The opinion
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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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12 PAULINE KIK, an individual, Case No.: 25-cv-02479-WQH-DDL
Plaintiff,
13 ORDER
v.
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15 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
16 inclusive,
17 Defendants.
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HAYES, Judge:
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The matter before the Court is the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses
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filed by Plaintiff Pauline Kik. (ECF No. 13.)
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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On August 14, 2025, Plaintiff Pauline Kik (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action by filing
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a Complaint in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego, Case No.
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25CU043185C. (ECF No. 1-3.) Plaintiff asserts claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer
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Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq., against Defendant
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Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”) arising from her purchase of an allegedly defective
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automobile on August 10, 2023. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 16–56.
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1 On September 19, 2025, Defendant removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.)
2 On the same day, Defendant filed an Answer. (ECF No. 2.)
3 On November 7, 2025, Plaintiff and Defendant filed a Joint Notice of Settlement
4 informing the Court that the parties “reached a settlement in principle” but that “attorneys’
5 fees, costs, and expenses remain outstanding.” (ECF No. 9 at 2.)
6 On January 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs,
7 and Expenses. (ECF No. 13.)
8 On March 3, 2026, Defendant filed a Response in Opposition. (ECF No. 18.)
9 On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Reply and Objections to Defendant’s Opposition.
10 (ECF No. 19.)
11 II. CONTENTIONS
12 In the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses, Plaintiff states that, “[o]n or
13 about November 6, 2025, the parties settled the underlying claims when Plaintiff executed
14 Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 Offer” (the “Rule 68 Offer”). (ECF No. 13 at 19.) Plaintiff
15 contends that the Rule 68 Offer provides that “Plaintiff is the prevailing party” and that
16 “Plaintiff could ask the Court to award fees and costs, if they could not be resolved
17 informally.” Id; see also ECF No. 13-13 at 3 (“Defendant Ford Motor Company’s Offer of
18 Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68”).
19 Plaintiff contends that, on December 10, 2025, her counsel provided an “invoice
20 with fees incurred to date” to Defendant’s counsel “along with an offer to discount those
21 fees,” but that Defendant rejected the proposed offer. Id. at 12–13. Plaintiff contends that
22 her counsel made a subsequent offer on January 12, 2026 with “an even bigger discount on
23 the fees,” but that this offer was also rejected. Id. at 13.
24 Plaintiff now moves for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $34,387.50. Id.
25 at 9–10. Plaintiff contends that a lodestar calculation of her attorneys’ fees results in a total
26 of $22,925.00 and that a lodestar multiplier of 1.5 supports her request of attorneys’ fees
27 in the total amount of $34,387.50. Id. Plaintiff also requests reimbursement of costs and
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1 expenses in the amount of $821.77. Id. The total amount sought in the pending motion is
2 $35,208.27. Id. at 10.
3 Plaintiff contends that the request for attorneys’ fees is supported by the complexity
4 of this action, the skill of her attorneys, and the contingent-fee arrangement her attorneys
5 used in this case. Id. at 19–20, 27. In support, Plaintiff submits the Declaration of Sepehr
6 Daghighian and its related Exhibits. (Daghighian Decl., ECF No. 13-1.) The first exhibit
7 (the “Billing Table”) describes the work, hours, rates, and total fees incurred by Plaintiff’s
8 counsel for the purposes of calculating the lodestar amount. (Exhibit A to Daghighian
9 Decl., ECF No. 13-2.) The Billing Table describes 38.0 total hours of work performed by
10 two “Associate Attorneys” and two “Partners” and identifies a “Services Subtotal” of
11 $22,925.00 for their legal services. Id.
12 Plaintiff also submits “two neutral and independent surveys” (the “Fee Reports”)
13 that purportedly “show that the rates requested match what other consumer rights attorneys
14 charge.” (ECF No. 13 at 18; Exhibits B, C to Daghighian Decl. (ECF Nos. 13-3, 13-4).)
15 Plaintiff contends that the calculation of attorneys’ fees does not include “charges for
16 paralegal or administrative work” or “hours for partner supervision and inter-office
17 communications.” (ECF No. 13 at 18.)
