IT IS HEREBY

7 | ORDERED that:

8 1. Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) is

9 converted to a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and GRANTED.

10 2. Within five (5) days of this Order, Petitioner shall be afforded a

11 constitutionally adequate bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

12 before an Immigration Judge. The Government shall bear the burden of

13 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a

14 danger to the community or risk of flight, and Petitioner shall be allowed to

15 have counsel present.

16 3. The merits of this matter are referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge for

17 all further pretrial proceedings.

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19 IT 1S SO ORDERED.

20 | Dated: _ January 29, 2026 “Dank A CDbnetto—

Hon. Daniel alabretta

21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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