Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
May 6, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

FELIPE GARCIA SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-695-TJC-PDB

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER

On March 30, 2026, Petitioner Felipe Garcia Sanchez, an immigration

detainee at Baker Correctional Institute, initiated this action through counsel

by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1; Petition). The Federal

Respondents filed a Response. (Doc. 9; Response). Respondent Warden, Florida

Baker Correctional Institute filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. (Doc. 10).

The case is now ripe for review.

I. Background

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without

inspection in 2005. Petition at 13; Response at 2. Since his entry, he has resided

continuously in the United States. Petition at 13. On February 17, 2026, he was

involved in a single-vehicle accident, with no other vehicles or persons involved

or injured. Id. at 14. Petitioner was charged with driving without a valid license

under Fla. Stat. § 322.03(1), a misdemeanor. Id. He pled no contest and was

adjudicated guilty on March 9, 2026. Id. Following his release, on or about

March 10, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took custody of

Petitioner in connection with his February 2026 arrest and issued a Notice to

Appear in immigration court. Id.; Response at 2.

In 2007, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of driving without a valid

driver’s license under the same Florida statute. Petition at 14. Petitioner has

no criminal history other than these two traffic offenses. Id. He argues that

“[n]either conviction triggers mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)[,]”

which Respondents do not dispute. Id. Respondents argue that ICE is properly

detaining him under § 1225(b)(2). Response at 8 et seq.

II. Analysis

The Petition contains four counts, alleging: (1) Respondents have violated

the Immigration and Nationality Act; (2) Respondents have violated the bond

regulations; (3) Respondents have violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment

procedural due process rights; and (4) Respondents have violated Petitioner’s

Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights. Petition at 15–17. As relief,

Petitioner requests, inter alia, immediate release or an order directing

Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing before an immigration judge

that has “strong procedural protections.” Id. at 19–22.

As Respondents acknowledge, the Court has recently addressed nearly

identical issues in Orozco Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:26-cv-

646-TJC-LLL, 2026 WL 947955 (M.D. Fla. April 8, 2026). The Court

incorporates the reasoning in Orozco Torres into this Order. A difference

between the two cases is that Orozco Torres had a bond hearing at which the

immigration judge determined he had no jurisdiction to consider bond, whereas

Petitioner likely has not. But his efforts to secure a meaningful hearing would

likewise be futile, given Respondents’ position that he is being held under

§ 1225(b)(2) and that he is therefore “subject to mandatory detention.” Response

at 12.

Accordingly, the Court rejects the Federal Respondents’ arguments that

two statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and (b)(9), deprive this Court of

jurisdiction to adjudicate Petitioner’s claims and that he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing this case. Regarding the merits of his

claim, the Court finds, in line with Orozco Torres, that Petitioner is not properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2). Thus, his Petition is due to be granted. See 2026

WL 947955, at *6.1

1 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently came to a similar

conclusion. See Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141-pr, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL

1146044 (2d Cir. April 28, 2026) (“Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to

noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who are present in the United States after

entering the country without inspection and admission, and who were not

apprehended at or near the border at the time of entry. This result is dictated

by the plain text of these provisions, and further confirmed by the statute’s

context, structure, history, and purpose. It likewise comports with the Supreme

III. Remedy

The Court considered requiring an individualized bond hearing before an

immigration judge on Petitioner’s detention. However, the Board of

Immigration Appeals decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216

(BIA 2025), which is binding on all immigration judges, held that such judges

lack authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to consider bond requests for

individuals who entered the United States without admission. Thus, if the

Court were to require a hearing, the immigration judge would be bound to find,

under Hurtado, that he or she lacks jurisdiction to provide Petitioner with a

meaningful hearing.2 Moreover, Respondents argue Petitioner is subject to

“mandatory” detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which does not permit

bond hearings. Response at 12.3

Court’s established understanding of Sections 1225 and 1226. It reflects

Executive Branch practice over thirty years and across five Presidential

administrations. Moreover, it explains why Congress has never challenged that

settled practice despite making numerous amendments to the immigration

laws. Finally, even if the government’s newfound interpretation of Section

1225(b)(2)(A) were plausible—and it is not—we would nonetheless reject it

based on our obligation to construe these statutes in a manner that would avoid

the serious constitutional questions attendant to what would be the broadest

mass-detention-without-bond mandate in our Nation’s history for millions of

noncitizens.”)

2 Indeed, in previous similar cases before the undersigned, the

immigration judges have found they do not have “jurisdiction” to grant an

individualized bond hearing.

3 Respondents argue alternatively that if the Court finds that Petitioner

is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, “the appropriate remedy” is to

For these reasons, the Court finds ordering an individualized hearing

would not afford relief and would be futile. See, e.g., Rivero v. Mina, No. 6:26-

cv-66-RBD-NWH, --- F. Supp. 3d ---- , 2026 WL 199319, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan.

26, 2026) (explaining that when the government “asserted no lawful basis” for

petitioner’s detention, allowing his continued detention while waiting for a

hearing “would gut the purpose of habeas review”) (citations omitted). Without

any lawful basis for his detention at this time, and unable to access a

meaningful bond hearing, the Court can only find that Petitioner is entitled to

immediate release.

Since the Court will grant the Petition because Petitioner is not properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2), it does not, and need not, address his other claims

and arguments. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (declining

to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after granting relief on

another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would

be cumulative”).4

Accordingly, it is hereby

order a bond hearing before an immigration judge. Response at 13. However,

Respondents have not contended that they are detaining Petitioner under

§ 1226. Consequently, the Court declines to address § 1226, finding only that

the Petitioner is not properly detained under § 1225.

4 For example, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s due process

arguments.

ORDERED:

1. Felipe Garcia Sanchez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1)

is GRANTED as to Count One; the Petition is otherwise denied

without prejudice as moot. Respondents shall release Petitioner

within 48 hours of the entry of this Order. Respondents shall

facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility by

notifying his counsel when and where he can be collected.

2. Respondent Warden, Florida Baker Correctional Institute’s Motion

to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 10) is DENIED

as moot.

3. No later than May 12, 2026, Respondents shall FILE a notice with

the Court confirming that Felipe Garcia Sanchez has been released

from custody.

4. The Clerk shall enter judgment granting the Petition as to Count

One and close the file.

5. The Court retains jurisdiction to effectuate this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 6th day of May,

2026.

LEE Timithey 9. Corvigon

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

STACI Senior United States District Judge

hms. Copies: Counsel of record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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