18 Defendant, in its Opposition, requests that the Court deny the motion “in its entirety”
19 because Plaintiff “unreasonably rejected Ford’s pre-litigation repurchase offer” and now
20 moves for an unreasonable award of fees that includes “excessive time entries, duplicative
21 entries, and anticipated work entries.” (ECF No. 18 at 4, 14.) Defendant contends that,
22 upon receiving a letter from Plaintiff’s counsel demanding replacement of the allegedly
23 defective automobile around July 16, 2025, Defendant “inform[ed] [Plaintiff] of Ford’s
24 repurchase approval, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 5. Defendant
25 contends that it “reiterated its repurchase offer,” but that Plaintiff’s counsel requested an
26 unreasonably large reimbursement of attorneys’ fees without supporting documentation.
27 Id.
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1 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is unreasonable
2 because its Billing Table reflects excessive, duplicative, and anticipated work. Id. at 8–11.
3 In support, Defendant submits the Declaration of Alyssa M. Abrante and its related
4 Exhibits. (ECF No. 18-1.) The first exhibit identifies the billing entries to which each of
5 Defendant’s contentions applies, and requests that the Court decline to award attorneys’
6 fees for 30.1 hours out of the total 38.0 hours reported by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 18-1 at 5–6.)
7 Defendants request that the Court reduce Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fees by a total of
8 $17,912.00 and, instead, award attorneys’ fees in the adjusted amount of $5,013.00. Id.
9 Defendants also request that the Court decline to apply a lodestar multiplier because this
10 “case was not particularly novel and did not require special expertise,” Plaintiff’s counsel
11 has not demonstrated that their work on this case precluded them from taking other cases,
12 and any risk from their purported contingency fee arrangement is “mere fiction” because
13 this type of action routinely results in a fee-shifting agreement. Id. at 11–14.
14 III. LEGAL STANDARD
15 When a federal district court exercises diversity jurisdiction over a case, the “law of
16 the state in which the district court sits determines whether a party is entitled to attorney
17 fees, and the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees is governed by federal
18 law.” Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).
19 Under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer:
20 shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal
to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based
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on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably
22 incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution
of such action.
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24 Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). The Song-Beverly Act requires that a district court “make an
25 initial determination of the actual time expended; and then [] ascertain whether under all
26 the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge
27 being made for the time expended are reasonable.” Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am., 31
28 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
1 “Courts calculate attorneys’ fees under § 1794(d) using the ‘lodestar adjustment
2 method.’” Aispuro v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18-CV-2045 DMS (KSC), 2020 WL 4582677,
3 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020) (quoting Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal.,
4 Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). “The lodestar calculation ‘begins
5 with a touchstone or lodestar, based on careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable
6 hourly compensation of each attorney.’” Id. (quoting Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122,
7 1132 (Cal. 2001)). After determining the reasonable hourly rate for comparable legal
8 services in the community, courts may adjust that amount based on the following factors:
9 “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in
10 presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other
11 employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Ketchum,
12 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. “[T]he purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market
13 value for the particular action.” Id.
14 “The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the fees sought were allowable,
15 reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and reasonable in amount.”
16 Hellenberg v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18cv2202 JM (KSC), 2020 WL 1820126, at *1 (S.D.
17 Cal. Apr. 10, 2020) (citing Karapetian v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036
18 (C.D. Cal. 2013)). “If the reasonableness of fees is challenged,” the opposing party must
19 “demonstrate the hours spent are duplicative or excessive.” Id. (citing Premier Med. Mgmt.
20 Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guar. Assoc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 562, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)).
21 IV. DISCUSSION
22 A. Defendant Ford’s Late Filing
23 As a preliminary matter, the Court considers whether to accept Defendant’s untimely
24 Opposition to the pending Motion. Plaintiff filed her motion on January 30, 2026, and
25 indicated the correct hearing date of March 9, 2026 on the cover page of the motion. (ECF
26 No. 13.) Pursuant to the Southern District Court of California Local Rules (“Local Rules”),
27 Defendant was required to file any Response in Opposition no later than February 23, 2026.
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1 See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7.1.e.2. Defendant untimely filed its Opposition on March 3, 2026.
2 (ECF No. 18.)
