Firsov

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 SERGEY FIRSOV, Case No. 25-cv-05487-NW

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

9 v. DISMISS

10 ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., Re: ECF No. 53

Defendant.

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13 On December 29, 2025, Defendant Alaska Airlines, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss self-

14 represented Plaintiff Sergey Firsov’s complaint. ECF No. 53.1 Having considered the parties’

15 briefs and the relevant legal authority, the Court concludes oral argument is not required, see N.D.

16 Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the hearing set for March 18, 2026, and GRANTS the motion

17 without leave to amend.

18 I. BACKGROUND

19 On June 30, 2025, Firsov sued Alaska Airlines seeking relief primarily under the Montreal

20 Convention. ECF No. 1 at 5. In addition, Firsov brought state law claims for breach of contract,

21 false advertising, unfair and deceptive business practices under the California Business and

22 Professions Code (“UCL”), unjust enrichment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and

23 breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 6-11. Firsov’s grievances stem from

24 allegations that the company violated his rights by refusing to let him board an Alaska Airlines

25 flight without a ticket for his dog, causing Firsov to purchase an additional pet ticket that was

26 never refunded, and failing to finish food and drink service on the flight such that Firsov and his

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1 dog never received sustenance. See generally id. The Alaska Airlines flight from Los Angeles,

2 California to San Jose, California, was the last leg of a multi-stop international plane trip Firsov

3 took in March 2025.

4 Alaska Airlines timely filed a motion to dismiss Firsov’s complaint for lack of subject

5 matter jurisdiction on December 29, 2025. ECF No. 53. Firsov opposed and Alaska filed a reply

6 in further support of the motion. ECF Nos. 59, 60.

7 II. LEGAL STANDARD

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge a federal court’s

9 jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. As the party invoking the jurisdiction of the

10 federal court, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject

11 matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

12 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). If a federal court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it

13 must dismiss the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Brooks v. Geico Ins., No. 23-CV-05085-RFL,

14 2023 WL 8852738, *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2023).

15 A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint in its totality, it appears to lack

16 federal jurisdiction either “facially” or “factually.” Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. &

17 Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035,

18 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When a complaint is challenged for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on its

19 face, all material allegations in the complaint will be taken as true and construed in the light most

20 favorable to the plaintiff. Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, a district

21 court resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Leite v. Crane

22 Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pride, 719 F.3d at 1133).

23 III. DISCUSSION

24 There are two common ways to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under statute:

25 (1) diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and (2) federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

26 § 1331. In this case, Firsov’s complaint indicates that subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied by a

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1 federal question.2 ECF 1 at 2. “Federal district courts have original federal question jurisdiction

2 of actions ‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’” Sullivan v. First

3 Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Generally, under

4 the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” a claim “arises under” federal law only if a federal question

5 appears on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint. See ARCO Environmental Remediation, L.L.C. v.

6 Dep’t of Health & Env’t Quality of Montana, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

7 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.7 (1987) (“[t]he party who brings a suit . . .

8 decide[s] what law he will rely upon”); Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers

9 Vacation Tr. for S. California, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983) (“federal courts [have] jurisdiction to

10 hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded

11 complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right

12 to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law”).

13 The specific “federal question” that Firsov asserts is under the Montreal Convention,

14 Article 1, Paragraph 3. ECF 1. The “Montreal Convention” is an international treaty also known

15 as the Convention for Int’l Carriage by Air, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45 (May 28, 1999). Alaska

16 argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Montreal Convention does not

17 encompass Firsov’s one-way domestic flight on Alaska, and the complaint lacks allegations

18 demonstrating Alaska “regarded itself as involved in part of a single operation with the other

19 carriers involved in [Firsov’s] travel between Poland and the United States.” ECF No. 53 at 13.

20 In opposition, Firsov argues that “articles 1.3 and 36 of Montreal convention domestic connection

21 with international trip considered single international trip even purchased on separate tickets.”

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2 Firsov’s complaint does not allege facts to support diversity jurisdiction, which requires Plaintiff

and Defendant to be citizens of two different states, and an amount in controversy over $75,000.

