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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JUAN JOSE FERNANDEZ VASQUEZ, No. 1:26-cv-00476-DAD-EFB

12 Petitioner,

13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

14 ORESTES CRUZ, et al.,

(Doc. No. 4)

15 Respondents.

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17 This matter is before the court on petitioner’s ex parte motion for temporary restraining

18 order filed on January 23, 2026. (Doc. No. 4.) For the reasons explained below, the court will

19 deny petitioner’s motion.

20 BACKGROUND

21 On January 20, 2026, petitioner Juan Jose Fernandez Vasquez filed a petition for writ of

22 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention by the United States

23 immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. No. 1.) Therein petitioner asserts a

24 violation of his rights under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) pursuant to the

25 decision in Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2024). (Id. at ¶¶ 38–40.) In support of

26 his motion for temporary restraining order, petitioner has provided evidence of the following.

27 Petitioner entered the United States in 1994. (Id. at ¶ 29.) On May 13, 2025, petitioner

28 was detained by ICE during an adjustment of status interview to obtain his legal permanent

1 residence.1 (Id. at ¶ 30.) Following his detention, petitioner was placed in removal proceedings

2 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Id. at ¶ 31.) On December 3, 2025, petitioner’s prior conviction

3 for domestic violence was vacated pursuant to California Penal Code § 1473.7. (Id. at ¶ 32.)

4 Subsequently, petitioner sought a bond redetermination hearing. (Id. at ¶ 34.) On January 7,

5 2026, the assigned immigration judge denied petitioner bond on the basis of his having a serious

6 criminal history, finding that petitioner constituted a “danger to other persons or property.” (Id. at

7 ¶ 35.)

8 On January 23, 2026, petitioner filed the pending motion for temporary restraining order.

9 (Doc. No. 4.) On January 27, 2026, respondents filed their opposition to that motion and, on

10 January 28, 2026, petitioner filed a reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 7, 8.)

11 LEGAL STANDARD

12 The standard governing the issuing of a temporary restraining order is “substantially

13 identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v.

14 John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for

15 preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the

16 merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

17 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans,

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19 1 The court observes that it has previously ordered release of a petitioner on the basis that he was

improperly detained during an adjustment of status interview in violation of the INA. See Franco

20 v. Meyer, No. 1:25-cv-01620-DAD-CKD, 2025 WL 3280782, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). In

that case, the undersigned granted release of a petitioner who had been detained at an adjustment

21 of status interview on the grounds that the use of the adjustment of status process to lure non-

citizen spouses violated the INA. Id. However, unlike in Franco, petitioner at the time of his

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adjustment of status interview had been previously convicted of domestic violence, a conviction

23 which was not vacated until December 3, 2025 after the adjustment of status interview. (Doc.

No. 1 at ¶ 32.) “Aliens convicted of certain crimes are generally ineligible to apply for

24 adjustment of status because they are deemed inadmissible.” You, Xiu Qing v. Nielsen, 321 F.

Supp. 3d 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Moreover, petitioner has not raised a statutory claim

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asserting a violation of the INA on the basis of improper detention during his adjustment of status

interview. See Ngugi v. Lyons, No. 1:25-cv-01783-KES-EPG, 2026 WL 35610, at *2 n.1 (E.D.

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Cal. Jan. 6, 2026) (declining to address an argument that the petitioner’s arrest during an

27 adjustment of status interview violated the INA where the petitioner did not raise that argument in

his petition or in his motion for temporary restraining order). Accordingly, the court does not

28 address this unbriefed issue further in this order.

1 Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

2 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th

3 Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just

4 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los

5 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). A petitioner seeking a preliminary injunction must

6 make a showing on all four of these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127,

7 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is

8 appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were

9 raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 1134–35 (citation

10 omitted). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v.

11 City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caribbean Marine Servs. Co.

12 v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“A plaintiff must do more than

13 merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate

14 immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an

15 injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the

16 plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

17 The likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor. See Disney

18 Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Petitioner bears the burden of

19 demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims or, at the very least, that

20 “serious questions going to the merits were raised.” All. for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131.