3 Defendant “apologizes to the Court and Plaintiff” for its late filing and requests that
4 the Court consider its contentions. Id. at 6–7. Plaintiff replies that the Court should not
5 excuse the violation of the Local Rules because Defendant failed to seek relief under
6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), which states that a district court may provide relief
7 from a deadline for “good cause.” (ECF No. 19 at 3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)).) In the
8 interest of determining the motion on its merits and providing both parties with an
9 opportunity to be heard, the Court finds good cause to permit the late filing of Defendant’s
10 Response in Opposition (ECF No. 18) and considers its contentions therein.
11 B. Objections to Defendant’s Opposition
12 In her Reply, Plaintiff raises two objections to the supporting materials attached to
13 Defendant’s Opposition. (ECF No. 19-1 at 2–3.) The Court considers her objections.
14 First, Plaintiff objects that Exhibit A of the Declaration of Alyssa M. Abrante
15 (“Abrante Decl.”) filed in support of Defendant’s Opposition, (ECF No. 18-1 at 5–7),
16 contains improper argument and lacks foundation. (ECF No. 19-1 at 2.) Alyssa M. Abrante,
17 counsel for Defendant, states in her declaration that the document is “a true and correct
18 copy of a spreadsheet of Plaintiff’s billing sheets, Ford’s objections, and proposed
19 reductions.” (ECF No. 18-1 at 2.) Plaintiff contends that Local Rule 7.1 requires that all
20 contentions “be contained in the memo” submitted with a motion rather than in a
21 supporting declaration. Id. Plaintiff cites Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP W. Coast Prods. LLC, in
22 which Judge Jinsook Ohta of the Southern District of California “disregarded the improper
23 legal conclusions and argumentative statements” contained in declarations submitted at the
24 summary judgment stage. 632 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1130 (S.D. Cal. 2022). That case is
25 inapposite. Defendant’s Exhibit A is a table that compiles Plaintiff’s own Billing Table
26 alongside a brief description of Defendant’s contentions, which are also raised in its
27 memorandum of points and authorities. (ECF No. 18-1 at 5–6.) The contentions listed in
28 the “Objection” column are not additional argumentative statements submitted to bolster
1 the Opposition; rather, the exhibit serves to identify the contentions raised in Defendant’s
2 memorandum of points and authorities and to apply them to the corresponding billing
3 entries. (ECF No. 18 at 7–10.) The Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection to Exhibit A and
4 will consider the document insofar as it contains specific applications of Defendant’s
5 contentions regarding the reasonableness of requested attorneys’ fees.
6 Second, Plaintiff objects that Exhibits B, C, D, and E of the Abrante Decl. are not
7 relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and contain settlement negotiations that are
8 inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. The Abrante Declaration states that these
9 exhibits are “correspondence” between the parties regarding the potential “replacement of
10 the Subject Vehicle” and discussions regarding attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No. 18-1
11 at 2.) The Court finds these exhibits to be irrelevant to its analysis and sustains Plaintiff’s
12 objections.
13 C. Attorneys’ Fees
14 The Court considers Plaintiff’s requested award of attorneys’ fees based on the
15 reasonableness of requested rates and hours expended in this action.
16 1. Reasonable Rates
17 In determining a reasonable rate for attorneys’ fees, “the burden is on the fee
18 applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—
19 that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar
20 services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v.
21 Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “The relevant community is that in which the
22 district court sits.” Carr v. Tadin, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 970, 978 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting
23 Weeks v. Kellogg Co., No. CV 09-08102(MMM) (RZx), 2013 WL 6531177, at *32 (C.D.
24 Cal. Nov. 23, 2013)); see Butler v. Homeservices Lending LLC, No. 11-cv-02313-L
25 (MDD), 2014 WL 5460447, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014) (“The survey and reports
26 submitted by both [plaintiff] and [defendant] are irrelevant to the hourly rate inquiry
27 because none of them address the prevailing market rate for attorneys of reasonably
28 comparable skill, experience, and reputation in the Southern District of California.”).