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28 U.S.C. § 1332. While the diversity of citizenship requirement may be met here, see ECF No. 1

at 1, Firsov does not allege damages over $75,000, even when liberally considering the damages

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he specifically alleged in his complaint (i.e., $2500 for the violation, $100 pet fee, $128.30

ticketing fee, $2,079 as the value of the miles Plaintiff used for his own ticket, $22.83 as “10%

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interest for using Plaintiff’s money”) as well as the other damages he alludes to in the complaint

(i.e., the value of Plaintiff’s own food and drinks that he brought on board that should have been

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provided by the airline). The Court notes that in passing Plaintiff states that Defendant should pay

1 ECF No. 59 at 2 (errors in original).

2 The Montreal Convention applies to “all international carriage of persons, baggage, or

3 cargo performed by aircraft for reward.” Montreal Convention, Art. 1(1). Article 1(3) of the

4 Montreal Convention provides:

5 Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers is deemed, for

the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage if it has

6 been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been

agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of

7 contracts, and it does not lose its international character merely

because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed

8 entirely within the territory of the same State.

9 Article 36 provides in part that where carriage is performed by “successive carriers,” liability is

10 limited to the carrier that “performed the carriage during which the accident or the delay occurred,

11 save in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole

12 journey.” Id., Art. 36.

13 Whether a domestic flight is part of international carriage depends on the intent of the

14 parties to enter into an agreement for international carriage. Kruger v. United Air Lines, No. C 06-

15 04907 MHP, 2007 WL 3232443, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 1, 2007); see also Coyle v. P.T. Garuda

16 Indonesia, 363 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). Determining intent rests on “objective indications

17 of the parties’ intent.” Kruger, 2007 WL 3232443, at *4; Coyle, 363 F.3d at 989. The analysis

18 begins by analyzing “the objective manifestations of the parties’ intent expressed by the tickets.”

19 Coyle, 363 F.3d at 987; Kruger, 2007 WL 3232443, at *4 (stating that a court’s inquiry begins

20 with the “document of carriage or its equivalents”).

21 Drawing all inferences in Firsov’s favor, as the Court must, the complaint does not allege

22 facts to support a reasonable inference that Alaska regarded itself as part of a single operation with

23 any other air carrier. Instead, the complaint shows the opposite, that Firsov attempted “to

24 purchase a complex round-trip ticket [from] SFO-WAW-YYZ-LAX-SFO on united.com” but

25 ended up “purchas[ing] 4 separate tickets” after payment on united.com failed. ECF No. 1 at 3.

26 These four separate tickets appear to be for travel on four separate air carriers and were purchased

27 on four different days. The first of these tickets involved travel from San Francisco to Warsaw on

1 The air carrier for Firsov’s second ticket, purchased on February 9, 2025, for travel from Warsaw

2 to Toronto is unknown, id. 6-9, but the carrier was not Alaska because Alaska does not fly to or

3 from Warsaw, Poland, Beyer Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 53-1. Firsov’s third ticket involved travel on Air

4 Canada from Toronto to Los Angeles, California and was purchased through United on February

5 10, 2025. ECF No. 1-2 at 10-13. Finally, Firsov’s fourth ticket, purchased on February 12, 2025,

6 for travel from Los Angeles to San Jose, California was issued by Alaska for a flight operated by

7 SkyWest Airlines. ECF No. 1-2 at 16-17.

8 The Alaska/SkyWest ticket does not reference any of these other flights. Id. Firsov’s

9 allegation that his “complex round-trip” travel from San Franscico to Warsaw, then Warsaw to

10 Toronto, Toronto to Los Angeles, Los Angeles to San Jose, California on four different air carriers

11 was part of “a single international trip” strains credulity. ECF No. 1 at 2, 4. Instead, “the

12 objective manifestations of the parties’ intent expressed by the tickets,” Coyle, 363 F.3d at 987,

13 demonstrates that the trip was not “regarded by the parties as a single operation,” Montreal

14 Convention, Art. 1(3). Therefore, the complaint fails to plausibly allege a claim under the

15 Montreal Convention.

16 Because Firsov’s claim for violation of the Montreal Convention is the sole basis he

17 advances for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the complaint fails to plausibly allege a basis for

18 the Court to exercise jurisdiction in this action. Absent a viable federal claim, a district court

19 “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has

20 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28. U.S.C. § 1367(c). “Ordinarily,

21 ‘when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law

22 claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.’” Carrillo v. Monterey

23 Mech. Co., No. 24-CV-09202-LJC, 2025 WL 2615064 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2025) (quoting

24 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (superseded on other grounds by Royal

25 Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 41 (2025)).

26 The Court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

27 Firsov’s remaining state law claims, given the early stages of this case.

1 IV. CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, Alaska’s motion to dismiss Firsov’s complaint is GRANTED.

3 Firsov’s federal claim for relief under the Montreal Convention is DISMISSED without leave to

4 || amend and the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Firsov’s state law

5 claims. The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

6 IT IS SO ORDERED.

7 Dated: March 5, 2026

Noél Wise

9 United States District Judge

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