Opinion

Guzman

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
May 5, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

LORENZO GUZMAN,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01238-SPC-DNF

MARKWAYNE MULLIN et al.,

Respondents,

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Lorenzo Guzman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 2), the government’s response (Doc. 8), and Guzman’s reply (Doc.

9).

Guzman is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States

without inspection on July 1, 1999. He has resided in the United States since

then, and he has a U.S. citizen wife and two young U.S. citizen children.

Guzman’s wife filed an I-130 petition on his behalf, and it remains pending.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) apprehended Guzman on

February 10, 2026, when he reported to a state probation office for a check-in

relating to an arrest for driving under the influence. ICE issued a notice to

appear that same day, commencing a removal proceeding and charging

Guzman as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted

or paroled.” (Doc. 2-8 at 1). He is currently detained at Glades County

Detention Center.

On March 18, 2026, an immigration judge conducted a custody

redetermination hearing. The judge denied release on bond for two reasons.

First, he found Guzman did not meet “his burden of establishing that he is

NOT a public safety risk based on his criminal history.” (Doc. 2-3 at 1). Second,

the judge found he lacked jurisdiction to review the Department of Homeland

Security’s initial bond determination because Guzman is subject to mandatory

detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

Guzman claims the respondents violated the Immigration and

Nationality Act and the Fifth Amendment by detaining him under§ 1225(b)(2)

rather than § 1226(a). The distinction matters because § 1225(b)(2) mandates

detention, while aliens detained under § 1226(a) have the right to a bond

hearing before an immigration judge. Guzman asks the Court to order the

respondents to either release him or provide a prompt individualized bond

hearing. In response, the government argues Guzman is detained under §

1226(a) and received the bond hearing to which he is entitled.

The scope of § 1225(b)(2) has become well-trodden ground. Last year,

the government began applying it to all noncitizens present in the country after

entering without inspection and admission. While the four circuits to address

the issue are split, the vast majority of district courts to consider it have

rejected the government’s position. See Cunha v. Freden, --- F.4th ---, ---, 2026

WL 1146044, at *4 (2nd Cir. 2026). This Court agrees with the majority—over

the last seven months or so, the Court has ordered the government to give

hundreds of noncitizens unlawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2) an opportunity

to seek release on bond.

This case is unusual because of the immigration judge’s opinion, which

both denied the bond request on the merits and found a lack of jurisdiction to

consider it. One contradiction is obvious. A court must have the power to

decide the claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction)…before it can resolve a

case.” Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 95 (2017). Another

contradiction is more subtle. The immigration judge’s order concludes,

“Because the law requires the detention of all applicants for admission, this

Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Respondent’s bond

determination made by DHS.” (Doc. 2-3 at 3). Under the government’s current

view, applicants for admission detained under § 1225(b)(2) are subject to

mandatory detention and cannot be release on bond. So if DHS made a bond

determination in Guzman’s case, that would indicate it was detaining him

under the authority granted by § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2).1

1 The record before the Court does not indicate whether DHS made an initial bond determination here.

But the fact remains, the immigration judge weighed the evidence and

found that Guzman should not be released on bond. This Court does not have

authority to review an immigration judge’s discretionary bond decision. See §

1226(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the

application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside

any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding

the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond.”). Guzman was

afforded a bond hearing and had the opportunity to present evidence and

argument to an immigration judge. While Guzman has legitimate concerns

about the order denying his bond request, the Board of Immigration Appeals

is the proper venue to raise those concerns, not this Court.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

Lorenzo Guzman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is

DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 5, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies: All Parties or Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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