1 “Fee applicants may provide affidavits of practitioners from the same forum with
2 similar experience to establish the reasonableness of the hourly rate sought.” Base v. FCA
3 US LLC, No. 17-cv-01532-JCS, 2020 WL 363006, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2020). Courts
4 may also draw upon “[d]ecisions by other courts regarding the reasonableness of the rate
5 sought,” as well as the court’s “own experience in determining what constitutes a
6 reasonable rate.” Id. “Once the fee applicant has proffered such evidence” of the prevailing
7 market rate in the community, “the opposing party must produce its own affidavits or other
8 evidence to rebut the proposed rate.” Nguyen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 3:20-CV-2432
9 JLS (BLM), 2023 WL 173921, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2023) (quoting Cortes v. Metro.
10 Life Ins. Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
11 Plaintiff contends that the following hourly rates are reasonable:
12 Name Position Hourly Rate
13 Michael Rosenstein Partner $700.00
14 Sepehr Daghighian Partner $625.00
15 Mitchel Brim Associate Attorney $550.00
16 Alastair Hamblin Associate Attorney $550.00
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(Daghighian Decl., ECF No. 13-1 at 2–5; Billing Table at 5.) Plaintiff contends that these
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hourly rates are reasonable based on her attorneys’ “extensive experience in lemon law
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litigation.” (ECF No. 13 at 18.) Plaintiff also submits the Fee Reports, which include the
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“United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report 2017–2018” and the “2021
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Real Rate Report,” in support of her request. (ECF Nos. 13-3, 13-4.) Defendant does not
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raise specific contentions regarding the reasonableness of the hourly rates for Plaintiff’s
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counsel. (ECF No. 18.) Defendant refers to “inflated rates” in its Opposition, but contends
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that it is the number of hours expended—rather than the rates charged—that renders
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Plaintiff’s fee request unreasonable. Id. at 10; see also ECF No. 18-1 at 5–6 (objecting to
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nearly every billing entry on the basis that the “[r]ate [is] too high for routine litigation type
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of work performed).
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1 In cases related to allegedly defective automobiles, federal courts in this district have
2 recently approved hourly rates between $225 to $600. See Moron v. Gen. Motors LLC, No.
3 3:25-CV-02458-H-BLM, 2026 WL 357534, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (approving
4 hourly rates of $450 to $545 for attorneys with seven to ten years of practice and adjusting
5 the hourly rate for an attorney with three years of practice to $250); Cabrera v. Ford Motor
6 Co., No. 23-CV-1775-WQH-LR, 2025 WL 2462442, at *4–*6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025)
7 (approving hourly rates for attorneys between $395 and $595); Garcia v. Ford Motor Co.,
8 No. 22-CV-1474-GPC, 2023 WL 3961090, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2023) (approving
9 hourly rates for attorneys between $475 and $605); Hellenberg v. Ford Motor Co., No.
10 18CV2202 JM (KSC), 2020 WL 1820126, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020) (approving
11 hourly rates between $350 and $550 for partners and between $275 and $375 for associate
12 attorneys); Aispuro v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18-CV-2045 DMS (KSC), 2020 WL 4582677,
13 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020) (approving hourly rates of $350 for partners and $225 for
14 associate attorneys). Here, Plaintiff requests hourly rates that exceed the upper end of the
15 range of rates typically awarded by courts in this district for similar cases. The Court finds
16 reason to revise the requested rates downward based on the experience of each attorney.
17 Plaintiff’s counsel makes the following declarations regarding the experience of
18 attorneys who worked on this case. Michael Rosenstein has “30+ years of litigation
19 experience” and has “litigated hundreds of lemon law matters” in California. (Daghighian
20 Decl. at 3–4.) Sepehr Daghighan has “20+ years of litigation experience.” Id. at 3. Brian
21 Shippen-Murray and Alastair Hamblin, the associate attorneys, have both been “actively
22 prosecuting lemon law cases . . . since 2015.” Id. at 4. Based on their experience, the
23 reasonable hourly rates for Plaintiff’s attorneys should be revised to the higher end of the
24 range of rates awarded in similar actions. The Court adjusts the hourly rates of Plaintiff’s
25 counsel as follows for the purpose of determining a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees:
26 / / /
27 / / /
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1 Name Position Adjusted Rate
2 Michael Rosenstein Partner $605.00
3 Sepehr Daghighian Partner $605.00
4 Mitchel Brim Associate Attorney $475.00
5 Alastair Hamblin Associate Attorney $475.00
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2. Hours Expended
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Plaintiff contends that the number of hours that her counsel expended is reasonable
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based on the work required to litigate this action. (ECF No. 13 at 14.) Plaintiff also contends
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that her calculation of hours expended is reasonable because it “doesn’t list charges for
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paralegal or administrative work” and omits hours for “partner supervision and inter-office
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communications.” (ECF No. 13 at 18.) Plaintiff submits the Billing Table with detailed
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entries in support of her contentions. (ECF No. 13-2.) The total number of hours expended
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by each attorney is described here:
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Name Position Hours Expended
15
Michael Rosenstein Partner 11.5
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Sepehr Daghighian Partner 4.0
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Mitchel Brim Associate Attorney 12.4
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Alastair Hamblin Associate Attorney 11.5
19
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Id. at 5.
