Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JORGE VALDEZ-RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:26-cv-1312-KCD-NPM

v.

U.S ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, SECRETARY; AND

ICE DIRECTOR FIELD OFFICE,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

Petitioner Jorge Valdez-Rodriguez filed a pro se habeas corpus petition

challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement. (Doc.

1.)1 He claims that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment.

(Id. at 7-8.) Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 10.) For the reasons below,

the petition is DENIED.

I. Background

Valdez-Rodriguez, a Cuban citizen, was paroled into the United States

in 1980. (Doc. 10-1 at 2.) He was ordered removed from the United States in

1999, and waived his right to appeal. He was not deported but instead placed

on supervision. (Id. at 4.)

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

In October 2025, Valdez-Rodriguez was arrested on suspicion of

battery. His custody was transferred to the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) on December 8, 2025, and he was provided a notice of

revocation of release the following day. (Id. at 4-5, 9.) He was also provided

with an informal interview. (Id. at 6.)

ICE advised Respondents’ counsel that the Cuban Government has

denied repatriation. Other removal efforts have also failed. On February 13,

2026, Valdez-Rodriguez refused to comply with removal to Mexico, and he

was returned to Florida. (See Doc. 10-1 at 9.) Earlier this month, DHS

notified Valdez-Rodriguez of its plan to attempt again removal to Mexico. (Id.

at 8.)

II. Legal Framework

The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to

issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of

the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At

its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).

“Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration

detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at

*2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

III. Discussion

A. Substantive Due Process

The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a

noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90

days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period,

detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the

noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the

individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6).

But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis, the

authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious

constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the

statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period

“reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). And to

make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first

six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that

period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is

no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the

burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut

that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002).

Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must

show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must

provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.

Applied here, Valdez-Rodriguez cannot satisfy the initial temporal

requirement. ICE took him into custody on December 8, 2025. (Doc. 10-1 at 4-

5, 9.) Because he has been detained just over five months, he remains within

the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. See, e.g.,

Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8

(S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case

No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26,

2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL

1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature”

because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”). And, in

any event, Valdez-Rodriguez has refused removal to Mexico, which tolls the

detention period. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 n.4 (stating that the

“removal period shall be extended ... if the alien ... acts to prevent [his]

removal subject to an order of removal”); Quo Zing Song v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,

516 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The six-month period is tolled,

however, if the alien acts to prevent his removal.”). Thus, Valdez-Rodriguez’s

challenge to his continued detention fails. Brown v. Gonzalez, No. 4:06CV525-

RH/WCS, 2007 WL 2790585, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2007).

Valdez-Rodriguez claims that his removal is not likely in the

foreseeable future. (Doc. 1 at 7.) But this argument puts the cart before the

horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is

presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g.,

Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8

(S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case

No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26,

2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL

1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature”

because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”).

B. Procedural Due Process

Valdez-Rodriguez also presses a procedural due process claim. (Doc. 1

at 7.) He argues Respondents have failed to provide him a meaningful

opportunity to show he should not be detained. (Id. at 7.)

At its core, the Due Process Clause demands that before the

government strips a person of a protected liberty interest, it must provide

notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “Due process requires notice reasonably calculated,

under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of

the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” United

Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010).

In the context of revoking a noncitizen’s supervised release and

detaining him, like here, ICE’s regulations strike that constitutional balance

by guaranteeing written notice and an informal interview that allows the

individual to respond. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i). Valdez-Rodriguez

received both. (See Doc. 10-1 at 4-6.) He got exactly what the Fifth

Amendment requires—notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

The Constitution guarantees a fair process, not a favorable result.

Because ICE afforded Valdez-Rodriguez the requisite notice and an

opportunity to be heard, his procedural due process claim fails.

IV. Conclusion

Valdez-Rodriguez’s due process claim under Zadvydas fails, so the

habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new

petition should his current detention (which is not impeded) extend beyond

the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is

DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions

and deadlines, and close the case.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 15, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge