Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

EDWAR RAUL MARTINEZ DIAZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-630-TJC-SJH

TODD LYONS, Acting Director of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER

On March 23, 2026, Petitioner Edwar Raul Martinez Diaz, an

immigration detainee at Baker Correctional Institute, initiated this action

through counsel by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1; Petition).

The Federal Respondents filed a Response. (Doc. 5; Response). Respondent

Warden, Baker Correctional Institute filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition.

(Doc. 6). The case is now ripe for review.

I. Background

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without

inspection in 2022. Petition at 5. Since his entry, “he has lived in Jacksonville,

Florida, as a law-abiding member of his community, he has earned a living as

a construction worker, and he has no criminal record.” Id. at 6. On March 17,

2026, Petitioner was stopped in a vehicle by a law enforcement officer, who then

transferred him to the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

Id. Petitioner notes that during his encounter with law enforcement, he had not

“engaged in any traffic infraction or any criminal conduct.” Id. ICE issued

Petitioner a Notice to Appear before an immigration judge on April 15, 2026,

but it is unclear from the record whether this hearing occurred. Response,

Exhibit 1. Petitioner’s next “master calendar hearing” is scheduled for May 8,

2026. Response at 2.

II. Analysis

The Petition contains three counts, alleging: (1) Respondents have

violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and

implementing regulations; (2) Respondents have violated Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable seizures; and (3) Respondents have

violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Accardi doctrine by failing

to follow their own custody and parole regulations. Petition at 8–11. As relief,

Petitioner requests, inter alia, immediate release or an order directing

Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Id. at 11.

As Respondents acknowledge, the Court has recently addressed nearly

identical issues in Orozco Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:26-cv-

646-TJC-LLL, 2026 WL 947955 (M.D. Fla. April 8, 2026). The Court

incorporates the reasoning in Orozco Torres into this Order. A difference

between the two cases is that Orozco Torres had a bond hearing at which the

immigration judge determined he had no jurisdiction to consider bond, whereas

Petitioner likely has not. But his efforts to secure a meaningful hearing would

likewise be futile, given Respondents’ position that he is being held under §

1225(b)(2) and that he is therefore “subject to mandatory detention.” Response

at 16.

Accordingly, the Court rejects the Federal Respondents’ arguments that

two statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and (b)(9), deprive this Court of

jurisdiction to adjudicate Petitioner’s claims and that he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing this case. Regarding the merits of his

claim, the Court finds, in line with Orozco Torres, that Petitioner is not properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2). Thus, his Petition is due to be granted. See 2026

WL 947955, at *6.1

1 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently came to a similar

conclusion. See Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141-pr, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir.

April 28, 2026) (“Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens, such as

Petitioner, who are present in the United States after entering the country

without inspection and admission, and who were not apprehended at or near

the border at the time of entry. This result is dictated by the plain text of these

provisions, and further confirmed by the statute’s context, structure, history,

and purpose. It likewise comports with the Supreme Court’s established

understanding of Sections 1225 and 1226. It reflects Executive Branch practice

over thirty years and across five Presidential administrations. Moreover, it

explains why Congress has never challenged that settled practice despite

making numerous amendments to the immigration laws. Finally, even if the

III. Remedy

The Court considered requiring an individualized bond hearing before an

immigration judge on Petitioner’s detention. Respondents argue Petitioner is

subject to “mandatory” detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Response at

16. Respondents argue alternatively that if the Court finds that Petitioner is

subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, “the appropriate remedy” is to order

a bond hearing before an immigration judge. Id. at 20. However, the Board of

Immigration Appeals decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216

(BIA 2025), which is binding on all immigration judges, held that such judges

lack authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to consider bond requests for

individuals who entered the United States without admission. Thus, if the

Court were to require a hearing, the immigration judge would be bound to find,

under Hurtado, that he or she lacks jurisdiction to provide Petitioner with a

meaningful hearing.2

For these reasons, the Court finds ordering an individualized hearing

government’s newfound interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) were

plausible—and it is not—we would nonetheless reject it based on our obligation

to construe these statutes in a manner that would avoid the serious

constitutional questions attendant to what would be the broadest mass-

detention-without-bond mandate in our Nation’s history for millions of

noncitizens.”)

2 Indeed, in previous similar cases before the undersigned, the

immigration judges have found they do not have “jurisdiction” to grant an

individualized bond hearing.

would not afford relief and would be futile. See, e.g., Rivero v. Mina, No. 6:26-

cv-66-RBD-NWH, --- F. Supp. 3d --- , 2026 WL 199319, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26,

2026) (explaining that when the government “asserted no lawful basis” for

petitioner’s detention, allowing his continued detention while waiting for a

hearing “would gut the purpose of habeas review”) (citations omitted). Without

any lawful basis for his detention at this time, and unable to access a

meaningful bond hearing, the Court can only find that Petitioner is entitled to

immediate release.

Since the Court will grant the Petition because Petitioner is not properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2), it does not, and need not, address his other claims

and arguments. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (declining

to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after granting relief on

another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would

be cumulative”).3

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Edwar Raul Martinez Diaz’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Count One; the Petition is otherwise

denied without prejudice as moot. Respondents shall release

3 For example, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act arguments.

Petitioner within 48 hours of the entry of this Order.

Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the

detention facility by notifying his counsel when and where he can

be collected.

2. Respondent Warden, Baker County Correctional Institute’s Motion

to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 6) is DENIED

as moot.

3. No later than May 8, 2026, Respondents shall FILE a notice with

the Court confirming that Edwar Raul Martinez Diaz has been

released from custody.

4. The Clerk shall enter judgment granting the Petition as to Count

One and close the file.

5. The Court retains jurisdiction to effectuate this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 4th day of May,

2026.

(Le Linwthey 9. Corrigam

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

STACI Senior United States District Judge

hms

Copies:

Counsel of record