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The prevailing party is entitled to “an award of fees for all time reasonably expended
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in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney traditionally
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is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time reasonably expended on a matter.”
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Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 431 (1983) (quotation omitted). “A fee applicant must
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provide records documenting the tasks completed and the amount of time spent.” Scott v.
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Jayco Inc., No. 1:19-cv-0315 JLT, 2021 WL 6006411, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2021)
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(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424). “If a court determines that some hours billed are not
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1 an ‘hour-by-hour analysis’ of the fee request or make an ‘across the board percentage cut.’”
2 Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1223 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting
3 Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013)). The court may exclude
4 “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Yarovoy v. Tesla Motors,
5 Inc., No. 23-cv-04182-JSC, 2024 WL 2412547, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2024) (quoting
6 Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)).
7 i. Excessive Billing
8 Defendant contends that the Billing Table contains “unreasonably excessive billing
9 entries” in the amount of 15.4 hours. (ECF No. 18 at 8–9.) In its supporting exhibit,
10 Defendant identifies: (1) Michael Rosenstein billing 1.1 hours for reviewing documents,
11 analyzing causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act, and drafting the Complaint on
12 August 14, 2025; (2) Mitchel Brim billing 1.3 hours for drafting correspondence to
13 opposing counsel on October 9, 2025; (3) Mitchel Brim billing 2.5 hours for drafting and
14 revising a Joint Discovery Plan on October 31, 2025; (4) Mitchel Brim spending 0.5 hours
15 drafting and revising a Joint Notice of Settlement; (5) Michael Rosenstein billing 3.5 hours
16 for conducting legal research and drafting a memorandum related to remedies under the
17 Song-Beverly Act on January 17, 2025; (6) Alastair Hamblin billing 0.6 hours for auditing
18 bills in preparation for the pending motion for attorneys’ fees; (7) Alastair Hamblin billing
19 4.5 hours for drafting the pending motion for attorneys’ fees; and (8) Sepehr Daghighian
20 billing 1.4 hours for finalizing the pending motion for attorneys’ fees. Id.; see also ECF
21 No. 18-1 at 5–6.
22 Defendant contends, specifically, that Michael Rosenstein billing 3.5 hours for
23 conducting research and drafting a memorandum on January 17, 2025 is unreasonable in
24 light of his extensive experience with cases involving claims under the Song-Beverly Act
25 and that Mitchel Brim billing 1.3 hours for corresponding with opposing counsel is
26 unreasonable because the correspondence was “merely a copy-and-paste non-confidential
27 version of the internal summaries that the firm had already completed.” (ECF No. 18 at 8–
28 9.)
1 The time expended for each of these billing entries is commensurate with the work
2 described. See, e.g., Moron, 2026 WL 357534, at *4 (finding 0.9 hours reasonable to draft
3 a complaint); Cabrera, 2025 WL 2462442, at *11 (finding 5 hours reasonable to draft a
4 motion for attorneys’ fees). The Billing Table provides sufficient information for the Court
5 to review the reasonableness of each entry. For those two entries that Defendant addresses
6 in its Opposition in greater detail, the Court does not find adequate basis to revise the
7 amount of time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court declines to adjust the hours
8 expended based on “excessive” billing entries. (ECF No. 18 at 8.)