21 DISCUSSION

22 Petitioner argues that the immigration judge “unlawfully and unconstitutionally” denied

23 him bond. (Doc. No. 4-2 at 3–4.) Respondents argue that petitioner has failed to exhaust his

24 administrative remedies and should instead seek an appeal of the immigration judge’s order

25 through the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Doc. No. 7 at 2–3.) Petitioner replies that

26 the immigration judge’s bond decision was based upon a vacated criminal conviction, that this is

27 an impermissible basis for immigration detention, and accordingly that this court should waive

28 any exhaustion requirement. (Doc. No. 8 at 2.)

1 “On habeas review under § 2241, exhaustion is a prudential rather than jurisdictional

2 requirement.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011). “Courts may require

3 prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a

4 proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the

5 deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow

6 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Puga v.

7 Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,

8 even if these factors weigh in favor of requiring exhaustion, “there are a number of exceptions to

9 the general rule requiring exhaustion, covering situations such as where administrative remedies

10 are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture,

11 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Laing v.

12 Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).

13 In this regard, the court finds the district court’s order in Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-

14 01538-TSZ-GJL, 2025 WL 2689844 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2025), report and recommendation

15 adopted, 2025 WL 2689066 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 19, 2025), where the district court concluded that

16 the Puga factors strongly weigh in favor of requiring exhaustion when a petitioner requests

17 review of an individualized bond hearing determination before an immigration judge and that the

18 petitioner had failed to demonstrate the existence of one of the exceptions recognized by the

19 Ninth Circuit in Laing. Here, as to the second Puga factor, the court emphasizes that “[b]ecause

20 of the fact-intensive inquiry involved in reviewing individual bond determinations . . . allowing

21 [p]etitioner to bypass the administrative scheme would not provide concrete guidance for a large

22 swath of future administrative proceedings. Rather, relaxing the exhaustion requirements in this

23 case would encourage others to immediately seek habeas review if they deem the federal courts to

24 be a more sympathetic forum.” Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5. The court finds this

25 reasoning from Martinez to be persuasive and, accordingly, concludes that petitioner has not

26 demonstrated that the prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived in his case.

27 Petitioner appears to contend that the lengthy process of appealing his bond determination

28 to the BIA constitutes irreparable harm that justifies waiving the prudential exhaustion

1 | requirement. (Doc. No. 4-2 at 5.) Extended periods of detention combined with a clear legal

2 | error during a bond redetermination hearing may constitute grounds to waive the prudential

3 | exhaustion requirement. See Perez v. Wolf, 445 F. Supp. 3d 275, 286 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (waiving

4 | the prudential exhaustion requirement where the court found that, if the petitioner was correct

5 | regarding the underlying due process violation, he would have been unlawfully deprived of a

6 | bond hearing for over two years). Nevertheless, courts are reticent to waive prudential exhaustion

7 | on these grounds because the argument “begs the constitutional questions presented” in the

8 | underlying habeas petition. Hilario Pankim v. Barr, No. 20-cv-02941-JSC, 2020 WL 2542022

9 | (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the district court in Martinez

10 | observed “irrespective of the errors Petitioner assigns to his bond hearing, the fact remains that he

11 || received a bond hearing[.] ... This case is thus readily distinguishable from those involving

12 | continued detention without any process.” 2025 WL 2689844, at *6 (emphasis in original).

13 | Therefore, the court rejects petitioner’s argument that he has established irreparable harm

14 || justifying the waiving of the prudential exhaustion requirement in this case.’

15 For the reasons above, petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 4) is

16 | DENIED. The court hereby VACATES the previously scheduled February 2, 2026 hearing on

17 | petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order.

18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: _ January 29, 2026 Da A. 2, oye

20 DALE A. DROZD

54 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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24 | * The court also observes that an immigration judge’s reliance on a vacated conviction at a bond

hearing would not appear to constitute clear legal error. The only case which petitioner cites in

25 support of this contention is Bent v. Garland, 115 F.4th 934 (9th Cir. 2024), in which the court

96 || held that it was legal error for the BIA to assume as a matter of course that a conviction vacated

pursuant to California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) was vacated solely to alleviate the immigration

27 || consequences of a conviction. Bent, 115 F.4th at 940-41. The Ninth Circuit did not address in

Bent whether a vacated conviction may be considered at a bond redetermination hearing.

28 | Petitioner’s reliance on the decision in Bent, without more, is therefore misplaced.