9 ii. Duplicate Entries
10 Defendant contends that the Billing Table contains “duplicative billing entries” in
11 the amount of 5.2 hours. (ECF No. 18 at 9–10.) Defendant identifies: (1) Michael
12 Rosenstein billing 1.1 hours for reviewing Plaintiff’s purchase documents on August 14,
13 2025, and Mitchel Brim billing 2.3 hours for “analyzing the same six repair orders of the
14 Vehicle and bill[ing] an additional 1.5 hours for preparing a summary of the same” on
15 September 23, 2025; (2) Mitchel Brim billing 0.6 hours for reviewing documents related
16 to the vehicle purchase on September 23, 2025; (3) Michael Rosenstein billing 0.2 hours
17 for reviewing Defendant’s Rule 68 Offer and Mitchel Brim billing 0.3 hours for the same
18 task on November 6, 2025; and (4) Michael Rosenstein billing 0.5 hours for email
19 correspondence with opposing counsel on December 30, 2025. Id.; see also ECF No. 18-1
20 at 5–6.
21 “[T]he participation of more than one attorney does not necessarily constitute an
22 unnecessary duplication of effort.” Caccamise v. Credit One Bank, N.A., No. 18-CV-971
23 JLS (BLM), 2020 WL 804741, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) (quoting Kim v. Fujikawa,
24 871 F.2d 1427, 1435 (9th Cir. 1989)). Here, Defendants fail to establish why the few billing
25 entries that reflect similar work performed by multiple attorneys were unnecessary to
26 litigate this case. The Court declines to adjust the hours expended by Plaintiff’s counsel on
27 the basis that their efforts were duplicative or unnecessary.
28 / / /
1 iii. Anticipated Work
2 Defendant contends that the Billing Table contains anticipated work, including for
3 “preparing and attending the further Settlement Disposition hearing, reviewing
4 Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, drafting a Reply in support of the Motion,
5 and preparing for and appearing at the hearing for the Motion,” totaling 9.5 hours. (ECF
6 No. 18 at 10.)
7 The Billing Table contains three entries that describe “anticipated” work. (Billing
8 Table at 4.) First, Plaintiff’s counsel anticipates that Michael Rosenstein will spend 2 hours
9 preparing for and attending a Settlement Disposition Conference. Id. Second, Plaintiff’s
10 counsel anticipates that Alastair Hamblin will spend 5 hours drafting a Reply to
11 Defendant’s Opposition to the pending motion. Id. The Court concludes that both
12 “anticipated” entries are reasonable, especially in light of the Reply that Plaintiff ultimately
13 filed. See Moron, 2026 WL 357534 at *5 (awarding 10 hours of fees incurred in drafting a
14 motion for attorneys’ fees); Cabrera, 2025 WL 2462442 at *11 (awarding 5 hours of fees
15 incurred in drafting a motion for attorneys’ fees). The third entry, however, describes 2.5
16 hours that Sepehr Daghighian anticipates to spend in connection with a hearing on the
17 pending motion. Billing Table at 4. The Court did not hold a hearing prior to issuing this
18 Order. Accordingly, the Court reduces the hours expended by Sepehr Daghighan by 2.5.
19 After the adjustment described above, the total number of hours expended by each
20 attorney is reflected here:
21 Name Position Adjusted Hours
22 Michael Rosenstein Partner 11.5
23 Sepehr Daghighian Partner 1.5
24 Mitchel Brim Associate Attorney 12.4
25 Alastair Hamblin Associate Attorney 11.5
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 3. Lodestar Multiplier
2 Plaintiff contends that the Court should apply a lodestar multiplier of 1.5 to its
3 calculation of attorneys’ fees because her counsel handled this case on a contingency basis,
4 which creates a “real genuine risk of outlaying tens of thousands of dollars in fees and costs
5 without recovery” and requires “absorb[ing] significant delay in being paid if Plaintiff does
6 win.” (ECF No. 13 at 25–28.)
7 Defendant contends that the Court should not apply a lodestar multiplier because
8 this case was “not particularly novel and did not require special expertise,” Plaintiff’s
9 counsel was not “precluded from taking other employment opportunities” by taking on this
10 case, and Plaintiff’s counsel did not assume unreasonable risk by taking on this case on a
11 contingency fee basis. (ECF No. 18 at 11–14.)
12 “The lodestar amount is considered presumptively reasonable, and only the ‘rare’ or
13 ‘exceptional’ case will justify an upward adjustment.” Rahman v. FCA US LLC, 594 F.
14 Supp. 3d 1199, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co.,
15 214 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000)). Courts generally consider four factors when
16 determining whether to add a “multiplier” or “enhancement” to the lodestar: “(1) the
17 novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them,
18 (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the
19 attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am.,
20 LLC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1128).
21 The Court does not find reason to add a lodestar multiplier to the attorneys’ fees in
22 this action. This case did not involve unusually complex legal issues and did not appear to
23 impose such a burden on Plaintiff’s counsel that they might be expected to have declined
24 other cases. The time, skill, and complexity required to litigate this action are reflected in
25 the lodestar amount. The Court declines to apply a lodestar multiplier. See Moron, 2026
26 WL 357534, at *6 (declining to award a lodestar multiplier in a “routine” case arising under
27 the Song-Beverly Act); Cabrera, 2025 WL 2462442, at *12 (declining to award a lodestar
28 multiplier “given the routine nature of th[e] case and the lack of novel or complex issues”);
1 Rahman, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 1207 (declining to award a lodestar multiplier in a “largely
2 routine lemon law case”).
3 4. Summary of Attorneys’ Fees
4 Based on the adjustments made in the preceding analysis, the following table reflects
5 the reasonable hours spent and hourly rates for Plaintiff’s counsel:
6 Name Position Adjusted Hours Adjusted Rate
7 Michael Rosenstein Partner 11.5 $605.00
8 Sepehr Daghighian Partner 1.5 $605.00
9 Mitchel Brim Associate Attorney 12.4 $475.00
10 Alastair Hamblin Associate Attorney 11.5 $475.00
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The total amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded to Plaintiff’s counsel is
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$19,217.50.
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D. Costs and Expenses
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Plaintiff requests costs and expenses in the amount of $821.77. (ECF No. 13 at 10;
15
see Daghighian Decl. at 4–5 (compiling expenses in a table with brief descriptions).)
16
Plaintiff contends that the Song-Beverly Act provides that a prevailing party may recovery
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“costs and expenses.” (ECF No. 13 at 28 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d)).) Plaintiff also
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contends that the cost-recovery provisions of the Song-Beverly Act, rather than Federal
19
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), should guide the Court’s analysis regarding recovery of
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costs and expenses. Id. at 29.
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Defendant contends that Plaintiff “failed to submit a Bill of Costs with the Court
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and, instead, lodged a request for costs in the body of her Motion” in violation of the Local
23
Rules. (ECF No. 18 at 14 (citing S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 54.1).) Defendant also contends that,
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if the issue of costs and expenses is “properly before the Court,” the request is also
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unreasonable because the costs were incurred after “Plaintiff rejected Ford’s prelitigation
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repurchase offer.” Id. Plaintiff responds that the Rule 68 Offer to which the parties agreed
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1 ‘‘didn’t require Plaintiffto file a separate Bill of Costs,” and that Local Rule 54.1(a) permits
2 || the parties to “stipulate around the general rule” that a Bill of Costs must be filed.
3 Under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing plaintiff may recover “ta sum equal to the
4 ||aggregate amount of costs and expenses.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794 (d). The requirements of
5 ||Local Rule 54.1 do not limit Plaintiff's ability to recover costs sought under the Song-
6 || Beverly Act and the terms of the parties’ Rule 68 Offer. See Holcomb v. BMW of N. Am.,
7 || LLC, No. 18CV475 JM (BGS), 2020 WL 759285, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) (“The
8 ||costs and expenses available to Plaintiffs are not limited by Rule 54(d) or by Local Rule
9 .. . Additionally, both Rule 54(d) and Local Rule 54.1 are based on an entry of
10 ||judgment, which has not occurred here.’’). Here, the Rule 68 Offer does not provide a
11 || limitation on fees and costs incurred after acceptance of the offer. (ECF No. 13-3 at 3.)
12 || Plaintiff provides adequate support for its expenses incurred in service of the summons and
13 |}complaint. (Billing Table at 4-5.) The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
14 $821.77 in costs and expenses.
15 Vv. CONCLUSION
16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and
17 || Expenses (ECF No. 13) is granted, as follows. The Court awards Plaintiff $19,217.50 in
18 attorneys’ fees and $821.77 in costs and expenses, for a total amount of $20,039.27.
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21 ||Dated: April 6, 2026 itt Z. Ma
22 Hon. William Q. Hayes
3 United States District Court
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